¹ The impact of the book and its author can be judged by the fact that two conferences in the spring of 1972 on military history, one in Edinburgh and the other put on by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt of Freiburg im Breisgau, were very much concerned with his theories. The latter can fairly be said to have been a conference to discuss Der Tirpitz-Plan

² Several passages of a recent article of mine are undoubtedly wrong in the light of Dr Berghahn's new evidence. I had no idea of the existence of the elaborate plans of 1903 and 1904 for gigantic expansion. Cf. Berghahn, Tabellen 5–15, Anhang, pp. 609–12; Steinberg, J., ‘The Novelle of 1908: Necessities and Choices in the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race ’, Transactions of tie Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., XXI (1971), 25–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ J. Steinberg, ibid. p. 27; cf. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz-Plan, p. 508, where part of the above Donkschrift is cited together with others of a few weeks later.

⁴ A von Tirpitz, Erinnerungen (Leipzig, 1919), p. 109.Google Scholar

⁵ Veblen, Thorstein, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York, 1915, 4th ed., New York, 1954), p. 271.Google Scholar

⁶ Dr Peter-Christian Witt, author of Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschcn Retches von 1903–1915, Historische Studien no. 415 (Lübeck, 1970),Google Scholar deserves a review article himself. His analysis of the complexities of financial policy in Wilhelmine Germany has opened an entirely new perspective on its problems. His paper at the Freiburg Conference in Apr. 1972 belonged with Dr Berghahn's as a necessary complement. It can be found in Schottelius, H. & Deist, W. (ed.), Marine und Marine politik im kaiserlichen Deutschland 1871–1914 (Dusseldorf, 1972).Google Scholar

⁷ Viscount Haldane of Cloan, Before the War (London, 1920), p. 71.Google Scholar

⁸ Quoted in Theodor Eschenburg. Die improvisierte Demokratic: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Weimarer Republik (Munich, 1963), p. 20.Google Scholar

⁹ Bismarck to B. E. von Bülow, 1 Dec. 1877, Die Gcsammelten Werke, Berlin (1924–35), VIC, 90.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Lowell, A. Lawrence, Government and Parties in Continental Europe (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1896), I, 284–5Google Scholar

¹¹ The Holstein Papers. The Memoirs Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein (Cambridge, 1955–1961), 1, 175.Google Scholar

¹² Quoted in Carl-Axel Gemsell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien. Der Kampf für einen maritimen Operationsplan. Bibliotheca Historica Lundensis, XVI (Lund, 1965), 229.Google Scholar

¹³ Quoted in Dudley Sommers, Haldane of Chan. His Life and Times, 1856–1928 (London, 1960), p. 203.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein. Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II (2 vols., Cambridge, 1965), II, 843–5.Google Scholar

¹⁵ In a recent article, I tried to demonstrate how inefficient Wilhelmine government was by selecting a critical period, 1904–6. Incompetence is the one explanation for Germany's disastrous diplomatic record in these years which would appear to have been overlooked. Cf. Steinberg, J., ‘ Germany and the Russo-Japanese War ’, American Historical Review, vol. LXXV, no. 7 (Dec. 1970).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Kehr, Eckart, Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894–1901. Versuch eines Querschnitts durch die innenpolitischen, sozialen und ideologischen Voraussetzungen des deutschen Imperialismus. Historische Studien no. 197 (Berlin, 1930).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Dr Gustav Schmidt has recently warned of the dangers of seeing political developments in Wilhelmine Germany either in terms of the revolution of 1918 or inflexible ‘ Strukturkrisen ’ with determined outcomes. Cf. Schmidt, Gustav, ‘ Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs ’ in Das Kaiserliche Deutschland. Polink und Gesettschaft 1870–1918 (ed.), Stünner, Michael (Duesseldorf, 1970);Google Scholaridem., ‘ Innenpolitische Blockbildungen in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges ’, aus politik und zeitgeschichte, beilage zur wochenzeitung das parlament, B 20/72, 13 May 1972.

¹⁸ The trouble with German history, as one of my students once observed, is that it ends badly, and it is hard to fault Dr Berghahn for not liking what Wilhelmine Germany stood for, especially when he knows what the next dreadful chapter will bring. On the difficulties of writing German history after all its catastrophes, cf. Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, ‘ Von den Schwierigkeiten deutsche Geschichte zu schreiben ’, Merkur, Heft 4, 25 Apr. 1971.