¹ See for example Einzig, P., The Economics of Rearmament (London, 1935),Google Scholar and the discussions in Klein, B. H., Germany's Economic Preparation for War (Harvard, 1959),Google Scholar and Carroll, B. A., Design for Total War (The Hague, 1968).Google Scholar See also Thomas, General G., Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (Schriften des Bundesarchivs, 14, Boppard am Rhein, 1966),Google ScholarPossony, S. T., Die Wehrwirtschaft des totalen Krieges (Vienna, 1938)Google Scholar, and Rothe, C., Wirtschaftskrieg und Kriegswirtschaft (Leipzig, 1936).Google Scholar

² See for instance, Bracher, K. D., Sauer, W. and Schultz, G., Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung. Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftsystems in Deutschland 1933/34/(Cologne, 1960), pp. 785–806;Google ScholarHandke, H., ‘ Zur Rolle der Volkswagenpläne bei der faschistischen Kriegsvorbereitung ’, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 1 (1962);Google Scholar P. Kirchberg, ‘Typisierung in der deutschen Kraftfahrzeugindustrie und der Generalbevollmächtigte für das Kraftfahrwesen’, ibid. vol. VIII (1969); Kluke, P., ‘Hitler und das Volkswagenprojekt’, Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. VIII (1960);Google ScholarLarmer, K., ‘Einige Dokumente zur Geschichte des faschistischen Reichsautobahnbaues’, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 1 (1962);Google ScholarSchweitzer, A., ‘Die wirtschaftliche Wiederaufrüstung Deutschlands von 1934–1936 ’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, vol. CXIV (1958).Google Scholar

There are numerous popular contemporary accounts of the extent of rearmament or of the nature of rearmament under a totalitarian regime, but this is of little value as source material. Much of the archival material has been destroyed and what remains is in East Germany in Potsdam and Leipzig. Among the collections destroyed or missing, that is of material directly relevant to motorization, are the bulk of the Reichsverkehrsministerium records, the German Labour Front records on the Volkswagen, the documents of the Reichsverband der Automobilindustric, and the personal papers of men like Dr Porsche. The Fritz Todt papers, for material on the Autobahnen, are still in private hands. The whole subject would benefit from more intensive archival research, where this is possible. This article is bv way of an introduction to it.

³ Lärmer, , op. cit. p. 217.Google Scholar

⁴ See for example Jarman, T. L., The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany (New York, 1956), pp. 174–5;Google ScholarSchweitzer, A., Big Business in the Third Reich (London, 1964), pp. 297–8, 341 ff.Google Scholar

⁵ Schweitzer, ‘Die wirtschaftliche Wiederaufrüstung …’, pp. 594—5.

⁶ Bracher, , Sauer, , Schultz, , op. cit. p. 785.Google Scholar

⁷ Ibid. p. 801.

⁸ ‘Trotz Krieg Weiterbau an den Reichsautobahnen ’, Verkehrstechnische Woche, XLIX-L (1940),Google Scholar 323–

⁹ Wirtschaft und Statistik (Wi u St), xix, 14 (1939), 557.Google Scholar This was the final figure before Sept. 1939, and it is interesting to note that Lärmer makes no reference to the amount of road actually available at this time, nor any reference as to how it was to be strategically employed in practice, even though he maintained that the roads clearly represented a branch of the fascist rearmament policy.

¹⁰ Wi u St, XVII, 18 (1937), 819.

¹¹ Is it too much of a coincidence that the first completed planned route was this ‘sentimental journey ’from Berlin, via Nuremberg, Munich and Berchtesgaden to Linz?

¹² Wi u St, XVII, 22 (1937), 907. This was the position on 31 Mar. 1937 but excluding town roads, which accounted for approximately a further 60,000 kilometres. The most important roads from this national network were the Landstrassen I Ordnung of some 63,000 kilometres, which were the equivalent of the British ‘A ’roads.

¹³ Singer, H. W., ‘The German War Economy I ’, The Economic Journal, L (1940), 543.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Details in Verkehrstechnische Woche, loc. cit.

¹⁵ Carroll, , op. cit. pp. 171, 245.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (NCA) (10 vols., Washington, 1946), VI, 718—31Google Scholar (Doc.3787-PS, Second Meeting of the Reich Defence Council, 23 June 1939) for a good illustration of this point. See also Dorpmüller, J., Chairman of the Reichsbahn, in Probleme des deutschen Wirtschaftslebens (Berlin, 1937), p. 34,Google Scholar when he wrote that ‘The Reichsbahn was and is undoubtedly for the foreseeable future, the most efficient and at the same time the most important means of transport for the Armed Forces and their dependent branches ’. There is a good analysis of the importance of railways to Germany in the war in Block, H., ‘ European Transportation under German Rule’, Social Research, vol. xi, no. 2 (1944)Google Scholar and in ‘ Die Bedeutung der Verkerhrsmittel im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben ’, Verkehrstechnische Woche, vol. XII (1939).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Hitler's Europe (Oxford, 1954), p. 256.Google Scholar See also Road and Rail in 40 Countries (London, 1935)Google Scholar a Report prepared for the International Chamber of Commerce by P. Wohl and A. Albitreccis, p. 132, which demonstrated that in the early 1930s long-distance road haulage in Germany represented only 0.5 per cent of potential rail capacity.

¹⁸ NCA, VI, 729.

¹⁹ Carroll, , op. cit. p. 176.Google Scholar

²⁰ Hitler's Europe, p. 258, reproduces a memorandum from the Dutch Government on Nazi seizures after the occupation. ‘Railways: — of 890 locomotives, 490 were requisitioned; of 30,000 freight cars 28,950 were requisitioned; of 1,750 passenger cars, 1,446 were requisitioned; of 300 electric trains, 215 were requisitioned ’. See also details in France Still lives (London, 1942)Google Scholar, and de Jong, L., Holland Fights the Nazis (London, no date)Google Scholar and a discussion of requisitioning in Brown, A. J., Applied Economics: Aspects of the World Economy in War and Peace (London, 1947).Google Scholar

²¹ See for instance Milward, A. S., The German Economy at War (London, 1965), pp. 173–5,Google Scholar and the discussion in Francis, E. V., The Battle for Supplies (London, 1942), p. 119.Google Scholar The extent of this disruption has never been fully established, despite the intensive bombing surveys at the end of the war.

²² NCA, vi, 729–30. A decree was issued the same day ‘for preparing the means of transport for war’.

²³ Ibid. p. 731.

²⁴ Carroll, , op. cit. p. 171,Google Scholar writes ‘construction of the great motor highways continued also with Hitler's blessing, though regarded by professional soldiers as of dubious military value ’.

²⁵ Papers of Field Marshal Milch, LI, 452 (from the collection in the Imperial War Museum, London. The references arc those given to the documents by the Air Historical Branch of the Air Ministry).

²⁶ Verkehrstechnische Woche, XLIX-L (1940), 323.Google Scholar

²⁷ Wi u St, xix, 3 (1939), Supplement ‘Die Kraftverkehrswirtschaft im Jahre 1938 –4.

²⁸ There was in fact a very short addition to the Berlin-Munich motorway from the frontier to Salzburg, built just before the war.

²⁹ Görlitz, W. (ed.), The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel (London, 1965), pp. 60–4.Google Scholar It is interesting to note from these memoirs that the construction in the West was to be no temporary affair. Blomberg had planned that they should be consructed over a twenty year period.

³⁰ It will be remembered that the Organization Todt took on even greater military tasks after the war broke out. It was responsible for building the Atlantic Wall from Norway to Bordeaux. See Majdalany, F., The Fall of Fortress Europe (London, 1969), pp. 40–1.Google Scholar

³¹ The planning of the additional 1,100 kilometres of road followed immediately on the annexation of Austria (Wi u St, vol. xvm, no. 8 (1938) ). It had been one of Göring's particular plans for the union, according to Fraenkel, H. and Manvell, R., Hermann Göring (London, 1968), p. 133.Google Scholar

³² Work was begun on the stretch Salzburg-Linz almost at once, on 20 Mar. 1938, as an act in the fight against Austrian unemployment. See Wi u St, XVIII, 8 (1938), 319.

³³ The figures were as follows.

³⁴ Speer, A., Inside the Third Reich (London, 1970), p. 180.Google Scholar Hider never tired of his project even during the war years, and over dinner would often talk of the return to peacetime construction and renewed building of the roads. See Trevor-Roper, H. (ed.), Hitler's Table Tallk (London, 1953), especially pp. 4, 338, 486, 577–9.Google Scholar

³⁶ See above, footnote 15.

³⁶ Block, , op. cit. p. 236.Google Scholar

³⁷ Speer Collection, Deutsche Privatfirmen, FD 4969/45, p. 14. A Report prepared for the German Air Ministry on plans to move a factory belonging to the Bayerische Motorenwerke in 1944. In the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Report II, app. 1, p. 6, there is an account of a Messerschmitt factory in Horgau forest using an Autobahn as part of a delivery scheme between sheds and as a testing runway.

³⁸ See Francis, , op.cit. p. 129.He also shows that lorries were extremely inefficient in terms of manpower in wartime, for it was estimated that it would take 100 four-ton lorries and 200 men to do the work of one train and three skilled operatives.Google Scholar

³⁹ See United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Report 200, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Transportation, p.16.

⁴⁰ Reichsluftfahrtministerium records, RL3/53, Report from Armaments Inspectorate, in (1 Sept.1942), 2.

⁴¹ See for example Lochner, L., What About Germany? (London, 1943), pp. 116–17, J39–Google Scholar

⁴² Handke, , op.cit. p. 218.Google Scholar There is very little evidence to show that the military took any direct action in the planning or execution of the roads.

⁴³ Investment in roads from 1924 to 1927 increased as follows:

⁴⁴ Das Archiv, XII (1934), 1322Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Kaftan, K., Der Kampf um die Autobahnen (Berlin, 1935).Google Scholar It is interesting to note that when HAFRABA approached the Nazis in 1929 for support it was refused, and in fact the NSDAP opposed the roads in the Reichstag.

⁴⁶ Wi u St, xvi, 6 (1936), 247, records that expenditure on the roads (maintenance only) was in 1932 only half that of 1929 (601.1 million marks instead of 1,241.4).

⁴⁷ Guillebaud, C.W., The Economic Recovery of Germany (London, 1939), p. 34.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Das Archiv, ix (1934), 908.Google Scholar The roads were known deliberately as ‘Die Strassen Adolf Hitlers ’.

⁴⁹ There is a reference to this link with the past in Todt's speech at the International Roadbuilding Congress held at Munich, 3—8 Sept.1934.He outlined at length the history of the great constructions, citing the pyramids of Cheops and the roads of Han China and Rome, whose glory would have been unthinkable without her roads! Finally he called to mind the glories of Peru from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries.The Autobahnen were in the natural line of succession.See Das Archiv, ix (1934), 911.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ A good example of this thinking came in a speech given by Gauleiter Kerpenstein of Pommerania on 18 May 1934 in which he said: ‘The Autobahnen will give to thousands of men the courage to come again to this country, to the overpowering spaciousness of the East, which has become empty and must be filled again with men.’For this, see Das Archiv, v (1934), 223,Google Scholar and also vi (1934) and ix (1934), 910.

⁵¹ See for instance Generalinspektor für das Strassenwesen, Drei Jahre Arbeit an die Strassen Adolf Hitlers (Berlin, 1936)Google Scholar, which reported that each local construction authority had a Landschaftsanwalt attached to advise the engineers on the siting of roads.DrTodt, in Germany Speaks (London, 1938), pp. 272–3,Google Scholar examined this aspect in some detail.‘The effort ’he wrote, ‘to make out of nature and technique one perfect unit characterizes the work of the Reich motorroads.…Technique and art, nature and life are to take on a new form as a result of this creative spirit.’Some of the same sort of sentiment had been expressed at times at the Bauhaus in Dessau which the Nazis purged in 1932, because they believed that the New Architecture, unlike the new roads, would destroy all ‘deeper national loyalties ’.See Gropius, W., The New Architecture and the Bauhaus (London, 1935), p. 111.Google Scholar

⁵² Das Archiv, ix(1934), 912.Google Scholar Dr Todt announced that ‘The roads are a labour of peace.’ If every European country were to become involved in the work, ‘the stronger becomes the disinclination in each country to disturb or interrupt this activity, the stronger grows the will in each country to continue and complete the work begun through a condition of lasting peace ’.

⁵³ Das Archiv, v (1934),.223.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ I have deliberately avoided going into the economic aspects of the Autobahnen in greater depth as a further article on motorization in this period as a whole is in preparation for publication.For a brief discussion see Kleinmann, W., ‘Der Verkehr als Schrittmacher des Wirtschaftsaufbaues ’, Der Vierjahresplan, vol.III, no.1/2 (1939)Google Scholar, ‘Landstrasse und Wirtschaft’, Der deutsche Volkswirt, vol.xx (1934–1935),Google Scholar and ‘Wirtschaftsfragen beim Autostrassenbau ’, ibid.

⁵⁵ See Hitler's Europe, p.256, Fischer, G., ‘Die Reichsautobahnen ’, Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschajt (1935) p. 190 ff.Google Scholar, Kluke, op.cit.who presents this as the primary function of the roads, and Drei Jahre Arbeit…, p.48.

⁵⁶ Deliberate policies were pursued to create a labour intensive project, by restricting machinery, and, in order to stimulate wage labour and hence consumption, Labour Servicemen were not allowed to work on the new roads, except in very small numbers.See Fischer, , op.cit. p. 194, Drei Jahre Arbeit…, p.21.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Das Archiv, VIII (1934), 713–14.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Wi u St, xvi, 14 (1936), 553.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Das Archiv, II (1935), 738.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See Guillebaud, , op.cit. pp. 40, 257–8.Google Scholar

⁶¹ The figures for material used on the roads is as follows.

⁶² Wi u St, XVII, 18 (1939) 727Google Scholar

⁶³ Drei lahre Arbeit…, p.76.Dr Todt wrote in Germany Speaks, p.270, that ‘Traffic statistics available… point to the fact that the entire long-distance traffic on the roads is going over to the Reich motor-roads.Their advantages do not only consist in a saving of time, but also less wear and tear and a lower consumption of motor fuel.’;

⁶⁴ See Verkehrstechnische Woche, XII (1939), 129.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Handke, op.cit., Kluke, , op.cit. p. 343,Google ScholarNecker, W., Hitler's War Machine and the Invasion of Britain (London, 1941), ch.III.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ I am indebted for the above discussion and much of the material on the Volkswagen to Hopfinger, K.B., Beyond Expectation: the Volkswagen Story (London, 1954)Google Scholar and Nelson, W.H., Small Wonder: the Amazing Story of the Volkswagen (London, 1967).Google Scholar Hopfinger has based much of his account on conversations held with Porsche himself and with wartime employees of the Volkswagen factories.See also von Frankenberg, R., Die ungewöhnliche Geschichte des Houses Porsche (Stuttgart, 1960)Google Scholar, and Nitske, W.R., The Amazing Porsche and Volkswagen Story (New York, 1958).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Kluke, , op.cit. p. 349 ff.Google Scholar, Hopfinger, , op.cit. p. 70.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Opel had produced the cheap P4 after investing 150 million marks in its development.

⁶⁹ Nelson, , op.cit. p. 39.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Kluke, , op.cit. p. 341.Google Scholar This decision coincided with the creation of the Hermann Goring Works, the first large-scale industrial undertaking directly run by the State for the purpose of challenging the power of the industrialists.

⁷¹ Ibid. p.361.

⁷² Nelson, , op.cit.pp. 29–39.Google Scholar See a report presented to the Vorstand of the RDA, 5 Feb.1936, reprinted in Kluke, , op.cit.pp. 376–9.This document lists six major objections to the new car in the form in which Dr Porsche had produced it, the final factor being a reminder of the fate of the private radio industry on the introduction of the Volksempfänger, the People's Radio.Google Scholar

⁷³ Ibid. p.349.

⁷⁴ Kirchberg, , op.cit.pp. 120.124.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Kluke, , op.cit.p. 355.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Kirchberg, , op.cit.p. 122.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Hopfinger, , op.cit.ch.XXVI.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Ibid. p.129, Nelson, op.cit.p.68.

⁷⁹ Papers of Field Marshal Milch, LI, 451.Letter from Milch to Goring, 21 Sept.1938.

⁸⁰ Deutsche Privatfirmen, FD 4969/45.Report prepared by the Bayerische Motorenwerke for the German Air Ministry, Jan.1945.

⁸¹ Nelson, , op.cit.p. 76.Google Scholar

⁸² Ibid. quoted from an interview with Hochne.

⁸³ Ibid. pp.73, 75.The peak month of production was Jan.1945 when the war was almost over.

⁸⁴ Ibid. pp.73–4.

⁸⁵ For details of the rationalization drive initiated to release resources for the Volkswagen, see Das Archiv, VIII (1938), 723, and II (1939), 1793.Of course, by mid-1939 (when the first standardization programme was announced) the preparations for war could no longer be separated from peacetime projects, and the actual crisis over the conflict between the new car and rearmament never materialized.Had war not broken out in Sept.1939 the problem would still have had to be solved in some way or another.

⁸⁶ For an indication of the rapid rise in car manufacturing profits, see Wi u St, XVI, 2 (1936), 49, and XVII, 3 (1937), 86.For a more general discussion, see Sweezy, M.Y., ‘German Corporate Profits, 1926–1938’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.LIV (1940).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Kirchberg, , op.cit.p. 124.Google Scholar The problem is discussed in Schell, A.von, ‘Neue Wege der deutschen Motorisierung’, Der Vierjahresplan, vol.III, no.4 (1939) and ‘Die Typenbegrenzung in der Kraftfahrzeugindustrie’,Google ScholarIbid. vol.III, no.7 (1939).

⁸⁸ Kirchberg, , op.cit.p. 136.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ USSBS, Report no.77, German Motor Vehicles Industry Report, p.II, Table 9, shows that even in 1942 there were twenty-nine different kinds of cars being produced and supplied to the Armed Forces, and twenty-three types of lorry.

⁹⁰ Nelson, , op.cit.p. 72.Google Scholar

⁹¹ The plant never produced completed vehicles as it was originally designed to do.The machinery for pressing the bodies never materialized after the outbreak of war, and all chassis had to be shipped to Berlin to have the bodies assembled there.

⁹² USSBS, Report 77, pp.3–4.According to figures in Necker, , op.cit.pp. 72–4, it can be calculated that the actual number of vehicles in the motorized divisions by 1938 constituted less than 1 per cent of all production from 1934–8.Google Scholar

⁹³ This short account cannot pretend to present the whole question of motorization and the armed forces.For the industry, see Olley, M., The Motorcar Industry in Germany during the Period 1939–45 (London, 1949)Google Scholar.For motorization and the Army, see Kutz, C.R., War on Wheels.The Evolution of an Idea (London, 1941)Google Scholar; Ogorkiewicz, R.M., The Development of Mechanized Forces and their Equipment (London, 1960)Google Scholar; Senger, F.M.von und Etterlin, , German Tcm\s of World War Two, the Complete Illustrated History of German Armoured Fighting Vehicles, 1926–1945 (London, 1969)Google Scholar; and EUis, C., Military Transport of World War Two (London, 1971).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Figures calculated from statistics in USSBS, Report 77, pp.8, 13: Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War (London, 1951)Google Scholar; Webster, C., Frankland, N., The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany (4 vols., London, 1961), IV, app.49 (iii), 469.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Hart, B.H.Liddell, History of the Second World War (London, 1970), pp. 18, 20.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Taylor, T., The March of Conquest (London, 1959), pp. 180-6.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Ogorkiewicz, R.M., Armoured Forces.A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles (London, 1970).The number of tanks per division dropped from 320 in 1939, to 150–200 in 1941 and 100–120 by 1944.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Wilmot, C., The Struggle for Europe (London, 1952), pp. 459–60.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Hart, , op.cit. p. 21.Google Scholar This fact is well elaborated in Goutard‘s, A. excellent account, The Battle of France, 1940 (London, 1958), pp. 25–31.Google ScholarThe French estimated in May 1940 that the Germans had some 7,000 to 7,500 tanks available for the western campaign.The General-Inspektor of panzer units recorded that there were in fact only 2,574 available at the beginning of the battle.The French had 3,458 modern tanks of which some 2,400 were used in the battle, together with 600 older tanks.The British tanks brought the total to well over 3,000.In terms of quality the French tanks were superior in armour and armament, though not in speed.At least a quarter of the German tanks mounted no heavy gun but two machine guns.

¹⁰⁰ Klein, , op.cit.p. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ See Tournoux, J.R., pétain and de Gaulle (London, 1966).Google Scholar De Gaulle had maintained a long battle with the French General Staff on the question of tank tactics.He believed that ‘to create a specialized corps is to tip your spear with fire.To dilute your mechanized forces is to put a pincushion there instead‘.He developed this idea in the famous thesis Vers I'armée de métier.It was Gamelin's view, however, that ‘you cannot hope to achieve a real breakthrough with tanks’, and the infantry remained wedded to the idea that without tanks in a supporting role scattered throughout the line, they would once again, as in the first world war, be the victims of synchronized machine-gun cross-fire.For support of this view, see Weygand, General M., ‘How France is Defended’, International Affairs, vol.XVIII (1939).Google Scholar See also Goutard, , op.cit. p. 31Google Scholar, and an analysis in Bois, E.J., Truth on the Tragedy in France (London, 1941), ch.VIII.Google Scholar

¹⁰² USSBS, Report 77, p.5: ‘Apparently the main reason for the major expansion programme of the German automotive industry from 1934–39 was not to build up manufacturing facilities that could easily be adopted to war purposes, but rather to increase production of a civilian commodity which was one of the basic items of a high living standard as well as a profitable export item.‘

¹⁰³ Ibid. pp.8–9.

¹⁰⁴ Papers of Field Marshal Milch, LVII, 3228–9.

¹⁰⁵ Hopfinger, , op.cit.p. 99.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Murphy, M.E., The British War Economy 1939–43 (New York, 1943), p. 314.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ USSBS, Report 77, p.21.

¹⁰⁸ NCA, III, 868–73, document group 1301-PS.These documents show the extent of the gap between Wchrmacht stocks of fuel and rubber and what was actually needed in the event of mobilization.Very little was done to improve this position satisfactorily for the motorized forces by 1939, for civilian demands for fuel oil had been allowed to rise rapidly in the last years before the war.

¹⁰⁹ See Milward, op. cit. and Klein, op. cit. for a discussion of this.