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How biological is human history? Kant's use of biological concepts and its implications for history as moral anthropology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 April 2013
Abstract
This article concerns a specific shift in Kant's use of biological concepts in his theory of history. As I argue in the first section, biological concepts play an important role in Kant's early theory of history. However, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant explicitly separates history from biology: history and biology become fundamentally different forms of teleological explanation. In the second section, I examine Kant's reasons for the separation of history from biology. I conclude with a discussion of the moral implications of this modification in his historical writings.
Kant's main concern in his philosophy of history is the intelligibility of history. How should history be understood, given the fact that it appears to be a mere amalgam of contingent human actions?
The reason why historical facts are so confusing and unsystematic is that human behaviour is not fully determined by any particular factor. It is underdetermined by animal instinct, but it is not completely guided by principles of reason either. To address this randomness, philosophers of history must actively search for coherent structures. They must look for concepts and assumptions that help them to grasp the phenomena in a systematic way. Kant suggests that assuming a predisposition which unfolds throughout history is inevitable in this regard. A predisposition is understood as a natural tendency of the human species, which is initially hidden but manifests itself gradually and continually.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain , Volume 32 , Special Issue 1-2: Special Issue on Kant and Hegel , 2011 , pp. 252 - 268
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2011