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The Origins of British–Saudi Relations: The 1915 Anglo–Saudi Treaty Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Jacob Goldberg
Jacob Goldberg
Affiliation:
Tel Aviv University
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Extract

The outbreak of the First World War in Europe and the subsequent Ottoman–German alliance presented Great Britain with some severe dilemmas as to her interests in the Middle East as well. Striving to consolidate their position in the Middle East should a war against the Ottomans become inevitable, the British began to search for local allies. In the Arabian Peninsula, three rulers emerged as potential allies: the Sharif Husayn, the guardian of the Holy Places in the Hijāz on behalf of the Ottoman sultan; the Idrisi Sayyid of 'Asīr, the area south of the Hijāz and north of Yemen; and 'Abd al-'Azīz Ibn Saud, the Amir of Najd, who became a Persian Gulf coastal ruler in May to 1913 by virtue of his occupation of Hasa the coastal strip stretching from Kuwayt to the base of the Qatar peninsula.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 28 , Issue 3 , September 1985 , pp. 693 - 703
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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References

1 Hurewitz, J. C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, 1956), pp. 13–17, 12, 17Google Scholar.

2 See this author's ‘The 1913 Saudi occupation of Hasa reconsidered’, Middle Eastern Studies, XVIII (1982), 21–9Google Scholar.

3 Public Record Office, Foreign Office files (F.O.), 406/16, 101–2 and F.O. 78/5488.

4 F.O. 371/345, no. 10143/2 and F.O. 424/238, p. 212.

5 India Office Records, Political and Secret Correspondence with India, 1875–1911 (L/P&S/7), vol. 251.

6 Persian Gulf Residency files (R/15) 5/27, p. 45 and F.O. 424/228, no. 34.

7 R/15/5/27. P. 106 and F.O. 424/238, p. 146.

8 F.O. 424/238, pp. 146 and 145.

9 Gooch, G. P. and Temperly, H., British documents on the origins of the war, 1898–1914, X, pt. II, 190–4Google Scholar.

10 F.O. 424/239. P. 138.

11 F.O. 371/1820, E 37510/22076/44.

12 F.O. 424/240, p. 30.

13 L/P&S/10/385, pp. 255–6.

14 Cox's letters to Ibn Saud and the meeting between the latter and Shakespear and Trevor clearly attest to the existence of contacts between the British and Ibn Saud, authorized by the Foreign Office, even before the outbreak of the First World War. This contradicts the argument advanced by D. Silverfarb that in the pre-war period the ‘Foreign Office had opposed any contacts with Ibn Saud’. Silverfarb clearly fails to make a distinction between the period preceding the conquest of Hasa, where his argument is correct, and the period following the conquest, where he is factually wrong. Such a factual error led to Silverfarb's erroneous thesis that it was the outbreak of the war which constituted the turning point in British attitudes towards Ibn Saud. See his ‘The Anglo-Najd Treaty of December 1915’, Middle Eastern Studies, XVI (1980), 167–77Google Scholar.

15 Hurewitz, , Diplomacy, 1, 143–4, 194 and 209, 208, 218, and 11, 22Google Scholar.

16 F.O. 424/251, pp. 111–14.

17 Ibid.

18 Gooch, and Temperly, , British documents, pp. 340–1Google Scholar.

19 L/P&S/10/385, p. 227 and F.O. 424/251, pp. 223–4. The blunt unequivocal language of the memorandum contradicts Silverfarb's contention (Silverfarb, , ‘Anglo-Najd Treaty’, p. 168)Google Scholar that ‘in the pre-war period the Foreign Office refused to sanction any activity which might give the appearance of treating Ibn Saud as an independent ruler rather than as an Ottoman subject’. In this case, British intervention was carried out – not merely sanctioned – by the Foreign Office itself.

20 F.O. 371/2124.

21 F.O. 424/252, pp. 142–3.

22 F.O. 371/2140.

23 F.O. 882/8, IS/15/1 and Graves, Philip, The life of Sir Percy Cox (London, 1941), p. 182Google Scholar.

24 Shakespear dispatched a lengthy report of his negotiations with Ibn Saud on 4 january 1915, F.O. 371/2479, p. 338. Silverfarb (Silverfarb, ‘Anglo-Najd Treaty’, p. 170)Google Scholar writes that ‘Ibn Saud explained that he would not commit himself to the British side without a firm treaty of alliance and protection…against Ottoman reprisals’. This implies erroneously that once provided with a treaty, Ibn Saud was ready to commit himself to the British side. This is a mistake, since Shakespear's report makes it abundantly clear that Ibn Saud's refusal was totally unconditional.

25 F.O. 371/2479, p. 338 and L/P&S/10/388, p. 193.

26 Silverfarb (Silverfarb, ‘Anglo-Najd Treaty’, p. 170)Google Scholar quotes Shakespear to have argued that ‘a treaty with Ibn Saud, in addition to bringing him into the war against Turkey, would give Britain’ other advantages. Not only does this not tally with the record, but it ignores the very fact that Shakespear was the first British official to realize that Ibn Saud had rejected any military role against the Ottomans.

27 F.O. 371/2479, p. 307.

28 Ibid. p. 319.

29 Ibid. pp. 271–3.

30 F.O to I.O., 2 February 1915, ibid. p. 281. The Foreign Office supported the idea of a treaty with Ibn Saud, concurred in its terms and accepted the new concept advanced by the India Office. Moreover, two of its leading officials, Nicolson and Oliphant, noted that ‘the sooner we can secure Ibn Saud the better’, supporting ‘the immediate conclusion of the treaty’ (Minutes, 31 January and 1 February 1915, ibid. p. 270). Such obvious support can hardly be described as ‘the Foreign Office no longer objected to negotiations with the Najd ruler’, as Silverfarb does (‘Anglo-Najd: Treaty’, p. 172).

31 As Silverfarb does (‘Anglo-Najd Treaty’, p. 167).

32 Silverfarb concludes mistakenly (‘Anglo-Najd Treaty’, p. 176) that ‘Britain derived little direct military benefit from the treaty during the war, because Ibn Saud did not take the field against the Turks’. According to both the negotiations and the treaty, Ibn Saud was not expected to fight the Ottomans, and this is what all British officials had realized long before the treaty was concluded.

33 L/P&S/10/635, p. 79 and Hurewitz, , Diplomacy, II, 13–17Google Scholar.

34 Hurewitz, , Diplomacy, II, 12Google Scholar. Busch, B. C., Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914–1921 (Berkeley, 1971), P. 236Google Scholar, implies erroneously that Ibn Saud's treaty was a wartime instrument of the type of the Idrisi's, writing that ‘it remained to be seen what contribution Ibn Saud and al-Idrisi would was make’.

35 L/P&S/10/390, p. 254.