¹ All citations of the Dionysian corpus are numbered according to Migne, J. P., Patrologiae cursus completus (Athens: Typographeiou Georgiou Karyophylle, 1879) 3.1Google Scholar , from which all Greek quotations are taken. Except where otherwise noted, all English quotations are from the invaluable Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (trans. Luibheid, Colm; notes and additional trans. Rorem, Paul; New York: Paulist Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

² Gersh, Stephen, From lamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1978).Google Scholar

³ Balthasar, Hans Urs von, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 2: Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles (trans. Louth, Andrew, McDonagh, Francis, and McNeil, Brian; San Francisco: Ignatius; New York: Crossroads, 1984) 144–210.Google Scholar

⁴ Rorem, Paul, Biblical and Liturgical Symbols within the Pseudo-Dionysian Synthesis (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984).Google Scholar Although Rorem's most recent monograph (Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993])Google Scholar is an important contribution to English-language scholarship in the field, with respect to negative theology it rehearses quite precisely Rorem's comments in Symbols and especially in the footnotes of Complete Works. When discussing Rorem, therefore, I will refer to these earlier volumes.

⁵ Derrida, Jacques, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Coward, Harold and Foshay, Toby, eds., Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany: SUNY, 1992) 73–142.Google Scholar

⁶ There are several a priori presumptions against even the possibility of finding a logical structure in Dionysian negative theology. First, Dionysius claims, humans cannot know God as God knows himself (Divine Names 1.588b; for a discussion of the difficulty in Neoplatonism of imputing knowledge to the undivided God, see , Gersh, Iamblichus, 267–68).Google Scholar The fact that human epistemology is limited, however, does not mean that there is no discernable structure to the highest kind of knowledge.

Second, Dionysius sometimes writes humbly about the ability of his words to describe divine matters (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 7.568d; Celestial Hierarchy 15.340b; Divine Names 13.981c-84a). Even if one takes these expressions of humility at face value, it does not follow that what Dionysius manages to say is not clearly structured. (For the view that Dionysius's expressions of humility should not be given too much importance, see Hathaway, Ronald F., Hierarchy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius [Hague: Nijhoff, 1969] xvii).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Third, several scholars imply that since Dionysius understands theology as a prayer, a hymn of praise, and a form of direct address, it should not be externally analyzed as an abstract discussion of philosophical language. See Louth, Andrew, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981) 164–66Google Scholar ; and , Rorem, Symbols, 51.Google Scholar This merely shows, however, that identifying a coherent logical structure in Dionysian negation is not equivalent to grasping the religious meaning of the contemplative practices that manifest such a structure. For an example of postmodern anxiety about this question as it applies to Dionysius, however, see , Derrida, “Denials,” 79, 91, 98, 111Google Scholar.

⁷ For the sake of analyzing Dionysian negative theology, it suffices to say that the denial of all beings will deny individual existents, being itself, and the totality of all existents. For a study of the kinds of being in Dionysius, see Brons, Bernhard, Gott und die Seienden: Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von neuplatonischer Metaphysik und christlicher Tradition bei Dionysius Areopagita (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976) esp. chap. 1Google Scholar : “Die Seienden: Ontologie und menschliche Hierarchie,” lemma 1: “Die Ontologie” (pp. 29-52).

⁸ Dionysius draws the metaphor of sculpting from Plotinus (Enn. 1.6.9). Aphairesis (άΦαίρεσις, “clearing aside,” “removal”) includes both a sculptor's carving and a logician's denial, the “subtraction” of attributes from a subject.

⁹ Some scholars, particularly von Balthasar, downplay or even deny this polemic tone. Citing Letters 7.1077c-80a, Balthasar, von writes (Glory, 149)Google Scholar : “Nothing is more characteristic of Denys than his rejection of apologetic: why engage in controversy? To do so is only to descend to the level of one's attacker.” , Elsewhere, von Balthasar implies that Dionysius wishes to “adopt an irenical position” (p. 162).Google Scholar This is a generous interpretation of Dionysian motives, but it is not supported by the corpus.

¹⁰ For Dionysius, both things and concepts “exist”; see Mystical Theology 1.1000a–b.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Regarding such Dionysian passages, Derrida remarks “one is not far from the innuendo that ontology itself is a subtle or perverse idolatry” (“Denials,” 90). In Dionysius, this is not merely innuendo but an explicit, definitive statement of his entire theological project.

¹³ Dionysius's discussion of biblical names in chapter 2 of Celestial Hierarchy begins with the issue of names for angels. As Rorem notes (Symbols, 86), however, it is clear that the discussion is also about the use of names for God.

¹⁴ Celestial Hierarchy 2.137b-c.

¹⁵ Ibid., 140c-d. Among other interpreters of Dionysius, Aquinas was uncomfortable with the apparent sense of this passage. Appealing to common sense, Aquinas denied that Dionysius regarded all affirmations concerning God as equally defective. For example, Aquinas emphasized (S.th. la.13.2) how much better it is to say that “God is good” than to say “God is a body.”

¹⁶ Divine Names 1.588c.

¹⁷ Ibid., 5.824a-b.

¹⁸ Particularly on the basis of Mystical Theology 4-5, almost all interpreters agree that denials occur when Greek nouns, and adjectives of both positive and negative form (such as “in motion” and “motionless”), are said not to apply to a subject. Thus, in Mystical Theology 5.1048a, Dionysius writes that God is not “in motion,” not “motionless,” and neither error nor truth.

¹⁹ In other words, for Dionysius any of the “names” for God, such as “mind” or “life” or “lifeless,” are privative, since they refer to particular being and therefore imply a lack of perfection.

Letters 6 may also address the juxtaposition of assertion and denial. Dionysius writes (Letters 6.1077a) that “what is not red does not have to be white. What is not a horse is not necessarily a human.” Although this letter does not discuss denial or assertion explicitly, there are three reasons for linking this passage with Divine Names 5.824a–b. First, both discuss that false conclusions are drawn from incorrect assumptions about the relation between negative and positive claims. Second, the letter's overall message, that the addressee has merely traded one mistake for another, correlates well with the Dionysian view of ambiguous denials. Third, according to Hathaway (Hierarchy, 71), Letters 6 contains terms that “one would normally associate with a treatise on logic.” If Letters 6 addresses denial, then Hathaway's provocative suggestion about the relation between the numbering of the Parmenidean hypotheses in neoplatonism and the numbering of the Dionysian letters would find support. He writes (Hierarchy, 80), “the sixth hypothesis represents (the absurdity of) relative not-being, and the Sixth Letter connects the problem of falsehood and appearance with relative not-being (no one should attack a particular religious belief or practice as not being good, since not-being-X never necessarily implies being-Y, i.e., it is the being, the positive nature of a thing, which must be known or recognized).”

²⁰ Divine Names 5.824b.

²¹ “Power”: ibid., 11.953c; “truth”: ibid., 7.872c-73a.

²² , Rorem, Symbols, 89.Google Scholar Although the “symbols” in the title of Rorem's monograph suggest material images for God, such as those discussed in chapter 2 of Celestial Hierarchy, Rorem's analysis applies equally to non-material, conceptual names, such as those in Divine Names. Hence I prefer to speak of “metaphors.”

²³ “Lion”: Celestial Hierarchy 2.144d; “drunkard”: Mystical Theology 3.1033b, c.

²⁴ Mystical Theology 4-5.1040d; 1045d.

²⁵ Divine Names 1.593b-c.

²⁶ Unlike Mystical Theology 5.1048b below, the translation for πάν does not affect the meaning of Divine Names 1.593b–c; to deny each being is to deny all beings.

²⁷ Mystical Theology 2.1025a-b.

²⁸ Divine Names 1.596a suggests that scripture writers are among the “unified minds.” As Rorem emphasizes throughout Symbols (for example, 18), “theologian” for Dionysius means scripture writer (as in Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 3.432b). Chapter 2 of Mystical Theology makes clear that Moses is among the unified minds as well.

²⁹ For example, Paul knew the inscrutable and unsearchable God by knowing that God was beyond mind (Letters 5.1073a). In Letters 1 as well, knowledge as “unknowing” is a reference point for discussing the highest God: “And this quite positively complete unknowing is knowledge of him who is above everything that is known” (1065a-b).

³⁰ Mystical Theology 5.1048b.

³¹ Roques, Rene, Structures théologiques de la Gnose à Richard de Saint Victor: Essais et analyses critiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962) 143.Google Scholar Treating negations and denials as synonymous, , Rorem (Complete Works, 140 n.17)Google Scholar writes that Mystical Theology concludes by negating negation, by “abandoning all speech and thought, even negations.” On p. 136 n. 6, he also writes of Mystical Theology 1.1000b: “Here at the outset and again at its conclusion (MT 5.1048b 16-21), the treatise refutes the impression that negations can capture the transcendent Cause of all.” Similarly, Balthasar, von (Glory, 206)Google Scholar interprets the conclusion of Mystical Theology as saying that “God is not only beyond all affirmations but beyond all negations too.” Mystical Theology does not, however, abandon all forms of negative language; since the denial of all being is appropriate to the transcendent God, individual denials are abandoned.

Jan Vanneste also understands the denial that falls short of God in chapter 5 of Mystical Theology as including even the denial of all being (Le Mystère de Dieu: Essai sur la structure rationelle de la doctrine mystique dupseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite [Brussels: Declee de Brouwer, 1959] 48-51, 119-20, 154-55, 165).Google Scholar Apparently, Vanneste notices the difficulty of harmonizing this reading of Mystical Theology 5 with passages such as Divine Names 1. He suggests, therefore, in part on the basis of Dionysius's discussion of Moses' ascent of Mount Sinai in Mystical Theology 3, that no kind of denial reaches God; the moment of aphairesis is surpassed by unknowing (άγνωσία), which in turn is surpassed by union (ἔνωσις). Vanneste's groundbreaking exegesis of Mystical Theology, however, is inaccurate on this point. In Mystical Theology 3, Moses does not leave aphairesis behind in favor of agnosia. “He pushes ahead o t the summit of the divine ascents. And yet he does not meet God himself, but contemplates, not Him who is invisible, but where he dwells.” Clearly the summit of divine ascents is equivalent to “the holiest and highest of the things perceived with the eye of the body or the mind,” that is, things and concepts, or beings. Moses is united with God at the very moment he breaks free of “all that the mind may conceive, wrapped… in the invisible.” That is, the aphairesis of all beings, agnosia, and henosis are not successive moments. They are simultaneous.

Although Vanneste rejects the idea of temporal succession (Mystère, 49), his discussion of logical succession still introduces a division not found in the text.

³² Divine Names 2.640b.

³³ Ibid., 2.641a. Here, Luibheid and Rorem translate πάν as “every.”

³⁴ Mystical Theology 5.1048b.

³⁵ This reading shows other apparently contradictory phrases in the corpus to have a straightforward meaning. For instance, in Mystical Theology 3.1033c, Dionysius discusses how to “deny that which is beyond each denial” (Complete Works: “every denial”). Despite its paradoxical appearance, this phrase means simply that Dionysius will show how to employ some kind of aphairesis to articulate the transcendent God, “that which is beyond every denial.” This is done through the denial of all beings.

³⁶ This denial applies to the three persons of the Trinity as well (for example, Mystical Theology 5.1048a).

³⁷ Divine Names 2.641a.

³⁸ Ibid., 7.872a-b. Mystical Theology 2 also discusses the relation between unknowing, union, and denial.

³⁹ Divine Names 7.869d-72a.

⁴⁰ Celestial Hierarchy 2.140d-41a; Mystical Theology 2.1000a-b.

⁴¹ , Gersh, Iamblichus, 11, 155–56Google Scholar ; Corsini, Eugenio, Il trattato ‘De divinis nominibus’ dello Pseudo-Dionigi e i commenti neoplatonici al Parmenide (Turin: Giappichelli, 1962) esp. 42, 115–22.Google Scholar

Louth, Andrew (Denys the Areopagite [Wilton, CT: Morehouse Barlow, 1989] 87)Google Scholar , implicitly following Gersh and Corsini, suggests that Dionysius rejects the Proclean framework, which clearly distinguishes negative and affirmative theologies. According to Louth, Dionysius brings the two together “in stark paradox.” Louth undermines the force of this claim, however, by writing that denials are truer than affirmations (ibid., 88).

⁴² Or, to choose examples from the Parmenidean hypotheses, God is both at rest and moving (Divine Names 9.916b-d).

⁴³ , Vanneste, Mystere, 58.Google Scholar, Louth (Origins, 167, 174)Google Scholar , translates άΦαίρεσις as “negation,” but in his discussion of related passages refers to denial. An early French translation of the corpus (Gandillac, Maurice de. trans., (Œvres Complètes du Pseudo-Denys L'Aréopagite [Paris: Aubier, 1943])Google Scholar sometimes renders άΦαίρεσις as “dépouillement,” but also renders both άΦαίρεσις and άπόΦασις as “negation.” Rorem and Roques consistently refer to both άΦαίρεσις and άπόΦασις as negation (negation).

⁴⁴ Luibheid and Rorem render πάν in the final phrase as “every.” Throughout the corpus, Dionysius explicitly relates being and knowability. One can know only what has being; what is beyond being is by definition unknowable.

⁴⁵ Celestial Hierarchy 2.140c-d.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 2.140d-41a.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 2.140d-41a.

⁴⁸ , Rorem (Symbols, 86)Google Scholar suggests that tropos in this passage does not convey any technical sense; it means simply “manner” or “mode” of speaking. Whatever its meaning here, however, note that Dionysius provides specific examples of negations, not simply negative language in general.

⁴⁹ Celestial Hierarchy 2.140d.

⁵⁰ Divine Names 7.865b-c.

⁵¹ Ibid., 1.588c.

⁵² Letters 5.1073a-76a.

⁵³ The word “negation” always articulates transcendence. Yet, although most words that can function as negations logically denoting God's transcendence (for example, “unknowable,” “ungraspable”), two do not: infinite and invisible. For this reason, Dionysius can at times apply these words to beings. Why then does he use them as negations at all? There are two possibilities. First, these words derive from the same scriptural passages as other negations, so the words may connote transcendence. Second, the words may denote transcendence in a modified way. Whenever Dionysius uses “light” as a metaphor for the conceptual, the “invisible” indicates what is beyond both thought and perception. Also, if Dionysius, like other Neoplatonist writers, is undecided whether the realm of being has an infinity of its own, “infinite” may at times negate all being.

⁵⁴ Celestial Hierarchy 2.140d.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 2.140d-41a.

⁵⁶ , Rorem (Symbols, 6, 25, 49, 63Google Scholar , etc.) persuasively argues that Dionysian theology, both affirmative and negative, is a method for interpreting the concrete representations in scripture and liturgy. Rorem may not give sufficient attention, however, to what kind of method the theology is. Negations, which are ultimately true, show that all other biblical representations fall short of the transcendent God.

⁵⁷ Mystical Theology 5.1048a.

⁵⁸ This reading implies that there are negations as well as denials in Mystical Theology 5. In his helpful discussion, , Roques (L'univers dionysien: Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le pseudo-Denys [Paris: Aubier, Montaigne, 1954] 206–7)Google Scholar understands the negations of Celestial Hierarchy 2 as quite similar to “monstrous,” dissimilar images for God from scripture, such as eagle or drunkard. Both fall short of God, but at least both leave the intelligence unsatisfied, so that the mind knows not to dwell on them as adequate representations of God. In my reading, Dionysius juxtaposes negations and monstrous images not because they have the same status but hecause negations are the rationale for the value of dissimilar images. Dionysius's God is indeed “ungraspable.” If one must use images, therefore, it is better to use images that are less likely to appear adequate for depicting God.

⁵⁹ In other words, as Celestial Hierarchy 2.141a in particular shows, Dionysian negative theology requires that some predicates are not conceptual.

⁶⁰ According to Derrida, Dionysius wishes to gesture to a hyperessentiality beyond predication, negation, and conceptualization (“Denials,” 74, 77). I would respond that, for Dionysius, negations proper are so stripped of conceptuality that they do not risk delimiting God.

⁶¹ , Louth (Origins, 175)Google Scholar discusses Dionysius's relation to Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysian ecstasy; Louth's further discussion of the difference between the human and angelic hierarchies and the hierarchies of names for God (Origins, 176-78 and Denys, 105) is unequalled in its clarity.

⁶² Mystical Theology 2.1025a-b.

⁶³ Ibid., 3.1033b.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 1033c.

⁶⁵ I hope, in a later study, to examine the relation between negations proper and phrases that appear to be roughly synonymous with them, such as “free of every limitation” (Mystical Theology 1048b).

⁶⁶ Rolt, C. E., trans., Dionysius the Areopagite: “The Divine Names” and “The Mystical Theology” (8th ed.; London: SPCK, 1977) 195 n.l.Google Scholar