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THE INFORMAL ECONOMY OF CREDIT IN EARLY MODERN VENICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2018

JAMES E. SHAW
JAMES E. SHAW*
Affiliation:
University of Sheffield
*
Department of History, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, s3 7ra[email protected]
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Abstract

Evidence from the Piovego, the fraud magistracy of early modern Venice, offers a critical perspective on the documentary record of credit and the ways in which this was used in practice. Although it was formally illegal to charge interest on personal loans, a variety of legal fictions were employed to evade the ban. Such fictions significantly reduced the transparency and certainty of exchange, pushing personal loans into a world of semi-legality. This was a ‘baroque economy’, in which people were aware of the potential discrepancy between surface form and underlying substance, and private agreements might be contested on grounds of substantive fairness. The ‘hidden transcripts’ presented by litigants indicate that the formal record must be interpreted through a ‘thick description’ that considers its role as a resource in a broader process of negotiation. Far from being a ‘market’, characterized by price competition, choice, and transparency, the informal economy of credit was embedded in long-term power relationships. Rather than celebrating intermediaries such as brokers and notaries as facilitators of ‘market’ relations, we need to understand them as part of a hierarchical network of power and wealth, embedded in long-term relationships.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 61 , Issue 3 , September 2018 , pp. 623 - 642
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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54 Goldberg, Jews, pp. 109–10.

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57 Ibid., ‘usura d'usura’.

58 Piovego, b. 34, Baldin Guerra vs. Salamon Camis.

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62 Ibid., c. 47r, ‘Menachen Coen venne ad offerirmi li soprad[ett]i ducati due mille per far servitio più tosto al grana, che à me.’

63 Ibid., cc. 51r, 120r.

64 Ibid., c. 11v, ‘queste cose di quattordeci per cento et altre usure passano in quattro occhi’.

65 Ibid., c. 43r. This was the only case identified where the Piovego had a witness tortured (with the strappado), a very unusual situation linked to ethnic prejudice and the court's determination to obtain a conviction.

66 Ibid., c. 24r, ‘ho detto la verità da huomo legale, e di tutta integrità, ne per tutto l'oro del mondo porteria alcuna delle parti, ove si tratta di riputat[io]ne’.

67 Ibid., c. 23v, ‘fu esborsato alla mia p[resen]za due sacchetti d'oro’.

68 Ibid., c. 25v, ‘e sufficiente la confessione dei debitori, cosa che giornalm[en]te si prattica, et li Protocolli de nodari son pieni di tali instrum[en]ti’.

69 Ferro, Dizionario, ii, p. 204, ‘livello’.

70 Piovego, b. 33, S Zaccaria vs. Francesco Grana, c. 34r, ‘essendo suo compadre e amico’.

71 Ibid., c. 49v, ‘bisogna trovar modo che apparisca ch'io havessi maggior debito’.

72 Piovego, b. 29, Libanoto vs. Gambirasi, 23 Nov. 1627, ‘questo non si può fare, mà bisogna, che voi portate et contate il denaro alla sua presentia de testimonij’.

73 Ibid., ‘fece dichiarire al nodaro, che mi haveva esborsato il denaro alla presentia del nodaro, et testimonij, mà in fatto non corr[s]e dalla sua alle mie mani denaro alcuno’.

74 Ibid., c. 22, 11 Jan. 1627 mv, ‘riposando l'havere & facolta d'ogni famiglia sopra la fede notariale, la quale no[n] si deve, ne si puo metter in dubbio’.

75 Ibid., 11 Aug. 1627, ‘vidi ori…p[re]supongo che fossera la vera quantita espressa nell'instr[omen]to perche anco vidi che s[igno]r Libanoto se ne contento’.

76 Garzoni, Piazza, p. 97, ‘senza un'o[n]cia di coscie[n]za’.

77 Piovego, b. 33, S Zaccaria vs. Francesco Grana, c. 38r, ‘ogni g[ior]no mi faceva esser testimonio’.

78 Ibid., c. 35v, ‘non sò che cosa contenessero’.

79 Ibid., c. 34v, ‘circa il prezzo solito costume è che fra li contrahenti si stabilisce e sopra l'informat[io]ne de med[ese]mi si forma l'instrum[en]to, onde non sò se valessero di più o meno di quello parla l'instrum[en]to stesso’.

80 Piovego, b. 156, denunciation vs. Gerolemo Baldissini, 15 Jan. 1644 mv, ‘huomo tristo senza cognitione del s[igno]r Iddio privo di conscienza’.

81 Avogaria di Comun, b. 4034, filza 287, no. 14; Cowan, Alexander, Marriage, manners and mobility in early modern Venice (Aldershot, 2007), p. 143Google Scholar.

82 Piovego, b. 33, S Zaccaria vs. Francesco Grana, c. 48r, ‘questi per verità non sono stati che prò corsi sopra detti D[uca]ti 6 m[ila] raguagliati a 14 per c[en]to’.

83 Ibid., c. 58v, ‘Com’è possibile ch'il mutti si chiami debitore di d[uca]ti 6 m[ila] mentre non li havesse ricevuti.’

84 Ibid., c. 62r, ‘non fù contato pur un bagattino, a benche mostrassero con sachetti, non so di che ripieni, che vi fosse il denaro’.

85 Piovego, b. 29, Giacomo Gabrieli & Antonio Rubboni vs. Dario Solfin, 18 Sept. 1627.

86 Avogaria di Comun, b. 4132, 14 Nov. 1675, ‘estremo bisogno’.

87 Testamenti, b. 1196, no. 111, 31 Oct. 1648.

88 Piovego, b. 38, Loredan vs. Roncalli, 20 Sept. 1698, referred to the ‘contratti usuratici’ manipulated ‘con studiata accortezza de sansali’ which ‘inceneriscono i pretiosi capitali delle famiglie’.

89 Ibid., ‘per esser vecchi fatti lustri con arte’, ‘bevuto il mar beverò anco questo marino’.

90 Ibid., ‘dovevano restar à libera dispositione di detto Roncali come mezano per farne vendita’.

91 Ibid., capitoli of 19 Nov. 1698.

92 Ibid., ‘lasciar scritto un veridico testimonio per poter in qualunque tempo aggravarmi à tribunali di giustitia di tale infetto scandaloso contratto’.

93 Ibid., ‘havendo anco ciò diffamato con le più vive doglianze in secreta confidenza con più d'una persona’.

94 Piovego, b. 35, Andrea Cantin vs. Carlo Forella, 4 July 1670.

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