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Talents and Interests: A Hegelian Moral Psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 April 2013

Christopher L. Yeomans
Christopher L. Yeomans*
Affiliation:
Purdue [email protected]
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Abstract

One of the reasons why there is no Hegelian school in contemporary ethics in the way that there are Kantian, Humean and Aristotelian schools is because Hegelians have been unable to clearly articulate the Hegelian alternative to those schools’ moral psychologies, i.e., to present a Hegelian model of the motivation to, perception of, and responsibility for moral action. Here it is argued that in its most basic terms Hegel's model can be understood as follows: the agent acts in a responsible and thus paradigmatic sense when she identifies as reasons those motivations which are grounded in his or her talents and support actions that are likely to develop those talents in ways suggested by his or her interests.

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Articles
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , May 2013 , pp. 33 - 58
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2013

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