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Incentivising improvements in health care delivery

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 March 2015

Adam Oliver*
Affiliation:
Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics, London, UK
*
*Correspondence to: Adam Oliver, Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: [email protected]

Abstract

This Special Section of Health Economics, Policy and Law begins with an article on the different ways in which one might incentivise improved performance among health care providers. I asked five experts on performance management, Gwyn Bevan, Tim Doran, Peter Smith, Sandra Tanenbaum and Karsten Vrangbaek, to write brief reactions to the article and to the notion of performance management in health care in general. The commentators were given an open remit to be as critical as they wished to be, and their reactions can be found in the pages that follow. I would like to thank Albert Weale for reviewing all of the articles, and Katie Brennan for serving as the catalyst for this collection.

Type
Special Section
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2015 

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