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The ‘Dress Rehearsal’: The Foreign Office and the Control of Italy, 1943–1944

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Bruno Arcidiacono
Affiliation:
University of Geneva

Abstract

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Type
Communications
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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References

1 See respectively W. H. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia. Their cooperation and conflict,

2 See Yergin, D., Shattered peace (Boston, 1978)Google Scholar, chs. I and II. 1941–1946 (London, 1953), p. 310, and Kolko, G., The politics of war. The World and U.S. foreign policy, 1943–1945 (New York, 1968), p. 128Google Scholar.

3 Lynd, S., ‘How the cold war began’, Commentary, xxx, 5 (11 1960), 384Google Scholar.

4 McNeill, , America, Britain and Russia, p. 220Google Scholar.

5 The public papers and addresses of F. D. Roosevelt, ed. by Rosenman, S. I. (New York, 1950), XII, 3Google Scholar.

6 Macmillan to Churchill no. 9861, 9 Feb. 1943, Public Record Office, F.O. 371, R 6050/ 6050/22 (37298).

7 F.O. to Washington, no. 3596, 29 May 1943, R 6151/6050/22 (37300).

8 For a summary of this discussion see Arcidiacono, Bruno, L'Italie dans les relations interalliées: la répétition générate (1943–1944) (Genéva, 1981), pp. 36124Google Scholar, and Varsori, A., ‘Senior or equal partner?’, Rivista di studipolitici intemazionali, XLV, 2 (0406 1978)Google Scholar.

9 Macmillan, H., The blast of war, 1939–1945 (London, 1967), p. 454Google Scholar.

10 Memorandum, Haskell for A.S.W., C.A.D. files, 7 Apr. 1943, Civil affairs: soldiers become governors, ed. Coles, H. L. and Weinberg, A. K. (Washington, 1964), p. 168Google Scholar.

11 F.O. to Macmillan no. 857, 1 June 1943, R 6103/6050/22 (37299).

12 See a more detailed analysis of these discussions in La répétition, pp. 171–316.

13 This expression is used by Dixon, P. J. in his memorandum ‘Control commission and arrangements in Italy’, 29 09. 1943Google Scholar, R 9356/6447/22 (37309).

14 The memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), p. 109Google Scholar.

15 U 321/67/70 (35338).

16 Eden to Clark Kerr no. 56, 4 Feb. 1943, ibid.

17 ‘Secret record of meeting held in Jebb's room’, 3 Mar. 1943, U 1178/25/70 (35315).

19 On 24 and 25 March, during Eden's visit to the United States: Jebb accompanied the secretary of state and profited from the occasion to discuss the matter with Dunn, Atherton and N. Davis.

20 Memorandum by the secretary of state for foreign affairs, 25 May 1943, U 2556/25/70 (35318). Also see SirWoodward, L., British foreign policy in the secondworld war (London, 1976), v, 46–9Google Scholar, and Warner, G., ‘Italy and the powers 1943–1949,’ The Rebirth of Italy, ed. Woolf, J. S. (London, 1972) pp. 30ffGoogle Scholar.

21 See for example B. Kuklick: ‘On the basis of the available evidence it is difficult to explain this high-level British statement…’ What creates particular doubts in the author's mind is that ‘it immediately invited full Russian participation in the Italian surrender, and […]London soon attempted to dissociate itself from it’ (see The genesis of the E.A.C,’ Journal of Contemporary History, IV, 4 (1969), 190)Google Scholar. In the following pages I will attempt to explain this apparent incongruity.

22 Djilas, M., Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962), p. 114Google Scholar.

23 ‘On the making of peace’, memorandum dated Mar. 1943. U 2652/25/70 (35319).

24 Armistices and related problems.

26 See Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter F.R.U.S.], 1943, 1, 708–10.

27 See U 3009/25/70 (35320).

28 Note dated 26 June 1943, U 2709/324/70 (35385).

29 Note by J. G. Ward, 29 June 1943, ibid.

30 Minutes of a meeting between Jebb, Dixon, Webster, Ward, Fitzmaurice, etc., 30 June 1943, U 2997/324/70(35386).

31 Armistices and related problems.

32 ‘Surrender terms for Italy…’, memorandum C.C.S. 258/1, 1 July 1943, R 6347/6050/22 (37305). Also see J.S.M. to London no. 36, 5 July 1943, ibid.

33 Note of the 6 July 1943, U 3009/25/70 (35320).

34 F.O. to Halifax no. 4855, 23 July 1943, U 3225/324/70 (35386).

35 Note by G. M. Wilson, 25 July 1943, N 4514/499/38 (36991). The next day Eden suggested this interpretation to Winant: F.R.U.S., 1943, II, 335.

36 Note by Wilson quoted above.

37 As Clark Kerr put it, ‘if […] we invite them to come to Italy, we should be on good ground to demand a counter invitation’. Kerr to the F.O. no. 684, 28 July 1943, R 6938/242/22 (37263 A). Also see Kerr to C.F.A. Warner, letter dated 10 Aug. 1943 N 5158/66/38(36956).

38 Memorandun dated 3 Aug. 1943, F.R.U.S., The conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, P. 538.

39 Post-hostilities planning sub-committee, memorandum PHP(43)2, 9 Aug. 1943, P.R.O., CAB 87, 83.

40 ‘Administration of Italy after Husky’, memorandum by Dixon, dated 5 07 1943Google Scholar, R 6794/6445/22 (37307).

41 Memorandum ACA(43)7, 10 Aug. 1943, CAB 87, 83.

42 It was on this basis that the control commission was finally set up, at the beginning of November 1943: see La répétition, pp. 279–316.

43 In the meantime the F.O. had been clearly impressed by the ‘increasing interest taken by the Soviet government in Italian affairs’, and the cabinet had declared that ‘the Russians will regard [Italy] as a test case which will determine their future attitude towards collaboration’. But American reluctance vis-à-vis any project which might lead to the creation of ‘two independent sources of authority’ on the peninsula blocked the F.O.'s attempt to offer the Soviets ‘a satisfactory place on the Control Commission, something better than membership of the advisory Council on an equality with the Greek and Yugoslav governments…’ See La répétition, pp. 413, 422–4.

44 See respectively Kerr to the F.O. no. 1252, 5 Nov. 1943, and the Pravda editorial of 2 Nov. 1943, N 6575 and 6536/3666/38 (37031 and 37030).

45 See the British and American minutes in N 6921/3666/38 (73031) and F.R.U.S., 1943, 1, 604–13, 705–8.

46 At times they were made to believe exactly the opposite: see for example the British minutes of the meeting of October 22.

47 See The Eden memoirs (London, 1965), II, 414Google Scholar.

48 Pravda, 2 Nov. 1943.

49 At the beginning Vyshinsky's colleagues were Macmillan, Robert Murphy and René Massigli. The Greeks and Yugoslavs were admitted at a later stage.

50 See R 10750 and 11011/6447/22 (37311 and 37312). Also F.R.U.S., 1943, II, 434.

51 During the 3rd session, 15 Dec. 1943, R 238/51/22 (43829).

52 This appointment was the result of a deciphering error during the transmission to Moscow of the text of the armistice agreement between the United Nations and Italy: La répétition, p. 453.

53 J.S.M. to London DON 114, 11 Dec. 1943, and letter from Sargent to Bovenschen, 2 Dec. 1943, R 13105 and 12497/6447/22 (37316 and 37314).

54 Naturally enough Massigli, the French delegate on the A.C.I., followed closely on his heels.

55 This was Vyshinsky's verdict on his return to the U.S.S.R., as expressed to the British ambassador: Clark Kerr to the F.O. no. 691, 14 Mar. 1944, R 4019/51/22 (43830).

56 Mastny, V., Russia's road to the cold war (New York, 1979), p. 143Google Scholar.

57 Macmillan to the F.O. no. 408, 10 Mar. 1944, R 3880/51/22 (43830).

58 See his minute M 255/4, 10 Mar. 1944, R 4328/51/22 (43830).

59 Halifax to the F.O. no. 1374,18 Mar. 1944, R 4332/51/22 (43830) and Hull, 's instructions to Harriman, , 16 03 1944, F.R.U.S., 1944, III, 1057–9Google Scholar.

60 Rumbold to the F.O. no. 450, 21 Mar. 1944, R 4484/51/22 (43830).

61 Eden to Macmillan no. 421, 23 Mar. 1944, R 4547/51/22 (43830).

62 Ibid., and NAF 653, 22 Mar. 1944, R 4665/51/22 (43830).

63 It should be emphasized that the preamble to this document placed the U.S.S.R. on the same footing as Great Britain and the United States.

64 As has been argued by Herz, M.: ‘The U.S. and Britain did not wish the Russians to have a role in the occupation of Italy because they were worried that the Russians would support the activities of the Italian communists…’ Beginnings of the cold war (Bloomington, 1966), p. 182Google Scholar.