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French Military Intelligence and the Franco-Italian Alliance, 1933–1939

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Robert J. Young
Robert J. Young
Affiliation:
University of Winnipeg
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Extract

‘Watersheds’ and ‘turning points’ are two standard literary devices for addressing the question of direction in history. Once that direction is determined, one is able to survey the roads not taken, sorting out the possible and the probable from the unavoidable. This paper forswears the vocabulary of turning points, but it owes something to the idea such language expresses. Put cryptically, our discussions of the origins of the Second World War could afford to pay closer attention to Franco-Italian relations in the 1930s. Next to the Manchurian, Rhenish, Spanish, Austrian, Czech and Polish crises of that decade, the crisis within the ephemeral alliance between Paris and Rome has been given short shrift. Even within the context of the Ethiopian crisis there is a tendency to measure the implications against Anglo-French, Anglo-Italian and Italo-German relations. The net effect is to downplay the importance of relations between France and Italy. And from that, to choose but one example, comes an exaggerated sense of the ease with which the French fell into line with British policy in the Mediterranean, and with which the Italians subsequently received German overtures respecting Austria and Central Europe.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , March 1985 , pp. 143 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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References

1 An earlier paper on French military intelligence and Nazi Germany in 1938–9 is scheduled for publication in Knowing one's enemies: intelligence assessment before the two world wars, edited by Ernest May. Because of material previously provided, my opening remarks on the organization of intelligence work against Italy are confined to 1938.

2 The principal diplomatic memoirs are those of de Chambrun, Charles, Traditions et souvenirs (Paris, 1952)Google Scholar; François-Poncet, André, Au Palais Farnèse. Souvenirs d'une ambassade à Rome, 1938–1940 (Paris, 1961)Google Scholar; Blondel, Jules, Au filière de la carrière (Paris, 1960)Google Scholar; Lagardelle, Hubert, Mission à Rome (Paris, 1955)Google Scholar; Garnier, Jean-Paul, Excellences et plumes blanches, 1922–1946 (Paris, 1961)Google Scholar; Daridan, Jean, Le chemin de la défaite, 1938–1940 (Paris, 1980)Google Scholar; Bérard, Armand, Un ambassadeur se souvient (Paris, 1976)Google Scholar; de Dampierre, Robert, ‘Dix années de politique française à Rome (1925–1935)’, Revue des Deux Mondes, LXXI (1953), 14–38, 258–83Google Scholar. See also the memoirs of ambassador Charles-Roux, François, Huit ans au Vatican, 1932–1940 (Paris, 1947)Google Scholar and Souvenirs diplomatiques. Rome-Quirinal (Paris, 1958)Google Scholar.

3 See Beauvais, Armand, Attachés militaires, attachés navals et attachés de I'air (Paris, 1937)Google Scholar. There are two unpublished memoir accounts from the service attachés in Rome. Colonel Catoire (1934–7) has left us his ‘Journal de ma mission á Rome’. General Parisot (1933–8) left a collection of Conseils deriving from his experience in Rome. These are quoted extensively in the unpublished mémoire it maîtrise by Captain Claude Carré, entitled ‘Les attachés militaires français, 1920–1945’. Both the Catoire diary and Carré's work are available at the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre at Vincennes (hereafter cited as S.H.A.T.).

4 See the complaints to this effect from the 2e Bureau in its ‘Notice sur l'armée italienne’, Jan. 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N2927; and Parisot to 2e Bureau, 18 Nov. 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N2905.

5 The most useful memoir accounts include Gauché's, Le deuxiéme bureau au travail, 1935–1940 (Paris, 1953)Google Scholar; Paillole, Paul, Services spéciaux, 1935–1940 (Paris, 1975)Google Scholar; Navarre, Henri, Le service de renseignements, 1871–1944 (Paris, 1978)Google Scholar. Secondary accounts include Garder, Michel, La guerre secrète des services spéciaux français, 1935–1940 (Paris, 1967)Google Scholar; Stead, Philip J., Second Bureau (London, 1959)Google Scholar; Castellan, Georges, Le réarmement clandestin du Reich, 1930–1935 (Paris, 1954)Google Scholar.

6 Navarre, , Le service de renseignements, p. 53Google Scholar. If this assertion is correct, little evidence of such activity occurs in the Bureau's archives. Unlike the attachés in Berlin, who frequently refer to secret sources, those in Rome rarely do.

7 Navarre, , Le service de renseignements, pp. 43–4Google Scholar.

8 By 1938 this liaison was effected by a duty officer in the Bureau and a member of the foreign ministry's sous-direction d'Europe. See ‘note pour les sections’, apparently of 1936, S.H.A. T. 7N2525; and a small dossier of April-May 1939 in S.H.A.T. 7N2524.

9 Section des Armées Etrangères (S.A.E.), 2e Bureau, 03. 1933, S.H.A.T. 7N2944Google Scholar; Lelong, to 2e Bureau, 1 09. 1933, S.H.A.T 7N2904Google Scholar; Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, ‘Exercice pour l'hiver 1933–34’, S.H.A.T. 7N2524, dos. 1.

10 Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 19 10 and 18 11 1934, S.H.A.T. 7N2904Google Scholar.

11 The proposal to co-operate on intelligence work against Germany seems to have come from General Roatta, head of Italian military intelligence, in February 1935. He also proposed the curtailment of French and Italian espionage aimed at each other. See Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 25 02 and 19 03. 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N2905Google Scholar. The exchange of information ceased in the early summer of 1936, a situation formally recognized by the Italians in September 1936 when they announced that such collaboration was suspended, rather than ended, although they maintained that joint counter-espionage work should continue. Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 30 09. 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N2908, dos. 2Google Scholar.

12 ‘Bulletin de Renseignements’, 2e Bureau, , 01–03. 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N2506Google Scholar. Catoire's diary of 11 February reads: ‘Depuis 48 heures Rome avait la fièvre. On ne parlait à voix basse que de mobilisation en vue d'une expédition en Abyssinie’ (24).

13 See entry of 12 December 1935 in the diary of General Schweisguth, Victor, Archives Nationales (A.N.) 351 AP2/dr. 6Google Scholar.

14 Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 30 05 and 30 06 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N2907, dos. 1 and 2Google Scholar; reports by 2e Bureau, 16 06, 27 08. and the undated ‘répertoire…de juillet 1936’, 7N2521Google Scholar; and the reports of 22 June and 6 July in 7N2928, dos. 3.

15 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, 2 10 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N2927, dos. 1Google Scholar; also a slightly earlier report on the ‘attitude actuelle de l'ltalie’ of Sep. 1936, in 7N2908, dos. 2.

16 ‘Note établie par le Quai d'Orsay pour l'étranger’, 26 06 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N2521.

17 Cot, to Daladier, , 27 07 1936, S.H.A.T.7N2521Google Scholar. See also the exchange of letters between Cot and Foreign Minister Delbos in which both studiously avoid reference to Italian support. Delbos to Cot, 23 Sept. and Cot to Delbos, 22 Oct. 1936, in 7N2521.

18 Between 6 and 28 May there were at least five notes from these two bureaux, all of which argued the advantages of securing Italian support. See 2e Bureau notes of 6 and 28 May, S.H.A. T. 7N2929, dos. 2 and 7N2521; and the 3e Bureau notes of 13, 15 and 20 May, in 7N3449.

19 Catoire, 24 June 1936, 80.

20 C.H.E.M. Exercise, 2e Bureau, 05 1937, S.H.A.T. 7N2927, dos. 5Google Scholar; and , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘Compte-rendu des Rens.’, 16 06 1937, in 7N2522Google Scholar.

21 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, 12 01. 1938, S.H.A.T. 7N2523Google Scholar; ‘Note sur l'attitude possible de I'Italie…’, Feb. 1938, in 7N2928, dos. 2.

22 3e Bureau, , 18 01. 1938, ‘Note au sujet d'une opération éventuelle sur la Sardaigne’, S.H.A.T. 7N3449, dos. 3Google Scholar; 2e Bureau note, ‘La Sardaigne’, 18 01. 1938, in 7N3449, dos. 3Google Scholar; 3e Bureau, , ‘Conditions générales d'une offensive contre l'ltalic’, 21 01. 1938, in 7N3449, dos. 3Google Scholar; C.S.G. ‘Note’, 11 Feb. 1938, 7N3449, dos. 2. See also Phipps, to Eden, , 10 01. 1938, Public Record Office (P.R.O.) F.O. 371, 21626, C 195/95/62Google Scholar.

23 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘C.-r. de Rens’, 21 02. and 17 03. 1938, S.H.A.T. 7N2523Google Scholar.

24 Blondel, , Auflière de la carrière, 379–80Google Scholar; Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 20 04. 1938, S.H.A.T. 7N2912, dos. 2Google Scholar; 2e Bureau, ‘C.-r. de Rens.’, 22 04., 4 05 and 1 06 1938, in 7N2525Google Scholar.

25 ‘Bulletin de Rens.’, 2e Bureau, , 30 08. 1938, S.H.A.T. 7N2523Google Scholar.

26 ‘Bulletin de Rens.’, 2e Bureau, , 15 09. 1938, S.H.A.T. 7N2523Google Scholar; , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘Note pour le S.R.’, 17 09. 1938, in 7N2928, dos. 3Google Scholar;‘C.-r. de Rens.’, 22 and 28 Sep., 1938, in 7N2525; 2e Bureau, ‘Défense du Sud-Est, 1938–1939’, July–Oct. 1938, in 7N3449, dos. 4Google Scholar.

27 Conseil Supeérieur de la Guerre, 7 Sept. 1938, Service Historique de I'Armée de I'Air (S.H.A.A.), 2 Bi; Phipps, to Halifax, , 17 09. 1938, P.R.O., F.O. 371, 21596, C 10082/37/17Google Scholar.

28 Didelet to 2e Bureau, 12 12 1938, S.H.A.T. 7N2522Google Scholar; E.M.A. du Général Georges, 17 Dec. 1938, in 7N2339.

29 See ‘Leproblème militairefrançais’, Jan. 1939, S.H.A.T. 7N2524, dos. 1; S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘C.-r. de Rens.’, 4 01 and 1 03 1939, in 7N2525Google Scholar.

30 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘Note sur la situation créée par la disparition de la Tchécoslovaquie’, 16 03. 1939, S.H.A.T. 7N2524Google Scholar; and ‘C.-r. de Rens.’, 17 Mar. 1939, in 7N2525.

31 2e Bureau, ‘Situation’, 9 04. 1939, S.H.A.T.7N2524Google Scholar; , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘Note sur les tendances du Haut Commandement Italien’, 5 05 1939, in 7 N 2926, dos. 1Google Scholar.

32 Catoire, 11 Aug. 1937, p. 136.

33 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, 03. 1933, S.H.A.T. 7N2904Google Scholar; Lelong to 2e Bureau, 1 09. 1933, in 7N2904; Parisot to 2e Bureau, 19 10. 1934, in 7N2904.

34 Lelong, to 2e Bureau, 1 09 1933, S.H.A.T. 7N2904Google Scholar; 2e Bureau, ‘Bulletin de Rens.’, 12 1934, 7N2506Google Scholar.

35 2e Bureau, ‘Bulletin de Rens.’, 09–11–12 1934, S.H.A.T. 7N2506Google Scholar.

36 From the summer of 1935 to the autumn of 1936 such assessments depended solely on the ‘open’ intelligence network. The secret intelligence operations, in theory, had been discontinued by both parties as an expression of their new relationship. The change, temporary as it proved, produced no perceptible change in either the volume or character of reporting from Rome. See 2e Bureau, ‘C.–r. de Rens.’, 06–09 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N2521; and Parisot to 2e Bureau, 30 Sept. 1936, in 7N2908, dos. 2Google Scholar.

37 2e Bureau, ‘Bulletin de Rens.’, 01–03 1935, Mar.–Apr. 1936, May–June 1937, S.H.A. T. 7N2506Google Scholar; 2e Bureau, ‘Notes sur l'armée italienne’, 06 1936, in 7N2928, dos. 2Google Scholar; and ‘Bulletin de Rens.’, Jan.–Mar. 1935, in 7 N 2506.

38 Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 17 12 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N2908, dos. 5Google Scholar.

39 Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 7 12 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N2929Google Scholar; 2e Bureau, ‘Bulletin de Rens.’, 01–02 1937, in 7N2506Google Scholar.

40 2e Bureau, ‘Bulletin de Rens.’, 01–03 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N2506Google Scholar; ‘Grands rapports de L'E.M.A.’, 3 Nov. 1936, in 7N2290; 2e Bureau, ‘Bulletin de Rens.’, 01–03 and 09–10 1935 in 7N2506; 2e Bureau, 17 Dec. 1936, in 7N2927, dos. 1Google Scholar.

41 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘Note sur la puissance militaire de l'ltalie’, 26 10. 1937Google Scholar, S.H.A.T. 7N2927, dos. 1; Parisot to 2e Bureau, 8 Nov. 1937, in 7N2911, dos. 2.

42 Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 25 11 1937, S.H.A.T. 7N2929, dos. 3Google Scholar; ‘Le problème militaire français’.Jan. 1939, in 7N2524.

43 Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 9 12 1937, S.H.A. T. 7N2911, dos. 3Google Scholar; ‘Le problème militairefrançais’, Jan. 1939, in 7N2524; 2e Bureau, Nov. 1939, in 7N2928, dos. 2; 2e Bureau, ‘L'aéronautique italienne’, 1 01. 1938, in 5N579, dos. 3Google Scholar; 2e Bureau, ‘Note sur l'aéronautique italienne’, 15 04. 1938Google Scholar, S.H.A.A. 2B81; ‘Rapport sur mission à l'ltalie, 11–23 May 1938’, May 1938, S.H.A.A. 2B80;‘L'armée de l'air italienne’, June 1938, S.H.A.A. 2B81.

44 Parisot to 2e Bureau, 9 Sept. 1937, S.H.A.T. 7N2929, dos. 4; S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘Note sur la puissance militaire italienne’, 26 10. 1937Google Scholar, in 7N2927, dos. 1.

45 2e Bureau, 8 12 1938, S.H.A.T. 7N2927, dos. 1Google Scholar; ‘Mémento sur l'armée italienne’, Apr. 1939, ibid.

46 2e Bureau, ‘C.–r. de Rens.’, 20 12. 1938Google Scholar, S.H.A. T. 7N2523; ‘Note’ 7 Aug. 1937, in 7N2926; , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘Note sur les tendances du Haut Commandement Italien’, 27 05 1939Google Scholar, in 7 N 3449, dos. 4.

47 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘Note sur la puissance militaire de l'ltalie’, 26 10. 1937Google Scholar, S.H.A.T. 7N2927, dos. 1; Parisot to 2e Bureau, 8 Nov. 1937, in 7N2911, dos. 2; 2e Bureau, ‘Note’, 8 12. 1938Google Scholar, in 7 N 292 7, dos. 1.

48 Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 9 12 1937, S.H.A.T. 7N2911, dos. 3Google Scholar; ‘C.–r. de Rens.’, 20 Dec. 1938, in 7N2523; naval attaché to 2e Bureau, 24 Feb. 1939, in 7N2914, dos. 1.

49 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘C.–r. de Rens.’, 29 03. 1939Google Scholar, S.H.A.T. 7N2525.

50 2e Bureau, ‘Situation’, 9 04. 1939Google Scholar, S.H.A.T. 7N2524; ‘Note de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée’, 8 Jan. 1936, Documents Diplomatiques Français (D.D.F.), 2nd Series 1, no. 82, pp. 116–20. By the autumn of 1938 the general staff reckoned that war against an Italo-German coalition would require the stationing of 15 divisions in the Alps and another 15 in North Africa. See Gamelin's remarks in London as reported in F.O. memorandum, 26 sept. 1938, P.R.O. F.O. 371, 21782, C 10722/10722/18.

51 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, 2 10 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N2520Google Scholar. For an appraisal of the dangers presented by bases in the Balearics, see 2e Bureau, ‘Synthèse des Rens.’, 11 1936, in 7N2521Google Scholar. As for operations conducted from Sicily, Leros, Libya and Rome, see cabinet du ministre, ‘Rens. sur les forces aériennes de l'ltalie’, 5 Nov. 1935, in 5N579, dos. 3.

52 2e Bureau, ‘Bulletin de Rens.’ 01–03 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N2506Google Scholar.

53 3e Bureau, 6 05 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N3449; Parisot to 2e Bureau, 8 Aug. 1935, in 7N2905Google Scholar. See also the author's In Command of France (Cambridge, Mass. 1978), pp. 89–90Google Scholar.

54 ‘Ière réunion des représentants des états-majors de I'air français et italien’, 9–12 Sept. 1935, S.H.A.A.2B80.

55 3e Bureau, ‘Notes relatives aux bases d'une collaboration militaire franco-italienne en Autriche et sur le Rhin, 1935–1936’ 11 Apr. 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N3449; ‘Note d'étude relative à la collaboration franco-italienne’, 8 July 1936, in 7N3449; Parisot to 2e Bureau, 18 July 1935, in 7 N 2905. See also Lt. Col. Henry Dutailly, ‘Les problèmes de l'Armée de Terre Française (1935–1940), thèse de doctorat de 3e cycle, 11, annex 2, pp. 317–24. This work is now in published form from the Imprimerie Nationale (1980).

58 3e Bureau, ‘Notes relatives aux bases d'une collaboration …’ 11 04 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N3449Google Scholar; ‘Note’ 11 May 1935, ibid.; ‘Note d'étude …’, 8 July 1935, ibid.; Parisot to 2e Bureau, 18 July 1935, in 7N2905; ‘Note sur la composition du corps expéditionnaire…’, 20 May 1936, in 7N3449.

57 See Dutailly's treatment of mobilization Plan D bis in ‘Les problèmes de l'Armée..’, 1, 90–8; and the 3e Bureau study of 11 04 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N3449Google Scholar.

58 3e Bureau study of 11 04 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N3449Google Scholar; 4e Bureau, ‘Note sur l'intervention éventuelle des forces françhises en Europe centrale’, 13 05 1936Google Scholar, ibid..

59 4e Bureau, ‘Note sur l'intervention…’, 13 05 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N3449Google Scholar; Quai d'Orsay to War Ministry, 7 Apr. 1934, in 7N2520; Schweisguth diary, 20 Oct. 1936, and 19, 22 February 1937, A.M. 351 AP3/dr 10 and dr 12.

60 4e Bureau, ‘Note sur l'intervention…’, 13 05 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N3449Google Scholar.

61 For Fabry's account of the cabinet meeting of 28 August 1935, see his deposition to the Riom court of July 1941. This material can be found in the Archives Daladier, 4DA14/dr 3/part 1, p. 5. See also 2e Bureau, ‘Etude de la réponse anglaise’ 2 10 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N2520Google Scholar.

62 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘Etude des répercussions exercées sur la Défense Nationale par le conflit italo-éthiopien’ 8 10 1935, S.H.A.T. 7N2520Google Scholar.

63 See for example the note entitled ‘Le conflit italo-éthiopien et la France’, 19 Oct. 1935, S.H.A.T. 5N579, dos. 3.

64 2e Bureau lecture on ‘la situation politique et militaire en Europe’, 10 Feb. 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N2521Google Scholar; Gamelin, to Daladier, , 14 08 1936, Archives Daladier, 1DA7/dr2/sdreGoogle Scholar.

65 Parisot to 2e Bureau, 17 Dec. 1936, S.H.A.T. 7N2908, dos. 5; Schweisguth diary, 22 Dec. 1936, A.M. 351 AP3/ dr 10.

66 2e Bureau, ‘Réflexions sur un conflit éventuel en Europe’ 9 Mar. 1937, S.H.A.T. 7N2522.

67 For this short-lived diplomatic initiative, see Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 20 04 1937, S.H.A.T. 7N2909, dos. 4Google Scholar; , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘C.-r. de Rens.’ 17 07 1937, in 7N2522Google Scholar. Schweisguth's, lecture on ‘les données militaires actuelles d'une guerre de coalition’ of 20 04 1937, is found in Dutailly, ‘Les problèmes de l'Armée…’, 11, annex 9, 390–2Google Scholar.

68 2e Bureau, ‘Hypothèse sur les forces dont I'Allemagne et I'Italie pourraient disposer au printemps 1939…’, 24 03 1938, S.H.A.T. 7N2522Google Scholar.

69 Apart from Buisson, there were others in the minister's cabinet militaire who regarded Italy as ‘un facteur preponderant’. See the note from the ministry's section de défense nationale on ‘la question tchécoslovaque’, 15 May. 1938, Archives Daladier, 4DA8/dr5/sdra.

70 Buisson's, note is entitled ‘L'Alliance France-Italie’ 13 03 1938, S.H.A.T. 5N579, dos. 3Google Scholar.

71 Ibid. For the air staff's support of this advice, see General Vuillemin's note to Gamelin, 25 Oct. 1938, Archives Daladier, 4DA5/dr7/sdrb.

72 Parisot, to 2e Bureau, 19 03 and 9 04 1938, S.H.A.T. 7N2912Google Scholar; , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, 20 12 1938, in 7N2523; and 4 May 1939, in 7N2524Google Scholar.

71 ‘Etude sur les opérations aériennes initiales contre l'ltalie et l'Allemagne’ 19 Dec. 1938, S.H.A.A. 2B92; ‘Instruction particulière sur l'exécution des opérations initiales contre l'Italie’, 14 Apr. 1939, in 2B80.

74 , S.A.E., 2e Bureau, ‘C.-r. de Rens.’, 31 05 1939, S.H.A.T. 7N2525Google Scholar; 2e Bureau, 7 07 1939, in 7N2524, dos. 1Google Scholar.

75 Included among contemporary sceptics was Jean Daridan, embassy secretary in Rome in 1939. See Daridan, , Le chemin de la défaite, 114–18Google Scholar.

76 Quai d'Orsay to War Ministry, 7 Apr. 1934, S.H.A.T. 7N2520.