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FASCIST FOREIGN POLICY AND OFFICAL ITALIAN VIEWS OF ANTHONY EDEN IN THE 1930s

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2000

ROBERT MALLETT
ROBERT MALLETT
Affiliation:
University of Leeds
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Abstract

This article examines the relationship between Anthony Eden, British minister for League of Nations' affairs (1935) and foreign secretary (1935–8), and Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime within the context of Italian foreign policy in the later 1930s. It outlines the precise aims and objectives of Mussolini's expansionist policies over the period 1935–8, assesses the accuracy of Eden's interpretation of them and, in turn, discusses official Italian diplomatic perceptions of Eden. It specifically challenges Renzo De Felice's view that for Mussolini, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia (1935–6) marked the limit of Fascist expansionism. Furthermore, it contests his theory that the dictator did not pursue an Italo–German alliance that would drive an Italian imperialist war against Britain and France in the Mediterranean and Red Sea. Anthony Eden had been fully aware of such an intention, and had been targeted by the regime as Italy's ‘public enemy number one’, precisely because he fully comprehended what lay at the heart of Mussolini's brand of Fascism.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 43 , Issue 1 , March 2000 , pp. 157 - 187
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

The author wishes to thank Peter Bursey of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library London, and dottoressa Stefania Ruggeri of the Archivio Storico Diplomatico Rome, for their kind assistance. He is also indebted to Professor John Gooch, Professor Brian Sullivan, and Dr Martin Thomas for their advice on early drafts of this article, and to the Royal Historical Society and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their financial support.