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³² In February 1913, Bethmann had rejected the idea of a preventive war against Serbia because ‘Russian intervention…would result in a war-like conflict of the Triple Alliance… against the Triple Entente, and Germany would have to bear the full brunt of the French and British attack’: ibid. p. 44. Cf. the very pessimistic assessments described by Schoenon 18 July 1914: ibid, p. 130, doc. 33.

³³ Gustav Schmidt, ‘Contradictory postures and conflicting objectives; the July crisis’, in Schöllgen, (ed.), Escape into War?, p. 139Google Scholar; , Geisi, July 1914, pp. 238–41, docs. 97, 98, 99; p. 276, doc. 122; pp. a88f., doc. 130Google Scholar.

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³⁵ Ibid. p. 221, doc. 95.

³⁶ Ibid. pp. 237f, doc. 96; pp. 243f doc. 101; pp. 253f., doc. no; p. 332, doc. 165.

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⁴³ , Geiss, July 1914, p. 356, doc. 183; p. 359, doc. 186Google Scholar.

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⁴⁵ On 28 April 1913, Jagow himself had refused to provide the Reichstag budget committee with a guarantee of Belgian neutrality, since it would give the French ‘a pointer as to where to expect us’- one of those revealing denials which were his peculiar forte: , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, p. 279Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ , Geiss, July 1914, pp. 46f.Google Scholar; , Berghahn, Germany and the approach of war, pp. 164–7. The exchange was on either 20 May or 6 June. See alsoGoogle Scholar, Geiss, July 1914, pp. 65–8, docs. 3, 4Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ , Berghahn, Germany and the approach of war, p. 180Google Scholar.

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⁴⁹ , Geiss, July 1914, p. 123, doc. By 16 July, even Grey was aware that the German government was ‘genuinely alarmed at the military preparations in Russia’; though he mistakenly assumed this would put the Germans in ‘peaceful mood’: Schmidt, p. 144Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Wolff, T., The EM 0f 1914 (London, 1935), p. 448Google Scholar.

⁵¹ , Berghahn, Germany and the approach of war, p. 203Google Scholar.

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⁵⁴ , Föster, Der doppelte Militarismus, p. 205Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ See also Rothenberg, G. E., The army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, 1976); it is true that only 20% of the annual cohort in Russia was called up; but given the enormous absolute numbers involved, this was scant consolation for Berlin:Google ScholarKennedy, P. M., The rise and fall of the great powers. Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London, 1988), p. 307.Google ScholarCf. Stone, N., The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (London, 1975)Google Scholar; Rutherford, W., The Russian army in World War I (London, 1975)Google Scholar.

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⁵⁷ , Kennedy, Rise and fall of the great powers, esp. pp. 249–354Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ , Geiss, Der lange Weg in die Katastrophe, pp. 54, 116, 123Google Scholar; cf. , Kennedy, Rise and fall, pp. 269–77Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ See the survey in Hentschel, V., ‘Produktion, Wachstum und Produktivität in England, Frankreich und Deutschland von der Mine des 19. Jahrhunderu bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg’, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschafisgeschihte, LXVIII (1981)Google Scholar.

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⁶⁵ In addition to Ritter, Staatskurst und Kreigshandwerk, see: Vagts, A., A history of militarism. Civilian and military (New York, 1959)Google Scholar; Craig, G. A., The politics of the Prussian army, 1640–1945 (Oxford, 1955)Google Scholar; Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., The nemesis of power (London, 1954)Google Scholar; Carsten, F. L., The Reichswehr and politics, 1918–1933 (Oxford, 1966)Google Scholar; Messerschmidt, M., Mililär und Politik in der Bismarckzeit und im wilhelminischen Deutschland (Darmstadt, 1975)Google Scholar; Berghahn, V. R., Militarismus (Cologne, 1975)Google Scholar; idem, Militarism. The history of an international debate 1861–1979 (Leamington, 1981).

⁶⁶ , Zilch, Reichsbank, p. 40Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Cf. G. Eley, ‘Army, state and civil society: revisiting the problem of German militarism’, in idem, From unification to Nazism. Reinterpreting the German past (Boston, 1986), pp. 85–109.

⁶⁸ , Fischer, War of illusions, pp. 13–25Google Scholar. Idem, Bündnis der Eliten. Zur Kontinuitäs der Machtstrukturen in Deutschland, 1871–1945 (Düsseldorf, 1979), transl. From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: elements of the continuity in German history 1871–1945 (London, 1986)Google Scholar.

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⁷² Eley, G., Reshaping the German right. Radical nationalism and political change after Bismarck (New Haven, 1979); idem, ‘The Wilhelmine right: how it changed’, in R.J. Evans (ed.), Society and politics in Wilhelmine Germany (New York, 1978), pp. 112–35. Sec also:Google ScholarChickering, R., We men who feet most German: a cultural study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914 (London, 1984)Google Scholar.

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⁷⁷ The Army League in south west Germany had links with the Volunteer Youth Army; the German League against the Abuse of Intoxicating Drinks; the German League for the Combatting of Women's Emancipation; the League against Social Democracy and the General German Language Association - as well as, improbably but revealingly, the Württemberg Association for Breeding Pedigree Hunting Dogs: ibid. pp. 55–8, 65.

⁷⁸ Ibid. pp. 76–104. Coetzee's attempt to derive a more exact sociological profile of the League from the rolls it kept of members killed in the war gives a similar picture: 29·4% were career soldiers; 16·2% civil servants; ii·4% academics or teachers; 7·7% businessmen; 8·9% other professions; and only 6·5% were clerical employees (pp. 90f). Unfortunately, there are methodological difficulties with these figures, since they naturally over-represent the young; whereas another sample of 195 pre-war members reveals that 90% were over 40. One point which Coetzee could perhaps have made more of is the League's origin and popularity in non-Prussian Germany. Was this a self-conscious effort to ‘germanicise’ the traditionally Prussian army?

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⁸² A.-H. Leugers, ‘Einstellungen zu Krieg und Frieden im deutschen Katholizismus vor 1914’, in ibid. p. 62. It is significant that crowds in Berlin on 1 and 2 August 1914 sang not only the protestant ‘Ein’ feste Burg ist unser Gott’, but also the catholic ‘Grosser Gott wir loben Dich’; , Eksteins, Rites of spring, p. 61Google Scholar.

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¹²² , Kroboth, Finanpolitik, p. 211Google Scholar.

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¹²⁴ It is fascinating to learn that Hindenburg gained an intimate knowledge of the future battlefield of Tannenberg on these rides; and that Waldersee insisted on being accompanied on them by his two dachshunds in a basket: , Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian war planning, pp. 106, 128, II. 40Google Scholar.

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¹²⁸ , Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian war planning, pp. 306fGoogle Scholar.

¹²⁹ See e.g. Berghahn, V., Germany and the approach of war, p. 74Google Scholar.

¹³⁰ As Albert Ballin put it in 1908: ‘We just cannot afford a race in dreadnoughts against the much wealthier British’: ibid. p. 78. By 1909, the Kaiser too accepted that ‘under the inexorable constraints of the tightness of funds…justified demands of the “Front” had to be left unfulfilled’: ibid. p. 83. Even Moltke saw the problem, commenting in December 1912: ‘Our enemies are arming more vigorously than we, because we are strapped for cash’: , Forster, Der doppelte Militarismus, p. 253; cf.Google Scholar, Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptrt, II, 220. Ironically, Moltke tried to justify war as‘a deliverance from the great armaments [and] from the financial burdens’they entailedGoogle Scholar.

¹³¹ , Kroboth, Finanpolitik, p. 188Google Scholar.

¹³² Gall, L., Bismarck. The white revolutionary (London, 1986), I, 317Google Scholar.

¹³³ See Kruedener, J. von, ‘The Franckenstein paradox in the intergovernmental fiscal relations of imperial Germany’, in Witt, P.-C., Wealth and taxation in Central Europe. The history and sociology of public finance (Leamington Spa, 1987), pp. 111–23; Witt, Finanzpolitik, passimGoogle Scholar; Terhalle, F., ‘Geschichte des deutschen Finanzwirtschaft vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Schluss des zweitcn Weltkrieges’, in Gerloff, W. and Neumark, F. (eds.), Handbuch der Finanzwissenschaft (Tubingen, 1952)², pp. 274–89Google Scholar.

¹³⁴ By 1913, the states depended on income tax for between 40 and 75% of their revenues: Schremmer, ‘Taxation and public finance. Britain, France and Germany’, pp. 488ft The communes, which accounted for around 40% of total public expenditure by 1913, also relied increasingly on income tax: by 1910, 52% of Prussian local government revenue came from surcharges on the state income tax: Hentschel, V., ‘German economic and social policy, 1815–1939’, in Mathias and Pollard, The Cambridge economic history of Europe, VIII, 163fGoogle Scholar.

¹³⁵ , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, p. 29Google Scholar.

¹³⁶ Figures From Kroboth, , Finanzpolitik, pp. 489fGoogle Scholar. Cf. Stuebel, H., Das Verhältnis zwischen Staal und Banken auf dem Gebiet des preussischen Anleihewesens von 1871 bis 1313 (Berlin, 1935)Google Scholar.

¹³⁷ Wagner, A., Grundlegung der politischen Oekonomte (Leipzig, 1893), p. 895Google Scholar; Timm, H., ‘Das Gesetz der wachsenden Staauausgaben’, in Finanzarchiv, new series, XXI (1961), 201–47; Andic and Veverka, ‘The growth of government expenditure’, passim. A maximum estimatefor the public sector's share of NNP - including revenues from public sector enterprises, public borrowing and the social insurance system - shows it rising from 13–8 % in 1890 to 18–8 % in 1913:Google Scholar, Hentschel, Wirtschafispolitik, p. 148; cf.Google ScholarWitt, P.-C., ‘Finanzpolitik und sozialer Wandel. Wachstum und Funktionswandel der Staatsausgaben in Deutschland 1871–1933’, in Wehler, H.-U. (ed.), Soziatgeschichte Heute. Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg (Göttingen, 1974), pp. 565–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³⁸ , Witt, Finanzpolitik, pp. 17–58Google Scholar; idem, ‘Reichsfinanzen und Rilstungspolitik’ in Schottelius, H. and Deist, W. (eds.), Marine und Marinepolitik im kaiserlichen Deutschland 1871–1914 (Düsseldorf, 1981), pp. 146–77Google Scholar.

¹³⁹ There remains a profound division between those, like Wehler and Witt, who see the Reichstag's power over finance as extremely limited - part of the Reich's ‘sham constitutionalism’ - and those, notably Rauh, who argue for a gradual process of parliamentarization before 1914: Wehler, German empire, pp. 52–65, 72–83; Witt, P.-C., ‘Innenpolitik und Imperialismus in der Vorgeschichte der Ersten Weltkrieges’, in Holl, K.. and List, G. (eds.), Liberatismus und impenalistischet Stoat (Göttingen, 1975)Google Scholar; Rauh, M., Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus im wilhelminischen Reich (Düsseldorf, 1972); idem. Die Parlamentarisierung dts Deutscken Reichts (Düsseldorf, 1977)Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁰ Crothers, C. G., German elections of 1907 (New York, 1941)Google Scholar.

¹⁴¹ On the Centre's increasingly mitttändisch political tone, see Blackbourn, D., Class, religion and total politics in Wilhtlmine Germany. The Centre party in Württtmberg before 1914 (New Haven, London, 1980). Hentschel estimates that the indirect tax burden fell from 5% on incomes of less than 800 M to just 1 % on those over 10,000 M. Tariffs alone cost the average family 1–1–5% of annual income: Wirlschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. 202fGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴² For the debate on the effectiveness of Sammlungspolitik (which clearly existed as a government strategy), see esp. Stegmann, D., Die Erben Bismarcks, Parttien und Verbände in der Spätphase des wilhelminischem Deutschlands. Sammlungspolitik, 1897–1918 (Cologne, 1970); and the critique byGoogle ScholarEley, G., ‘Sammlungspolitik, social imperialism and the German navy law of 1898¹, Militärgesckicntliche Mitteilungen, xv (1974), 29–63Google Scholar.

¹⁴³ Unlike Witt, he was unable to make use of the important archives in what was, at the time he undertook his research, still the GDR.

¹⁴⁴ Thus he sees the parliamentary conflicts over financial reform as being between ‘industrial-liberal’ interests and ‘agrarian-conservatives’: , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, pp. 30f., 105, 250. These are then implicitly equated with the conflicting‘protagonist* of a constitutional modernisation appropriate to the [extent of social] change’and ‘the exponents of the political and social status quo’: ibid. p. 284Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁵ For example, it suited the Social Democratsto talk only about Reich finances when stressing the regressive and militaristic character of the German financial system, quietly ignoring the increasingly progressive tax system of the states and communes, around half of the revenues of which were by 1910–13 devoted to‘social’policies (e.g. health and education provision). Between 1907 and 1913, the percentage of total public revenues coming from direct tax rose from 49 to 57%; the percentage of totalpublic expenditure devoted to ‘social’ and educational purposes rose from 133% (1891) to 28%: see Kroboth, Finmnpolitik, pp. 301–5; , Hentschel, Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik, p. 150; Schremmer, table 95, p. 482Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁶ , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, p. 122, II. 65Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁷ Kroboth estimates the proportion of total Reich debt incurred by the army, the navy and colonies as 65–3% in 1913–14: ibid. p. 33, II. 116.

¹⁴⁸ Calculated from figures in Witt, Finanzpolitik, p. 378.

¹⁴⁹ By 1901–5, it had reached over 10%, enough to prompt complaints about the ‘interest-serfdom of the masses for the sake of the state's creditors’: , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, p. 33Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁰ Between 1896 and 1913, the volume of public sector bond issues rose 166%, compared with just 26% for private sector issues; and after 1901, public sector bond issues accounted for, on average, between 45 and 50% of the nominal value of all stock and share issues: , HentschelWirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik, p. 144. Among the leading competitors for funds was in fact the Prussian state. Between 1892 and April 1914, the Prussian state debt rose from 6,240 m. M to 10,400 m. M. Thus, by 1913, of the total public debt of 32,843 m. M, the Reich's share was just 15%: cf.Google Scholar, Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, p. 489, Tab. II. Of this total, almost 20% was held by foreign investorsGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵¹ When total issues of 128 billion M of Reich and Prussian bonds in 1909–10 were poorly received on the bourse, many foreign observers concluded with Wermuth that Germany's‘financial armament’did not match its ‘military armament’: ibid. p. 98. When the price of 4% Reich bonds fell below that of 3–5% Italian bonds, there was dismay in the press: ibid. p. 235.

¹⁵² Eschenburg, T., Das Kaisstrrtich am Scheidweg (Berlin, 1929)Google Scholar; Berghahn, V. R., ‘Das Kaiserreich in der Sackgasse’, Neut Politische Literatör, XVI (1971)Google Scholar; Mommsen, W. J., ‘Die latente Krice des Deutschen Reiches’, Miliärgeschichtliche Mituilungen, I (1974). See alsoGoogle ScholarSchmidt, G., ‘Innenpolitische Blockbildungen in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkricges’, in Aus Polttik und Zeitgeschichte, xx (1972), 3–32Google Scholar.

¹⁵³ , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, p. 115Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁴ The government succeeded in quashing the second and third resolutions: ibid. pp. 170–81.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 181.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 197.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 214.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 218.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. pp. 272f.

¹⁶⁰ Groh, D., ‘“Je eher, desto betser!” Innenpolihsche Faktoren fur die Praventivkriegs. berciuchaft des Deutschen Reiches 1913–14’, in Politischt Vierteljahresschrift (1972):Google Scholar, Wehler, German empire, pp. 192–201Google Scholar.

¹⁶¹ See above, p. 737; Mommsen, W., ‘Domestic factors in German foreign policy before 1914’, Central European History, vi, I (1973)Google Scholar; Gordon, M. R., ‘Domestic conflict and the origins of the First World War: the British and German cases’, Journal of Modern History, XLVI (1974), 191–226:CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Joll, Origins, pp. 108–18Google Scholar.

¹⁶² It was typical that, although the Reichstag raised the yield of the capital gains tax by 18 m. M by making the tax more progressive, it actually increased die total level of expenditure by 22 m. M: , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, pp. 220–70Google Scholar.

¹⁶³ Westarp and Heydebrand had been divided about tactics in the DKP; Erzberger's enthusiasm was not shared by all Centre deputies, a number of whom voted against the capital gains tax; there were many in the SPD who objected to voting for any legislation linked to arms spending; while a significant number of National Liberals were unhappy with the introduction of a progressive scale for the Defence Contribution. The BdI, which had initially supported the introduction of a direct tax now feared ‘the beginning of confiscation’: ibid. pp. 272ff.

¹⁶⁴ , Stegmann, Die Erben Bismarcks, pp. 352–448;Google Scholar, Eley, Reshaping the German right, pp. 330–4Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁵ Figures calculated from: Mitchell, B. R., European historical statistics 1750–1970 (London, 1975), pp. 29–35, 733ff., 752–68;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBairoch, P., ‘Europe's gross national product: 1800–1975’, Journal of European Economic History, v (1976), 281, 303Google Scholar; , Witt, Finanzpolitik, pp. 386f.Google Scholar; , Andic and , Veverka, ‘Government expenditure’, pp. 241f.Google Scholar; Statistisckes Jahrbuch (1914), pp. 348–55; , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, pp. 489–510; Schremmer, ‘Public finance’, passimGoogle Scholar; Peacock, A. T. and Wiseman, J., The growth of public expenditure in the United Kingdom (Princeton, 1961), pp. 151 ff., 164–8, 201Google Scholar; Delarme, R. and André, C., L'État et L' Économic, un essai d'explicationde revolution its défenses publiques en France (Seuil, 1983), pp. 50, 721–7, 733Google Scholar; Gregory, P. R., Russian national income, 1885–1913 (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 58f., 252, 249–56, 261 ff. Cf. the now outdated figures inGoogle ScholarRichardson, L. F., Arms and insecurity (London, 1960), p. 87Google Scholar; Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for mastery in Europe 1846–1848 (Oxford, 1954), p. XXVIIIGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶⁶ It is worth noting that the fiscal position of Germany's principal ally, Austria-Hungary, was similar to that of the Reich, only worse: see Wysocki, j., ‘Die osterreichische Finanzpolitik’, in Wandruszka, A. and Urbanitsch, P., Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, I (Vienna, 1973), 68–104. I would like to thank Dr John Leslie for his comments on this under-researched questionGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶⁷ , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, pp. 21 ofGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶⁸ Die Wehr in 1912, quoted in , Coetzee, Army league, p. 50Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁹ , Berghahn, Germany and the approach of war, p. 83Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁰ , Förster, Der doppelts Militarismus, pp. 228f., nn. 11, 12Google Scholar.

¹⁷¹ , Kroboth, Finanzpolitik, pp. 57fGoogle Scholar.