¹ Schafer, H., ‘Die militSrischen Abmachungen des Dreibundes vor dem Weltkrieg’, Militdrwissenschaftliche Mitteihtngen (1922), Heft 9.Google Scholar Further material on these early negotiations is provided by Glaise-Horstenau, E. von, Franz Josephs WeggefdhrteGoogle Scholar; in Kiszling's, R. study of the subject in Mil. Wiss. Mit. (1933), Heft 3Google Scholar; and in three admirable works by Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, of which there is an English edition, the first two volumes of his Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, and a long article, ‘Die Zusammenarbeit der Generalstabe Deutschlands und Oesterreich-Ungarns vor dem ersten Weltkrieg’ in Zur Geschichte und Problematik der Demokratie (1958), pp. 523-49.

² The full text of this draft is given in Ritter's Schlieffen. The plan became more and more single-minded, until eventually Schlieffen included Holland in his list of condemned neutralities. She won her reprieve in 1914 because Moltke thought her an essential economic outlet.

³ Glaise-Horstenau, 344.

⁴ , Ritter, ‘Zusammenarbeit’, pp. 532–3Google Scholar.

⁵ , Ritter, Schlieffen, pp. 31–2Google Scholar.

⁶ , Conrad, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918, 1, 369–70Google Scholar, gives an account of the opening of these negotiations and discussions. They were arranged beforehand by Aehrenthal and Biilow, and throughout the resulting correspondence the foreign minister, the German Chancellor, and the two emperors were shown the letters concerned.

⁷ Railway construction in the Habsburg Monarchy, particularly in the Balkans, was made excessively difficult by Hungarian obstruction. The Hungarian regime was most anxious to emphasize that Hungary was a separate state and to make her economically cohesive. Consequently, while each half of the Monarchy built up its railways with speed and care, there were very few lines which connected the two. Hungary and Galicia, for example, were connected only by a single-track railway over the Dukla Pass; transport from Vienna to Lwów (Lemberg) went not by the shorter route through Hungary but via Cracow and Prague. These conditions were still worse in the Balkans, where they were complicated by economic rivalry between Austria and Hungary. Hungary was anxious to integrate Croatia into the other lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, and there was therefore no direct and fast railway communication between Austria and Bosnia, except via Budapest. To travel from Laibach (Ljubljana) in Austrian Slovenia to Zagreb in Hungarian Croatia, a distance of some forty miles, took three hours; and any freight to Europe proper had to pass from Croatia via Budapest. The Hungarians seem even to have chosen a somewhat different railway track. The Archduke Charles, later emperor, when returning from his honeymoon in Dalmatia in 1911, had to transfer from his own state-coach to one specially brought down from the Hungarian capital, since the Hungarian state-railways could accommodate only such a carriage ( Lorenz, R., Kaiser Karl und der Untergang der Donaumonarchie, p. 100)Google Scholar.

⁸ Winston Churchill's Unknown War contains an unsurpassed account of the Austro-Hungarian mobilization plans and the difficulties they encountered. Information on these comes from a variety of sources, notably Conrad's memoirs, the Austrian Official History, Oesterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, 1, 3–15—this is an official history rare in its kind in fairness and lucidity—Kiszling, Oesterreichs Anteil am Ersten Weltkrieg; and a dissertation for Vienna University by F. Kas. I have considerably simplified the Austro-Hungarian plans, particularly as regards the exact numbers involved with the three mobilization-plans: these were slightly altered from year to year, and in a strategic study it would be cumbersome to record trivial changes in the operational structure. In July 1914, the strength of the three groups was: ‘A’-Stqffel, 28½ infantry divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, 21 reserve brigades; ‘B’-Staffel, 12 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 6 reserve brigades; Minimalgruppe Balkan, 8 infantry divisions, o cavalry divisions, 7 reserve brigades. (The reserve brigades were composed of territorials (Landsturm) and untrained conscripts (Ersatz): these were not counted as a serious fighting-force.) I do not, in the text, complicate issues by mentioning the cavalry divisions, since each was little more than the size of an infantry regiment, and all but one were intended for Galicia. The First, Fourth, and Third Armies made up ‘A’-Staffel; the Second Army was ‘B’-Staffel; the Fifth and Sixth Armies formed the Minimalgruppe Balkan. Each of the sixteen Army Corps of the Monarchy was also attached to one of the Staffeln, but the mobilization of 1914 disrupted these careful apportionings, and ‘B’-Staffel lost, in the end, a good part of its original force. The exact strength of the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1914 was: 48 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions, 2 Landsturm divisions and 41 reserve brigades. The German Army contained 90 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions. Much useful information on these points is to be gained from the London War Office series, ‘Handbooks on Foreign Armies’, prepared for the Intelligence Department of the British War Office.

⁹ The Moltke-Conrad correspondence is printed almost in entirety in Conrad's memoirs. After the War, when writing these memoirs, Conrad had the use of the original material in the War Archives and his versions are, apart from a few and trivial verbal omissions, correct. This correspondence is still extant, for the great part, in Vienna, and, where possible, I have given the reference of the War Archives: Kriegsarchiv (Wien) Generalstab Faszikel 89 (a) Operations-Bureau, in addition to the Conrad reference. This archive source contains Moltke's letters as they arrived, and Conrad's letters in their final draft before being made easily legible by a copy-writer. In quoting the original German I do so where the source is entirely imprinted. According to the text of these letters, or to notes appended to the text, they were invariably shown to the foreign ministry and the emperor, both in Vienna and Berlin, before being sent off. I find it difficult to believe that the responsible political authorities ever paid much attention to this correspondence, varying as it does so often from wearisome technicalities to grotesque fantasies. Many of Conrad's comments to Moltke were in flagrant contradiction to his foreign ministers’ views: but I can find nothing to suggest that the foreign ministers, particularly Aehrenthal, ever took exception to the contents of any of these letters. I assume that Aehrenthal, after a time, gave up reading the correspondence. The German statesmen were presumably more thorough: but at the same time they were much more intimidated by military minds. Conrad's initial letter of 1 January 1909, referred to in Conrad I, 369-75, is in Vienna as Kriegsarchiv Generalstab Faszikel 89 (a) Operations-Bureau Kuvert 1909/I.

¹⁰ Conrad, I, 379-84; Kr.A. ibid. 1909/II.

¹¹ Conrad, I, 384-93; Kr.A. ibid. 1909/III. To this letter is attached as Beilage Ilia, document which appears to be a tracing of an operational sketch, apparently sent with the letter. It covers a possible defensive position for ‘A’-Staffel in Galicia, with its strength gathered behind the rivers San and Dniester. This was the very plan which Moltke found unwelcome.

¹² Conrad, I, 394-6; Kr.A. ibid. 1909/IV. Conrad's pencilled note occurs where Moltke urges Conrad to attack Russia: ‘1st dieses grosse Ziel erreicht, dann wird sich die serbische Angelegenheit fiir Oesterreich von selber erledigen.’

¹³ Conrad, I, 396-9; Kr.A. ibid.1909/V.

¹⁴ This letter, briefly mentioned by Conrad, is Kr.A. ibid.1909/VI.

¹⁶ Conrad, 1, 401-2; Kr.A. ibid.1909/VII.

¹⁶ Conrad, I, 403-5; Kr.A. ibid.1909/VIII.

¹⁷ Conrad, 1, 405-6; Kr.A. ibid.1909/IX. Conrad mentions in his memoirs a further letter of 1909, described as Privatschreiben (1, 165). Here Moltke regrets that an occasion for war was missed in 1908/9.

¹⁸ Conrad, II, 54-7; Kr.A. ibid.1910/II.

¹⁹ Conrad, II, 57-60; Kr.A. ibid.1910/III.

²⁰ Conrad, II, 61-2; Kr.A. ibid.1910/VIII.

²¹ Conrad, II, 62; Kr.A. ibid.1910/IX.

²² Conrad, II, 102-5; Kr.A. ibid.1911/XVII.

²³ Conrad, II, 105-7; Kr.A. ibid.1911/Geheimnummer 34.

²⁴ Conrad, II, 107-9; Kr.A. ibid.1911/Geheimnumrner 35.

²⁵ Kr.A. ibid.1912/II.

²⁶ Schemua wrote to Moltke in May to confirm all previous arrangements (Kr.A. ibid.1912/III) and, on taking up office, had required the file of extracts. On 22 November 1912 he wrote a report of his stay in Berlin with the German Chief of Staff: ‘Auch versprach mir derselbe eine nicht nur zuwartende, sondern tatkraftige Offensivaktion parallel mit der unseren. Er betonte wiederholt die bundestreue Gesinnung, dass wir absolut auf Deutschlands Unterstiitzung rechnen diirfen, wenn Russland uns bedroht, und dass es ja auch fur Deutsch-land ein eminentes Interesse sei, dass wir nicht geschwacht werden.’ On his plans in the West, Moltke gave as his intention ‘Den Gegner in West zuerst niederzuwerfen, was er in 4-5 Wochen hoffe, und dann den Ueberschuss an Kraft gegen Ost einzusetzen.’ Moltke even talked of strengthening his forces in the East with reserve troops (Kr.A. ibid.1912/VII).

²⁷ Conrad, III, 49–50. The 1912–13 files contain a plan for Averescu's attention.

²⁸ Conrad, III, 76; Kr.A. ibid.1913/VIII. The 1914 files contain the text of a military agreement with Italy, concluded in 1913. I doubt if anyone took this very seriously, though Conrad (in, 33 and 88) gives curious evidence of German optimism here.

²⁸ Ibid. pp. 144-7.

³⁰ Conrad, III, 147-51. I have not found the original texts of these letters in the Archives. 81 There are several indications that Moltke was assuming English intervention at the side of France. An Austro-Hungarian military mission, sent by Conrad, reports that Moltke was thinking in such terms (Kr.A. ibid.Kuvert 1911). Conrad cites (III, 151—3) a report from his military attaché in Berlin that Moltke ‘with regard to England… believed that England had pledged herself to France by a written agreement to co-operate in a war against Germany, therefore he had to reckon on her intervention… it was a pity that England was so blind.’ Again, at the Leipzig anniversary celebrations in October 1913, Moltke declared that ‘We must consider England, who will certainly stand at the side of France’. On the other hand, Moltke's military attache in Vienna told Conrad that German statesmen did not believe England would intervene until two years of war had passed. (Conrad, III, 433 and 167.)

³² Ibid. pp. 561-3.

³³ Ibid. pp. 668-73; Kr.A. ibid.1914/IV for the text of Conrad's final letter of 14 February, where he regrets that war was not caused in 1908/9 or 1912/13, and describes his fears at the growth of an enemy ring.

³⁴ Moltke came to Karlsbad again at the beginning of July, but it was deemed inappropriate that the two men should meet, in view of a possible press-comment on the danger of war (Conrad, IV, 63).

³⁵ Ibid. pp. 55-6; Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, VIII, Nr. 10,076 (‘One of the most damning documents on German responsibility for the war’, L. Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914, II, 146).

³⁶ Conrad, IV, 52 f.

³⁷ Ibid. pp. 110 f.

³⁸ Details of the Austro-Hungarian mobilization procedure are given in the Official History, Oesterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg, I, 3-15, and in the introductions to the sections on the summer campaigns in Russia and Serbia. Conrad's memoirs also contain most of the relevant material—the partial mobilization against Serbia is discussed on IV, 122. In the partial mobilization ‘B’, the Third Corps (Graz) was also mobilized, for fear of complications with Italy: strictly it belonged to ‘A’-Staffel. The mobilization programme was built on the so-called ‘Mobilization-Day’, generally two or three days after the mobilization order was given. For the partial mobilization against Serbia, 28 July was named as the ‘fist Day of Mobilization’, with 27 July as Alarmtag, a day on which all security precautions were taken and frontiers closed and the necessary precautions taken to receive Wehrpflichtige when they arrived on the Mobilization Day. For the total mobilization, on 31 July 4 August was named as Mobilization Day, the preceding two days being those of the Alarm. Thus for Minimalgruppe Balkan and for ‘B’-Staffel the ‘the fifth day of mobilization’ which Conrad mentions would be 1 Aug., as Conrad himself recognized (IV, 157). An extremely valuable account of the military programme is given by General Béla von Lengyel, ‘Die oesterreichisch-ungarische Heeresleitung 1914’ in Allgemeine Schweizerisch Militärzeitschrift of August 1964.

³⁹ Conrad, IV, 132. There is also certain evidence to suggest that the Russians began to mobilize considerably earlier than they made out: at a comparatively early stage in the Lemberg campaign, Austro-Hungarian units took prisoners from Siberian and Caucasian units, which could scarcely, in view of Russia's great transport-problems, have reached the West if mobilized only at the end of July.

⁴⁰ Conrad, IV, 142.

⁴¹ Oe.U.L.K. 1, 15; Oe.U.A.P. VIII, 11,002.

⁴² Conrad, IV, 150–1.

⁴³ Conrad advised that it would be better to mobilize on 31 July, but that with 1 Aug. he still had time enough (iv, 150-1). This is curious, as his chief of the railway section advised him that mobilization against Russia should be delayed, naming 1 Aug. as the more suitable day (Kriegsarchiv A.O.K. 4119: Eisenbahn-Berichte, Tagebuch 20-7-14-31-12-14, report of 30-7-14, 11 a.m.). It seems strange that Conrad should have told Berchtold that 31 July was a more convenient day: perhaps he wished to reduce the time available to Berchtold for further negotiation.

⁴⁴ Conrad, IV, 152.

⁴⁵ Ibid. pp. 152-3.

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 153.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 153. At the same time Bethmann sent Berchtold a request for moderation, which prompted Berchtold's famous, ‘Das ist gelungen! Wer regiert in Berlin, Bethmann oder Moltke?’ He could equally have said the same of himself and Conrad.

⁴⁸ Oe.U.A.P. VIII, 11,130.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 11,125.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 11,132.

⁵¹ Oe.U.A.P. VIII, 11,134.

⁵² Ibid. 11,204. Conrad's account of the drafting of this reply, and an apparently full text of his recommendations to the Ballhaus, is contained in IV, 159-60.

⁵³ Conrad, IV, 110-13 and ‘56-7.

⁵⁴ Kriegsarchiv A.O.K. 4119 Eispegel (code-name for the chief of the railway section) Tagebuch 20/7-31/12/14.

⁵⁵ Log-book entry of 31 July: ‘Es wird nun die ernsthafte Frage vorgelegt, wie ich dariiber denke, wenn der im Rollen befindliche ‘B’-Aufmarsch nicht gefiihrt werden sollte und alles gegen Russland gebraucht. Ich informiere Seine Excellenz dass dies eine Katastrophe bedeuten wiirde und dass dies eisenbahntechnisch nicht durchzufiihren ware.’

⁵⁶ Still later in evening, Straub saw Conrad and declared that there would be ‘Eine Unzahl von Komplikationen’, since too many of the ‘B’-Staffel units had already begun to move south—(of VIII Corps (Prague) the vanguard of 9th Division; of IV Corps (Budapest) the vanguards of 31st and 32nd Divisions; of IX Corps (Leitmeritz/Litomefice) the vanguard of 29th Division; of VII Corps (Temesvar/Timicoara) about a third of both 17th and 34th Divisions). By vanguard (die Teten) is meant, I assume, headquarters troops, perhaps in all 2000 men in each Division: thus, 15,000 men had already begun movement to Serbia.

⁵ ‘Eispegel entry of 1 Aug.: the reversal would be a catastrophe ‘fiir die ich unter keinen Verhaltnissen die Verantwortung ubernehmen kann’. General von Lengyel has severe criticisms to make of these pronouncements, and, although I cannot claim to be an expert in military-transport, I greatly sympathize with his views. It had been accepted as an integral part of the Austro-Hungarian plans since 1909 and before that it would be possible to reverse ‘B’-Staffel provided that the necessity became clear within reasonable time of mobilization. There is no evidence that railway-administration altered its plans: a Referat on the subject on 18 December 1913 actually confirmed previous arrangements (Kr.A. Gstb. Faskl. 89(a) Korrespondenz, Kuv. 1914/10) and it seems particularly curious that 31 July was too late to reverse ‘B’-Staffel. As General von Lengyel says, ‘Die Umleitung dieser Divisionen nach Galizien hatte in den ersten Augusttagen ohne Schwierigkeiten umso besser durchgefiihrt werden konnen, als die Divisionen der vom 4. August an mobilisierten und nach Galizien zu fuhrenden ‘A’-Staffel den Eisenbahntransport planmässig erst am dritten, beziehungsweise am siebenten Mobilmachungstag, also am 7, beziehungsweise am 11 August anzutreten hatten. Die ‘B’-Staffel hatte in ihrer Marschbereitschaft daher vor der ‘A’-Staffel einen Vorsprung von 4 Tagen’ (Lengyel, op. cit. pp. 504-5). General von Lengyel's argument seems to me to be unanswerable: until 4 Aug., even the ‘A’-Staffel lines and trains would be entirely clear for ‘B’-Staffel to use, and even if headquarters troops had moved to Serbia, it was surely not impossible to send off the units by Brigades, under the corps commands, which had not, at that stage, moved off. Moreover, Straub's assurance of 1 Aug. that ‘B’-Staffel, even by the Bosnian route, would still arrive on time, is altogether suspect. General von Lengyel contents himself with the reproach that organization ‘durfte eisenbahntechnisch nicht ganz einwandfrei gewesen sein’. It seems to me not unlikely that certain General Staff officers were so anxious to see ‘B’-Staffel destroy Serbia that they arranged their technical details in consequence of this wish rather than any reality. Perhaps this is the meaning of the curious entry for 29 July where Straub, Metzger, and Hofer discussed the Russian mobilization and ‘konstatieren die Gleichheit unserer Anschauungen’—the log-book does not in any way clarify this entry. Conrad, as the record shows, does not seem to have been particularly perturbed: he had been pleading since 1907 for the destruction of Serbia, and in any case, at that time, he was sure the Germans would take on an adequate burden of the Eastern war. Also, his conscience could be relatively clear, since he had warned Moltke in 1909 that his troops might be engaged irrevocably in Serbia.

⁵⁸ Kr.A. A.O.K. Op.Nr. 35, 29 July 1914.

⁶⁹ Kr.A. A.O.K. Op.Nr. 41, 29 July 1914.

⁶⁰ Conrad, IV, 275.

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 54, confirmed in the Berchtold papers, H. Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, II, 579.

⁶² Ibid. p. 137.

⁶⁸ Conrad, iv, 137 is here confirmed by a telegram from Burián to Tisza on 28 July printed in Gróf Tisza István osszes munkái, II, 33 (‘Complete Works of Count Stephen Tisza’).

⁶⁴ Kr.A. Neue Feldakten II, Armee Op, Abteilung 1914, Nr. 25. This order, missing from the A.O.K. files, was sent at 8 p.m. and received in Budapest by the Second Army at 8.15: ‘Es bleiben fur die vor dem 30 Juli zur Mobilisierung befohlenen Formationen die fur den Kriegsfall B (Balkan) getroffenen Anordnungen des Kriegsministeriums und des Armeeoberkommandos sowie speziell die Instradierung fvir den Kriegsfall B in Kraft.’

⁶⁵ Kr.A. A.O.K. Op.Nr. 122 of 1 Aug.: ‘Aufmarsch wird, wie eingeleitet, durchgeführt.’

⁶⁶ Kr.A. A.O.K. Op.Nr. 123, 19 Aug. 1914: ‘Trotz allgemeiner Mobilisierung bleiben die erteilten Befehle aufrecht und Aufmarsch gegen Serbien wird, so wie eingeleitet, durchgefuhrt.’ In the files of A.O.K. for this period there is also an unreferenced paper marked 2 Aug. which seems to be a sketch by a member of the railway section for ‘B’-Staffel to move to Galicia. However, there is no evidence on this paper that it was considered, and had it been more than a routine exercise, it would certainly have been at least initialled by Conrad. It does not therefore seem to have more than cursory significance.

⁶⁷ Kr.A. Neue Feldakten II. Armee Op.Abt. Armeebefehl, Nr. 1 of 4 Aug. 1914.

⁶⁸ Kr.A. Neue Feldakten II. Armee Op.Abt. Nr. 113 (missing from A.O.K. files): ‘II. Armee mit 7. Korps, das ab heute dem II. Armeekommando unterstellt ist, wird zwischen 18 August und 21 August auf nordostlichen Kriegsschauplatz abtransportiert werden.’

⁶⁹ Kr.A. Nachldsse A-3, Faszikel 5, Tagebuch des Feldzeugmeisters Potiorek, 31 July to 6 Aug. 1914, Geh. Nr. 7. I should like here to thank Dr Pebbal of the Kriegsarchiv for his invaluable help with many of the documents connected with the article.

⁷⁰ Ibid.: ‘Ich bin… in meiner… Arbeit dadurch gehemmt, dass ich nicht weiss, ob beabsichtigt ist, trotz des eingetretenen Falles R zunächst mit den fur den Fall B bestimmten Korps einen Schlag gegen Serbien zu fiihren und dann mit ganzer Kraft gegen Russland zu wenden…’

⁷¹ Ibid. Geh. Nr. 8 of 2 Aug. 1914.

⁷² Ibid. Geh. Nr. 10 of 3 Aug. 1914.

⁷³ Ibid. Geh. Nr. 11 of 4 Aug. 1914.

⁷⁴ Ibid. Geh. Nr. 13 of 5 Aug. 1914: ‘Ich bin sehr begierig warn das A.O.K., das bisher nur als sparlicher Nachrichtenvermittler fungiert, aus seiner Reserve heraustreten wird’ and later ‘A.O.K. hat sich bis 7 Uhr nur durch die telegraphische Verfugung bemerkbar gemacht…’ There is considerable evidence that A.O.K. found these sarcasms little to its liking. There was a well-known rivalry between Potiorek and Conrad. Potiorek was a most peculiar commander: in one of his reports (Geh. Nr. 13 of 5 Aug.) he complains that his staff insists on keeping him occupied with details and statistics: he proposes in future to limit his communications with it to short notes. His Tagebuch is filled with such notes to his Chief of Staff, and on the most trivial subjects.

⁷⁵ Oe.U.L.K. 1, 96-7 (Op.Nr. 128).

⁷⁶ Italy did not formally declare her neutrality until early in August: but it is most unlikely that anyone in Vienna really expected her active assistance: indeed, the Graz Corps had been specially mobilized on 25 July against the case that Italy might feel that her conscience compelled her, too, to defend Serbia. Italy had said several years before that she would have no part in any war with Great Britain, and on 31 July both Berlin and Vienna were prepared to reckon on an English intervention against them. As Jagow told the Austro-Hungarian ambassador on that day (Oe.U.A.P. vm, 11,127) it was ‘leider sicher, dass England unbedingt sofort gegen Deutschland und Oesterreich-Ungarn losgehen werde, wenn der kriegerische Konflikt mit Frankreich und Russland ausbrechen wiirde’. Rumanian help was also purely a fictitious possibility: Count Czernin from Bucharest reported on 29 July that Rumania would unquestionably remain neutral (Oe.U.A.P. VIII, 10,956). This report did not reach Vienna until the 31st, but even on the 29th, Burian informed Tisza that ‘our Rumanian ally has just cleared her position, and this is to the good. In the case of a Russian war, she will go neither against us nor with us’ (Gróf Tisza István ōsszes munkái, II, 35).

⁷⁷ Stürgkh, Graf J., Im deutschen Grossen Hauptquartier, 12Google Scholar; cf. , Freytag-Loringhoven, Menschen und Dinge, wie ich sie in meinem Leben sah, p. 195Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Conrad, IV, 318-21; the text of the letter exists as Kr.A. A.O.K. Kuvert, Op.Nr. 1-500: Nr. 15, received by Conrad at 5.30 p.m. on 3 Aug. In 1925 the Kriegsarchiv was given a copy of this order to the German Eighth Army; see also R. Kiszling Oesterreichs Anteil, p. 10,. for the effect of this, and August von Mackensen, Briefe und Aufseichnungen, ed. W. Foerster, P. 32.

⁷⁹ General von Lengyel, op. cit. pp. 504–5, believes that Conrad recalled the Second Army because Russian mobilization turned out to be much quicker than expected. I cannot accept this explanation: on 5 Aug., when Conrad sent the orders to Potiorek and the Second Army, there was no evidence that Russia would mobilize so much more quickly than expected. This became clear only some three weeks after the outbreak of war and therefore had little to do with Conrad's initial decisions. Professor Ritter, in his ‘Zusammenarbeit’ study and also, using almost the same words, in his ‘Staatskunst’ work (‘Zusammenarbeit’, p. 543 and Staatskunst, 11, 306) makes a curious defence of Moltke's retraction of his promise to attack. Giving Moltke credit for this ‘kliiglich’ escape-clause, he alleges that the promise given in the letter of 19 March 1909 was followed by a reservation that immediate information should be given if enemy action changed one ally's plans: this change occurred, and the reservation therefore operated, he says, through the invasion of East Prussia by the Russian Army of the Niemen (Rennenkampf's). In the first place, Moltke withdrew his unconditional promise on 2 Aug., a day after war had been declared: Rennenkampf did not invade East Prussia until several days later. Also, it would hardly be more creditable to Moltke if we did accept Professor Ritter's defence: in this case, Moltke's letter of 19 March was no more than a promise to Conrad that he would let him know in good time when he intended to let him down. It was assumed in the entire correspondence, and stressed by Moltke in this very letter, that the Russians would mount a large-scale operation against Germany. Conrad's strategic map is: Kr.A. Gstb. Faskl. 89(0), 1914/7.

⁸⁰ Kr.A. ibid.1914/14, ‘Vorhaben einer ehesten Offensive’ is Conrad's phrase, summing up Eastern plans.

⁸¹ Orders to this effect were issued on 5 Aug., reaching the commands on the 6th.

⁸² Conrad, IV, 323-4.

⁸³ Conrad, iv, 193-5.

⁸⁴ Conrad seems to have been acutely conscious throughout this time of the great risks which he and the Monarchy were taking: he knew that this would possibly be “Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg’. He told an old friend, Baron von Chlumecky, shortly before the Ultimatum was sent, ‘In 1908–9 it would have been a lay-down for us, in 1912–13 a game with the odds in our favour: now it is a simple gamble’ (Conrad, iv, 72: a similar, though not identical, version of this remark is given by Chlumecky in his book Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen, p. 106).

⁸⁵ I should like to thank Mr. J. M. K. Vyvyan of Trinity College, Cambridge, for his many helpful suggestions in connexion with this article.