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‘Freethinking’ and ‘Freedom of Thought’ in eighteenth-century Britain*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Peter N. Miller
Peter N. Miller
Affiliation:
Clare Hall, Cambridge
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Abstract

In early modern Europe, religious heterodoxy and intellectual inquiry posed serious challenges to the authority of centralizing forces both secular and ecclesiastical. At the same time, however, these dangerous developments had been driven by those individuals whom eighteenth-century writers had adopted as ‘culture heroes’ for an age increasingly self-conscious of its own enlightened status. In Britain, the newly established order defended itself against the scepticism and moral determinism of ‘freethinkers’ by upholding a religious and moral order based on liberty. But ‘freethinkers’ such as Anthony Collins were themselves the inheritors of, and propagandists for, the seventeenth-century revolution in science which underpinned the ideology being wielded against them. Their challenge elicited from Edmund Law an argument which co-opted their epistemology to ground the familiar metaphysics of liberty associated with the Newtonian position of Samuel Clarke. Where ‘freethinking’ had been perceived as a dangerous solvent of the social order, ‘freedom of thought’, within limits that were themselves a leading subject of debate in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain, could be upheld as consistent with the demands of political society.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , September 1993 , pp. 599 - 617
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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References

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