Since 2001, implementation of a New Zealand’s Primary Health Care Strategy (the Strategy) has led to an increase in the proportion of primary health care services which are publicly funded, the development of 82 primary health organisations (PHOs) to oversee primary health care services and universal public capitation funding of PHOs. This approach has replaced the previous system of fee-for service targeted public subsidies paid to individual general practitioners (GPs). Patient copayments, although at a reduced level but still set by individual practitioners, have remained a core feature of the system.

This paper focuses on the implementation and impact of key policy changes over the first five years of the Strategy. Although patient copayments have fallen and consultation rates have increased, the new funding and payment system has raised a number of unresolved issues – whether to retain the new universal funding system or revert to the former targeted approach; how to achieve the potential gains from capitation when GPs continue to receive their income from a variety of sources and in a variety of different ways; and how to manage the potential for ‘cream skimming’.

Recent improvements in access may, in time, improve health status and reduce inequalities in health, but there is no guarantee that a universal system will necessarily improve average health or reduce inequalities. Much depends on the services being delivered and the populations that are benefiting most – something New Zealand needs better evidence on before determining future policy directions in primary health care.

Rising suicide rates have been identified as a social problem in several Western countries. The application of a Welfare Economics argument justifies a role for policy that reduces the welfare impact of suicide, whereas the measurement of that impact can inform policy making. Two dimensions of the concept can be measured: the social loss from suicide, and the inequality in the distribution of that loss. In this study, an alternative measure of suicide to the conventional suicide headcount, viz. the potential years of life lost (PYLL), is employed. The PYLL measure is a proxy measure of the social impact of suicide, and involves the concept of ‘premature’ loss of life. The PYLL also lends itself to inequality measurement. We apply the approach to inequality measurement of health phenomena that was pioneered in the 1980s by Jacques Silber and Julian Le Grand, in a literature now described as measuring health inequality per se. The empirical part of the paper statistically estimates equations on Australian suicide data for the period 1907–2003 and determines the trends in the social loss from suicide and the inequality of its age distribution. Some illustrative examples assist in interpreting the welfare impact of suicide measured both ways, by the headcount rate and the PYLL rate.

Federal agencies in the USA pay significantly different prices for the same prescription drugs because each agency uses a different approach to derive the payment rate. Because we do not identify any economic rationale or socially accepted moral reasoning that would justify the current level of price variation, we suggest that the federal government should pay a uniform price for each drug. Laws and regulations that give certain federal agencies the ability to earn rebates, use formularies, or permit other special arrangements would need to be eliminated in order to have a single payment rate. This could make some government agencies worse off than others; however, a uniform payment rate would not need to affect beneficiaries’ current financial contributions, access to drugs, benefits or overall public expenditures. At the same time, having a single rate would permit the government to adopt a more effective approach to purchasing drugs and send a consistent message to pharmaceutical companies concerning which types of drugs the government wants them to develop for government beneficiaries. How this single price would be derived and how it would compare with the lowest or highest prices currently achieved by government agencies would depend on a variety of policy issues including the government’s desire to encourage pharmaceutical research and development and the need to control health care spending.

This article analyses the European Union policymaking process regarding tobacco advertising. While others already highlighted the importance of intergovernmental bargaining between member states to explain the outcome of the tobacco advertising case, the main aim of this article is to identify the use of escape routes by the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and interest groups that played an important role in overcoming the deadlock. When looking at the different institutions that structure policymaking, we argue that indeed focusing on escape routes provides a clear insight in the process and in what strategies were necessary to ‘make Europe work’. In the end, it appears to be a combination of escape routes that resulted in the final decision.

This study aims to present an overview of the evolutionary policy process in reforming the health care system in Taiwan, through dissecting the forces of knowledge, social-cultural context, economic resources and political system. We further identify factors, which had a significant impact on health care reform policies in Taiwan through illustrative policy examples. One of the most illuminating examples highlighted is the design and implementation of a single-payer National Health Insurance (NHI) program in 1995, after nearly five years of planning efforts (1988–1993) and a two-year legislative marathon. The NHI is one of the most popular social programs ever undertaken in the history of Taiwan, which greatly enhances financial protection against unexpected medical expenses and assures access to health services. Nonetheless, health care reform still has an unfinished agenda. Despite high satisfaction ratings, Taiwan’s health care system today is encountering mounting pressure for new reforms as a result of its rapidly aging population, economic stagnation, and imbalanced NHI checkbook. Although there may exist some heterogeneous system characteristics and challenges among different health care systems around the world, Taiwan’s experiences in reforming its health care system for the past few decades may provide valuable lessons for countries going through rapid economic and political transition.

In 2006, the Dutch health insurance system was radically reformed to strengthen competition among health insurers as purchasers of health services. This article considers whether purchaser competition has improved efficiency in health-care provision. Although supply and price regulation still dominates the allocation of health services, purchaser competition has already significantly affected the provision of hospital care, pharmaceuticals and primary care, as well as efforts to gather and disseminate information about quality of care. From this perspective, the glass is half full. However, based on the crude performance indicators available, the reforms have not yet demonstrated significant effects on the performance of the Dutch health system. From this perspective the glass is half empty. The article concludes that the effectiveness of purchaser competition depends crucially on the success of ongoing efforts to improve performance indicators, product classification and the risk equalisation scheme.

This article comments on Schut and van de Ven's overview of the results of purchaser competition in Dutch health care, which concludes that the glass can be seen as half full or half empty. Although it is true that results have been achieved, we believe that the evidence is incomplete and in some respects flimsy. More importantly, however, Schut and van de Ven neglect the political context of the market reform introduced in 2006. The reform is far from finished and there has been a constant need for political compromise. Optimism about the market's potential also seems to be on the wane. Several insurer and provider initiatives have provoked political resistance. As a result, there are good reasons to argue that the reform's future is uncertain.

In this paper, we first deal with the rationale of risk adjustment and risk equalization in health insurance markets. Then we discuss the state of the art concerning the application of risk adjustment and risk equalization in practice. Finally, we focus on: What needs to be done?