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The Normative Authority of Social Practices: A Critical Theoretical Reading of Hegel’s Introduction to the Philosophy of Right

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2017

Erick Lima
Erick Lima*
Affiliation:
University of Brasilia, [email protected]
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Abstract

What follows is an attempt to interpret Hegel’s Introduction to the Philosophy of Right in a way that explores the thesis of reason’s social character in light of the recent debate on Hegel’s theory of practical normativity. The discussion aims to highlight Hegel’s commitment to a ‘reconstructive’ version of the ‘immanent transcendence’ motive of Critical Theory and, more generally, to a programmatic critique of ‘deficient’ rationality and its effects on practice.

Type
Articles
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 41 , Issue 2 , August 2020 , pp. 271 - 293
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2017

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