Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 March 2010
This article is concerned with explanations of the failure of stateformation and nation building in liberal Italy, and concentrates on attempts to integrate western Sicily into the new political framework. The marxist account of this process has emphasized the extent of peasant revolt against the new state, and its brutal repression. Unification, it is argued, failed because it was based on coercion and domination rather than on leadership by popular consent. The present article suggests that this explanation is incomplete as it ignores the behaviour and attitude of local elites within western Sicily. The dominance of local affairs by such groups was challenged by the advent of a modern centralizing state. The article uses records from this period to show that many local notables frustrated government efforts to set up new town councils, new police forces and a liberal judicial system. This kind of resistance was far more difficult to overcome than popular revolt, because it could (and did) challenge the whole basis of centralized liberal rule. The article also looks at the military repression of the 1860s and argues that it too was undermined by the opposition of local elites. An additional reason, therefore, for the failure of unification after 1860 may be the new state's lack of appeal among its supposed class allies.
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2 Vincenzo Cuoco was a Neapolitan philosopher who advocated ‘revolution’ without mass participation, or reform instituted from above to pre-empt a popular upheaval. See Hoare, Q. and Smith, G. Nowell (eds.), Selections from prison notebooks (London, 1971), p. 59Google Scholar.
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7 Molfese, F., Storia del brigantaggio dopo l'unita (Milano, 1964). Molfese made use of previously neglected material contained in an 1863 parliamentary commission of inquiry into brigandageGoogle Scholar.
8 Caracciolo, A., Stato a società civile. Problemi dell'unificazione italiana (Torino, 1977), p. 60. See also Ernesto Ragionieri's description in ‘Politica e amministrazione nella storia unitario’, inGoogle ScholarPolitica examministrazione nella storia dell' Italia unita (Bari, 1967)Google Scholar.
9 Raffaele Romanelli argues that the domination of civil society by the state led to the eradication of feudal elements and the development of the liberal economy. It is in this sense that state ‘dictatorship’ can also be seen as a progressive influence. Romanelli, R., L'Italia liberale, 1860–1900 (Bologna, 1979), pp. 44–6Google Scholar.
10 Romanelli summarizes the aims and contributions of this kind of study in ‘La nazionalizzazione della periferia. Casi e prospettive di studio’, Meridiana, IV (1988), 13–24. The same volume of Meridiana is dedicated to the subject of local power. Romanelli has also concerned himself with the study of local power inGoogle Scholar‘Autogoverno, funzioni pubbliche, classi dirigenti locali. Un'indagine del 1869’, Passato e Present, IV (1983), 35–83, and in the recently publishedGoogle ScholarSulle carte interminate. Un ceto di impiegati tra privato e pubblico: i segretari comunali in Italia, 1860–1915 (Bologna, 1989)Google Scholar. Paolo Pezzino has published a number of articles concerned with local power in southern Italy, and with Sicily in particular. See his ‘Alle orgini del potere mafioso: stato e societa in Sicilia nella seconda meta dell’ ottocento, , Passato e Presente, VIII (1985), 33–69, andGoogle Scholar‘Mezzogiorno e potere locale: analisi classiche e revisioni storiografiche’, Rivista di Storia Contemporanea, XVI, 4 (1987), 387–615.Google ScholarJohn Davis also refers to the importance of local power in his book, Conflict and control, law and order in nineteenth century Italy (London, 1988)Google Scholar.
11 Romanelli, ‘Autogoverno’, pp. 80–1.
12 Conditions on the southern mainland were perceived by contemporaries to be far more disturbed than in Sicily. Brigandage, sponsored by the Bourbons, never represented a major challenge to government authority in Sicily, as it did elsewhere in the south. However, extremely high levels of personal crime were experienced in major Sicilian towns such as Palermo and Girgcnti (Agrigento).
13 Recupero, A., ‘Ceti medi e “homines novi”. Alle origini della mafia’, Polis, I, 2 (1987), 320. He argues that after unification control of the comune was a more important source of power and social control than land ownership. See also his comments inGoogle Scholar‘La Sicilia all'opposizione (1848–74)’, in Aymard, M. and Giarrizzo, G. (eds.), La Sicilia (Torino, 1987), p. 65. Pezzino argues that, in the period before unification, local government was also becoming a source of economic power and a means of consolidating, or expanding, personal authority and social status.Google Scholar‘L'intendent e le scimmie: autonomia e accentramento nella Sicilia del primo ottocento’, Meridiana, IV (1988), 53Google Scholar.
14 9 Dec. 1860, La liberazione del mezzogiomo e la formazione del regno d' Italia. Carteggi di Camillo Cavour con Villamarina, Scialoja, Cordova, Farini, ecc (5 vols., Bologna, 1949–1954), IV, 45Google Scholar.
15 14 Dec. 1860, Il carteggio Cavour-Nigra dal 1858 al 1861 (4 vols., Bologna, 1926–1929), Iv, 290–3. The plan, Farini wrote to Ricasoli in September was to goGoogle Scholar ‘and establish monarchic authority, morality and good sense in Naples and Sicily’. Quoted in Smith, D. Mack, Cavour and Garibaldi (Cambridge, 1985 edn), p. 258Google Scholar.
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17 For a detailed description of Sicilian economy and society before, and at the time of, unification, see Romeo, R., Il Risorginunto in Sicilia (Bari, 1950). Maurice Aymard gives a general survey of economy and society since unification,Google Scholar‘Economia e società: uno squardo d'insieme’, in Aymard, and Giarrizzo, (eds.), La Sicilia. Giuseppe Oddo's Lo sviluppo incompiuto, storia di un comune agricolo della Scilia occidentale, Villafrati 1596–1960 (Palermo, 1986), also has some interesting details about life in rural communes. On the system of land tenure in Sicily, one of the best summaries isGoogle ScholarSmith, D. Mack, ‘The latifundia in modern Sicilian history’, Proceedings of the British Academy, LI (1965), 85–124. See also the works ofGoogle ScholarBalsamo, Paolo, A view of the present state of Sicily (London, 1811), andGoogle ScholarMemorie inedite di pubblica economia ed agricoltura (Palermo, 1845), for a contemporary analysis of the same problems. The most detailed contemporary survey of the Sicilian economy after unification isGoogle ScholarSonnino, S., I contadini in Sicilia (Firenze, 1974 edn). In 1876, Franchetti also analysed the specific causes of peasant disorder and crime.Google ScholarFranchetti, L., Condizioni politiche e amministrative della Sicilia (Firenze, 1974 edn), pp. 3–8, 18–39, 85–135Google Scholar.
18 Mack Smith suggests that what knowledge northern Italians had of Sicility came from ancient history and poetry, A history of Sicility, II, modern Sicility: after 1713 (London, 1968), p. 454Google Scholar.
19 10 Oct. 1861, Archivio Centrale dello Stalo, Roma (ACSR), carte Ricasoli (fondo Bianchi), b. 2, f.4, also in Scichilone, G., Documenti sulle conditione della Sicilia dal 1860 al 1870 (Roma, 1952), pp. 92–103Google Scholar.
20 Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, discussioni, tornata 7 dicembre 1861, p. 131.
21 On the reforms passed by the liberal government see Giuffrida, R., Politica ed economia nella Sicilia dell' ottocenlo (Palermo, 1980). The land reform introduced in 1862 was a watered-down version of the reform introduced during the pro-dictatorship of Mordini in 1860. The reform of 1862 divided up former church land into perpetual leaseholds, and was intended to encourage smallholdings. However, no form of credit was made available to the potential peasant proprietor and there were no barriers to the monopoly purchase of land. As a result, the peasantry was excluded and many powerful landowners simply added to their extensive holdings. SeeGoogle ScholarCerrito, C., ‘La questione della liguidazione dell'asse ecclesiastico in Sicilia’, Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, XLII, 2 (1956), 270–63, andGoogle ScholarCorleo, S., Storia dell'enfiteusi dei terreni ecclesiastici di Sicilia (Caltanissetta-Roma, 1977), especially the introduction by A. li VecchiGoogle Scholar.
22 Iachello, E. and Signorelli, A., ‘Borghesie urbane dell'ottocento’ in Aymard, and Giarrizzo, (eds.), La Sicilia, p. 120. They note, however, that as a result of changes in the tax laws, the proportion of those eligible to vote increased rapidly, reaching 2.3 per cent as early as 1866Google Scholar.
23 Some members of the Destra (such as Farini and Minghetti) opposed centralization. Cavour himself occasionally expressed sympathy for some form of regional autonomy. The eventual decision to centralize was probably due to fear of republicanism and of the prevailing chaos in the south. Pavone, C., Ammninistrazione centrale e amministrazione periferica da Rattazzi a Ricasoli, 1859–1866(Milano, 1964) andGoogle Scholar Ragionieri, ‘Politica e amministrazione’. Federico Chabod outlines an alternative (and more Crocean) view, based on an analysis of Italy's foreign policy difficulties, in Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1876, vol I, It premesse (Bari, 1951)Google Scholar.
24 Brancato, F., La Sicilia net primo ventennio del regno d'Italia (Bologna, 1956), pp. 148–53 describes the steps taken before October 1861. See alsoGoogle ScholarRomanelli, , L'Italia liberal, pp. 29-41Google Scholar.
25 ‘All the administrative authorities have been appointed by Crispi and Mordini [key figures in the 1860 government]’ La Farina complained to Cavour on 22 December 1860, ‘and are therefore hostile to us’, La liberation del mezzogiomo, IV, 61Google Scholar. Minghetti's instructions to Naples 12 Nov. 1860, that before replacing the Bourbon system of government it was necessary to remove the ‘obstacles and appendages’ added by the ‘so-called government [sgoverno] of Garibaldi, indicate both official hostility and concern about administrative problems. Ibid, III, 349.
26 From exile in London, Mazzini had begun during the second half of 1861 to agitate through the società operaie. In Sicily there were a number of Mazzinians active in these societies and it was this presence which so worried the government, Candeloro, G., Storia dell'Italia moderna (Milano, 1968), v, 184–90Google Scholar.
27 19 Apr. 1861, Archivio di State di Palermo (ASP) ministero e real segretario di stato presso il luogotcnente generate, polizia, b. 1683. With the introduction of Piedmontese legislation, the Sicilian governors became prefects, the inUndenti became sub-prefects. The new terms were not always immediately adopted. Here, the titles have been used according to those actually used by the correspondents.
28 See the correspondence in May 1861 between the minister of the interior Minghetti and the Sicilian luogotenente generale Rovere, Della in La liberazione del mezzogiorno, IV, 471–3, 487–9Google Scholar.
29 On moderate policy towards the judiciary, see D'Addio, M., Politico e magistratura, 1848–1870 (Milano, 1966)Google Scholar.
30 Pezzino notes that the 1876 inquiry into conditions in Sicily revealed the extent to which lack of roads prevented the prompt execution of government policy. Moreover, the failure to build roads reflected the failings of local administration. ‘Alle ongini del potere mafioso’, pp. 42–3.
31 Franchetti pointed out in 1876 that even the undulating nature of the terrain in the interior favoured the bandit. It allowed him to survey his ‘territory’ and see the arrival of the police, or a victim, from far off. Franchetti, Condizioni politiche e amministrative, p. 113.
32 A letter from the prefect of Girgenti on 22 Mar. 1862 spoke of the enormous problem of crime prevention and investigation since ‘its very victims, either from fear or from awareness of the difficulties of proving anything, sometimes keep to themselves, and not the law, the right of revenge’. ACSR, ministero di grazia e giustizia, direzione generate affari penali, miscellanea, b. 1, f. 1. Such reluctance could pervade the administration of justice. Pantaleoni wrote in October 1861 that ‘it is impossible to find witnesses willing to testify, or mayors or questori prepared to order arrests, and even when this can be done through the good offices of the carabinieri, it is impossible to find judges to carry out the trials and sentencing’. ACSR, Bianchi-Ricasoli, b. 2, f. 17, also in Scichilone, Documenti, pp. 92–103.
33 For example, in Santa Margherita on 4 Mar. 1861, rebels blew up the town hall and killed eight men before troops arrived from Sciacca, 35 kilometres away. Six days passed before troops arrived from Palermo. Often it was far easier to send troops by steamer than by land.
34 The church had long been involved in charitable works on which the livelihood of many depended. Emerico Amari told the parliamentary commission of inquiry in May 1867 that 2,000 families in Palermo had lived off church charity, and that many workers and artists had also been employed by the church. 8 May 1867, I moti di Palermo del 1866, verbali della commissione parlamentare di inchiesta (Roma, 1981), p. 49Google Scholar.
35 The church had immense influence, particularly in rural communes. However, the Sicilian clergy had never been particularly loyal to the Bourbon monarchy and, during 1860, the basso clero had fought alongside Garibaldi. See the comments of Nino Bixio on the nationalism of Sicilian priests in a letter of 12 June i860, in Morelli, E. (ed.), Epistolario di Nino Bixio (Roma, 1939), 1, 347. See alsoGoogle ScholarBrancato's, Francesco ‘la partecipazione del clero alla rivoluzione siciliana del 1860’, in La Sicilia e l'unità Italia (Palermo, 1960). Six months later, Diomede Pantaleoni advised the government that the Sicilian clergy was ‘above all…Sicilian in spirit and in origin’ rather than pro-Bourbon. ACSR, Bianchi-Ricasoli, b. 2, f. 4, also in Scichilone, Documenti, pp. 92–103Google Scholar.
36 See, for example, the complaints of the governor of Girgenti on 19 June 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1680.
37 The removal of the democratic president of the court of appeal, Pasquale Calvi, was a response to his independently minded decisions, which the government saw as evidence of disloyalty. Calvi, however, was a popular, educated and progressive figure and gave proof of exemplary conduct in Florence, where he was transferred. D'Addio, , Politica e magistratura, pp. 752–8Google Scholar.
38 ‘Regionalist’ is the term used by Orazio Cancila to describe the autonomist party, and it is perhaps a more accurate one. Cancila, O., Palermo (Bari, 1988), p. 114Google Scholar.
39 Smith, Mack, Cavour and Garibaldi, pp. 67–8, 72–6Google Scholar.
40 Quoted in Cancila, , Palermo, p. 123. It is also worth noting, in this context, the extent to which the administrative consequences of unification in Palermo (the loss of the capital) adversely affected the economic position of many professional and middle class groups. Cancila, Palermo, p. 133, Iachello and Signorelli, ‘Borghesie urbane’, p. 143. Iachello an d Signorelli note that the 1867 inquiry into the Palermo revolt revealed a strong hostility to the government on the part of the Palermo middle classGoogle Scholar.
41 Although more popularly based than the autonomists, the democratic movement in western Sicily consisted of a fairly mixed group of aristocrats, professionals, and artisans. One perhaps unusual feature was that all its principal leade n were masons. Indeed, Cancila describes the Palermo masonic lodge as the headquarters of the democratic movement. Palermo, p. 115.
42 10 Oct. 1861, ACSR, Bianchi-Ricasoli, b.2, f.4, also in Scichilone, Documenti, pp. 92–103.
43 Ibid. Recupero writes that the moderate party was the ‘government party’ largely by default, and lent only its passive support to the regime. ‘La Sicilia all'opposizione’, p. 73.
44 Minimal hegemony u the term used by Femia to denote Gramsci's description of the type of hegemony prevailing in Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to Femia, this ‘type of hegemony rests on the ideological unity of the economic, political and intellectual elites… The dominant economic groups do not “accord their interests and aspirations with the interests and aspirations of other classes”. Rather, they maintain their rule through trasformismo, the practice of incorporating the leaders - cultural, political, social, economic, of potentially hostile groups into the elite network, the result being “the formation of an ever broader ruling class”’. Femia, J., Gramsci's political thought. Hegemony, consciousness, and the revolutionary process (Oxford, 1981), pp. 47–8. On the other hand, the extent to which Piedmontese moderate liberals had succeeded in forming ‘an ever broader ruling class’ should not be over-estimated. For example, resistance after 1860 to the ‘Piedmontisation’ of government was quite strong, not only amongst southern deputies but also amongst Tuscan and, to a lesser extent, Lombard deputiesGoogle Scholar.
45 Latent divisions in the democratic movement between the more ‘transformed’ pro-Savoy dements and those who remained loyal to Mazzinian ideals finally became overt in 1862, in the aftermath of Garibaldi's attempt to march on Rome. On the divisions which emerged in 1862–3, and on die activities of the revolutionaries Corrao and Badia, see Alatri, , Lotte politiche, pp. 73–6. On the more general background at a national level, seeGoogle ScholarCandeloro, , Storia dell Italia moderna, v, 266–7Google Scholar.
46 Between 1861 and the Palermo revolt of 1866, the introduction of conscription, increases in taxation, a sharp rise in the price of grain, a severe cholera outbreak, and the abolition of church orders which destroyed most of the church's chariuble functions, led to an explosion of popular feeling against the government.
47 Clark, M., Modern Italy 1870–1982 (London, 1984), pp. 58–61Google Scholar.
48 Lettere edite e inedite di Camillo di Cavour (Torino, 1885), IV, 238Google Scholar.
49 The isolation of many communes had, for example, created enormous obstacles in organizing the January 1861 elections. Montezemolo to the minister of the interior, 21 Jan. 1861, ASP, prefettura di Palermo, serie gabinetto, 1860–1905, b. 1, prat. 1, f. 1, n.8.
50 Sonnino, , I contadini in Sicilia, pp. 107–10Google Scholar.
51 Falconcini, E., Cinque mesi di prefettura in Sicilia (Firenze, 1863), p. 24Google Scholar.
52 22 Mar. 1862, ASP, prefettura di Palermo, ufficio provincial di pubblica sicurezza, 1862–1879, filza 3, f. 1, n.31.
53 Ibid. A memorandum on the brothers written in early 1861 stated that with their father Don Niccolò, the family had dominated Lercara for over forty years. ASP, luog, polizia. b. 1680, f. fratelli Nicolosi.
54 22 March 1862, ASP, pref.pubblica sicurezza, filza 3, f. 1, n.31.
55 D'Alessandro, V., Briganiaggio e mafia in Sicilia (Messina-Firenze, 1959), p. 89Google Scholar.
56 See the Lo Lascio report above, and the report of brigadier Balsamo, ASP, pref. pubblica sicurezza, filza 3, f. 1, n. 31. See also a further report after the 1866 revolt, 24 Nov. 1866, ACSR, gabinetto ministero interno, atti diversi, 1849–95, b.8, f. 1, n.300.
57 The sub-prefect's report of 13 Dec. 1861 praised the work of the Nicolosi family and recommended the removal of Balsamo. ASP, pref. gab. b. 2, prat. 8, 3 div. Balsamo's commanding officer remonstrated with the authorities in a letter of 28 Mar. 1862, and cast doubt on the sub-prefect's impartiality. ASP, pref.pubblica sicurezza, filza 3, f. 1, n.31. Balsamo subsequently returned to Lercara, and further friction between him and the Nicolosi brothers led to a major confrontation in 1866. See the report of 24 Nov. 1866, ACSR, interno, b.8, f. 1, n.300.
58 From the commander of carabinieri, 5 Apr. 1861, ASP, luog.polizia, b. 1683, f. 1.
59 See the exchange of telegrams between the luogotenente generale and Trabonella, over Trabonella's refusal to investigate reactionary activities, ASP, ministero e real segretario di stato presso il luogotenente generate, interno, b.4176, f. 4. An account of Trabonella's obstructionist tactics, dated 19 Aug. 1861, is in ASP, luog.polizia, b. 1679.
60 6 June 1861, ASP, pref.gab. b.a, f.8, 2 Div. Also in Scichilone, Documenti, pp. 76–7.
61 23 Aug. 1861, ASP, luog.interno, b.4176, f.4.
62 10 Oct. 1861, ASP. luog.polizia, b. 1682, f.ottobre.
63 20 Jan. 1861, ASP, pref.gab. b. 1, f. 1, n.8.
64 19 Apr. 1861, ASP, luog.polizia, b. 1682, f.aprile.
65 11 Feb. 1862, ASP, luog.polizia, b. 1683, f. 1.
66 11 May 1867, I moti di Palermo, p. 102.
67 ‘L'intendente e le scimmic’, pp. 51–2.
68 12 Jan. 1861, ASP, luog. internet, b.4176, f.6.
69 19 Apr. 1861, ASP, luog.interno, b. 1682, f.aprilc.
70 Costanza, S., ‘La rivolta contro i “cutrara” a Castellamare del Golfo (1862)’, Nuovi Quaderni el Meridions, XVI (1966), 421–30Google Scholar.
71 The involvement of De Blasi led the government to believe that die revolt was the result of a Bourbon conspiracy. See the report from the inspector of militi a cavallo, 6 Jan. 1862, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1655, f. 50–1. However, eye-witness accounts (such as one sent by the delegato Fundaro) spoke of republican slogans and republican actions. Fundaro's report, and other firsthand accounts, are in ACSR, grazia e giustizia, b. 1, f. 1 (n.67, 121, 137).
72 In a letter of 19 Apr. 1861, the governor attributed the revolt in Santa Margherita to the division between ‘Bourbons’ and ‘revolutionaries’, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1682, f.aprile. What had sparked off the riot was the murder of a commander of the national guard, Giuseppe Montalbano, who had established close links with the peasanu (the governor of Girgenti to the luogotenente generale, 10 Mar. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1680.) The motive for the murder was precisely Montalbano's popularity and his control of the national guard.
73 Recupero, ‘Ceti medi e “homines novi”’, p. 310.
74 Giovanna Fiume has written of the ‘employment’ of bandits by powerful landowners during the early part of the 19th century. Le bande armate in Sicilia, 1819–184) (Palermo, 1984), pp. 9–13, 67–8Google Scholar.
75 19 Apr. 1861, ASP, luog.polizia, b. 1682, f.aprile.
76 Falconcini, , Cinque mesi di prefettura, pp. 57–8Google Scholar.
77 A report on the Nicolosi brothers of 24 Nov. 1866 wrote that Don Peppino ‘held his headquarters in an estate belonging to the Nicolosi family, in which the capo-masnadiere together with his most loyal retainers would receive from Giovanni Nicolosi the most gracious hospitality, including the delivery or the Palermo newspapers’. ACSR, interno, b.8, f. 1, n. 300. Don Peppino managed to evade arrest until Giovanni Nicolosi, for reasons which remain obscure (but were perhaps connected with a plan to win favour in Palermo), decided to withdraw his protection, and instead assisted in Don Peppino's capture. D'Alessandro, , Brigantaggio e mafia, pp. 87–90Google Scholar.
78 See, forexample, the report of 30 Apr. 1861 from the secretary of public security about a feud in Contessa (in the Corleone area), ASP, luog.polizia, b. 1682, f.aprile, and that of 7 Mar. 1861 about a feud in Campofranco, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1679.
79 23 May 1861, ASP, pref. pubblica sicurezza, filza 4, f. 1, n.2.
80 30 Dec. 1861, ASP, pref. gab. b. 2, prat. 8, 2 div.
81 The intendente of Sciacca wrote that since the population had no trust in the judiciary, an increase in violence and vendettas was quite likely. 15 Oct. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1682, f.ottobre. According to the mayor of Castellamare, the magistrate Milone had made little effort to question witnesses to the disturbances and had departed without completing his inquiry. 28 Jan. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1683.
82 From the commander of carabinieri, 14 July 1861, ASP, luog. interno, b.4176, f.6.
83 30 Apr. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1682, f. aprile.
84 22 Oct. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1678.
85 28 Oct. 1861, ASP, pref.gab. b.2, prat. 8, 2 div.
86 22 Oct. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1678.
87 17 May 1861, I mod di Palermo, p. 119.
88 10 Oct. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1682, f.ottobre. He described elements of the ‘ordinary police’ as a ‘gamorra’.
89 20 Jan. 1861, ASP, pref.gab. b. 1, prat. 1, f. 1, n.8.
90 According to a series of reports about the national guards in the districts of the province of Palermo: Palermo (14 July), Termini (24 July), Cefalu (26 July), Corleone (28 July), and Palermo (28 July), ASP, prefettura di Palermo, archivio generate, 1860–7, b. 386. There were also huge delays in supplying the national guards with proper uniforms and guns.
91 ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1683, f. 1.
92 5 Feb. 1861, ASP, pref.gab. b. 1, f. 1.
93 Report on the district of Palermo, 14 July 1862, ASP, pref. archivio, b. 386.
94 An angry report from the town council of Parco on 18 Mar. 1861 told how the inspector Amato Poulet had reversed all the work of the town council. Re-forming the national guard, he had included those excluded by the council and excluded all the ‘honest citizens’ who had been included. Poulet also promoted Giuseppe Murfia, recently dismissed from his post as delegato di pubblica sicurezza, and included Murfia's son, at that time in prison in Palermo, in the revised list ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1679.
95 10 Feb. 1861, ASP, luog. interno, b. 1762.
96 29 July 1862, ASP, pref. archivio, b.386.
97 From the intendente of Sciacca, 14 Oct. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1682, f.ottobre.
98 From the inspector of the militi a cavallo, 6 Jan. 1862, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1655, f. 50–1.
99 10 Jan. 1861, ASP, luog. interno, b. 1757, f. 1–4.
100 29 July 1862, ASP, pref. archivio, b.386. On the career of Turi (Salvatore) Miceli, see N. Giordano, ‘Turi Miceli, il brigante-eroe monrealese nei moti del '48, del '60, e del '66’, Il Risorgimento in Sicilia, I, 1–2 (1965), 200–30Google Scholar.
101 From the president of the council, 18 Mar. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1679.
102 15 Oct. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1682, f.ottobre.
103 From the commander of the twelfth legion of carabinieri, 12 Oct. 1861, ASP, pref. gab. b.8, cat. 2, f.8. Nicolosi was attempting to settle accounts with the maresciallo Balsamo and his ‘friends’, the Sartorio family. The behaviour of the Lercara national guard in September 1866 was not an isolated incident, if the number of national guards which were dissolved by troops during the campaigns of 1865 and 1866 is any indication. In October and the first half of November 1866, troops dissolved and disarmed nineteen national guards in the province of Palermo alone. ASP, pref. archivio, b. 385.
104 The governor of Caltanisetta spoke in a letter of 30 Apr. 1861 of the speed and efficiency with which the militi had captured a gang of robbers and recovered stolen goods. ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1682, f.aprile.
105 22 Mar. 1862, ACSR, grazia e giustizia, b. 1, f. 81.
106 10 Oct. 1861, ASP, luog.polizia, b. 1682, f.ottobre.
107 Described by the intendente of Termini as ‘deceptions, threats, tortures carried out on real or supposed criminals who don't give the desired evidence’, in ibid.
108 Franchetti, , Condizioni politiche e amministrative, p. 42Google Scholar. The commander of the Misilmeri national guard wrote that the militi in his area were too frightened to proceed with arrests, 3 Jan. 1861, ASP, luog. interno, b. 1757, f. 1–4. See also the letter from the minister of the interior, 7 Jan. 1861, ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1681, f.comitive armate.
109 ASP, luog. polizia, b. 1655, f. 43–1.
110 From the commander of the militi a cavallo, 3 Dec. 1861, in ibid.
111 (No date), in Govone, U. (ed.), Il Generale Giuseppe Govone, framenti di memorie (Torino, 1902), pp. 151–5. The help given by the military ‘informer’ Antonio Sticchi was so negligible that he was placed under arrest. From the major commanding a column of the 34th infantry, 10th June 1863, ASP, pref. pubblica sicurezza, filza 22, f. 79Google Scholar.
112 14 May 1867, I moti di Palermo, pp. 110–11.
113 Camera dei Deputati, discussioni, tornata 25 novembrc 1862.
114 Troops were organized into detachments with strictly defined theatres of operation and a designated command centre. Medici to prefect Gualterio, 20 Apr. 1865, ASP, pref. gab. b. 7, cat. 2, also in ACSR, interno, b. 7, f.4, n. 7. allegato A. Procurator General Giovanni Imerdonato also advised General Medici on the possibility of making arrests in the absence of a warrant from a local magistrate, 23 Apr. 1865, ASP, pref. gab. b. 7, cat. 35.
115 Medici to Gualterio, 22 July 1865, ASP, pref. gab. b. 7, cat. 35. See also Gualterio's letter to the mayor of Termini, 2 June 1865, ASP, pref. gab. b. 7, cat 35, concerning the mayor's refusal to supply troops with information, and the mayor's reply of 8 June (where he argues that he did all he could to help the troops). A further letter of 1 July 1865 on this subject is in ASP. pref.gab. b. 7, cat. 2, also in Scichilone, Documenti, pp. 162–3. Obstruction of all kinds was not uncommon. During disturbances in Palermo in the previous May, the mayor of Monreale had done nothing t o support the government and had instead ‘shut himself in his house and locked the doors: inactive to the point of treason, and surrounded by twelve bold criminals, members of the maffia, he simply waited for a favourable or unfavourable outcome… while all enjoyed the wine allocated to the municipal tax office’. Medici to Gualterio, 11 June 1865, ASP. pref.gab. b. 7, cat. 35, ibid.
116 1 Sept. 1865, ACSR, interno, b. 7, f. 10, n. 12.
117 11 May 1865, ASP, pref. gab. b.7, cat. 2.
118 The carabinieri, Franchetti wrote in 1876, were ‘strangers to the island, tied to service regulations drawn up for different circumstances and regions, often ignorant of the language, of the place, of the people… without any idea of popular traditions, or of the complicated relationships which tie criminals together and to other classes of society, they live in the midst of people isolated as if in a desert, they have the same effect as a statue of justice in the middle of a gang of criminals’. Franchetti, , Condizioni politiche e amministrative, p. 41Google Scholar.
119 Siege tactics were employed most frequently during Govone's 1863 campaign, and to a lesser extent during 1862, when they were notoriously unsuccessful. However, as noted above, even the more organized campaigns of General Medici met with little success.
120 Romanelli, ‘Autogoverno’, p. 81. In this article he describes how proposals in 1869 for greater provincial de-centralization were generally rejected by prefects throughout Italy, who considered the amount of autonomy available to local bodies to be already quite sufficient, if not actually more than enough.