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⁴ van Creveld, Martin, Hitler's strategy, 1940–1941: the Balkan clue (London, 1973), pp. 9, 12 and 22.Google Scholar This is not necessarily to imply that Hitler was ignorant of, or strongly averse to, such an Italian invasion of Greece, Van Creveld has argued that Hitler, notwithstanding the traditional view that he was taken by surprise by the Italian incursion into Greece, was well aware of their aggressive project and had sanctioned it – at least negatively by refusing to veto it in advance (ibid. pp. 5, 9–13, 18–19, 30–51). Additional evidence for van Creveld's assertion of prior German knowledge and toleration of the Italians' Greek expedition is contained in Hill, Leonidas E. (ed.), Die Weizsäcker-papiere, 1933–1950 (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), p. 221.Google Scholar

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²⁶ D.B.F.P., ser. 2, XIV, 344–5. Eden carefully omitted any mention of Laval's admission about this point in the detailed account of his talks with the French premier contained in his memoirs (Memoirs, pp. 232–4).

²⁷ Warner, Geoffrey, Pierre Laval and the eclipse of France (London, 1968), p. 69.Google Scholar

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