¹ It is, perhaps, worth noting that most recent writing on British foreign policy in the years after 1763 has been concerned, either directly or indirectly, with Anglo-Russian relations. The work of Professor M. S. Anderson, Dr I. de Madariaga, Professor Michael Roberts and, to a lesser extent, the late Dr Frank Spencer, has in large measure dealt with Britain's pursuit of the holy grail of alliance with Russia.

² A brief discussion of these negotiations can be found in Gerhard, D.England und der Aufstieg Russlands (Munich-Berlin, 1933), pp. 17–30.Google Scholar An interesting contemporary account is the anonymous (though officially inspired) State of the Negotiation for a Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Russia, from 1763 to 1771’, in Public Record Office, State Papers (hereafter cited as P.R.O., S.P.) 103/63, fos. 37–62. These negotiations can be followed in P.R.O., S.P. 91/71 ff. Substantial extracts from the dispatches of Britain's representatives in St Petersburg in the years 1763–7 are printed in Sbornik (imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva (148 vols., St Petersburg, 1867–1916)), XII.and I have in such cases referred to the printed version where possible, though I have checked this against the original in the Public Record Office. All dates are in New Style, except where otherwise indicated.

³ Cf Suffolk's characteristically self-righteous valediction on the breakdown of the alliance negotiations (Suffolk to Gunning, Robert (British representative in St Petersburg), 7 05, 1773, Sbornik, XIX, 354–5).Google Scholar

⁴ A brilliant account of Harris mission to St Petersburg (1778–83) is provided by Madariaga, I. de, Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (London, 1962).Google Scholar

⁵ Cf. Roberts, MichaelSplendid Isolation 1763–1780 (‘The Stenton Lecture, 1969’; University of Reading, 1970), esp. pp. 25–26.Google Scholar

⁶ Anderson, M. S., ‘Great Britain and the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–74’, English Historical Review, LXIX (1954), 39–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, ‘Great Britain and the Russian Fleet 1769–1770’, Slavonic and East European Review, XXXI (1952), 148–63.

⁷ Roberts, Michael Splendid Isolation 1763–1780, passim; idem, Macartney in Russia (English Historical Review, Supplement 7 (London, 1974))Google Scholar; idem, ‘Great Britain, Denmark and Russia, 1763–1770’in Studies in Diplomatic History, eds. Hattonand, RagnhildAnderson, M. S. (London, 1970), pp. 23667Google Scholaridem, ‘Great Britain and the Swedish Revolution, 1772/3’, Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), pp. 286–347.Google Scholar

⁸ Cf. Splendid Isolation 1763–1780, where Professor Roberts writes (p. 26) that ‘the chance… was missed deliberately, in the full knowledge that if we failed to win the Russian alliance, we should probably have no allies at all’.

⁹ A point emphatically underlined by Spencer, Dr Spencer: Frank (ed.), The Fourth Earlof Sandwich: Diplomatic Correspondence 1763–1765 (Manchester, 1961), p. 41 and passim.Google Scholar

¹⁰ A helpful introduction to the situation in Sweden is provided by Hatton, R. M. ‘Scandinavia and the Baltic’, in New Cambridge Modern History, VII. The Old Regime 1713–1763Google Scholar, ed. Mrs Lindsay, J. O. (Cambridge, 1957), esp. pp. 357–64.Google Scholar

¹¹ For which, cf. Roberts, ‘Great Britain, Denmark and Russia, 1763–70’; see also Otto Brandt, Caspar von Saldern und die nordeuropaische Politik im Zeilalter Katharinas II (Erlangen-Kiel, 1932), pp. 146 ff.Google Scholar

¹² As Panin was honest enough to admit: Bérenger (French chargé d'affaires in St Petersburg) to Praslin, 22 Nov. 1763, Sbornik, CXL, 276.Google Scholar

¹³ For which, cf. Rostworowski, E., in History of Poland, ed. Kieniewicz, S. (Warsaw, 1968), PP- 315–16.Google Scholar

¹⁴ A point emphasized by Schmidt, K. Rahbek ‘Problems connected with the last Polish Royal Election’, Scando-Slavica II (1956), 134–42.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For what follows, cf. Sbornik, XLVIII, 216, 242–3, and 299–300.1 am grateful to Professor R. E. F. Smith, who kindly translated the relevant Russian documents for me.

¹⁶ See, for instance, the remarkable account of the French ambassador Breteuil's formal audience of Catherine II to take his leave, when a routine diplomatic occasion degenerated into an acrimonious (and remarkably frank) discussion of the points at issue between the two states (Breteuil to Praslin, 12 05 1763, Sbornik, CXL, 187–91).Google Scholar

¹⁷ de Martens, F.Recueil des Traités el Conventions conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances Etrangeres (13 vols., St Petersburg, 1874–1902), vi, 1 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Schmidt, K. Rahbek, ‘Wie ist Panins Plan zu einem Nordischen System entstanden?’, Zeitschrift fur Slawistik, II (1957), 406–22, provides a useful introduction to the notion of a;. ‘Northern System’.Google Scholar

¹⁹ A helpful brief account of this complicated business can be found in Berkis, A. V.A History of the Duchy of Courland (1561–1795) (Towson, Maryland, 1969), pp. 237 ff.Google Scholar

²⁰ Cf. Martens, Recueil des Traites, vi, 40–2.Google Scholar

²¹ Cf. Halifax to Buckinghamshire, 24 06 1763, Sbornik, XII, 100–3.Google Scholar

²² See, for example, the ‘State of the Negotiation for a Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Russia, from 1763 to 1771’, with its expression of the hope that ‘the imposing authority of their Grand Alliance would induce the neutral powers of Europe to take part with them, against the united Houses of Bourbon and Austria’ (P.R.O., S.P. 103/63, fo. 41).

²³ See, for example. Sandwich to Stormont (British Ambassador in Vienna). 8 Jan. 1765, P.R.O., S.P. 80/202.Google Scholar

²⁴ Anderson, M. SBritain's discovery of Russia 1553–1815 (London, 1958), pp. 108–42 provides a valuable discussion of the development of British attitudes to Russia in the eighteenth century.Google Scholar

²⁵ Cf. Gerhard, England und der Aufstieg Russlands, p. 15, for the view that commercial relations were perhaps not strong enough to affect political relations.

²⁶ Her partiality for England was a constant (if predictable) theme of French diplomats: see, for example, Breteuil to Praslin, 9 Jan. 1763, Sbornik, CXL, 141, for the Tsaritsa‘s’ goût de I co prédilection pour l‘Angleterre’.Google Scholar

²⁷ Considerable embarrassment was caused in 1764 when Catherine offered to pay back these subsidies, but the British government refused to accept repayment (Sbornik, XII, 162–4).Google Scholar

²⁸ Hobart, John. second earl of Buckinghamshire, was Britain's ambassador in St Petersburg from 23 Sept. 1762 until mid-January 1765.Google Scholar

²⁹ Buckinghamshire's Instructions, dated 13 Aug. 1762, are printed in Sbornik, xu, 16–22.Google Scholar

³⁰ The Tsaritsa's expressed desire was to avoid any alliance until it was clear 'à quoi s'entenir définitivement sur la situation politique du système européen après la restauration dela paix générate' (Martens, Recueildes Traités, ix(x), 215–16); cf Solms, ( Prussian Minister in St Petersburg) to Frederick II, 9 01. 1763, Sbornik, V, 15–16.Google Scholar

³¹ Buckinghamshire to Grenville, 25 08. 1762, Sbornik, XII, 45–6. It was, perhaps, unfortunate (though indicative of Buckinghamshire's limited talent for diplomacy) that the British ambassador should choose Prince A. Galitzin from all Catherine's ministers for his first approach. Galitzin was the former Russian minister in London (1755–62) where he had shown himself to be no friend to England, and was clearly hostile to the idea of a British connexion, as Macartney later emphasized (to Sir Andrew Mitchell (British minister in Berlin) 22 July 1766, British Museum, Additional Manuscripts (hereafter cited as B.M., Add. MSS) 6826, fo. 76). The Russian court was, in general, much more favourably inclined to alliance with Britain than Galitzin gave Buckinghamshire to understand.Google Scholar

³² At which Buckinghamshire repeatedly expressed his (understandable) bewilderment: see e.g. his letter to Halifax, 17 June 1763, Sbornik, XII, 110.Google ScholarFrench diplomats were equally confused, e.g. Breteuil to Praslin, 28 10. 1762, Sbornik, CXL, 103–4.Google Scholar

³³ See Catherine II to Chancellor Voronzov, M. I. 1 Nov. 1762 (O.S.), Martens, Recueildes Traités, ix (x), 216, for her views on foreign policy at this time. Breteuil's dispatches for these months (Sbornik, CXL) provide considerable evidence for the view that a future Russo-British alliance was thought likely in St Petersburg.Google Scholar

³⁴ Buckinghamshire to Halifax, 28 Dec. 1762, Sbornik, XXI, 634Google Scholar; same to same, 20 Jan.' 1763, P.R.O., S.P. 91/71, fo.63; Halifax to Buckinghamshire, 11 Feb. 1763, Sbornik, XII, 65–6.Google Scholar

³⁵ Buckinghamshire to Halifax, 27 01. 1763, Sbornik, XII, 73.Google Scholar

³⁶ Buckinghamshire to Halifax, 28 Feb. 1763, Sbornik, XII, 845Google Scholar; Catherine, cf to Voronzov, M. I, 16 Feb. 1763 (O.S.)Google Scholar, Martens, Recueil des Traités, IX (X), 21718, for the Tsaritsa's intention that Poland would be the proving ground for British intentions irf respect of the alliance.Google Scholar

³⁷ Cf. Roberts, ‘Great Britain, Denmark and Russia, 1763–1770’, p. 250, for a similar, conclusion.Google Scholar

³⁸ Some indication of British attitudes to Poland at this time can be quarried from W. F. Reddaway, ‘Great Britain and Poland, 1762–72’, Cambridge Historical Journal, IV (1932–4), 223–62.

³⁹ British Diplomatic Instructions 1689–1789, VII: France, part IV, 1745–1789, ed. Legg, L. G. Wickham (London, 1934), pp. 91–2, fn. 2.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ As Halifax rightly pointed out (to Buckinghamshire, 20 May 1763, Sbornik, xn, 96).

⁴¹ The dispatches of the French chargé d'affaires, Bérenger, for these months (in Sbornik, CXL) contain one rumour after another, usually of a new conspiracy, disaffection in theGuards, imminence of Catherine's deposition and so on. This undifferentiated reporting, exaggerated as it was, accurately caught the tone of considerable uncertainty which prevailed during these months, an impression which is amply confirmed by the dispatches of Solms (in Sbornik, XXII).

⁴² This draft is in P.R.O., S.P. 91/72, fos. 79–87; the secret articles are printed in Sbornik, XII, 120–4.Google Scholar

⁴³ Article XV. The Prussian Minister, Solms, a usually well-informed source, contended that the changes made in the treaty of 1742 were the work of the Tsaritsa herself (to Frederick II, 9 Aug. 1763, Sbornik, XXII, 100).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Sbornik, XII, 120–3.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Sbornik, XII, 123–4.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ It seems mistaken to argue, as did Dr Spencer, that 'the draft treaty of alliance…was deliberately made unacceptable' (Spencer, Sandwich Correspondence, p. 46). A draf/treaty was no more than an opening bid, an expression of Russian hopes, rather than a realistic exposition of Russian terms. It was the inflexible rejection given to it by London that made it unacceptable; the Russian ministers were visibly surprised when Britain did not reply by demanding some similar concessions (Buckinghamshire to Sandwich, 18 Oct. 1763, P.R.O., S.P. 91/72, fo. 185). Panin's expectation that the Russian draft would be modified in the course of negotiation is evident from his remark to the British ambassador that' no treaty of consequence had ever been concluded without some sort of alteration' (Buckinghamshire to Halifax, 20 Sept. 1763, P.R.O., S.P. 91/72, fo. 138).

⁴⁷ The first Secret Article of the Russo-Prussian Treaty of April 1764 committed Prussia to come to the aid of Russia in the event of an Ottoman attack, though it also specified that this help could be in the form of a subsidy rather than troops (Martens, Recueil des Traites, VI, 18–19).

⁴⁸ See Buckinghamshire to Halifax, 22 Aug. 1763, Sbornik, XII, 119; same to same, 31 Aug. 1763, 9 and 20 Sept. 1763, P.R.O., S.P. 91/72, fos. 117, 129, 137–8.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Sbornik, XII, 119.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Sbornik, XI, 119.Google Scholar

⁵¹ The appropriate cabinet minute reads that 'the project of a Treaty from Russia...(was) rejected unanimously as inadmissible as tending to involve Great Britain in fresh disturbances by engaging to take part in the Polish disputes and even to furnish money for thatpurpose and to engage us likewise in disputes with the Ottoman Porte in case of a war between Russia and Turkey that exception not being made in the project as was made in the last Treaty to which the Lords all agreed this project ought to be brought back' (Additional C.renville Papers 1763–65, ed. J. R. G. Tomlinson (Manchester, 1962), p. 318).

⁵² 23 Sept. 1763, Sbornik, XII, 129–33.

⁵³ On 30 Sept. 1763, Catherine had told the British ambassador that, in her view, ‘there was no immediate prospect of a vacancy’ (Buckinghamshire to Halifax, 30 Sept. 1763, Sbornik, XII, 134).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Buckinghamshire reported on 4 Nov. 1763 that they see a disagreement with the Porte as a very probable contingency' (Sbornik, XII, 142).Google ScholarBérenger's dispatches provide ample confirmation of this concern (Sbornik, CXL, 245, 258).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Bérenger, France's representative in St Petersburg, believed Britain, Prussia and Russia would unite to solve the critical situation in Poland (to Praslin, 22 Oct. 1763, Sbornik, CXL, 246).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ It is at this point that Nikita Panin emerges from the shadows to become the sole ministerial voice in Russian foreign policy. Hitherto, his influence with the Tsaritsa was considerable and, perhaps, predominant, but only with his appointment as head of the College of Foreign Affairs on 7 Nov. 1763 (Martens, Recueil des Traites, ix (x), 223) did this become public.

⁵⁷ See Buckinghamshire to Sandwich, 23 11 1763, Sbornik, XII, 143–7.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Sandwich to Buckinghamshire, 20 Dec. 1763, Sbornik, XII, 148–50.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Ibid. 148.

⁶⁰ The pentiv-pinching attitude of the leader of the ministry, George Grenville, was a further factor in this British decision. Grenville's view, as expressed to the king, was'to take no first part in regard to the Polish Election, but to remain in such a state as should make him be courted as a neutral power by all the contending parties…' {The Grenville Papers, ed. Smith, W. J (4 vols., London, 1852), II, 240). Treasury economy, as Dr Spencer rightly pointed out, prescribed the framework within which foreign policy operated, though of course there were (as earlier shown) other, stronger, reasons for the refusal of a subsidy (Spencer, Sandwich Correspondence, p. 65).Google Scholar

⁶¹ Buckinghamshire to Sandwich, 17 Jan. 1764, Sbornik, XII, 155–8.Google Scholar

⁶² It would be wrong to deny that, for Panin at least, Frederick was the more valued political partner; but, equally, the British and Prussian alliances were not seen as alternatives in St Petersburg. At the beginning of December 1763, Panin was still thinking in terms of a triple alliance of Russia, Prussia and Britain (Solms to Frederick 11,6 Dec. 1763, Sbornik, XXII, 168) and though the Prussian king's distaste for any British connexion was duly expressed (to Solms, 23 Dec. 1763, Sbornik, XXII, 174–5) it seems clear that Prussia's need for alliance with Russia would have obliged him (however unwillingly) to accept the inclusion of England in the ‘Northern System’. The collapse of the British negotiations left Frederick as Russia's only potential ally of any importance, and somewhat restored the balance of political advantage, hitherto rather in St Petersburg's favour.

⁶³ As Buckinghamshire was soon noting (to Sandwich, 13 Apr. 1764, Sbornik, XII, 164–5); cf. Buckinghamshire to Mitchell, 1 June 1764, B.M., Add. MSS 6826, fo. 55.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Panin to Gross, 29 Jan. 1765 (O.S.), Martens, Recueildes Traités, IX (X), 225–6, for the Russian insistence on a subsidy in the event of a Turkish War being a sine qua non of any alliance; cf. Macartney to Mitchell, 4 Sept. 1766, B.M., Add. MSS 6826, fo. 81: ‘I amconvinced that M. Panin will never recede from the principle he first set out upon of including a Turkish War in the Casus Foederis. He is irritated against us for our refusal of this condition, more than I venture to express to the office.’Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See, for example, Solms to Frederick II, 24 July 1764, Sbornik, XXII, 271–2.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Buckinghamshire to Lord George Germain, 8 July 1780, H.M.C. Lothian MSS., p, 371.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Halifax to Hertford (British Ambassador in Paris), 18 Oct. and 8 Nov. 1763, printed' in British Diplomatic Instructions, VII: France 1745–1789, pp. 91–2.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Macartney to Conway, 6 Feb. 1767, printed in Barrow, JSome Account of the Public Life of the Earl of Macartney (2 vols., London, 1807), 1, 424.Google Scholar

⁷² Panin to Gross, 29 Jan. 1765 (O.S.), Martens, Recueil des Traités, XI ( x ). 226.Google Scholar

⁷³ For a good example of which, see J, 20 Jan. 1764, P.R.O., S.P. 91/73, fos. 32–3.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See Conway to Shirley, 9 10 1767, Sbornik, XII, 310–16.Google Scholar 75 Ibid., XII, 311.

⁷⁶ Shirley to Conway, 15 Nov. 1767, Sbornik, XII, 316–22.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Macartney to Crafton, 16 Nov. 1765, Sbornik, XII, 232.

⁷⁸ Macartney to Conway, 5 Aug. 1766, Sbornik, XII, 270.

⁷⁹ Roberts, , Macartney in Russia, pp. 4–33, provides a masterlv account of this complicated business.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ As Professor Roberts has argued (Splendid Isolation 1763–1780, p. 26Google Scholar) contra Sir Herbert Butterfield (‘British Foreign Policy, 1762–5’, Historical Journal, VI (1963), 137).Google Scholar

⁸¹ Macartney to Conway, 31 Oct. 1766, Sbornik, XII, 280.

⁸² British ministers, of course, made exactly the same calculation in reverse: see, for example, Conway to Robert Gunning (British Minister in Copenhagen), 19 Dec. 1766Google Scholar, British Diplomatic Instructions 1689–1789, III: Denmark, ed. Chance, J. F (London, 1926), 178.Google Scholar

⁸³ For this episode, cf. Anderson, ‘Great Britain and the Russian Fleet’.

⁸⁴ Panin professed to be concerned about this as early as October 1764 (Buckinghamshire to Halifax, 17 Oct. 1764, PRO., S.P. 91/74, fo. 113).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See, for example, Macartney to Conway, 13 Feb. 1767, Sbornik, XII, 295–6.

⁸⁶ That it was Panin, and not (as is usually said) Macartney who was the real origin of this famous phrase is evident from Macartney to Conway, 4 July 1766Google Scholar, P.R.O., S.P. 91/77, fo. 189; Hans Stanley, as he wriggled to escape from a futile mission to Berlin and St Petersburg (the object of which was to be an attempt to turn Pitt's dreams of a ‘Northern League’ into political reality) had said much the same thing: to Pitt, 19 Aug. 1766, Correspondence of Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, eds. Taylor, W. S. and Pringle, J. H (4vols., L, 1838–1840), 111, 36–8.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Which emerges clearly from (e.g.) Panin to Gross, 29 Jan. 1765 (O.S.), Martens, Recueil des Traités, IX (X), 225–6.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Macartney to Conway, 6 Feb. 1767, printed in Barrow, Life of Macartney, 1, 425; cf. Macartney to Mitchell, 8 Feb. 1767, B.M., Add. MSS 6826, fo. 114, where this view is emphatically underlined.