¹ F.O. 371/21659 (P.R.O.). The document consists of over 150 pages, mostly in typescript.

² With the exception of the paper headed ‘What We Should Do’, which was submitted by the Secret Service on 18 September, at the height of the Czech crisis. Cadogan included it in this collection because it contained a recent estimate of German intentions.

³ Of the work on British policy in this period published since the adoption of the ‘thirty-year rule’, only Middlemas, Keith, Diplomacy of Illusion : The British Government and Germany 1937–39 (London, 1972), has given much attention to this document (pp. 429–32);Google Scholar and his discussion of it is open to challenge at a number of points. Colvin, Ian, The Chamberlain Cabinet (London, 1971),Google Scholar and Parkinson, Roger, Peace for Our Time: Munich to Dunkirk – The Inside Story (London, 1971),Google Scholar rely mainly on the Cabinet and Staff papers to tell their story, as does Barnett, Correlli, whose The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972)Google Scholar provides in ch. 2 an intellectual and psychological topography of the British governing class in the interwar years. In his edition of The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938–1945 (London, 1971),Google Scholar David Dilks has printed (at pp. 116–20 and 123–4) substantial extracts from the essays Cadogan contributed to this collection.

⁴ Strang's first paper was included as item (C) in C14471/42/18. He did not say exactly what he meant by a ‘successful’ foreign policy, but it may fairly be inferred that he had in mind one which could risk all the implications of insisting (whenever it was judged necessary to do so) that agreements be based on reciprocal concessions negotiated by peaceful means.

⁵ On 6 October the Prime Minister had said that the Government had no plan to introduce peace-time conscription; 339 House of Commons Debates, 5th series, col. 474. In private conversation Strang was more open about the bases of his pessimism. To Oliver Harvey in mid-November he spoke understandingly about all aspects of British policy except the slow pace of rearmament, which he and Harvey agreed in ascribing to those rich elements within the Government party who feared heavy taxation and believed the Nazis to be, on balance, more conservative than the parties of the radical Left; see Harvey, John, ed., The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937–1940 (London, 1970), p. 222.Google Scholar

⁶ At this point Cadogan put an emphatic ‘NO’ in the margin. That Chamberlain hoped for such a proposal from Germany is borne out in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945, D/iv, nos. 251, 252 (n. 1) and 260 (hereafter, GD).

⁷ With memories of the diplomatic prelude to the Great War still fresh, many British officials expected the German Government to try to use the Naval Agreement as a lever to secure British neutrality, which had conspicuously escaped it in 1914. The Prime Minister valued the agreement very highly, as witness his friendly reference to it in the note he signed with Hitler after Munich. It eased somewhat the burden of rearmament and provided a point of stability notably absent from prewar Anglo-German relations. Hence Foreign Office fears that it might be used to press the British into awkward and damaging concessions were natural and well founded.

⁸ On the successful use of such a threat earlier in 1938, see MacDonald, C. A., 'Economic Appeasement and the German “Moderates” 1937–1939: An Introductory Essay’, Past and Present, no. 56 (1972), p. 116.Google Scholar

⁹ On the relationship between colonial concessions and appeasement, see, alia, inter, Gilbert, Martin and Gott, Richard, The Appeasers (Cambridge, Mass., 1963),Google Scholar ch. 4; Schmokel, Wolfe W., Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919–1945 (New Haven, 1964),Google Scholar ch. 3; and Hildebrand, Klaus, Vom Reich zum Weltreich (Munich, 1969), pp. 491–548.Google Scholar

¹⁰ The idea that German policy had a continuing interest in obtaining access to the central Mediterranean, very probably at Trieste, has a long history, on which see Andrew, Christopher, ‘German World Policy and the Re-Shaping of the Dual Alliance’;, Journal of Contemporary History, i, 3 (1966), 132–46.Google Scholar

¹¹ On this see Donald Lammers, ‘Fascism, Communism and the Foreign Office 1937–39 ', ibid. vi, 3 (1971), 74, n. 8.

¹² Item (B) in 014471/42/18; extracts in Dilks, , ed., Diaries, pp. 116–20.Google Scholar Given the categorical nature of Cadogan's insistence on rearmament for defensive purposes only, it is hard to accept Middlemas's contention (Diplomacy of Illusion, p. 430) that ‘Cadogan can be seen as the lineal heir of the Vansittart of 1936’, as the supporter, that is, of a ‘policy of deterrence and Anglo-German détente’ if the statement is true at all, it is true of Strang, not Cadogan.

¹³ That Hitler might, in SirWheeler-Bennett's, John felicitous phrase, ‘choke…to death with cream’ from his economic empire; Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (New York, 1962 ed.), p. 326.Google Scholar

¹⁴ It is worth noting that although Cadogan (and others) fully appreciated the global nature of the challenge to British interests, he did not think it necessary on this occasion to invite the views of those officials who dealt with the Far East or the Western Hemisphere; Germany was, unmistakably, the touchstone of policy.

¹⁶ Item (F) in C14471/42/18. Although this paper is unsigned and undated, Cadogan attributed it to Nichols in his covering minutes, and internal evidence supports the conclusion that it was submitted sometime before the others.

¹⁶ Even Sir Nevile Henderson was writing from Berlin at about this time to endorse a really ‘fanatical’ effort to complete Britain's air defence system – ‘no sacrifice can be too great’; Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, iii/m, appen. I, no. (ii) (hereafter, BD).

¹⁷ Item (E) in C14471/42/18.

¹⁸ Ashton-Gwatkin fair-mindedly included here a long extract from a paper prepared by the commercial counsellor to the British Embassy in Berlin (Magowan), which flatly and spiritedly contradicted his own estimates and deductions. Magowan dismissed as pure ‘Cordell Hullism’ the naive notion that Germany would permit the use of international exchange in the general interest. He believed, accurately, that Germany intended to reduce the inhabitants of Middle Europe to the status of serfs or slaves. Hence he could not endorse the policy of economic co-operation with Germany. Yet such was his sense of reality that he also could not endorse a policy of trying to hold marginal markets by quasi-loans or gifts. For more on Magowan, see MacDonald, , ‘Economic Appeasement,’ Past and Present, no. 56, pp. 121 and 126.Google Scholar

¹⁹ On Ashton-Gwatkin and the ‘moderates’, see ibid. p. 116 and passim.

²⁰ Yet at this time Göring was actually pressing for an intensification of Germany's rearmament programme; Bullock, Alan, Hitler, a Study in Tyranny (New York, 1952 ed.), pp. 450–1. Halifax had already raised the possibility of a visit by Goring in talks with Captain Wiedemann in July 1938: GD, D/VII, appen. iii (H).Google Scholar

²¹ See Gilbert, and Gott, , The Appeasers, chap. 11;Google Scholar and Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement (London, 1966), pp. 129–37 and 151–8.Google Scholar The German records of these conversations are in GD, D/iv, no. 257 and passim. MacDonald, , ‘Economic Appeasement,’ Past and Present, no. 56,Google Scholar reviews the evidence and the recent literature, especially the major study by Wendt, Berndt Jürgen, Economic Appeasement. Handel und Finanz in der britischen Deutschland Politik 1933–1939 (Düsseldorf, 1971).Google ScholarSirLeith-Ross, Frederick has denied (Money Talks [London, 1968], p. 256) that there were any official negotiations for a general economic detente with Germany after Munich – a statement which would be hard to sustain unless very strained meanings were put on the words ‘official’ and ‘general’.Google Scholar

²² For a recent review of the controversy over Hitler's proximate and ultimate aims, see Michaelis, Meir, ‘World Power Status or World Dominion?’, Historical Journal, xv, 2 (1972), 331–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Item (D) in C14471/42/18.

²⁴ For Collier's role in stimulating discussion of the ideological determinants of policy, see the article cited above, n. 11.

²⁵ Here Cadogan wrote, ‘Yes, but wouldn't the offer of reasonable concessions (which are ultimately extorted from us anyhow) cramp their style?’

²⁶ Cadogan underscored the word ‘effective’ in the text and added, ‘Yes, but is A.R.P. effective against German bombers?’ – another clear sign that he shared Strang's sense of extreme vulnerability to air attack.

²⁷ The words indicated were lined out in the original, presumably by Cadogan.

²⁸ When Middlcmas writes (Diplomacy of Illusion, p. 430) that Collier favoured a ‘tough line’, to include a modus vivendi with Russia and a refusal to restore the German colonies, he gives an impression somewhat at variance with the language just quoted. Collier's point about Russia was that a modus vivcndi had been reached after the Western Powers had showed a determination to resist Communist machinations, not that one should now be sought in an effort to stop Hitler.

²⁹ For a recent review of the state of British opinion after Munich, see Eatwell, Roger, ‘Munich, Public Opinion and the Popular Front,’ Journal of Contemporary History, vi, 4 (1971), 122–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ Item (H) in C14471/42/18. In Diplomacy of Illusion, p. 431, Middlemas states (incorrectly) that Strang took a leading part in composing this paper (it was Jebb's work alone) and that it contained the ‘final recommendations’ of the Office (this is also incorrect; the advice was Jebb's and was based only in part on the previous papers, nor was it accepted in its entirety by Strang or Cadogan).

³¹ The question mark was inserted in the original in what appears to be Jebb's handwriting.

³² Item (I) in C14471/42/18. Strang referred to the prime minister's statement of 1 November in the House of Commons.

³³ Cadogan was especially sensitive to the need to achieve change by peaceful means; see his remarks in N6227/97/38 in F.O. 371/22289.

³⁴ See Michaelis, , ‘World Power Status’, Historical Journal, xv, 2, 331–60.Google Scholar

³⁵ Strang continued by pointing out that ‘in Herr Hitler's own mind, and therefore in that of the Party as a whole, the dream of expansion eastwards – whether by political or economic domination, by the establishment of puppet states, or by outright conquest and annexation – is a more powerful motive than colonial expansion, unless indeed it has been superseded in recent months by the megalomaniac dream of the destruction and partition of the British Empire’. That Hitler expected to recover a colonial empire for Germany, but only after he had completed his expansion in Europe, is shown by Schmokel, , Dream of Empire, pp. 87–127.Google Scholar

³⁶ Item (A) in 014471/42/18. Middlemas (Diplomacy of Illusion, pp. 430–1) traces a downward curve of Foreign Office resolution during this period, but that is largely a consequence of his over-estimating Cadogan's commitment to ‘deterrence’ in October (see n. 12 above).

³⁷ Eatwell, , ‘Munich, Public Opinion’, Journal of Contemporary History, vi, 4, 1220–30.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Chamberlain's remarks in the Cabinet of 31 October, in CAB 23/96. For some comment on the mood of the time, see Harvey, , ed., Diplomatic Diaries, pp. 211–12;Google ScholarNicolson, Nigel, ed., Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters 1930–1939 (New York, 1966), pp. 373–80;Google Scholar and Jones, Thomas, A Diary with Letters 1913–1950 (Oxford, 1954), pp. 472 and passim.Google Scholar

³⁹ This recalls Taylor's, A. J. P. generalization: ‘It was more important that the parties should negotiate than that they should reach agreement – a common theme in British diplomacy’; The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1954), pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Gilbert, and Gott, , The Appealers, p. 192;Google ScholarWatt, D. C., ‘On Opposition from within the Elite: The Case of Appeasement, 1933–1939’, Government and Opposition, i, 3 (1968), 428. In GD, D/iv, no. 305, a member of Chamberlain's staff is reported as telling a German press officer that ‘an extremely bitter feeling against us prevailed in the whole of the Foreign Office’.Google Scholar

⁴¹ SirBerlin, Isaiah, 'Lewis Namier: A Personal Impression’, in Gilbert, Martin, ed., A Century of Conflict 1850–1950: Essays for A. J. P. Taylor (London, 1966), pp. 219–20.Google Scholar

⁴² Middlemas, , Diplomacy of Illusion, pp. 69–79.Google Scholar

⁴³ Medlicott, W. N., Britain and Germany: The Search for Agreement 1930–1937 (London, 1969), p. 32;Google Scholar to which may be added the words of an anonymous reviewer in the Times Literary Supplement (no. 3694, 22 December 1972 p. 1547): ‘the blame for the failures of policy is by no means to be laid exclusively on Britain's political leaders, to the exclusion of the Foreign Office…The general impression … is that the diplomats were as confused and uncertain as their political superiors about Hitler's mentality and the way to handle the unprecedented problems created by him’.

⁴⁴ Lord Halifax himself, using the kind of analogical reasoning which was common enough at the Foreign Office in this (or any) period, hoped that Italy might be brought to play again what he called ‘the classic Italian role of balancing between Germany and the Western Powers’ – for even in 1914 Italy, while legally bound to the Central Powers, was practically free to choose her own course; BD, iii/m, no. 285.

⁴⁵ First published in 1939 and re-issued, with minor verbal changes, in 1946. For Cadogan's approving comment, see Dilks, , ed., Diaries, p. 243.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ In ‘Going to War with Germany: Between Revisionism and Orthodoxy’, Encounter, xxxix, 1 (07 1972), 56–65,Google Scholar Robert Skidelsky has accepted the judgement of Keith Middlemas (Diplomacy of Illusion) and Northedge, F. S. (The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers 1916–1939 [London, 1966]),Google Scholar that British policy under Chamberlain was ‘clearly designed to reinforce the European status quo’, which it sought to do in the first place by appeasing the dictators with concessions in Africa. He has further argued that a deep abhorrence of war and a lively sense of its current inability to deter Hitler impelled the Government to pursue an agreement with Germany, but that ‘this was not to be an agreement which involved any major redistribution of power in Germany's favour’. The underlying assumption (or ‘illusion’), which was widely shared in the Foreign Office, was that such an agreement could be reached because Hitler's demands were ‘limited’ and ‘reasonable’ in nature and could be granted without producing an overturn of the status quo. Such a position may have ‘severely limited the possibility of peaceful revisionism’, but it did not eliminate it altogether.

⁴⁷ Carr, , Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 89;Google Scholar and see Skidelsky, , ‘On Going to War’, Encounter, xxxix, 1, 65, who claims that only die act of fighting a war could dispel this moral and intellectual malaise.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Vansittart was at this time vigorously contesting the view that the Government should connive at the dismemberment of Poland and/or the detachment of the Ukraine from Russia, or even consent to them in advance – such steps would mean the total domination of Europe by Germany. Unlike Cadogan, he proposed to encourage the German ‘moderates’ not by making further conciliatory gestures to Hitler, but by confronting him with a policy of ‘no concesssions’; see Colvin, Ian, Vansittart in Office: The Origins of World War II (London, 1965), pp. 283–4.Google Scholar But Vansittart's isolation may be gauged from the fact that he took no part in preparing these Foreign Office papers, nor did he see them on completion. Orme Sargent initialled the lot in December, and while he may have been ‘[t]he strongest opponent of appeasement within the Foreign Office’ (Gilbert, and Gott, , The Appeasers, pp. 373–4),Google Scholar he left no record here of what he thought of his colleagues ‘recommendations. For all of Sargent's disapproval of British policy toward Czechoslovakia, moreover, it is worth noting that he did not conspicuously share Vansittart's disposition to rely on Russia as a counter-weight in the East (see Medlicott, , Britain and Germany, p. 14; and an earlier expression of Sargent's views in N515/187/38 in F.O. 371/20346).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ In the absence of a close-fibred study of the Foreign Office in this period to match Zara Steiner's work (The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898–1914 [Cambridge, 1969]),Google Scholar it would be premature to try to pronounce definitively on the exact contours of departmental attitudes and the undercurrents of influence. A preliminary survey of some of the relevant papers does, nonetheless, suggest pretty strongly that it may be easy to over-state the case for the existence within the diplomatic service of a deep and coherent opposition to the main lines of governmental policy. All of the following officials, for instance, either wrote papers and/or minutes which could be construed as endorsing the policy of appeasement in the later 1930s or, at the very least refrained from negative comment upon it: Sir Nevile Henderson, Lord Perth, Sir Eric Phipps, Viscount Chilston, Sir Francis D'Arcy Godolphin Osborne, Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir George Clerk, Sir Henry Chilton, Sir Lancelot Oliphant, Sir George Mounsey, E. M. B. Ingram, P. B. Nichols, Paul Grey, Gladwyn Jebb, Ivone Kirkpatrick, Gordon Vereker, Pierson Dixon, Owen O'Malley, Geoffrey Thompson, Basil Newton, Thomas Preston, Paul Falla and R. C. Hadow – along with Cadogan, Strang and Ashton-Gwatkin. Those who wrote from a clearly contrary point of view make up a much shorter list, albeit a distinguished one.

⁵⁰ Birkenhead, Lord, The Life of Lord Halifax (London, 1965), p. 400.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Wheeler-Bennett, (Munich, pp. 295–6 and 326–8)Google Scholar has contended, and many historians have agreed, that Chamberlain, or at least some of his closest advisers, wanted to encourage Hitler to move eastward in the hope that Soviet Russia would eventually have to fight him to a standstill or be destroyed, with either outcome welcome to the ruling circles in the West. The papers in 014471/42/18 confirm that such considerations were understood at the Foreign Office, but the professional advisers there, while unable to recommend a policy of actively seeking an alliance or close association with Russia, were also largely unwilling to offer Germany any positive encouragement to attack the Soviet state – in a word, that their position was one of ‘passive’ anti-Communism. As for the Government itself, it never renounced its interest in the ultimate fate of Central and Eastern Europe, never understood its ideas of ‘reasonable change’ and ‘revision by agreement’ to amount to giving Hitler a ‘free hand’ in the East, and never made anti-Communism the basis of a settled policy; on this see, e.g. Skidelsky, , ‘On Going to War’, Encounter, xxxix, 1, 61/5;Google ScholarNorthedge, , Troubled Giant, p. 604;Google ScholarMedlicott, W. N., The Coming of War in 1939 (London, 1963), p. 23;Google Scholar and Ulam, Adam B., Expansion and Coexistence: The History oj Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–1967 (New York, 1968), pp. 70–1, n. 36.Google Scholar

⁵² Middlemas, , Diplomacy of Illusion, pp. 432–5 and 449.Google Scholar

⁵³ Medlicott, W. N., British Foreign Policy since Versailles (London, 1968 ed.), pp. 195–7.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ For recent accounts of the Cabinet's handling of rearmament, see Colvin, , The Chamberlain Cabinet, ch. 14;Google Scholar and Taylor, A. J. P., English History 1914–1945 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 430–5.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Gilbert, and Gott, , The Appeasers, pp. 193–8;Google ScholarMacDonald, , ‘Economic Appeasement’, Past and Present, no. 56, pp. 120–31.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ BD, iii/III, no. 325.