¹ Commons Journals, x, 14.

² Kenyon, J. P., ‘The Revolution of 1688: resistance and contract’, in McKendrick, N. (ed.), Historical perspectives: studies in English thought and society in honour of J. H. Plumb (London, 1974), pp. 43–69, especially pp. 47—50Google Scholar; Kenyon, J. P., Revolution principles: the politics of party, 1689–1720 (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 7–11 and passim.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Slaughter, T. P., ‘ “Abdicate” and “Contract” in the Glorious Revolution’, Historical Journal, xxiv (1981), 323–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Ibid. pp. 331–2.

⁵ Ibid. pp. 332–3.

⁶ Ibid. pp. 335–6.

⁷ Cobbett's parliamentary history of England, v (1809), 67–107 (hereafter Parl. hist.).Google Scholar

⁸ Grey, A., Debates in the house of commons 1667–94 (10 vols. London, 1769).Google Scholar

⁹ Schwoerer, L. G., ‘A jornall of the Convention at Westminster begun the 22 of January, 1688/9’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research XLIX (1976), 242–63 (hereafter ‘A Jornall’).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Slaughter, p. 330.

¹¹ Singer, S. W. (ed.), Correspondence of Henry Hyde, earl of Clarendon (2 vols. London, 1828), ii, 260–2Google Scholar; Simpson, A., ‘Notes of a noble lord, 22 January to 12 February 1688/9’, English Historical Review, LII (1937), 94–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Horwitz, H., Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William I(Manchester, 1977), pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

¹² For example, Bishop Turner equated the ‘original compact’ with the existing constitution, while Clarendon said that there was no such thing: Parl. hist, v, 75–6.Google Scholar

¹³ Slaughter, p. 325.

¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 324–5; Kenyon, ‘Resistance and contract’, pp. 56–7.

¹⁵ Commons Journals, x, 19.Google Scholar

¹⁶ For Locke's concept of trust see Two treatises of government, ed. Laslett, P. (Mentor edn, New York, 1965), pp. 413–16, 422–3.Google Scholar

¹⁷ ‘A Jornall, p. 255. The phrase ‘was entrusted with’ suggests an element of mutuality, of contract.

¹⁸ Parl. hist, v, 71.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 78.

²⁰ Slaughter, p. 325.

²¹ Proceedings of the house of commons touching the impeachment of Edward late earl of Clarendon (London, 1700), p. 33; Grey, viii, 330.Google Scholar

²² Grey, iv, 228.

²³ Locke, , Two treatises, p. 447Google Scholar. See also Kenyon, , The Stuart constitution (Cambridge, 1966), p. 472Google Scholar; Gough, J. W., The social contract (2nd edn, Oxford, 1957)Google Scholar; Elton, G. R., Studies in Tudor and Stuart politics and government (2 vols. Cambridge, 1974), ii, 209–13.Google Scholar

²⁴ ‘A Jornall’, p. 258; see also Grey, ix, 12.

²⁵ Grey, ix, 20.

²⁶ Ibid. p. 15.

²⁷ Historical Manuscripts Commission, report on the house of lords’ MSS, 1689–90, pp. 15–18; see also Burnet, G., History of my own time (6 vols. Oxford, 1833), 111, 384–5.Google Scholar

²⁸ Part. hist, v, 70; Grey, ix, 46; ‘A Jornall’, p. 252; Burnet, iii, 378–9.Google Scholar

²⁹ Part. hist, v, 75. Other tones, like Nottingham, agreed that all the laws were sacrosanct, but did not link this idea to that of an ‘original compact’Google Scholar: Ibid. pp. 82–3, 92.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 100.

³¹ Kenyon, Revolution principles, p. 43.

³² Note Treby's argument that James had not broken particular laws only, but all the fundamental laws-and that his religion had obliged him to do so: Parl. hist, v, 83–4.Google Scholar

³³ Grey, ix, 10–12.

³⁴ Maynard also argued on 6 February that the question of duress in James's departure was irrelevant: the crucial point was not his desertion but his breach of the laws: Parl. hist, v, 72. This did not necessarily indicate that James was deposed for breaking the laws, but rather that his breaking the laws was tantamount to renouncing his crown.Google Scholar

³⁵ ‘A Jornall, p. 251 (my italics); Grey, ix, 20.

³⁶ Grey, ix, 13, 26, 47–8.

³⁷ ‘A Jornall’, p. 258; Grey, ix, 18, 21; Burnet, iii, 383–4.

³⁸ See Frankle, R. J., ‘The formulation of the Declaration of Rights’, Historical Journal, xvii (1974), 265–79; Horwitz, pp. 11–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ Grey, ix, 21; also Ibid. pp. 7–9.

⁴⁰ Lords Journals, xiv, 110.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Miller, J., James II: a study in kingship (Hove, 1978), pp. 198–204Google Scholar; Beddard, R., ‘The Guildhall Declaration and the counter-revolution of the loyalists’, Historical Journal, xi, (1968), 403—20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clarendon correspondence, II, 188–236.Google Scholar

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⁴³ Grey, ix, 55–6.

⁴⁴ Parl. hist, v, 89–90.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Note also the arguments that the Convention was not a parliament and did not properly represent the people: Simpson, p. 92; Grey, ix, 21–3; ‘A Jornall’, pp. 252 4.

⁴⁶ Lords Journals, xiv, 117Google Scholar; Parl. hist, v, 72–3.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ They also argued, with more justification, that abdication was usually understood as a formal act.

⁴⁸ Lords Journals, xiv, 117.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Parl. hist, v, 89.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 103.

⁵¹ Grey, ix, 64.

⁵² Burnet, iii, 396.

⁵³ Part. hist, v, 84, 106.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Slaughter, , p. 332, quoting Lords Journals, xiv, 117.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Slaughter, pp. 332–3 (his italics).

⁵⁶ See Grey, ix, 18, 47; Parl. hist, v, 76.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Grey, ix, 12.

⁵⁸ Commons Journals, x, 18Google Scholar; Grey, ix, 48; Parl. hist, v, 69–70, 88.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ My italics.

⁶⁰ Note Locke's concern to argue that conquest did not confer a right to absolute power over the conquered: Two treatises, pp. 431–4.

⁶¹ See Behrens, B., ‘The whig theory of the constitution in the reign of Charles II’, Cambridge Historical Journal, vii (1941), 42–71; J. Miller, ‘Charles II and his parliaments’, to be published in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, for 1982.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶² Grey, x, 75–6.

⁶³ The speeches quoted by Slaughter (p. 333) make it clear that the commons’ spokesmen saw abdication as a voluntary renunciation, in the form of either a formal act or conduct totally incompatible with the responsibilities of one's office. This fact is obscured by Slaughter's alterations to Holt's speech. Holt said: ‘In the most common acceptation of the civil law, Abdication is a voluntary express act of renunciation. That is the general acceptation of the word and, I think, the Commons do so use the word in this case because it hath that signification’ (Parl, hist. v, 71Google Scholar; the speech appears in identical form in the source cited by Slaughter, : A collection of parliamentary debates, II, 196). Slaughter omits the words in italics (indicating that an omission has been made) and changes the last phrase into ‘it hath [also] that signification’. He thus implies that Holt talked of two different meanings, whereas by the plain sense of the words he discussed only one.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Burnet, iii, 384.

⁶⁵ Further evidence of this pragmatism, the prime importance of the succession and the inadequacy of Slaughter's argument, can be found in those parts of the resolution of 28 January which were incorporated into the Declaration and Bill of Rights. The references to ‘abdication’ and ‘vacancy’ were included; the passage about James's breaking the original contract and the fundamental laws was omitted.