Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-hc48f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T05:55:17.267Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

G. C. Peden
G. C. Peden
Affiliation:
University of Bristol
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Over ten years have passed since Michael Howard offered what he himself called a controversial thesis about British defence policy before the Second World War. This was that ‘the Empire brought Britain no strength in her dealings with Germany. Yet British strength had nevertheless to be dissipated in the Empire's defence.’ By 1937 the needs of home defence against air attack and of imperial defence seemed so overwhelming toBritish policy-makers that the cabinet decided that no expeditionary force could be spared to help maintain the European balance of power. Howard stressed that he was offering only a ‘very rough preliminary sketch’, which was ‘probably distorted and certainly incomplete’, in view of the limited range of documents which he had had time to consult. In particular, what was missing from his thesis was any attempt to give weights to the relative importance of home and imperial defence problems as explanations for lack of preparation to commit land forces to help allies on the European continent.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , June 1984 , pp. 405 - 423
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Howard, M., The continental commitment (London, 1972), pp. 100, 120Google Scholar. For the historiographical context of this book, and for the works of Correlli Barnett and Brian Bond referred to below, see Strachan, H., ‘The British way in warfare revisited’, Historical Journal, XXVI, 2 (1983), 447–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Howard, Continental commitment, p. 7.

3 Pratt, L. R., East of Malta, west of Suez (Cambridge, 1975), p. xiiGoogle Scholar.

4 Bond, B., British military policy between the two worldwars (Oxford, 1980), pp. 12 f., 80, 111, 188 f., 258 f., 267–70, 338Google Scholar.

5 Cabinet minutes, 8 12 1937, pp. 265Google Scholarf., Cabinet Office papers, Public Record Office, CAB. 23/90A.

6 Gibbs, N., Grand strategy (London, 1976), 1, 283–5, 642–7, 657–68, 675–9,Google Scholarand Young, R., ‘La guerre de longue durée: some reflections on French strategy and diplomacy in the 1930s’, in Preston, A. (ed.), General staffs and diplomacy before the second world war (London, 1978)Google Scholar.

7 The most detailed account is Gibbs, Grand strategy. Peden, G. C., British rearmament and the Treasury 1932–1939 (Edinburgh, 1979)Google Scholarexplains how economic and financial considerations shaped strategy. For a useful discussion of earlier literature see Dunbabin, J., ‘British rearmament in the 1930s: a chronology and review’, Historical Journal, XVIII (1975), 587–609CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Annual review by Chiefs of Staff, C.O.S. 310, 12 Oct. 1933, and minutes of defence requirements committee, p. 42, 14 Nov. 1933, CAB. 16/109; minutes of ministerial disarmament committee, D.C. (M.) (32), p. 150, 15 05 1934Google Scholar, CAB. 27/507.

9 Strategic appreciation committee, minutes, 13 03 1939, pp. 45–50Google Scholar, CAB. 16/209. The Chiefs of Staffhad hopes that Turkey might come in against Italy, stopping the latter's important Black Sea trade; see Gibbs, Grand Strategy, 1, 658, 665, 675.

10 See Smith, M., ‘The Royal Air Force, air power and British foreign policy, 1932–37’, Journal of Contemporary History, XII (1977), 153–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fearon, P., ‘The British airframe industry and the state, 1918–35’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. XXVII (1974), 236–51Google Scholar, and (for some international comparisons) Robertson, A., ‘The British airframe industry and the state in the interwar period: a comment’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. XXVIII (1975), 648–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 D.C.M. (32) 120, 20 06 1934Google Scholar, CAB. 27/511, and interim report by ministerial committee dealing with air defence, C.P. 193 (34), 16 07 1934Google Scholar, CAB. 27/514.

12 ‘Revision of defence requirements’, D.R.C. 30, 2 10 1935Google Scholar, CAB. 16/112. Howard, Continental commitment, p. 140.

13 Defence plans (policy) committee minutes, 19 04 1937Google Scholar, CAB. 167/181.

14 Cabinet minutes, 27 Oct. 1937, pp. 75–9, CAB. 23/90A; Cabinet minutes, 23 Feb. 1938, pp. 266 f., CAB. 23/92, andGoogle ScholarCohen, M., ‘British strategy and the Palestine question’, Journal of Contemporary History, VII (1972), 164fGoogle Scholar.

15 D.P. (P.) 20, by Chiefs of Staff, 11 Feb. 1938, CAB. 16/182.

16 Pratt, East of Malta, west of Suez, pp. 93, 115; Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) minutes, 26 January 1939, CAB. 27/8.

17 Bond, British military policy, p. 119; ‘The organisation of the army and its role in war’, D.P.(P.) 17, 10 Feb. 1938, CAB. 16/182.

18 Howard, Continental commitment, p. 115; cabinet minutes, 22 02. 1939, p. 307Google Scholar, CAB. 23/97.

19 Howard, Continental commitment, pp. 116 f.

20 Bond, British military policy, pp. 187 f., 338.

21 Ibid. p. 182.

22 Peden, British rearmament and the treasury, pp. 143 f., 147 f., 173, 175.

23 Ibid. pp. 121–8, 134–9.

24 ‘Mobile division/cavalry mechanization’ file, esp. fos. 14A, 30B and 33A ff., War Office papers, Public Record Office, W.O. 32/2826. The senior cavalry regiments were given the privilege of being the last to be mechanized – informal Army Council precis no. 3, 27 Oct. 1937, W.O. 163/47.

25 Hore-Belisha to Chamberlain, 31 Jan. 1938, Prime Minister's Office papers, Public Record Office, PREM. 1/241. Informal Army Council minutes, 20 July 1937, item 3, W.O. 163/47; ‘Tank situation statements to D.P.R. sub-committee’, memorandum by deputy under-secretary, 24 May 1937, W.O. 32/4441.

26 Informal Army Council minutes, 28 Oct. 1937, W.O. 163/47.

27 Peden, British rearmament and the treasury, ch. v.

28 Informal Army Council minutes, 13 July 1937, item 2, and précis no. 8, Nov. 1937 (n.d.), W.O. 163/47.

29 On this question see Parker, R. A. C., ‘British rearmament 1936–9: Treasury, trade unions and skilled labour’, English Historical Review, XCVI (1981), 306–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Howard, Continental commitment, pp. 74, 107.

31 C.I.G.S. to Secretary of State, 30 Sept. 1937, W.O. 32/4599.

32 Parl. papers, 1934–9, air army estimates and appropriation accounts.

33 Slessor, J., The central blue (London, 1956), esp. pp. 166, 183, 204–8Google Scholar; Webster, C. and Frankland, N., The strategic air offensive against Germany (London, 1961), I, esp. pp. 65, 107, 129 f., 145–7Google Scholar.

34 British military policy, pp. 337 f.

35 Chamberlain to his sister Ida, 6 Feb. 1937, Neville Chamberlain papers, N.C. 18/1/993, University of Birmingham Library.

36 Chatfield to First Lord, 10 Nov. 1937, covering ‘Notes on defence expenditure papers’ by Captain T. S. V. Phillips, director of plans, same date, Admiralty papers, Public Record Office, ADM. 116/3631.

37 See Roskill, S., Hankey, man of secrets, III (London, 1974), ch. VIIGoogle Scholar.

38 Hamill, I., The strategic illusion: the Singapore strategy and the defence of Australia and New Zealand (Singapore, 1981), esp. pp. 287 fGoogle Scholar.

39 Barnett, C., The collapse of British power (London, 1972), ch. IVGoogle Scholar.

40 Ibid., esp. pp. 133–7, 217–19, 232.

41 Ibid. p. 205.

42 Sources: Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Political and strategic interests of the United Kingdom (London, 1939)Google Scholar and Statistical Office of the United Nations, National income statistics 1938–1947 (New York, 1948)Google Scholar.

43 Cabinet minutes, 23 Feb. 1938, p. 276, CAB. 23/92. Hamill, Strategic illusion, p. 287.

44 Hankey to Stanley Baldwin, 17 Nov. 1934, Baldwin papers, 1/57, University of Cambridge Library.

45 Hillmer, N., ‘Defence and ideology: the Anglo-Canadian military “alliance” in the 1930s’, International Journal, XXXIII (1978), 588–612Google Scholar.

46 Darwin, J., ‘Imperialism in decline? Tendencies in British imperial policy between the Wars’, Historical Journal, XXIII (1980), p. 666Google Scholar. See also Holland, R. F., Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918–1939 (London, 1981), ch. XCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 Cabinet minutes, 25 Sept. 1938, p. 227, CAB. 23/95.

48 Ovendale, R., ‘Appeasement’ and the English-speaking world (Cardiff, 1975), esp. p. 319Google Scholar.

49 C.O.S. to prime minister, 29 Oct. 1930 (copy in Chancellor of the Exchequer's office), Treasury papers, Public Record Office, T. 172/1700.

50 Barnett, Collapse of British power, p. 134.

51 RIIA, Political and strategic interests of the United Kingdom, p. 295.

52 Rawson, J., ‘The role of India in imperial defence beyond Indian frontiers and home waters, 1919–39’, D. Phil. 1976Google Scholar.

53 ‘Cabinet committee on the defence of India. Report of the expert committee on the defence of India’, 23 June 1939, CAB. 24/287.

54 P. J. Grigg (government of India) to Sir Findlater Stewart (India Office), 4 May 1936, and Grigg to Sir Horace Wilson (Chamberlain's confidential adviser), 16 Jan. 1938, Sir James Grigg papers, 2/20 and 2/23, Churchill College, Cambridge.

55 Barnett, Collapse of British power, p. 219.

56 C.I.D. minutes, 29 Oct. 1936, CAB. 2/6(2).

57 Cabinet minutes, 13 Apr. 1938, p. 166, CAB. 23/93, and 29 June 1938, pp. 67–71, CAB. 23/94.

58 Cabinet minutes, 25 May 1938, pp. 360 f., CAB. 23/93. For Australian views on these matters see Australia in the war of 1939–1945 (series four, civil), Butler, S. J., War economy (Canberra, 1955), pp. 5–7, and (series three, air),Google ScholarGillison, D., Royal Australian Air Force (Canberra, 1962), 1, 42–9 and 55–7Google Scholar; McCarthy, J. M., ‘Australia and imperial defence: co-operation and conflict 1918–1939’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, XVII (1971), 19–32Google Scholar.

59 Official history of the Indian armed forces in the second world war: Sinha, N. and Khera, P., Indian war economy (Kanpur, 1962), pp. 14, 23–7, 202, 204–6Google Scholar.

60 Official history of the Canadian army in the second world war: Stacey, C. P., Six years of war (Ottawa, 1956), p. 20Google Scholar.

61 Thucydides, , History, trans. Jowett, B. (Oxford, 1881), 1, 83Google Scholar.

62 See Burk, Kathleen, ‘Great Britain in the United States 1917–1918: the turning point’, International History Review, 1 (1979), 228–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Hillmer, ‘Defence and ideology’, International Journal, XXXIII, 607 f.

64 Sayers, R. S., Financial policy 1339–45 (London, 1956), ch. XI, esp. p. 362Google Scholar.

65 Ibid. ch. IX, esp. pp. 256 and 274 f.

66 Hitler, A., Mein Kampf, trans. Murphy, J. (London, 1939), pp. 541 fGoogle Scholar.

67 Britain herself relied largely on oil from the Caribbean, but denying oil to the Germans was a major strategic goal – see Monroe, Elizabeth, Britain's moment in the Middle East (London, 1963), pp. 95, 112Google Scholar.