² A fourth ‘wave’ might be identified in the writings of Italian authors on the PCI. Their accounts, as distinct from the English language works considered here, focus on organizational history and the Party's leadership. Spriano, P., La stona del partito comunista italiano, 5 vols. (Turin, 1967)Google Scholar and Galli, G., Storia del partito comunista italiano (Milan, 1976)Google Scholar are two well-known examples.

³ The most influential of these studies is still Blackmer, D., Unity in diversity: Italian communism and the communist world (London, 1968)Google Scholar. The same approach but in a weaker analysis is evident in Evans, R. H., Coexistence' Communism and its practice in Bologna, 1945–1965 (Notre Dame, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁴ Blackmer concludes with the observation, ‘The weight this point [the importance of the PCI's international connexion to its militants] deserves would be difficult to ascertain without careful study of the attitudes of those who have joined and voted for the Communist party’ (Blackmer, , Unity, p. 389)Google Scholar. It is not only an issue of the weight to ascribe to the Soviet connexion within the PCI, but, as we shall see, the very nature of that connexion itself.

⁵ Among these are Cammett, J., Antonio Gramsci and the origins of Italian communism (Stanford, 1967)Google Scholar, Clark, M., Antonio Gramsci and the revolution that failed (London, 1977)Google Scholar; Davidson, A., Antonio Gramsci: towards an intellectual biography (London, 1977)Google Scholar; Femia, J., Gramsci'spolitical thought (Oxford, 1971)Google Scholar, Fiori, G., Antonio Gramsci. life of a revolutionary (London, 1970)Google Scholar; Mouffe, C. (ed.), Gramsci and Marxist theory (London, 1979)Google Scholar; Tarrow, S., ‘Le Parti communiste et la société italienne’ in Sociologie du Commumisme en Italie (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1974), pp 1–54Google Scholar; Williams, G., Proletarian order' Antonio Gramsci, factory councils and the origins of communism in Italy, 1911–1921 (London, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁶ Works in this genre include: Amyot, G., The Italian Communist Party: the crisis of the Popular Front Stragey (London, 1981)Google Scholar; Davidson, A., The theory and practice of Italian communism, vol. 1 (London, 1982)Google Scholar; Hellman, S., ‘The PCI's alliance strategy and the case of the middle classes’, chapter 10, Blackmer, and Tarrow, , Communism in Italy and France (Princeton, 1977)Google Scholar; P. Lange, ‘The PCI at the local level' a study of strategic performance’, ch. 7, Blackmer and Tarrow, Communism; Sassoon, D., The strategy of the Italian Communist Party: from the resistance to the historic compromise (London, 1982)Google Scholar An insightful critique of the strategic studies ‘school’ is Judt, T., ‘“The spreading notion of the town”: some recent writings on French and Italian communism’, The Historical Journal, XXVIII, 4 (1985), 1011–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Modena is one of eight provinces in Emilia-Romagna. Bologna is the largest province in the region and borders Modena to the south.

⁸ Clearly, the situation in southern Italy, occupied by the Allies during 1943, was much different. The history of the Modena PCI may therefore bear few similarities to the development of the Party in the South. Only the areas north of the Gothic Line (1944–5) along the crest of the Apennines experienced a twenty-month resistance. Rome was liberated in June, 1944 and Florence in September.

⁹ Gazzetta dell'Emilia, 26 July 1943 (26/7/43).

¹⁰ The basic works on the resistance in Modena are: Arbizzani, L. and Casali, L., ‘Montefiorino: distretto partigiano’ in La resistenza in Emilia Romagna (Imola, 1970)Google Scholar; Benedetti, L., ‘Vent'anni di lotte contro il fascismo nella clandestinità e nella resistenza, 1925–1945’, 2 vols, unpublished manuscript (1963)Google Scholar, PCI Modena Archive (hereafter, PCI:Mo); Canova, F. et al. Lotta di liberazione nella bassa Modenese (Modena, 1975)Google Scholar; Casali, L., Storia delta resistenza a Modena (Modena, 1980)Google Scholar; Cesarini, M., Modena M, Modena P (Rome, 1955)Google Scholar; Gorrieri, E., La repubblica di Montefiorino (Modena, 1975)Google Scholar; Nardi, M., Otto mesi di guerriglia (Bologna, 1976)Google Scholar; Pacor, M. and Casali, L., Lotte sociali e guerriglia in pianura: la resistenza a Carpi, Soliera, Novi, Campogalliano (Rome, 1972)Google Scholar; Poppi, O., Il commissario (Modena, 1979)Google Scholar; Ricci, M. and deMichels, A., Armando racconta (Milan, 1982)Google Scholar; Istituto Storico della Resistenza a Modena e nella Provincia (hereafter, ISRMo), Rassegne and Quaderni.

¹¹ These were very small organizations which quickly disappeared from the scene: Il Gruppo di Ricostruzione Liberate and Il Movimento di Unità Proletaria per la Repubblica Socialista. Other provincial committees formed during the 45 Days in two larger towns of the countryside – Nonantola and Mirandola.

¹² Figures on membership in the PCI during both clandestinity and the resistance are imprecise. Estimates for the 1920s and 1930s are: 1927–250–400 members: Cremaschi, O., ‘Dati riassuntivi dell'attività del PCI svolta in alcuni comuni della provincia di Modena dal 1921 al 1945’, interview with Casali, L., 1967, 4Google Scholar; 1929 75–80 members, but perhaps for the city of Modena only: P. Secchia, Azione svolta dal Partito Comunista in Italia durante il fascismo, 1926–1932 (Istituto Feltrinelli, , Annali, 1969), p. 223Google Scholar; 1932–100–200 members, with a further 177 in Communist Party youth organizations: Muzzioli, G., L'economia e la società Modenese fra le due guerre, 1919–1939 (Modena, 1979), table 31, p. 143Google Scholar. In 1928, after an inspection of the province, Secchia wrote that ‘In the city of Modena there is no longer anything; in the province there are some groups which have formed a committee, but even these have not been seen by anyone for six months’ (Secchia, , Azione, p. 130)Google Scholar.

¹³ The histories of the province during fascism include: Muzzioli, G., L'Economia; IGoogle Scholar, Vaccari, , ‘Il sorgere del fascismo nel Modenese’ in Movimento operaio e fascismo nell'Emilia-Romagna (Rome, 1973)Google Scholar; an extensive series of interviews compiled by Professor L. Casali, now found in the archive of the Associazione Nazionale dei Partigiani Italiani (hereafter cited, ANPI Mo). In addition to the interview with Cremaschi above (n. 12), two others are of special interest: ‘Appunti per una storia del PCI a Modena: dall’ occupazione delle fabbriche alla clandestinità (ANPI Mo, 1970); Turchi, G., ‘Appunti per una storia dell'antifascimso a Carpi, 1915–1943’ (ANPI Mo, 1970)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ The language of fascism and its style of political harangue thoroughly influenced the PCI during the first months of the resistance. See, for example, ‘Young men of Italy!’ (14/9/43) in Casali, , Storia, p. 272Google Scholar. One historian of the national resistance noted, ‘Antifascism had its tempo, rhythm and character inevitably conditioned by its enemies’ (Quazza, G., Resistenza e storia d'Italia: problemi e ipotesi di ricerca Milan, 1976, p. 117)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ One of the major figures in the provincial PCI during the resistance talked of the advantages for the Communist Party found in the ‘conspiratorial instincts’ developed during clandestinity. See Benedetti's interview in ‘Appunti per una storia’.

¹⁶ The history of the PCI's clandestine press is documented in five sources: Bellelli, A., ‘Come era organizzata la produzione della stampa clandestina della provincia di Modena’, ANPI Mo, 1967–1968Google Scholar; Borsari, E., ‘Contributo alla storia della stampa clandestina di Carpi’, ISRMo Rassegna 8 (1967), pp. 50–5Google Scholar; R. Gozzi, ‘Diario della tipografia clandestina’, ANPI Mo(no date); G. Musi, ‘La stampa clandestina del PCI presso la tipografia Cervi’, ANPI Mo(no date); Vaccari, I., ‘La raccolta della tipografia Cervi’, ISRMo Rassegna 8 (1967), pp. 7–36Google Scholar.

¹⁷ l'Unità 28/7/43 and 12/8/43 (‘But the music is still the same!’) show the PCI's transition from celebration over the fall of Mussolini to grave warnings about Italy's future under Badoglio.

¹⁸ Casali, , Storia, pp. 124–5Google Scholar.

¹⁹ l'Unità 7/9/43.

²⁰ Arbizzani, L., Azione operai, contadina di massa (Bari, 1976)Google Scholar, vol. III of l'Emilia Romagna nella guerra di liberazione, pp. 64–5; Casali, , Storia, pp. 127–31Google Scholar.

²¹ Only at two locations in Modena was there army resistance of any kind to the German invasion In both cases it was quickly overcome (Casali, , Storia, pp 150–2Google Scholar, Cesarini, , Modena M, p 39)Google Scholar In the haste to abandon their barracks in the mountains, Italian soldiers left behind stores of arms and munitions These later became the first weapons of the partisans.

²² The army lost more than its ‘legitimacy’ in September 1943, it also lost most of its soldiers The Germans imprisoned several thousand Italian troops in the days immediately after the invasion These men were later sent to fight on foreign fronts, including Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Those Italian soldiers not captured, attempted to return to their homes Many later joined the partisans, not as regular troops of the army but as members of the various political divisions in the resistance.

²³ Many of the publications of the provincial CLN are gathered in Atti e documenti del CLN clandesttno a Modena, ISRMo Quaderno 9 (1974) The communal CLNs in the larger towns formed during the winter of 1943–4, those in the smaller villages formed later, during the spring and summer of 1944.

²⁴ One important reason for the communists' lead in the CLNs was the scarcity of representatives from other political parties Socialist participation in Modena was problematic At least one CLN participant claimed that ‘During the clandestine struggle, when the idea was the construction of the Comilali di liberazione nazionale, we PCI members created artificial socialists We took our comrades and said to them, ‘You are now a socialist!’ They were not at all happy about this… However, some of them, because of the effort required “to be a socialist”, remained in that Party’ (A. DelMonte in ANPI Mo, 1970).

²⁵ ‘There is a class instinct in the workers which is nourished by the permanent ties with the factories, the masses and the reality of working life. When this is united to revolutionary ideology, it gives them a secure orientation in action’ (‘Due Svolte’ in La nostra lotta, October, 1943; quoted in Casali, , Storia, p. 297)Google Scholar.

²⁶ 360 of the 520 PCI members in the city of Modena at the end of 1943 were operai (Casali, , Storia, p. 274Google Scholar).

²⁷ The emphasis on the recruitment of the relatively small, industrial working class for the cadres of the resistance also reflected a generational split within the PCI. Older members relied on a political formation that included the Bolshevik Revolution, the Biermio rosso and the split of the communists from the socialists in 1921; younger members' political experiences were more directly tied to the situation of provincial agricultural workers under fascism. The first group concentrated its energies on industrial workers; the second on the mass struggle against fascism in the mountains and the countryside. The question of who would make the resistance came to be resolved by events themselves: the appearance of armed groups in the mountains during the winter of 1943–4.

²⁸ Casali, , Storia, p. 226Google Scholar; Gorrieri, , La repubblica, p. 87Google Scholar.

²⁹ The PCI responded to the other parties in the CLN with charges attendismo – a ‘wait and see’ attitude. Cesarini, , Modena M, p. 176Google Scholar; Poppi, , Il commissario, p. 18Google Scholar. Gorrieri, (La repubblica, p. 86)Google Scholar rejects the PCI's criticism of the other CLN members.

³⁰ Secchia, in La nostra lotta (11 1943), pp. 20–1Google Scholar.

³¹ A brief history of the Sassuola group is Tassi, O., ‘La prima pattuglia partigiana di Sassuolo’, ISR Mo Rassegna 6 (1965), pp. 55–7Google Scholar.

³² Gorrieri, , La repubblica, p. 119Google Scholar.

³³ This militant was Mario Ricci (Armando), a native of one of the more important towns in the mountains, Pavullo.

³⁴ Ricci, , (Armando), p. 183Google Scholar; Gorrieri, , La repubblica, p. 122Google Scholar; Poppi, , II commissario, pp. 21–4Google Scholar.

³⁵ Benedetti, , ‘Venti'anni’, I, 216–22Google Scholar; Poppi, , II commissario, pp. 43–8Google Scholar.

³⁶ The Communist Party took great pains to distance itself from the bandits, warning civilians of criminals ‘acting in the name of the partisans’ and noting that ‘The partigiani never request provisions at night, … they are never masked [and] they leave a regular receipt’, ISR Mo T. IV/26 (no date).

³⁷ Ricci, , Armando, pp. 114Google Scholar, 142. Similar descriptions of the popularity of these actions are found in nearly all the diaries of the communist Garibaldi brigades (ISRMo S. 11/6, S. 11/8 and S. 111/14) and in most memoirs, too. Alfeo Corassori, PCI member and later mayor of the city of Modena, noted that the acts which aided the peasantry ‘… constitute material for a detailed study, above all better to understand the conditions in which this battle saved thousands of peasant households from certain ruin and allowed our agricultural economy to grow again relatively easily once liberation had come’ (PCI, Alfeo Corassori (Modena, 1968), p. 15)Google Scholar.

³⁸ The Communist Party and the provincial CLN published numerous pamphlets calling attention to the reprisals carried out by the Germans. See R. Pinelli, I Volantini delta resistenza Modenese, vol. 1, Tesi di laurea, ISRMo U. V/26.

³⁹ Alberghi, P., Attila sull' Appennino: la strage di Monchio e le origini delta lotta partigiana nella Valle del Secchia (ISRMo Quademo 7, 1969)Google Scholar is the best account of the reprisal.

⁴⁰ Though at this time there were partisans of other (and no) political affiliation (Pd'A, PSI, ex-Army and DC) within the various communist brigades.

⁴¹ The Republic was established, not because the partisans were particularly strong, but because the enemy was rather weak. By the summer of 1944, the Italian fascists lacked a reason and a will to carry on the fight. They generally surrendered to the partisans once their communications were severed. The German military was hard-pressed by the Allies in mid-1944, immediately before the June liberation of Rome.

⁴² There is an historiographic debate concerning the correct label for Montefiorino: republic or district. It has little bearing on the concerns of this article. ‘Republic’ was chosen because it was the term most often used by the partisans during the forty days of Montefiorino.

⁴³ Arbizzani, and Casali, , ‘Montefiorino’, p. 12Google Scholar. Estimates of the partisans’ strength at the time of the attack range from 500 to 1,000.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 65; Poppi, , II commissario, p. 89Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Figures again are imprecise. Arbizzani, and Casali, (‘Montefiorino’, p. 44)Google Scholar claim that of the 1,000 partisans involved in the attack on Montefiorino, 60 were enrolled in the Pd ‘A and only 40 in the Christian Democracy. Most often socialists and communists fought together in the Garibaldi brigades.

⁴⁶ The first direct contacts with the Allies were established at the time of the Republic. Several English ‘missions’ set up permanent headquarters in the mountains of Modena during the summer of 1944. Three sources recount their work among the partisans: Davidson, B., Special Operations Europe: Scenes from the anti-Nazi war (London, 1980)Google Scholar; Macintosh, C., From cloak to dagger: An SOE agent in Italy, 1940–1945 (London, 1982)Google Scholar; Macintosh, C., ‘Le missioni avanzate Inglesi e la battaglia degli Appennini’ in Bergonzini, L., La lotta armata vol. I of I'Emilia Romagna nella guerra di liberazione, pp. 541–76Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Letter of the Political Commissar of the PCI to the Communist Party Federation in Modena (August 1944) in Benedetti, , ‘Venti'anni’, I, 245Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Ibid. II, 20 (16/9/44) Also in Istituto Nazionale per la Stona del Movimento di Liberazione in Italia, Le Bngate Garibaldi II, 601 3 (Milan, 1979)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Ricci, , Armando, p 181Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ An observation with which the Political Commissar for the PCI at Montefiorino agreed in full in the 1970s (Poppi, , II commissarino, p 93Google Scholar).

⁵¹ Arbizzani, and Casali, , ‘Montefiorino’, p 49Google Scholar, Bcllei, F, ‘La formazione “Italia Libera”’ (ANPI Mo, 1970)Google Scholar.

⁵² The PCI pamphlet which made this claim, ‘The truth about the battle’, is found in ISRMo T III/28 (4/8/44) and in Gorneri, , La repubblua, pp 426–7, n 42Google Scholar.

⁵³ Estimates of the number of German troops in the battle range from 5,000 to 30,000.

⁵⁴ Approximately 250 partisans died during the retreat (Gorrien, , La repubbhca, p 428, n 43Google Scholar) There may have been as many as 2,000 German casualties.

⁵⁵ By the end of the battle, somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500 partisans were dispersed throughout the mountains in small groups (Nardi, , Otto mesi, p 141Google Scholar)

⁵⁶ Pacor, and Casali, (Lotte sociali, pp 87, 97)Google Scholar give the following figures for growth of the early partisan movement in the pianura end of Dec 1943, 150, end of March 1944, 350, end of April 1944, 450, end of May 1944, 650, end of June 1944, 850, end of July 1944, 1,000, end of August 1944, 1,300 Figures (from ISRMo S III/14, ‘Diano stonco Anstides’) for the growth in seven brigades of the Modena, P (Pianura) command give the following totals autumn 1943, 91Google Scholar, autumn 1944, 1,462, spring 1945, 2,493, Liberation 1945, 3,196.

⁵⁷ A point repeatedly emphasized in the diaries of the Garibaldi brigades.

⁵⁸ Two pamphlets focused on these issues exclusively ‘Agncoltori ll grano al popolo’ Lavoraton, tutti' Difendiamo Il grano ' and ‘Difendiamo Il nostro bestiame’ Both were sponsored by the Provincial Committee for the Defence of Farm Workers (ISRMo T III/44 6)

⁵⁹ See ISRMo S III/14, ‘Diano stonco Anstides’, p 10 PCI propaganda was slow in coming to the peasantry Only sporadic and uncoordinated efforts were made in their direction before July 1944 See Casali, L, ‘Formazionedella “hneapohtica” del PCI’, in ISR Mo Rassegnan 9–10 (1968–1969), pp 18–19Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ ISRMo S. III/14, ‘Diario storico Aristides’, p.76.

⁶¹ One PCI warning to black market profiteers is found in ISRMo S. III/14, ‘Cronistoria della Brigata Matteotti’, allegato n. 18 (19/2/45).

⁶² ISRMo S. II/10, n. 256.

⁶³ Guerrieri, L., ‘Come il CLN salvō la Maserati’ ANPI Mo, 1969Google Scholar; ISRMo T. III/Carpi, n. 45; Cesarini, , Modena M, p. 161Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Pacor, and Casali, , Lotte sociali, appendix 8, ‘La Magneti Marelli di Carpi’ pp. 315–20Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Arbizzani, , Azione operai, pp. 180–2Google Scholar. The March 1943 industrial strikes in northern Italy found little reflexion in the province of Modena.

⁶⁶ The Podestà set the province's contribution of manual labourers at 20,000, excluding from consideration those with more than five children, the parents of soldiers killed in the war, students in their last year of studies and directors of ‘important’ industries. Local prefects were encouraged to select for deportation the unemployed and those on communal welfare roles. See F. Gorrieri, La resistenza nella bassa Modenese: da initiative di minoranze attive a movimento popolare di massa, 1943–1945, Tesi di laurea, ISRMo U. V/15.

⁶⁷ I' Unità (clandestine) 10–V–44.

⁶⁸ Gorrieri, , La repubblica, p. 217Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Ibid. pp. 215, 216; Bellelli, A., ‘Gli scioperi dell'aprile, 1944 a Modena’ ISRMo Rassegna, V (1964), pp. 45–8Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Cesarini, , Modena M, pp. 417–9Google Scholar; PCI, Corasson, p. 22.

⁷¹ The official CLN pamphlet on 25 April 1945 captures the atmosphere in Modena on the day of Liberation (ISRMo Rassegna I, 1960, p. 85Google Scholar).

⁷² ‘Dati Statistici’ ISRMo Rassegna I (1960), pp. 13–15Google Scholar; also ISRMo publication on the 27th anniversary of the Liberation (1972).

⁷³ The high estimate of 90% is drawn from instituto di Studie Ricerche ‘Carlo Cattaneo’, La Presenza Sociale del PCI e delta DC (Bologna, 1968), tables 2.2 (p. 296) and 2.4 (p.301)Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Istituto Gramsci, Rome (hereafter, IstG): Modena, 1945 and Modena, 1946 folders; Partito Comunista Modena Archive (hereafter, PCIMo) 1945 folder.

⁷⁵ IstG: Modena, 1946.

⁷⁶ PCI = 44–1; PSIUP = 260%; DC = 252%; ISTAT, Eleziom per l'Assemblea Costituente e Referendum Istituzionale, 2 giugno 1946 (Rome, 1948)Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ Republic = 75·2%; monarchy = 24·8%; ISTAT, Eleziom, 1946.

⁷⁸ Though by the time of the administrative and constituent elections in 1946 other issues were important in attracting and maintaining support for the provincial PCI. These included the communists' defense of the resistance heritage against the Christian Democrats in the national government, the Party's protests against the arrests of its members and ex-partisans in the province and the PCI's promotion of the first agricultural reforms in the countryside.

⁷⁹ From ‘Dati Statistici’. Of the 19,318 total officially recognized partisans and patriots, I, 984 (10%) were women in the province of Modena.

⁸⁰ Casali, L., unpublished data; Provincial figures from Compendio, p. 16Google Scholar. The complete comparisons show the following distribution of partisans according to general occupational category:

⁸¹ From the 1936 national census, in di Commercio, Camera, Modena, , Compendia Statistico, table 14 (Modena, 1958), p. 16Google Scholar.

⁸² ISRMo S. II/9. The dates of birth for thirty partisans, out of the Division's total of 383, were not recorded.

⁸³ Arbizzani's conclusions on the situation in Bologna appear equally applicable to Modena: ‘The mass struggle for the small demands (higher salaries, more lard, more tyres for the bicycles, etc.) contributed to the mobilization of thousands and thousands of people and to strengthen the preparation for the insurrection against the Nazi-fascists; the struggle for better conditions of work, for new divisions of agricultural products, for the daily kilogram of rice and for a higher ration of cereal became the struggle against the proprietor backed by the Germans and the definitive defeat of the fascists.’ Arbizzani, L., ‘Notizie sui contadini della provincia di Bologna durante la resistenza’ in Il movimento di liberazione in Italia, n. 75 (04–06 1964)Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ Casali, L., ‘Il programma agrario del PCI durante la resistenza’ Critica Marxista, 8, n. 6 (1970), p. 172Google Scholar; Gatti, E., ‘Propaganda e legislazione nella Repubblica di Montefiorino’, ANPI Mo, 1970Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ Because we are unable fully to answer these questions, I believe that the debates on doppiezza within the Communist Party are incomplete. The problem may not be simply one of the PCI hierarchy minimizing its revolutionary appearance while secretly reassuring cadres of an eventual X-hour for revolution. Much more profound was the doppiezza built into the Party through the nature of the antifascist commitment to the PCI – the ‘two-sidedness’ of Italian communism in which radical (social revolutionary) sentiments coexisted with ‘moderate’ (antifascist) programmes for the duration of the resistance. After the war in the dramatically different context of the Italian Republic, these two aspects of Italian communism might have become incompatible. But when doppiezza is seen as having social origins in the ambiguous heritage of the resistance and the mass allegiance generated by the armed struggle, then this entire debate becomes a more complex issue than merely one of the leadership's ‘duplicity’.

⁸⁶ ISRMo Pedrazzi, VII (CLN), 2, 42; ISRMo Pedrazzi VIII (PCI), 6, 8.

⁸⁷ La nostra lotta (7/11/44) in ISRMo S. 11/10, n. 254. This issue of the monthly newsletter was dedicated to the celebration of the Russian Revolution, idolizing Stalin and presenting the Soviet Union in precisely this fashion.