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British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry, 1933–1939

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Wesley K. Wark
Wesley K. Wark
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
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Extract

The advent of the Hitler regime in Germany in early 1933, with its emphasis on the overthrow of the Versailles- peace treaty restrictions and the re-militarization of German society, caused a fundamental shift in the focus of Bntish intelligence activity. Germany replaced Russia and the Comintern as the primary target. The arm of German military power which commanded the most attention was the Luftwaffe, Germany's new air force. The bomber was the only weapon with which Germany could directly threaten Britain; by which London and the industrial Midlands could be made vulnerable; which could strike at the civilian population. Out of this nexus of strategic anxieties, the air staff created their ‘worst-case’ assumption. The worst case, as the air ministry consistently saw it during the 1930s, was a massive German air attack launched against Great Britain with the object of forcing a quick surrender, primarily through the collapse of civilian morale. Group Captain J. C. Slessor, director of plans in the air ministry (and a future chief of the air staff), admitted in his memoirs that,’ in those years immediately before the war the possibility of what was referred to as the knock-out blow bore very heavily on the minds of the Air Staff’.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , September 1982 , pp. 627 - 648
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1982

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References

1 For information on Secret Service activities in the 1920s see Andrew, C., ‘The British secret service and anglo-soviet relations in the 1920s’, The Historical Journal, xx, 3 (1977), 673–706.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Slessor, Sir John, The central blue (London, 1956), p. 151.Google Scholar

3 Hart, B. H. Liddell, Europe in arms (London, 1937), p. 320.Google Scholar

4 Murray, Williamson, ‘German air power and the Munich crisis’, War and Society, 2 (1977), 107–18Google Scholar; Overy, Richard, The air war 1939–45 (London, 1980).Google Scholar

5 DCAS to CAS, 10Jan. 1936, Public Record Office, Air 2/1688.

6 See below, pp. 641–3

7 O. Sargent minute, 26 Oct. 1934, C 7088/20/18, F.O. 371/17695; British air attaché (Paris), 29 Oct. 1934, C7215/31/18, F.O. 371/17713; Vachell despatch, 17 Feb. 1939, C2325/11/18, F.O. 371/22956.

8 The records of the joint intelligence committee remain closed; those of the industrial intelligence in foreign countries sub-committee (F.C.I.) are only slowly unfolding under the fifty-year rule; among the missing material are the intelligence handbooks on the German air force compiled by the air intelligence directorate.

9 Hinsley, F. H. et al. British intelligence in the second world war, I, (London, 1979), chs. I, II.Google Scholar

10 Information from Air Marshal Sir Victor Goddard (deputy director of intelligence III, air ministry, 1936–9), interview, 4 June 1980.

11 Report by AI 4, July 1933, Air 2/1353.

12 Memorandum on a conference at the F.O., 7 July 1933, Air 2/1353.

13 Don to Courtney, 27 Mar. 1935,‘I feel that after these frank discussions in Berlin I shall cause no diplomatic embarrassment if I happen to see a war aeroplane’, Air 2/2708.

14 The records of the DRC meetings, which provide a useful insight into early attitudes towards the German threat, are in P.R.O. file CAB 16/109;DRC 12th meeting, 26 Feb. 1934 CAB 16/109.

15 Minute by DCAS to CAS, n.d. [May 1934], Air 9/24.

16 See Lawrence, T. E. (Aircraftman Shaw), The mint (London, 1935), for a picture of the RAF in the early 1930s.Google Scholar

17 Memorandum by the air staff, ‘Air defence requirements...’, 29 May 1934, circulated as D.C (M) (32) 115, CAB 16/111. French possession of the details of the Rhineland programme, which was devised in Jan. 1934 and called for the production of 3,715, later raised to 4,021, aircraft during 1934–5, suggests that they had an excellent source in the German air ministry. On the evolution of the Rhineland programme see Homze, E. L., Arming the Luftwaffe (Lincoln, 1976), pp. 79–87.Google Scholar

18 Memorandom prepared for the secretary of state for air, 5 July 1934, Air 9/69.

19 ‘Air defence requirements...’, 29 May 1934, D.C. (M) (32) 115, CAB 16/111.

20 Appreciation by the DCAS, July 1934, Air 9/69.

21 Minute by Vansittart, 19 June 1934, C3511/31/18, F.O. 371/17712.

22 C.P. 205 (34), July 1934, CAB 16/110.

23 Despatch by the military attaché, Paris, 24 Oct. 1934, Air 2/1355. The French swore the military attaché to the utmost secrecy and would have been horrified to learn that the despatch was printed and given wide circulation, by mistake.

24 Vansittart, Lord, The mist procession (London, 1958), p. 498.Google Scholar

25 See the excellent account of these events in Gilbert, Martin, Winston S. Churchill (7 vols., London, 1976), v,450Google Scholar; Hyde, H. Montgomery, Baldwin, the unexpected P.M. (London, 1973), p.382Google Scholar; Londonderry, Lord, Wings of destiny (London, 1943), pp. 127–32.Google Scholar

26 First interim report ofthe air parity sub-committee, 13 May 1935, C.P. 100 (35), CAB 24/255.

27 Ibid.

28 The intelligence was reported in an appendix to the first DRC report, C.P. 205 (34), July 1934, CAB 16/110.

29 ‘Note of Anglo-German conversations...’, Mar. 1935, C.P. 69 (35), CAB 24/254.

30 Memorandum by the CAS, ‘The German air programme...’, 17 Apr. 1935, C.P. 85 (35), CAB 24/254.

31 Phipps to Hoare, 20 Nov. 1935, C7789/55/18, F.O. 371/18851.

32 Minute by Vansittart, 29 Apr. 1935, C3614/55/18, F.O. 371/18838.

33 Comments by Vansittart on C.P. 85 (35), 24 Apr. 1935, D.C. (M) (32) 139, CAB 27/511.

34 Air parity sub-committee, 1st meeting, 1 May 1935, CAB 27/518.

35 First interim report of the air parity sub-committee, 13 May 1935, C.P. 100 (35), CAB 24/255.

36 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, ccvc, cols. 872–3.

37 This was the argument used in the disarmament committee, 10 May 1935, DCM 62nd meeting, CAB 27/508.

38 Memorandum by the CAS, ‘The potential air menace to this country from Germany’, 12 June 1934, COS 341, CAB 53/24.

39 Minute by Wigram, central department, 13 Nov. 1935, C8332/55/18, F.O. 371/18852.

40 DCM 63rd meeting, 20 May 1935, CAB 27/508.

41 IIC-air ministry correspondence file, Air 5/1154; Young, Robert J., ‘Spokesman for economic warfare: the industrial intelligence centre in the 1930s’, Euopean Studies Review, 6 (1976), 473–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hinsley, , British intelligence, I, 60–1.Google Scholar

42 FCI report, 22 Mar. 1934, CID 1134-B, CAB 4/22.

43 IIC - air ministry paper. ‘The German aircraft industry’, 5 Nov. 1934, CID 1151-B, CAB 4/23.

44 Third DRC report, Mar. 1936, D.P.R. (DR) 9, CAB 16/123.

45 See introduction to a biography of Christie: Conwell-Evans, T. P., None so blind (London, 1947). Only 100 copies of this work were printed but a copy is in the B.L.; Christie papers, Churchill College, Cambridge.Google Scholar

46 Vansittart letter to Hankey, 22 May 1935, CAB 21/540.

47 Christie papers, CHRS/1/17.

48 Memorandum by Vansittart on the Sudeten crisis, 12 July 1938, 07009/1941/18, F.O. 371/21727; Strang to Henderson, 21 July 1938, C7315/1941/18, F.O. 371/21728.

49 Christie papers, CHRS/1/17.

50 Rose, Norman, Vansittart: study of a diplomat (London, 1978), pp. 136–8. While giving some useful information on the Vansittart-Christie network, Rose wrongly identifies X (a common code-name) as Carl Goerdeler.Google Scholar

51 Most secret document, ‘Organisation of the German air force, December 1935’, received by the air ministry 12 Feb.1936. Christie's 1936 reports and the air staff response to them are contained in a file entitled ‘F.O. source secret X documents on the German air force’, Air 40/2102. Duplicates are usually to be found in the Christie papers.

52 X reply to questionnaire and ‘Notes on German aero-engines’, 10 Mar. 1936, Air 40/2102.

53 X report, ‘Development of new aero-engines and military aeroplanes in Germany’, 14July 1936, Air 40/2102.

54 Memorandum by Medhurst, deputy director of intelligence, air ministry to F.O., 11 Sept. 1936, C6429/3925/18, F.O. 371/11946; CID 1265-B (restricted circulation), 6 Oct. 1936, CAB 4/25.

55 Minute by Wigram, central department, 18 Oct. 1936, C 7044/3928/18, F.O. 371/19947.

56 Minute by Vansittart, 18 Nov. 1936, C8249/3928/18, F.O. 371/19947.

57 IIC - air ministry reports on the German air force and aircraft industry, CID 1218-B, CID 1250-B, CID 1284-B, 1936, CAB 4/24 and 25.

58 ‘German aircraft industry’, 30 Nov. 1936, CID 1284-B, CAB 4/25.

59 Medhurst to F.O., 23 June 1937, 04781/185/18, F.O. 371/20734.

60 S1 to Reynolds, 4 Mar. 1937, Air 2/1688.

61 Treasury to Air council, 27 Apr. 1937, Ibid.

62 Deputy director of intelligence to S1 21 June 1938, Ibid.

63 Deputy director of intelligence to S1, 10 Sept. 1938, Ibid.

64 The Christie-X material for 1937–8 is contained in a most secret air ministry file, ‘Information forwarded by Sir Maurice Hankey’, Air 40/2043; X documents, ‘Notes on Germany's Air force programme’, 31 May 1937 Air 40/2043.

65 The Christie—X information was given restricted circulation in a cabinet paper, ‘Progress of German Air rearmament’, 6 July 1937, D.P. (P) 7, CAB 16/182.

66 On the history of the Luftwaffe see: Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe; Schliephake, H., The birth of the Luftwaffe (London, 1971)Google Scholar; and Suchenwirth, Richard, The development of the German air force 1919–1939 (New York, 1968).Google Scholar

67 COS 130 and 132 meetings, 27 June 1934 and 24 July 1934 CAB 53/4–5.

68 Translation of Deuxième Bureau report contained in Hankey to Baldwin, 7 July 1937, CAB 104/32.

69 Despatch by Don, air attaché in Berlin, 7 Oct. 1937, C6966/136/18, F.O. 371/20731.

70 Summary of SIS information, 19 Jan. 1939, FP (36) 74, CAB 27/627.

71 Memorandum by AI 3, 24 Aug. 1938, Air 9/90; Vansittart to Hankey, 22 May 1935, CAB 21/540.

72 Note by Group Captain Goddard (AI 3), 15 Apr. 1937, Air 2/2797.

73 The first set of JIC reports are contained in COS 622–4 (JIC), 6 Oct. 1937, CAB 53/33; A special meeting was held to consider them on 19 Oct. 1937, COS 219 meeting, CAB 53/8.

74 AI 3 report on ‘German bombing potential’, 24 Aug. 1938, Air 9/90.

75 Memorandum by the air staff, 12 Sept. 1938, Air 9/90.

76 CAS to AOC-in-C, bomber command, 19 Sept. 1938, CAB 27/646.

77 ‘Inner cabinet meeting’, 24 Sept. 1938, CAB 27/646.

78 Homze, , Arming the Luftwaffe, p. 242.Google Scholar

79 Henderson to Halifax, 11 Oct. 1938, C14560/1425/18, F.O. 371/21710.

80 ‘German aircraft industry’, CID 1339-B, 13 July 1937, CAB 4/26.

81 ‘Germany: Exports of armaments’, CID 1426-B, 2 May 1938, CAB 4/27.

82 IIC - air ministry reports on the German air force and aircraft industry: CID 1339-B, CID 1407-B, CID 1472-B, for 1937–8, CAB 4/26–7.

83 Memorandum by the IIC, 2 Nov. 1938, C13557/65/18, F.O. 371/21670.

84 Kirkpatrick, Ivone, The inner circle (London, 1959), p. 139.Google Scholar

85 Watt, D. C., Too serious a business (London, 1979), pp. 128–9.Google Scholar

86 ‘European appreciation 1939–40’, COS 843, 20 Feb. 1939, CAB 53/45.

87 ‘Germany: aircraft industry’, CID 1541-B, 1 Feb. 1939, CAB 4/29.

88 Telephone conversation, Morton to Roberts, 1 Feb. 1939, C2382/11/18, F.O. 371/22956.

89 Despatch from air attaché, Berlin, 17 Feb. 1939, C2325/11/18, F.O. 371/22956.

90 Cited in Gilbert, Martin, Winston S. Churchill, v, 1011.Google Scholar

91 This conclusion is supported by comparison between air intelligence estimates and the published figures in: E. L. Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe; H. Schliephake, The birth of the Luftwaffe; and R. Suchenwirth, The development of the German air force. See also Hinsley, , British intelligence, I, 75.Google Scholar

92 Hinsley, Ibid.

93 Overy, R., ‘Hitler and air strategy’, Journal of Contemporary History, xv, 3 (1980), 409.Google Scholar

94 Williamson Murray, ‘German air power’, pp. 113–14.

95 ‘Précis of reports on visits to Germany June 7–11 and Sept 2–12 1937 by A. H. R. Fedden’ contained in cabinet supplementary registered file, CAB 104/32.

96 Hankey caused the IIC estimate of German industrial strength to be removed from the JPC report, ‘Appreciation of the situation in the event of war with Germany’, DCOS 9th meeting, 19 Nov. 1936, CAB 54/1.

97 Shay, Robert, British rearmament in the thirties (Princeton, 1977), pp. 294–5Google Scholar; see also Peden, G. C., British rearmament and the Treasury (Edinburgh, 1979).Google Scholar