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Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Robert Frazier
Robert Frazier
Affiliation:
University of Nottingham
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Extract

There is little reason to doubt that the Truman Doctrine was the direct result of the British announcement to the Americans on 21 February 1947 of the almost immediate withdrawal of financial aid to Greece. The Truman, Doctrine, in turn, is generally accepted as the real beginning of the Cold War; at least it is the declaration of full American involvement. What is not so definite is the British motivation for their withdrawal of aid. It is commonly assumed to have been the result of severe British financial difficulties in February 1947. In hindsight, this is highly credible because of the fuel crisis of that month and its effect on the export programme, as well as the approaching exhaustion of the American loan. It then follows that the British Labour government abandoned Greece at a time when its own continuation was in danger.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 27 , Issue 3 , September 1984 , pp. 715 - 727
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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References

1 While the British announcement concerned both Greece and Turkey, discussion here is restricted to Greece; it seems clear that Turkey was only a convenient addition to British proposals which evolved from the Greek problem. It should be emphasized that this article does not concern the British troops in Greece. Contrary to a number of authorities, these forces were not withdrawn in March 1947; most of them remained until 1950. A study of the problem of British troops in Greece and its effect on Anglo-American relations 1947–50, is in preparation.

2 For example: Fontaine, A., History of the cold war (London, 1965), p. 292Google Scholar; Frankel, J., British foreign policy, 1945–1973 (London, 1975), pp. 198, 286–7Google Scholar; Gordon, M. R., Conflict and consensus in Labour's foreign policy (Stanford, 1969), p. 124Google Scholar; Halle, L. J., The cold war as history (London, 1967), pp. 109–17Google Scholar; Kaiser, R. G., Cold winter, cold war (New York, 1974), pp. 177–8Google Scholar; LaFeber, W., America, Russia, and the cold war (New York, 1967), pp. 43–4Google Scholar; Meehan, E. J., The British left wing and foreign policy (New Brunswick, 1960), p. 106Google Scholar; Northedge, F. S., Descent from power (London, 1974), p. 62Google Scholar.

3 SirShawcross, Hartley, attorney general in the Labour government, told a public meeting in early February that unless the immediate economic problems were solved, ‘the Labour Government would fall and that would be the end of Socialism in our time’. The Times, 10 02 1947Google Scholar.

4 Separate comments on British sincerity in this matter are found in [F]oreign [R]elations of the United States, 1947 (Washington, 1971), v, 45, 47, 50–1, 57, 58Google Scholar; and Acheson's statement, U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 2616, ‘Assistance to Greece and Turkey’, p. 50.

5 Ernest Bevin (London, 1952), p. 263Google Scholar.

6 Notable acceptances of this view, usually based on Williams's Bevin, include Medlicott, H. N., British foreign policy since Versailles (London, 1968), pp. 280–1Google Scholar, and Contemporary England (London, 1967), pp. 493–4Google Scholar; Barker, Elisabeth, Britain in a divided Europe (London, 1971), pp. 68–9Google Scholar; Jones, Roy E., ‘Reflections upon an eventful period in Britain's foreign relations’, International Relations', 11 (1961), 524–40Google Scholar. This view has crept into texts likely to be used by uncritical younger students, such as Tames, Richard, Ernest Bevin (Aylesbury, 1974), p. 36Google Scholar, in the Lifeline Series; and Jones, R. Ben, The making of contemporary Europe (London, 1980), p. 24Google Scholar (in addition to the two widely used texts of Medlicott just cited).

7 This assumes that Truman, in February 1947, was not already looking for an issue on which to base a more aggressive foreign policy or, what is more important, that Bevin had no reason to believe that he had the idea.

8 High tide and after (London, 1962)Google Scholar.

9 Archives, British Library of Political Science and Economics, London.

10 The fact that the decisions to disengage from Palestine and India were announced in the same week that the note on Greece was sent to the Americans is sometimes used to show that the Labour government was in a state of panic because of the fuel crisis, and therefore driven to desperate measures. There seems little doubt that these two announcements were the culmination of long-term processes, and that it was only a coincidence that they were made public at this time.

11 Public Record Office, Foreign Office, F.O. 371/67032/R 944, R 2241, R 2440; F.O. 371/67043/R 10539; Cabinet Office, CAB 128/9, CM 14 (47) 4; FR, 1946, VII, 148–9.

12 F.O. 371/58786/R 14671, R 15047.

13 It seems to have been established Treasury policy to confine aid to Greece to support of the armed forces, rather than to make development grants or loans (F.O. 371/48338/R 21531, R 21610; F.O. 371/58767/R 13693/ and F.O. cable No. 90 in CAB 119/87). The most detailed breakdown of British aid to Greece for 1944–7 is that of 29 Jan. 1947 in F.O. 371/67032/R 2438, confirmed by Dalton's letter to Attlee of 11 Feb. 1947 in ibid., R 2443, and by the 1948 Treasury/Foreign Office investigation in F.O. 371/72279/R 2487. All these agree on £10,000,000 to back the currency and either £29,000,000 or £30,000,000 for the Greek armed forces. Dalton's figure of £87,000,000 in 434 [Parl]iamentary [Deb]ates, H.C., cols. 650–1 (6 Mar. 1947) is misleading; it apparently includes £48,000,000 for maintenance of British forces in Greece (which would have had to be spent anyway).

14 [T]reasury Records, T 236/1054/OF 48/34/1 A.

15 FR, 1947, v, 26–7, 37 9; Maclean's, Donald discussions with the State Department in FR, 1946, VII, 264Google Scholar; F.O. 371/58767/R 14121; F.O. 371/67032/R 2438; the appreciation of the British Ambassador in Athens in F.O. 371 /67032/R 1900; and Williams's, Francis statement to the American press (San Francisco Chronicle, 10 04 1947)Google Scholar as discussed in F.O. 371/67039/R 4886 and F.O. 371/67040/R 5084.

16 JP(47)5(Final) in F.O. 371/67032/R 1819; ibid. R 2629.

17 F.O. 371/58767/R 14121.

18 F.O. 371/58768/R 14969, R 15437.

19 F.O. 371/58709/R 14591; F.O. 371/58731/R 14873; F.O. 371/58786/R 14671.

20 F.O. 371/58658/R 15770, R 15933; FR 1946, VII, 223–4, 235, 240–5, 913–5

21 F.O. 371/67032/R 1609; FR, 1946, VII, 177–9, 223–4, 240–5, 255, 262–3.

22 F.O. 371/58658/R 15942. The Washington Embassy was rather more favourably impressed (F.O. 371/67032/R 1609).

23 JP (46) 199 (Final) and COS (46) 163 in F.O. 371/58658/R 16257; JP (46) 204 (Final) in ibid. R 16564; COS (46) 167 in CAB 79/53.

24 COS (46) 171 in CAB 79/54. See also F.O. 371/58659/R 16952.

25 F.O. 371/58659/R 17594, R 17720, R 18501.

26 F.O. 371/67032/R 2438.

27 DO (47) 1 Jan. 1947, in CAB 131/4, contains both the appreciation of the strategic importance of Greece, and the recommendations. The detailed proposals of the chiefs of staff are in Jp (47) 5 (Final), 25 Jan. 1947, in F.O. 371/67032/R 1819.

28 Bevin's proposal in CP (47) 34 in CAB 129/16. There is a hand-written note on the top margin from ‘B’ (presumably Sir Norman Brook, secretary of the cabinet): ‘Mr. Eastwood. Will you find out, if you can, what is recommended in this paper and set it out for the assistance of the P.M.’ The cabinet conclusion is CM 14 (47) 4 in CAB 128/9.

29 F.O. 371/67032/R 2439.

30 Ibid. R 1900.

31 Ibid. R 1900.

32 No indication has been found of a referral of the drafts to Alexander, the Minister of Defence. This is strange, in view of the conclusion of the ad hoc committee, and the major interest of Defence in the matter.

33 F.O. 371/67032/R 2443. Bevin's marginal note is not dated.

34 F.O. 371/67032/R 1900.

35 Ibid. R 2440.

36 Ibid. R 1900.

37 Ibid. R 2443.

38 F.O. 371/67033/R 2969, R 2970.

39 Acheson, Dean, Present at the creation (London, 1969), p. 217Google Scholar; and FR, 1947, v, 32–45. Details of Marshall's movements from the Archives of the Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va; Inverchapel's visits from the (Baltimore) Sun and Evening Sun, 21 Feb. 1947.

40 F.O. 371/67032/R 10421.

41 Ibid. R 2629. For the possibility that the Defence Ministry was being misled as to the strength of the guerrilla movement, see F.O. 371/67072/R 2451 and R 10767.

42 This is puzzling in view of the general pessimism reigning in the Foreign Office and the Treasury as to the prospects of obtaining any significant amount of help from the Americans (F.O. 371/67032/R 2440; F.O. 371/67033/R 2751; F.O. 371/67034/R 2973; T 236/1055/OF 48/341 B).

43 DO (47) 6 in F.O. 371/67034/R 2973; and FR, 1947, v, 105, 116–17, 133–4.

44 Dalton, High tide, pp. 206–7.

45 The criticism of Dalton is based on comparison of High tide, chapters 24, 25; Dalton's dairies for the period 7 Feb. –14 Mar. 1947; and the relevant F.O. files.

46 See the long string of statements by Dalton singling out Greece as an area which must be abandoned in: High tide, p. 171; diary entry for 14 Mar. 1947; F.O. 371/67032/R 2438, R 2443; F.O. 371/67039/R 4931; and F.O. 371/67040/R 5397.

47 Use of the term ‘tricky plan’ for Bevin's actions concerning Greece is that of Barker, , Divided Europe, p. 68Google Scholar.

48 A clipping of Trevor-Roper's review has been found, but there is no indication of the periodical in which it was printed. For Woolf, , see Political Quarterly, XXIV (1953), 116–17Google Scholar; Crossman, , New Statesman (8 11 1952), p. 554Google Scholar; International Affairs, XXIX (1953), 209Google Scholar; Foreign Affairs, XXI (1953), 687Google Scholar; Times Literary Supplement (14 Nov. 1952), p. 735; Daily Worker (6 Nov. 1952). The Sunday Times (9 Nov. 1952) and identical reviews of 6 Nov. 1952 in the Oxford Mail and the Birmingham Gazette all noted Williams's contention, but either doubted its validity or failed to accept it. Fifty-six reviews were examined.

49 For contemporary views that the financial position was not serious, see Jay, Douglas, ‘Labour's plan for 1947’, Labour Party Discussion Series, XIII (1947), 5Google Scholar (in his autobiography, Change and fortune (London, 1980), pp. 163–4Google Scholar, Jay admits error, but implies he was misled by the Overseas Finance Department of the Treasury); , Dalton, High tide, pp. 163–7Google Scholar, 257–8; The Times (3 Feb. 1947), reporting a recent speech: ‘Stating that there would be no financial crisis, Mr Dalton … said that present financial controls were quite strong enough to prevent such an event.’ For later comment, see Jones, , ‘Reflections’, p. 529Google Scholar; Blackburn, Raymond, I am an alcoholic (London, 1959), p. 72Google Scholar; and Watt, D. C., Personalities and politics (London, 1965), pp. 68Google Scholar, 73–4.

50 For indications of what the shock amounted to, see FR, 1947, v, 275; Acheson, , Creation, pp. 217, 220–1Google Scholar; Jones, Joseph M., The fifteen weeks (New York, 1955), p. 8Google Scholar; Truman, MargaretHarry S. Truman (New York, 1974), p. 376Google Scholar. Williams's story of Marshall being so shocked that he sent an angry cable to Bevin asking if there had been a major change in British foreign policy (Bevin, p. 263) seems based on faulty memory; the telegram he describes is almost certainlythat of 1 Aug. 1947 (FR, 1947, v, 273–4) concerning British troops in Greece. Lord Inverchapel made a tactful suggestion to the Foreign Office that, while the shock content of the note had probably been useful on this occasion, it might not be advisable to try such tactics again. (F.O, 371/67035/R 3482).

51 Williams is reported as telling American newsmen shortly after the Truman Doctrine speech that the United States had no reason to be shocked because the State Department had known for some months that Britain intended to abandon Greece in March 1947 (F.O. 371/67039/R 4886 and F.O. 371/67040/R 5084).

52 Strang, , Home and abroad (London, 1956), p. 291Google Scholar; Foot, , Aneurin Bevan (London, 1973), 11, 89Google Scholar. Others who praise Bevin's timing in this matter include: Barker, , Divided Europe, p. 69Google Scholar; Dilks, David, Retreat from power (London, 1981), II, 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Frankel, , Foreign policy, p. 187Google Scholar; and Seaman, L. C. B., Post-Victorian Britain (London, 1966), pp. 475–6Google Scholar.

53 433 Parl. Deb., H.C., col. 1909 (25 Feb. 1947). See Truman, Harry S., Memoirs (London, 1956), 11Google Scholar, 108, 164; and Acheson, , Creation, p. 181Google Scholar, for the effect of this speech on American decision makers.

54 For strong views to the effect that the Truman Doctrine speech had an adverse influence on the Moscow Conference see Toynbee, Arnold, ‘Introduction’, Survey of international affairs 1947–1948 (London, 1952), ed. by Calvocoressi, P., pp. 6–7Google Scholar; Jebb, Gladwyn, Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), p. 199Google Scholar; and Wheeler–Bennett, J. and Nicholls, A., Semblance of peace (New York, 1974), p. 471Google Scholar. On balance, it would seem that the Truman speech had little effect on the conference, but it is difficult to see how Bevin could have been sure of this.

55 The more significant reports of the British embassy in Washington on the changing American attitude are in F.O. 371/51609–11; they are analysed in detail by Boyle, Peter, ‘The Foreign Office view of Soviet–American relations’, Diplomatic History, III (1979), 307–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56 Files of the Office of the Prime Minister, PREM 8/705.

57 Williams states in the author's notes to Ernest Bevin that the book is based ‘upon many long conversations I had with him from 1929 to within a few days of his death and of which I kept notes’. A search of the Francis-Williams papers in Churchill College, Cambridge, has failed to locate any notes of Williams on conversations with Bevin, although many papers concerning the books are there. It is possible that Bevin in later years, aware of the results of the withdrawal from Greece, gave Williams the impression that he had planned it as a stimulus to the Americans.

58 Williams papers, box 24.

59 A prime minister remembers (London, 1961), p. 172Google Scholar.

60 Nothing so strange (London, 1970), p. 246Google Scholar.