A distinctive kind of theoretical and analytical discourse on ritual sacrifice evolved within the Indian and Jewish traditions, in Mīmāṃsā and in Talmudic literatures, respectively, introducing special modes of analyzing ritual sacrifice, and elaborate methods of conceptualizing the relations between text and practice. Despite the significant role that comparative studies of Vedic/Brahmanical and biblical/Jewish sacrifice played in the development of the modern study of religion, a detailed comparative study of these emic “sciences of sacrifice” has not yet been carried out.

This study examines two pericopes addressing a similar dilemma—the treatment of ritual byproducts—from the Jaimini-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra and from the Babylonian Talmud, each discussed within its commentarial tradition. The texts reveal a significant degree of convergence (major differences notwithstanding) in terms of dialectic discourse, terminology, thought-structures, hermeneutic assumptions, and more. Factors that may have contributed to this convergence are discussed, as are the broader implications of this comparative experiment.

Scholarship assumes no significant differences among various “terms for anger” in the Hebrew Bible, but it does assume an essential difference between human and divine anger. This article challenges these preconceptions by presenting a novel semantic analysis of כעס, considered a “term for anger.” It shows that in Classical Biblical Hebrew, כעס does not denote anger but rather sorrow or insult associated with קנאה, “jealousy.” This analysis leads to a new, deeper, and more precise understanding of the phrase “to cause כעס to Yhwh” and of its meaning in biblical literature and theology in general and in Deuteronomistic writings in particular.

There is no scholarly consensus on whether Paul’s mandates on head coverings were directed solely to married women or to all women in the Corinthian community. I suggest the discussion can be tentatively advanced by considering two factors that have not received the attention they warrant in conjunction with this passage: first, the presence of slaves in the community, and second, that the Genesis material which Paul alludes to in these verses was understood in some ancient thought as addressing the institution of marriage rather than creation. I propose that, in view of these considerations, it is more likely that Paul directed his exhortations towards free(d) married women.

This article asks what Paul’s claims about cosmology signify in terms of his competitive position on the nature and purpose of the moon. Specifically, in an age in which discourses and demonstrations involving the moon were rife, I argue that Paul is invoking principals shared by writers like Plutarch on the “double death” of the human being (first as soma on the earth, then as psyche/nous in orbit around and on the moon) and that he envisions an afterlife among the stars in pneumatic form that, to the degree it is anthropomorphic, is ideally male. I also posit that this aspect of Paul’s thought has been overlooked, in part due to the idiosyncratic-yet-pervasive translation of doxa in Paul as “glory” rather than in terms related to typologies and judgment, as it is elsewhere in Greek philosophical literature.

The question of whether the divine commandments were observed prior to the revelation at Sinai has vast theological and hermeneutical implications. The first known systematic account that has reached us on the question of the antiquity of the commandments is found in the tenth-century Karaite scholar Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī’s Kitāb al-Anwār w-al-Marāqib. Qirqisānī discusses two theories: according to the first, the divine commandments were given already to Adam; and according to the second, God’s law was given in an accumulative process, the Torah being developed in accordance with the historical circumstances. This article analyzes the two theories and demonstrates that they are rooted in a Muslim-Jewish debate, conducted in the first half of the ninth century, about the Muslim principle of abrogation (naskh), and that the historical context of the argument on the subject probably was that of the interreligious debates that took place in Qirqisānī’s time.

In the vein of important observations made by several scholars, in this article I discuss a variegated corpus of early sefirotic passages attesting to the prevalence and conventionality of spherical perceptions of the sefirot, already at the earliest stages of the sefirotic literature known to us. First, I show that for at least a substantial number of the earliest authors, seeing the sefirot as a set of concentric, hierarchical spherical divine entities was a self-evident premise. Second, I offer a tripartite division of the material, based on the different types of inner hierarchies characterizing the spherical descriptions. For each of these types I offer a relevant ideational context, related to contemporary cosmological conventions as well as to various theological notions.

Angelology is in a renaissance. Yet the angels of new religious movements in general, and the Bahá’í Faith in particular, remain less examined. In response, I offer a typology of Bahá’í angels as avatars of the Holy Spirit, distinct celestial beings, spiritually evolved people, manifestations of God, and carriers and personifications of divine virtue. These five types respectively function to emphasize the authority of divinity, accentuate the mystery of spiritual reality, reconcile spirituality and materialism through the duality of human nature, position prophets as “manifestations” of God in the context of “progressive revelation,” and attempt to make the unknowable God knowable through the transformation of axiology to ontology. Collectively, Bahá’í angels illumine an understanding of religion as a dialogic relationship. Religion is reconceived as an interactional balance of divine will and human agential choice.

In the early twentieth century, the Iranian Reza Shah state (1925–1941), in conjunction with the emerging group of state-trained scholars, called the status of ulama as knowledge producers into question. Existing scholarship has primarily examined the impact of state modernization on the Muslim clergy and their responses to modernization but has paid lesser attention to the passive role of the ulama or their representation in modernist intellectual and literary discourses. I examine two major Persian sources of the period to argue that intellectual representation of the ulama, in both polemics and academic critique, aided the state in its attempt to push the ulama from the center of intellectual and social life to the margins of ritual purity. Among my primary sources is a previously unexamined academic thesis authored by Qasim Tuysirkani in 1938.

This article considers how early Alexei Losev dealt with the concepts of hesychasm, Palamism, and Name-Glorification. It reveals a range of important sources that Losev employed in his essay “Onomatodoxy” while developing his formulas of hesychasm and Name-Glorification, elaborating on the concept of absolute symbolism and touching on his teaching about universals. These sources include “Synodikon of Orthodoxy,” “Philokalia,” and Pavel Florensky’s essay “Onomathodoxy as a Philosophical Premise.” Although Losev follows the main framework of Florensky’s project in his “Onomatodoxy” (1921–1922)—treating Palamism and Name-Glorification as derivatives of Platonism and comprehending the nature of applying the notion “God” to the divine essence and energies—he differs from Florensky in his interpretation of the structure of symbol. In Losev’s later work, “Essays on Ancient Symbolism and Mythology” (1930), he exchanges his understanding of the correlation between Palamism and Name-Glorification with Platonism, which directly correlates with Losev’s changed attitude toward Florensky. However, in the “Essays,” the specific interpretation of the application of the notion “God” to the essence and energies, dating back to Florensky, is preserved.