¹ Augustine, , Confessions, trans, by Warner, Rex (New York: Mentor-Omega Books, 1963), Book XI, Chapter 14, p. 267Google Scholar.

² Ibid., Book X, Chapter 8, pp. 218–19.

³ To Heidegger must be added: Barth, Bultmann, Berdyaev, Bergson, Husserl, Jaspers, Sartre, and Tillich.

⁴ The Concept of Dread, trans, by Lowrie, Walter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 77Google Scholar. Hereafter, CD. Throughout the paper, alterations in the English translations have been made according to the Danish Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Vœrker, edd. Drachmann, A. B., Heiberg, J. L., og Lange, H. O. (København: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1905)Google Scholar. The volume and page of the Danish text are listed.

⁵ In an interesting article, Paul Ttllich discussed some of the tensions between time and space. See: The Struggle Between Time and Space, The Theology of Culture, ed. Kimball, Robert C. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 30–39Google Scholar. Quite evidently, the title of the present essay is a variation of Tillich's title, though the issues with which each deals are significantly different.

⁶ Physica, Book IV, 11, p. 220^a. Page references are to The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, trans, by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gay (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970). The extent to which Aristotle's conception of time influenced the history of philosophical consideration of the problem is illustrated by Hume's very similar argument that time is “derived from the succession of our perceptions.” A Treatise on Human Nature (London: John Noon, 1739), vol. I, 68. See all of part II: Of The Ideas of Space and Time, 53–124.

⁷ For a perceptive consideration of this aspect of Aristotle's view of time, see: Smith, John E., Time, Times, and the “Right Time,” The Monist 53, no. 1 (January, 1969), 1–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Kierkegaard presented the existential correlate of this conception of time in his consideration of the aesthete, Don Juan, in Either-Or. Don Juan lives in an immediate immersion in the present which excludes the past (memory) and the future (hope). His sole concern is the pleasure of the present moment.

⁹ As will soon become apparent, this is an extraordinarily complex problem. I have treated some of these issues in more detail in an article entitled Kierkegaard on the Structure of Selfhood, which will appear in the next issue of Kierkegaardiana (Spring, 1973).

¹⁰ The Sickness Unto Death, trans, by Lowrie, Walter (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954)Google Scholar. Hereafter, SD.

¹¹ “Sjel” is a very difficult word to translate into English. I have used “soul,” but this does not imply strictly religious connotations, though these are involved. The word refers to the essential psychic and mental aspects of one's personality. As such, it might also be rendered “mind.”

¹² Kierkegaard misrepresented his own intention by stating this polarity in terms of freedom and necessity. As becomes obvious when he analyzed this distinction, the polarity is better expressed as possibility (Mulighed) /necessity. Unless the latter pair of terms is used, insuperable difficulties develop.

¹³ This passage is more comprehensible when it is remembered that Kierkegaard equated with the soul/body polarity the polarities of infinitude/finitude and possibility/ necessity.

¹⁴ Kierkegaard used necessity (Nøtdvendighed) and actuality (Virkelighed) interchangeably.

¹⁵ Kierkegaard used Phantasie and Indbildingskraft interchangeably.

¹⁶ For some unexplainable reason, Lowrie omitted this important phrase from his English translation of the text.

¹⁷ Training in Christianity, trans, by Lowrie, Walter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 185Google Scholar; XII, 173.

¹⁸ While there is a fascinating similarity between Augustine's effort to root time in his understanding of the self and Kierkegaard's argument about the connection between temporality and the structure of selfhood, a subtle, but significant, difference remains. For Augustine, the tenses of time are associated with remembering (Memoria), attending (Attentio), and expecting (Exspectatio). For Kierkegaard, they are related to remembering, deciding, and expecting (or hoping). The difference between the two points of view lies in the understanding of the importance of the present. For Augustine, the present is characterized by attending (or by sight). While Kierkegaard would certainly agree that attention or cognition is an important aspect of Øieblikket, he would argue that what essentially characterizes the present is the possibility of decision. From Kierkegaard's viewpoint, Augustine's understanding of the present would be speculative or theoretical as distinguished from Kierkegaard's own active or practical understanding of the present. This point of comparison is important to recognize, for it is central to many of Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's interpretation of time and of selfhood.

¹⁹ The problematic with which Kierkegaard was wrestling might be illuminated by noting Augustine's statement of the issue. “Yet if the present were always present and did not go by into the past, it would not be time at all, but eternity. If, therefore, the present (if it is to be time at all) only comes into existence because it is in transition toward the past, how can we say that even the present is?” Confessions, op. cit., Book XI, Chapter 14, p. 268.