In Aristotle there is no general term for those faculties of the soul which he treats of in the Third Book of De Anima and in De Memoria et Reminiscentia to differentiate them as a class from the five senses which he treats of in the Second Book of De Anima. In Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew philosophic texts, however, these post-sensationary faculties, or some of them, or sometimes only one of them, are designated by the term “internal senses,” in contradistinction to the five senses which are designated by the term “external senses.” Sometimes instead of “external” the terms “corporeal” and “passive” are used, and instead of “internal” the terms “spiritual,” “separable,” and “cerebral.” Sometimes, too, the term “faculties” or “apprehensions” is used instead of “senses.” The use of the terms “internal,” “spiritual,” and “cerebral” has been explained by the fact that the faculties to which they are applied reside within the brain and operate without bodily organs.

‘To no student of the Middle Ages,’ says Beeson, ‘can Tours and its scriptoria fail to appeal.’ The historian, for example, desires to know the part Alcuin played in the reform of writing, the relationship between the scriptoria and the Court and Church, the exact dates at which certain monks lived and wrote. The scholar interested in Classical and mediaeval literature turns to manuscripts of Cicero, Virgil, and Livy, or Augustine, Bede, and Isidore. The philologist looks for ‘Irish’ or ‘Spanish’ symptoms in the Latinity of certain codices.