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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
Louis Napoleon'S assumption of personal power by abrogating the constitution of the Second French Republic is recognized as one of the momentous events of the nineteenth century. His coup d'état of 2 December 1851 and his decision to take the title of emperor the next year were dramatic steps in the rise of the new Bonaparte from exile to arbiter of Europe. Understandably, these acts have attracted the attention of numerous historians. Much less consideration has been given to certain consequences—that is, to the reaction of the great powers to Louis Napoleon—s climb to power and in particular to the search for the means to block any imperialist aspirations he might harbour.
1 Palm, Franklin C., England and Napoleon III, a study in the rise of a Utopian dictator (Durham, N. C., 1948), p. 79.Google Scholar See also, Cowley to Palmerston, 9 December 1851, Public Record Office, Foreign Office (hereafter cited as F.O.) 519/156. There was, however, general disappointment that the Orleanists had such slight chance of success in France.
2 Heller, Eduard, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, mitteleuropas Vorkämpfer (Vienna, 1933), p. 156;Google Scholar Schwarzenberg to the Russian and Prussian courts, 29 December 1851, copy, Royal Archives, Windsor, 1, 27/26. The use of the Royal Archives at Windsor was by the gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen. These documents are hereafter cited as R.A., W. See also Schwarzenberg, Adolph, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, prime minister of Austria, 1848–1852 (New York, 1946), pp. 191, 197.Google Scholar
3 Niebuhr to Bunsen, 6 January 1852, copy, R.A., W. 1, 27/32; memorandum by the King of Prussia, January, 1852 (?), ibid. 1, 27/24.
4 A. W. Ward and Gooch, G.P., The Cambridge history of British foreign policy (3 vols. New York, 1921–1923), II, 333-5;Google ScholarSouthgate, Donald, ‘ The most English minister …’; the policies and politics of Palmerston (New York, 1966), pp. 286–92;Google ScholarBell, Herbert C.F., Lord Palmerston (2 vols. New York, 1936), II, 43–56.Google Scholar
7 Van de Weyer to Leopold I, 13 January 1852, Archives Géneráles du Royaume, Brussels (hereafter referred to as A.G.R., B.), Papiers Van de Weyer, no. 118. M. Duchâtel (Charles, a minister during the July Monarchy?) did not expect war, for a French army of 500,000 would face an all-European force of 1,800,000.
6 Queen Victoria's journals, 14 February 1852, R.A., W.
7 Granville to Albert, 8 January 1852, R.A., W. I, 27/29.
8 Turgot to Salignac-Fenelon, 24 January 1852, Imlah, Ann G., Britain and Switzerland 1845–60, a study of Anglo-Swiss relations during some critical years for Swiss neutrality (Hamden, Conn., 1966), p. 69.Google Scholar
9 Edwardes to Granville, 4 January 1852, copy, R.A., W. 1, 27/43.
10 Imlah, op. cit. pp. 71–3; Victoria to Derby, 12 March 1852, R.A., W. I, 27/76; Queen Victoria's journals 21 March 1852, ibid.
11 Turgot to Quinette, 26 January 1852, Archives, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, copied and maintained in the Service des Archives, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Brussels (hereafter cited as M.A.E., P. in M.A.E., B.), Cl. B, 50, 25; Bassano to Turgot, 7 February, and 22 February, ibid.; same to same, 19 February, M.A.E., P., Correspondence politique, Belgique, vol. 31, Cab., 250-I; same to same, 28 February, ibid. p. 269.
12 A special six-volume dossier, Délits de presse, 1851–78, is found in M.A.E., B.
13 The Paris embassy during the Second Empire. Selections from the papers of Henry Richard Charles Wellesley, 1st Earl Cowley, ambassador at Paris, 1852–1867, ed. Wellesley, F.A.,(London, 1928), p. 3.Google Scholar
14 The Observer (London), 8 February 1852; The Morning Chronicle (London), 12 12 1852.Google Scholar
15 5 March 1852, The letters of Queen Victoria. A selection from Her Majesty's correspondence, between the years 1837 and 1861, 1st Series (3 vols. London, 1908), II, 377–8.Google Scholar
16 Bassano to Turgot, 20 February 1852, M.A.E., P. in M.A.E., B., Cl. B., so, 25.
17 1 January 1852, F.O., G.D., 22/10.
18 Undated and unsigned British memorandum but which refers to the coup as ‘recent’, found in M.A.E., B., C.P., Légation, Grande Bretagne, 28.
19 Memo by John Fox Burgoyne, II December 1851, Russell Papers, P.R.O., 30/22/9 J-I. As for concern over the part of the British public,‘ There is hardly an issue of the journals of London that does not consecrate some lines to the situation in which Belgium finds itself vis-d-vis France since December 2’ (Drouet to Hoffschmidt, 27 February 1852, M.A.E., B., C.P., Légation, Grande Bretagne, 28).
20 Schwarzenberg to the Russian and Prussian courts, 29 December 1851, Adolph Schwarzenberg, op. cit. pp. 199–200. A copy of the entire document is found in R.A., W. I, 27/26.
21 Queen Victoria's journals, 5 January 1852, R.A., W. The British as well as the Austrians wanted definite assurance that Louis Napoleon would not follow a policy of aggression, with Russell suggesting written assurance ‘particularly with regard to Belgium and Sardinia’.
22 Adolph Schwarzenberg, (op. cit. p. 19s), says it was made by the president in January 1852 and that the Austrian minister rejected any action which excluded Prussia.
23 Cowley to Granville, 4 January 1852, copy, private, R.A., W. 1, 27/61; Niebuhr to Bunsen 6 January 1852, copy, ibid. 32.
24 Edwardes to Granville, 4 January (?) 1852, copy, private, ibid. 43.
25 Malmesbury to Cowley, 2 March 1852, private, F.O., 519/196. Also Westmorland to Granville, 20 February 1852, copy, R.A., W. I, 27/71 is the eighth report that repeats the idea that Schwarzenberg was the' warm partisan’ of Louis Napoleon. The common danger—émigrés in neighbouring states—is mentioned frequently. See also Malmesbury to Cowley, 4 March 1852, private, Cowley Papers, F.O., 519/196.
26 Schwarzenberg to the Russian and Prussian courts, 29 December 1851, copy, R.A., W I, 27/26.
27 Adolph Schwarzenberg (op. cit. pp. 199–201) quotes and paraphrases much of the above Schwarzenberg démarche of December 29 but does not disclose the fact that he proposed, to use his own words, an ‘alliance with Louis Napoleon’. Cp. also Hallberg, Charles W., Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852–1864, a study of Austro-French relations (New York, 1955), pp. 28–31.Google Scholar Schwarzenberg was known to have the bitterest personal hostility to the Foreign Secretary. When asked privately by Howard de Walden if he could account for this, Palmerston thought that the antagonism might have been traced back to his comment in 1838 that the prince was not the best prospect for Austrian minister to London because he had been involved too recently in divorce proceedings in England, with the lady concerned being related to likely members of any new Whig or Tory government (Howard de Walden to Palmerston, 14 November 1851 most private, Palmerston Papers, Historical Manuscripts Commission, London, used by permission of the Trustees of the Broadlands Archives, GC/HO/740; note by Palmerston, 8 January (?) 1852, copy, ibid.). On the affair with Lady Ellenborough see Schwarzenberg, pp. 12–13, and passim; for a review of other reasons why the prince considered Palmerston his bête noire see pp. 175–91.
29 The antipathy is shown in Niebuhr to Bunsen with the express sanction of the Prussian king, 6 January 1852, copy, R.A., W. 1, 27/32; memorandum by the King in Prussia, January 1852 (?), copy, ibid. 24; Cowley to Granville, 15 February 1852, copy, private, giving opinion of Nicholas I, ibid. 61; Schwarzenberg to Buol, 5 March 1852, copy, ibid. 74. See also Bell, op. cit. II, 44–6, 52; Southgate, op. cit. pp. 282–6.
29 Clarendon to Russell, 22 January 1852, private, P.R.O., 30/22 10 A.
30 Cowley to Granville, 15 February 1852, private, copy, R.A., W. I, 27/61. No doubt Queen Victoria took this report as the basis for her comment to that effect in a letter to Leopold on 9 March 1852 (Schwarzenberg, op. cit. pp. 190–1).
31 Edwardes to Palmerston, 29 November 1852, private, Palmerston Papers, France, 1852–63.
32 Niebuhr to Bunsen, 31 December 1851, private, copy, R.A., W. 1, 27/27; memorandum by the King in Prussia, January 1852 (?), ibid. 24. An objective in this Prussian approach to England was to gain support for the restitution of Neuchatel to Prussia, and it contained a veiled threat that, failing to gain support, a deal might have to be made with Louis Napoleon, although Frederick William would prefer a Protestant friend.
33 Granville to Jernighan, 20 January 1852, Palm, op. cit. p. 88.
34 Memorandum by Granville, 5 February 1852, ibid. 88–9.
35 AdolphSchwarzenberg(op.cit. p. 171) calls him ‘ Austria’s last statesman of commanding stature', who if he had lived his natural span of years would have ‘engaged Bismarck in a “titanic struggle for supremacy” in the German states’, and cites laudatory opinions of several other authorities. Hallberg (op. cit. p. 31) finds him; ‘undoubtedly the greatest statesman of his day’.
36 Niebuhr to Bunsen, copy, 6 January 1852, R.A., W. 1, 27/32
37 Nesselrode to Brunnow, 15 January 1852, F.O., 65/416.
38 Seymour to Granville, 3 February 1852, ibid. 407.
39 Granville to Seymour, 18 February 1852, ibid. 404; Russell to Granville (?) 9 February 1852, private, P.R.O., 30/22/10 B.
40 Nesselrode to Brunnow, 4/16 March 1852, F.O., 65/416.
41 Malmesbury to Seymour, 29 March 1852, ibid. 404.
42 Seymour to Malmesbury, 31 March 1852, ibid. 408; Malmesbury to Cowley, 11 April 1852, Earl of Malmesbury, Memoirs of an ex-minister, an autobiography (2 vols. London, 1884), II, 41.Google Scholar The latter work gives no indication of the joint action being planned.
43 Leopold to Schwarzenberg, 27 May 1849, 7 and 12 February 1852, Lettres do Léopold Ier, premier rot des Beiges, ed. Bronne, Carlo (Brussels, 1943), pp. 234,Google Scholar 237–40. The Prince de Ligne, one-time Belgian minister to Paris, visited Berlin and Vienna in late January or early February reportedly on a mission for his monarch; unfortunately, this could not be verified in the Belgian royal archives.
44 Hansard'sparliamentary debates, 3rd ser., CXIX, Lords, 27 February 1852, cols. 892–7. His reference to keeping the letter and spirit of treaty obligations and respect for the ‘independence of all nations, whether great or small’, was surely no special warning to Louis Napoleon. Furthermore, the plan to thwart French expansion was far from complete on 27 February.
45 Schwarzenberg to Buol, 5 March 1852, copy, R.A., W. I, 27/74.
46 Schwarzenberg to Buol, 9 March 1852, copy, ibid. 75.
49 Malmesbury to Cowley, 11 April 1852, private, F.O., 519/196. Hallberg devotes the most attention—two sentences—to the four-power plan which the author has been able to find: ‘The three [Eastern] powers, however, were none the less anxious to establish a common front with England in order to resist the pretensions of Louis Napoleon. Thus, in May 1852, notes were exchanged between London and St Petersburg and between London and Vienna concerning a possible French invasion of Belgium and it was agreed that if such an invasion took place, England would employ her fleet while the three continental powers would give military aid' (Buol to Mensdorff, 26 May 1852, op. cit. p. 34). Palm (op. cit. p. 82) states that the tsar proposed a quadruple alliance against French expansion but that the British opposed an alliance to defend all French neighbours and saw no need for new treaties to protect Belgium. Taylor, A.J.P. in The struggle for mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1954), p47.Google Scholar says the Russians ‘pushed in officiously, assuring Malmesbury in April 1852 that they would send 60,000 men to defend Belgian independence. Malmesbury, timid and inexperienced, welcomed the offer; and the Russians supposed they had consolidated the union of the four Great Powers’.
50 Nesselrode to Brunnow, 5/17 April 1852, copy, F.O., 65/416; Bloomfield to Malmesbury, 4 March 1852, ibid. 64/341.
51 Westmorland to Malmesbury, 18 May 1852, ibid. 7/402.
52 Bloomfield to Malmesbury, 18 May 1852, ibid. 64/342. The Prussians gave the British information on the size and distribution of the Prussian forces, six large sheets on the army and three on the naval forces as of 1 January 1852. It came from ‘a confidential and authentic source’ and was given in the strictest confidence for the British government alone (Bloomfield to Malmesbury, 10 and 17 March 1852, and enclosures, ibid. 341). Palmerston had sought the information some months previously.
53 Van de Weyer's reports to Hoffschmidt are in M.A.E., B., C.P., Légation, Grande Bretagne, 28.
54 Van de Weyer to Hoffschmidt, 1 April 1852, ibid.
55 Nothomb to Hoffschmidt, 19 April 1852, M.A.E., B., C.P., Légation, Prusse, 13, no. 180.
56 Westmorland to Malmesbury, 18 May 1852, F.O., 7/402, no. 95; Bloomfield to Malmesbury, 28 May 1852, ibid. 64/342, no. 121.
57 Malmesbury, op. cit. I, 356 and 11, 69–70. After only four months the United Kingdom had found it advisable to remind Vienna of the agreement (Malmesbury to Howard, 24 August 1852, F.O., 7/398). But in September Nicholas insisted that, while he did not believe Belgium was threatened as much as others said it was, he still would not allow any French expansion (Seymour to Malmesbury, 24 September 1852, F.O., 65/410). As late as June 1853 the tsar assured the Belgians that an Eastern entente existed and that it would fight in defence of Belgian neutrality; he still pledged 60,000 Russian troops at once and others if needed (Brouckère to Leopold, 8 June 1853, M.A.E., B., Indépendance, neutralité, et défence militaire, 1831–74).
58 Bloomfield to Malmesbury, 21 May 1852, F.O., 64/342; same to Westmorland, 22 June 1852, ibid. 7/398.
59 Bloomfield to Malmesbury, 18 May 1852, ibid. 342. Regard for the susceptibility of the Bonaparte would be shown countless times in the remaining years of his regime. No warning has been found in the official correspondence between Britain and France. Nor has research in the voluminous official and private correspondence between the British ministers and the ambassador in Paris disclosed any references to the extensive negotiations leading to the concord. The prince-president is said to have picked up a report late in March that the Russian envoy to Paris proposed to Cowley the conclusion of a four-power pact to preserve Belgian neutrality (Palm, op. cit. p. 93), but no source is given.
60 Bloomfield to Malmesbury, 28 May 1852, F.O., 64/342, nos. 125, 126.
61 Varenne to Turgot, 3 April 1852, M.A.E., P., C.P., Prusse vol. 311, pp. 65–6.
62 Southgate, op. cit. p. 499; Bell op. cit. n, 196; Ward and Gooch, op. cit. 11, 338.