The special operations executive (SOE) has been the subject of controversy among historians, who disagree over its contribution to the British war effort. Recent releases of SOE documents to the PRO make possible the re-examination of SOE's effectiveness in stimulating resistance in particular countries, for example Poland, the focus of this case study. Colin Gubbins, the key figure in the history of SOE, was brought into the organization in autumn 1940 specifically so he could co-ordinate the aid to the Polish resistance. But the level of supplies dropped by the RAF for the Polish resistance was disappointing. The chiefs of staff relegated the Polish resistance to a secondary role of sabotage and subversion and stressed that they could not prevent a Polish uprising from being overwhelmed by the Nazis. SOE, which had responsibility for British liaison with the Polish resistance, failed to convey this decision to the Poles with sufficient emphasis, and the Polish home army launched the Warsaw uprising unaware of the enormous difficulties in the way of supplying their capital from the air. Churchill, the earl of Selborne, and some SOE officers sought vigorously to provide the Poles with the maximum possible level of supplies. After the first ten days Gubbins himself played a surprisingly small part in supporting the Poles. Disheartened, Gubbins bitterly predicted that Britain would abandon Poland after the war. Overall, SOE's contribution to Polish resistance did more harm than good.