¹ By 1519 Eck had incurred the enmity of some important scholars, among them Ulrich Zasius, Desiderius Erasmus, and a group of Nürnberg humanists that included Bernhard Adelmann von Adelmannsfelden. For a description of the circumstances that gave rise to some of Eck's problems in relating see Rowan, Steven W., “Ulrich Zasius and John Eck: ‘Faith Need Not Be Kept With an Enemy,’” The Sixteenth Century Journal 8 (1977) 79–95Google Scholar. Rowan mistakenly dates Eck's birth in 1484 (p. 80); actually he was born 13 November 1486. and thus was three years younger than Luther.

For an older and rather slanted discussion of Eck's ability to cultivate enemies see Albert, R., “Aus welchem Grunde disputirte Johann Eck gegen Martin Luther in Leipzig 1519?” ZHT 43 (1873) 382–441Google Scholar. The thrust of Albert's article is to demonstrate that Eck was motivated by the desire for monetary and other rewards: “An den Mitteln, welche Eck anwendete, erkennt man … dass die Liebe zur Wahrheit die Triebfeder zu seinem Disputiren nicht war. Den Ruhm eines Vertheidigers der Wahrheit, den Lohn eines solchen suchte Eck, die Sache selbst stand ihm ferne” (428).

The most recent monographic biography of Eck is the outdated work of Wiedemann, Theodor, Dr. Johann Eck, Professor der Theologie an der Universität Ingolstadt (Regensburg, 1865)Google Scholar. Eck himself wrote three autobiographical summaries, the most important sources of information on his early life: “Schutz red. Kindtlicher unschuld wider den Catechisten Andre Hosander, unnd sein schmach buchlein.…”(Nürnberg, 1540); “Replica lo. Eckii adversus scripta secunda Buceri apostatae super actis Ratisponae” (Ingolstadt, 1543); “Epistola Iohan. Eckii theologi, de ratione studiorum suorum, scripta anno MDXXXVIII”(Ingolstadt, 1543). The third of these is available in a modern edition by Metzler, S. J., Johannes, Heft 2 in Corpus Catholicorum: Werke katholischer Schriftsteller im Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung (Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1921).Google Scholar

² Luther, Martin, Werke, (kritische Gesamtausgabe, Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1884; abbreviated hereafter as WA) 2. 288.1–7Google Scholar. “Quartus ‘Divisio immediata humanorum operum est, quod sunt vel virtuosa vel viciosa: quia si homo est viciosus et agit quidquam, tunc agit virtuose &c.’ Iste articulus, ut audivimus precedente hebdomada, triumphatus est per egregium d. d. Carolostadium, ita egregius d. d. Iohannes Eccius coactus sit Scotum et Scotistas, Capreolum et Thomistas cum universis sue factionis doctoribus celebrioribus repudiare et ei consentire.”The proposition cited is one of those ascribed to Huss and condemned at the Council of Constance; see Denzinger, H. and Schönmetzer, A., Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum (Editio XXXII; Freiburg im Breisgau, 1963) 642.Google Scholar

³ WA 2. 295.34–37. “Articulum ilium nunquam reputabo Christianum et ob hoc Gregorium Ariminensem 28. dist. 2 repuli. neque actum fuit inter nos, an possit dari opus indifferens vel an omnis vita infidelium sit peccatum vel similia que hunc respiciunt articulum.”

⁴ WA 2. 308.10–15. “Ultimum de articulis Bohemorum non vult iudicare, licet nunquam desistat me sugillare. Et ego de eis transeo, nihil dicens, nisi quod Gregorium Ariminensem dist. 28. reprobatum ab egregio d. d. ego approbo. est enim totus aliud quam Augustinus et divina scriptura, resistens quidem omnibus doctoribus scholasticis, turn maxime Aristoteli, sed nondum ab ullo confutatus est.”

⁵ WA 2. 308.16–19. “De Gregorio Ariminensi, cuius sententia mihi displicet, ei placet, nihil iam ad propositum. Nolo ergo in ista diverticula descendere: sed, ut accepimus, defendamus, articulum Constantiensis concilii esse verum et quicunque huic contradixerit errare et veritati et honori concilii contradicere.”

⁶ WA 2. 394.16–395.14. “Quin egregius iste scholasticorum doctorum patronus, quo caveret, ne victus videretur, inter disputandum Protheum imitatus subito ea, quae in principio magno impetu impugnarat, in fine omnia concessit, immo affirmavit: tum praeoccupans gloriatus est, quod in sententiam suam Carolostadium pertraxerit, audens etiam hoc dicere, scholasticos doctores nunquam aliter docuisse et sapuisse. Quod cum sentiret impudentius dici quam audire possit, quicumque scholasticos legisset, sic sane temperavit, ut Scotum cum Scotistis suis et Capreolum cum Thomistis suis constanter negaret, antiquiores, Altisiodorensem, Bonaventuram et nescio quos autores allegans.…. Nam id Carolostadio satis erat, scholasticorum doctorum tres celebriores sectas fuisse ab Eccio eadem hora negatas: quas nisi negasset, Pelagianus Ingolstadium reversurus erat. Certum est enim, Modernos (quos vocant) cum Scotistis et Thomistis in hac re (id est libero arbitrio et gratia) consentire, excepto uno Gregorio Ariminense, quem omnes damnant, qui et ipse eos Pelagianis deteriores esse et recte et efficaciter convincit. Is enim solus inter scholasticos contra omnes scholasticos recentiores cum Carolostadio, id est Augustino et Apostolo Paulo, consentit.… Nee hanc metamorphosin Ecciano ingenio alienam existimes: est in ea promptissimus. Nam hac die quidem cum Gregorio (ut dixi) sensit et Carolostadio: rursus altera mecum congressus eundem mihi Gregorium in eadem etiam materia negavit propter articulum Huss Concilio Constantiensi damnatum. Ita vere mirificus est et cui non viderim similem disputator Eccius, apud quem nihil sit vel periculi vel vicii, Gregorii Ariminensis sententiam cum D. Carolostadio contra omnes scholasticos pugnantem pro scholasticis amplecti, eundem rursus pro scholasticis eisdem in eadem re repudiare.” Luther repeats this judgment in Contra malignum I. Eccii iudicium M. Lutheri defensio, WA 2. 646f. “Eccius Lipsiae concessit, liberum arbitrium ante gratiam non valere nisi ad peccandum: ergo non valet ad bonum sed tantum ad malum.” See also Ad lohannem Eccium Martini Lutheri Episcola super Expurgatione Ecciana, WA 2. 701f. et passim.

⁷ Disputatio excellentium D. doctorum Iohannis Eccii et Andreae Carolosladii quae cepta est Lipsiae XXVII lunii, an. M.XIX (Erfurt, 1519), hereafter cited as Disputatio. Aii^r. “Intendo ergo probare illud esse conveniens sacre scripture [et] patribus fidei Christiane liberum arbitrium, voluntatem humanam habere causalitatem activam, vim productivam, elicitavam operis meritorii, non excludendo gratiam et specialem adiutorium dei. …” For the present research I have not had access to the modern edition by Seitz, Otto, Der authentische Text der Leipziger Disputation (Berlin, 1903).Google Scholar

⁸ Disputatio Aii^v. “Ad Ambrosium dico quod Ambrosius li. 1 c. 2 dicit quod liberum arbitrium absque gratia seu voluntas ipsa vaga, incerta, inconstans est, que nihil ex se ipsa facere potest quod deo acceptum est. Quemadmodum ecclesia etiam iam cecinit, sine tuo numine nihil est in homine, nihil est innoxium. Hoc est, voluntas absque gratia spiritus sancti nihil potest facere quod deo gratum est et acceptum, sed quidquid facit illud est nocivum.”

⁹ Disputatio Aiii^r. “Placet enim etiam mihi liberum arbitrium sine gratia nihil posse facere deo vel gratum vel acceptum.” Whereas Carlstadt asserts the incapacity of the will without “the grace of the Holy Spirit,” Eck responds only that the free choice can do nothing pleasing or acceptable “without grace.” It is possible that the slight change in terminology reflects Eck's desire to protect the possibility of acceptable works before justification. As we shall see, this would reflect his position in the Chrysopassus.

¹⁰ Disputatio Aiiii^r. “Et admodum mihi gratum est quod egregius dominus meus olim diversarius prima iam congressione in meam, immo spiritus sancti sententiam pertractus asserit liberum arbitrium seu voluntatem lapsam gratia dei nondum erectam atque instauratam nihil facere posse quod deo gratum, acceptum, atque complacitum sit. Valeant igitur dispositiones scholastice de congruo. Nee prosint contritiones quas voluntati necdum sanate attribuunt.”

¹¹ Ibid. “Facessat Aristoteles harum opinionum parens quem supra quadringentos annos non sine iactura animarum relicto scripturarum candore et spiritu docuerunt.”

¹² Disputatio Av^r. “Iudicent me peritiores an omnium ordinum et seculares theologi a quadringentis annis ita sint abiiciendi, quasi Christus qui pollicitus est se mansurum nobiscum usque ad consumationem seculi sponsam suam dereliquerit. Nec ego qui rem iam ago theologicam Aristotelem suscipio defendendum. Hoc unum scio, philosophorum et philosophantium solatio Aristotelem a summis et doctissimis viris commendatum quorum iam spectatum est iudicium tam Candida laus, ut a nullo reprobari possit, ut Ciceronem, Quintilianum, Platonem et reliquos facile afferre possem.…”

¹³ Disputatio Aiiii^r. “Quod autem voculam istam, mecum, expendit et libero arbitrio operationem adhuc aliquam propriam quam gratia non faciat tribuit, satis notum est intellectoribus divi Pauli quam misere torqueat auctoritatem eius contra manifestam divi apostoli intentionem; qui omnem actionem quam gratia non efficit ablegavit cum dixit, Non ego sed gratia dei mecum. Hoc est, non sum ego qui specialem activitatem, ut aiunt scholastici, sed gratia est que omnem largitur operationem.…”

¹⁴ Dispulatio Aiiii^v “De tertio quod clarissimus doctor tertio citra modestiam me incusat quasi misere torqueam apostoli verbum, non ego sed gratia dei mecum, et velim tribuere specialem operationem libero arbitrio quam non faciat gratia: miror plurimum unde hoc sibi in mentem venerit … quod asseruerim liberum arbitrium specialem habere operationem quam non faciat gratia, quod non cogitavi quidem de quo remitto me ad scripta per notarios.”

¹⁵ Disputalio Av^r. “Quod dominus doctor concedit liberum arbitrium non habere specialem activitatem in bonis operibus libenter assumimus cum gratiarum actione, et miramur quod in eodem conflictu, in eadem hora, sibi tam dissidet et repugnat. Sed non caret suspicione quin aliter senserit quia inducit auctoritates quibus probare conatur quod liberum arbitrium habeat talem activitatem.”

¹⁶ Disputatio Bi^r. “Postremo fateor liberum arbitrium habere propriam et specialem activitatem ad opus bonum, sed talem quam dat deus et gratia.”

¹⁷ Disputatio Bi^v. “Quare supplicatio ecclesie mihi non adversatur sed meam firmat sententiam. Nam bonum a deo largiri asserit et adiutorium dei ponit liberum non excludendo arbitrium. Et adiecit quod scholastici essent omnes eiusdem sententie.”

¹⁸ Ibid. “Mens Capreoli est quod liberum arbitrium causat substantiam actus, et sanctus spiritus modum. Scotus autem ita distinguit: quantum ad principalitatem entitatis in bono opere voluntas est causa principalis; quantum autem pertinet ad respectum esse meritorii, tunc gratia est principalis.” Eck's response to this (Ibid.) confesses some ignorance about Capreolus (“mihi non admodum cognitum”). In his Chrysopassus of 1514, however, Eck refers to Capreolus at least eleven times, once with a specific reference (Chrysopassus IV.xxxviii. “… mirandum est de Capreolo dis. xl. q. 1 …”). On the Chrysopassus see infra, n. 26 et passim.

¹⁹ Disputatio Bii^r. “… reperiet Thomam, Egidium, Albertum, Durandum et Gabrielem et alios qui concordi sententia post Petrum longebardum asserunt liberum arbitrium sibi relictum sine speciali et supernaturali auxilio dei posse quidem in opus malum sed non in opus bonum, adeo quod interior inspiratio dei omnem bonum volumtatis motum preveniat.”

²⁰ Supra, n. 6. Carlstadt's charge that Eck at first affirmed and then denied that the will has a special activity in good works apart from grace will be discussed in the final section of this study.

²¹ Supra, n. 10.

²² Between Mani and Pelagius: Predestination and Justification in the Early Writings of John Eck (Harvard dissertation, 1967) esp. 159–69.Google Scholar

²³ Disputatio Bii^r. “… (concerning an opinion held by Occam) et meam quoque hanc fuisse sententiam ante septennium d. d. luculenter ex Chrysopasso predestinationis potuit intelligere si eam tam diligenter legit quam importune vilipendit.” I have found no clear evidence that the Wittenbergers knew the Chrysopassus before the Leipzig debates. It was among the books burned before the Elster Gate in December 1520, but that was seventeen months after Leipzig.

²⁴ Supra., n. 3. For the relevant passage in the Chrysopassus see infra, nn. 32–35. Leif Grane made the point that Eck is referring to the Chrysopassus; see his valuable article, “Gregor von Rimini und Luthers Leipziger Disputation,” ST 22 (1968) 39. Grane's primary interest is Gregory's importance for the Wittenberg theologians, but he makes a number of pertinent comments about Eck as well.Google Scholar

²⁵ Defensio contra amarulentas D. Andreae Bodenstein Carolstalini invectiones (1518), in Greving, Joseph, ed., Corpus Catholicorum: Werke katholischer Schriftsteller im Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung. Heft 1 (Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1919) 65fGoogle Scholar. “Quamvis autem clare posuerim adnotationem meam, tamen D. Bodenstein quasi per capillos detorsit in materiam predestinationis, adducendo omnia, que sequuntur, ad hunc finem, quod nulla sit ratio predestinationis, sed omnia bona nostra sint a Deo, que est communis theologorum sententia, et latissime per Gregorium Ariminensem ad mentem Augustini distinctione 27. secundi [libri] tractata et distinctione xl. primi.… Plures tamen boni et sancti theologi rationem predestinationis suo modo admisere, ut seraphicus doctor Bonaventura, s. Thomas in scripto, Alexander de Ales, Henricus de Gandavo, Thomas Argentinus, Gabriel Biel, Silvester de Prierio et alii, quorum in Chrysopasso memini.…” H. A. Oberman used this passage from the Defensio to suggest that Eck is here isolating Gregory of Rimini from the scholastic tradition, and that Luther, who also separates Gregory from other scholastics (supra, n. 5), may have derived his interpretation of Gregory from Eck. The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1963Google Scholar; revised edition Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967) 143f. LeifGrane has taken issue with Oberman's suggestion. He pointed out first that the Defensio does not isolate Gregory but merely states that Gregory has opposition. Furthermore, the point at issue in the Defensio passage is the ratio predestinationis and not, as in the Leipzig debates, the necessity of grace for good works. Thus Luther does not seem to be influenced by Eck. “Gregor von Rimini und Luthers Leipziger Disputation,” 33f. A more recent response by Oberman makes the suggestion that Eck's clause in the Defensio, “que est communis theologorum sententia,” refers only to the commonplace, “omnia bona nostra sint a Deo,” and not to the denial of a ratio predestinationis. On this argument Eck would not intend here to speak of Gregory's view of the ratio predestinationis as communis. “‘Tuus sum, salvum me fac’: Augustinréveil zwischen Renaissance und Reformation,” in Scientia Augustiniana (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1975) 359f.Google Scholar; repeated in Werden und Wertung der Reformation (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1977) 92f.Google Scholar, n. 44. As we shall see infra (n. 30), however, Eck asserts in the Chrysopassus that the denial of a ratio predestinationis, i.e., Gregory's position, is communis and solemnis. In view of that assertion in the Chrysopassus it seems more probable that Eck intends to say the same thing in the Defensio.

²⁶ Chrysopassus a Ioanne Maioris Eckio procancellario Auripoli et canonico Eisteten. Lecta est subtilis ilia praedestinationis materia Wilhelmo illuslris. principe Baioariam gubernante Anno gratiae GDXII (Augsburg, 1514). For a narrative of the circumstances leading to publication of the Chrysopassus see Greving, Joseph, Johann Eck als junger Gelehrter: ein literar- und dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung über seinen Chrysopassus praedestinationis aus dem Jahre 1514. Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte. Band 1 (Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1906) 16–19. The Chrysopassus is divided into six centuriae, each of which in turn is divided into numbered sections. Each citation from the Chrysopassus will be located by centuria and section (e.g., Chrysopassus II.xix).Google Scholar

²⁷ Eck declares his neutrality in a letter to Erhard Truchses, included in the published version of the Chrysopassus, IV.xiii. “Videbis autem omnino me in achademiam concessisse: et non iam Aristotelis aut Zenonis sed Socratis discipulum animo herere, et nihil affirmare. Cum enim nodosior esset materia et anceps, malui suspensum tenere iudicium quam temere quicquam definire, quod tantis patribus esset adversum.” He goes on immediately, however, to express his preference for the opinion that there is a ratio predestinationis: “Quod si omnino quid sentiam exigas, non tibi repugno: nam etsi nihil decernam ut dogmatistes tamen ut opinator … id opinor et probo quod ultimo positum leges.” He has suggested his preference earlier, II.lviii: “… si minus communem et solemnem, magis tamen piam. … Videtur quoque plus trahere ad devotionem et inflammare affectum, ac rudi populo satisfacere quam prior sententia.” Furthermore, while there is no section of the book devoted to refuting the opinion he prefers, he does not include replies to objections which might be raised by defenders of the opposite view, III.Ixiii-lV.xiii.

²⁸ Chrysopassus I.xi. “Tertius articulus gygantea proceritate adauctus, erit dubiorum resolutivus: non solum remotiorum et subtiliorum sed vulgarium quoque et indoctorum: quorum quisquam quanto minus sapit, eo magis de hac altissima praedestinationis materia disputat et opponit.”

²⁹ A survey of explicit references in the Chrysopassus produced the following figures: Augustine, 208 references; Scotus and d'Ailly, 87 each; Gregory of Rimini, 77. Oberman notes that in 1510 Eck had come into possession of a copy of the Venice 1503 edition of Gregory's Commentary on Books I and II of the Sentences: Werden und Wertung der Reformation, 88.

³⁰ Chrysopassus I.lxix. “… acutissimi ingenii ex ordine divi Augustini doctor …” V.lxxviii. “magnus divi A. Augustini cultor” V.c. “… unde humiliter et cum magna modestia, quae Theologum decet, Gregorius Ariminensis dicit. …” And especially II.xxxv (mistakenly numbered xxv). “Haec Augustinus; quamvis Gregorium Ariminensem arguentem induxerimus ut non spoliaremus eum debita laude. Nam ex omnibus commentariis Theologicarum sententiarum nullum vel vidimus vel legimus qui frequentius, signate, et ad omne ferme propositum divi A. Augustini locupletissimum adferat testimonium quemadmodum is Gregorius facit in primo et secundo scripto: tertius enim et quartus a nobis et a doctis pluribus maxime desyderantur.” This high regard for Gregory as an interpreter of Augustine is tempered elsewhere, however, by Eck's assertion that Gregory is at times too faithful to the letter of Augustine and thus fails to discern the spirit. This is in connection with the common claim that Augustine excessive loquitur, which Eck discusses at some length in III.xcii-xciii.

Eck's frequent, favorable, and often lengthy references to Gregory in the Chrysopassus may be compared with Biel's use of the doctor authenticus, as reported by Oberman, Werden und Wertung der Reformation, 91: “Von Gabriel Biel … wird Gregor zwar weniger umfangreich zitiert und keineswegs bejaht; Gregors Theologie wird nur noch in einzelnen Fragen berücksichtigt, meist stark gekürzt, inhaltlich aber getreu wiedergegeben.”

³¹ When Eck notes a difference of opinion among the Neoterici he usually sides with Gregory. Thus Gregory is placed in opposition to other Neoterici in the following passages: Chrysopassus III.xxxii-xxxvi (with Occam against d'Ailly), V.xxi (against Occam and d'Ailly), V.lxxx (against d'Ailly), V.lxxxviii (against Holcot, d'Ailly, and Wodeham), V.xc (against d'Ailly and Wodeham), V.c (against d'Ailly), Vl.xxxvii (against d'Ailly). In the first, sixth, eighth, and ninth of these passages Eck sides with Gregory; in the other five he takes no position. There are seven other passages in which Gregory is included in a list of Neoterici: II.xi, IV.xxviii, IV.lii, IV.lxxxiiii, V.xxxvii, V.xcviii, and VI.xxv. Only in V.xcviii does Eck appear to disagree, in this case with Occam, Gregory, “and others.”

Eck's use of the term Neoterici suggests that he means by it not simply all recent doctors but a particular party among them, those usually identified heretofore as the Nominalists. For a good discussion of recent interpretations of Nominalism and some of the problems involved, see William J. Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” in The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, in Trinkaus, Charles and Oberman, Heiko A., eds., Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 10 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974) 26–59Google Scholar.

Does Eck himself belong to this party? For a discussion of this question see my edition of In primum librum Sententiarum Annotatiunculae, D. Iohanne Eckio Praelectore. Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 13 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976) 10–12.Google Scholar

³² I have simplified Eck's discussion slightly. In the Chrysopassus he at first distinguishes three answers to the question de ratione praedestinationis; in addition to the two I have mentioned he lists the view that there is a ratio reprobationis sed non praedestinationis (I.xci). He adds immediately that this position differs from the first one only in words, and his subsequent discussion assumes that there are only two distinct answers. The thirty-five names include those who defend the first and the third positions. The following hold the first position (Ibid.): “Magister in textu deducit earn ex divo Augustino. Divus Thomas, Albertus magnus suevus … Aegidius Romanus, Durandus, Petrus de Tarantasia, Ioannes Gerson cancellarius. Gregorius Ariminensis, Petrus Aliacensis, Marsilius de Inghen, Clemens de terra salsa, Capreolus, Conradus Vuimpina, Sulto, Franciscus Picus … Gartner. Alphonsus Toletanus, Richardus de media villa, Paulus Cortesius.” The third opinion, in substantial agreement with the first, is held by “Herveus Brito, Ioannes duns Scotus …, Franciscus Mayronis, Petrus de Aquila, Landulphus, Hugode novo castro, Guuillermus Vorrilon, Guuillermus Gorris, Pelbartus, Antoniusde Valentia, Henricus Gorcheim, Frater Paulus Scriptoris, Ioannes de Colonia, Robertus Holcot.”

That there is a ratio praedestinationis is the opinion of “Alexandri de Ales, Sancti Bonaventurae, Guuilhelmi Occham, Thomae argentoracensis, Uldrici Argentini, Nicholae de Orbellis, Henrici de Gandavo, Gabrielis Byel, Petri Aureoli, Silvestri de Prierio” (Ibid.). It would be the work of another article to assess the accuracy of Eck's characterizations in these lists.

³³ Supra, n. 25.

³⁴ Chrysopassus III.lxxix. “Ad beatum Hieronymum potest multivariam responderi: quoniam philosophos constat habuisse bonos actus moraliter quos dicimus esse bonos bonitate moris, licet non bonitate meriti. Quamvis Gregorius Ariminensis valens ille doctor more suo hic sit singularis: et arbitretur tarn philosophos quam veteres illos Romanos in eisdem etiam actibus, quibus dicuntur secundum virtutem operati, peccasse et deliquisse; immo omnium infidelium omnem vitam peccatum esse; quod omne quod non ex fide fiat peccatum sit, ut lautissime per eum disputatur dis. xxviii secundi. Attamen eum hoc loco non recipimus.”

The sentiment ascribed to Jerome is from the letter ad Demetriadem virginem, a document which Gregory himself rejected as being written not by Jerome but by Pelagius. Clearly Eck assumes Jerome's authorship, both in the Chrysopassus and in his debate with Carlstadt at Leipzig (Disputatio Aii^r and Bi^r). Leif Grane notes that Carlstadt eventually challenges Eck at Leipzig on the basis of Erasmus' new edition of Jerome. Why, Grane asks, did Carlstadt not challenge Eck on the basis of Gregory's denial of the authenticity of the letter? Grane uses this argument ex silentio to suggest that the Wittenbergers were not well acquainted with Gregory's writings at this time. “Gregor von Rimini und Luthers Leipziger Disputation,” 34–37. Grane's argument is weakened by the following consideration. In the Chrysopassus Eck appears to be very well acquainted with Gregory's writings, and yet he ascribes the letter in question to Jerome. Furthermore, at Leipzig Eck knows that he is likely to be accused of Pelagianism and yet he appeals again to the letter that Gregory has ascribed to Pelagius himself. Eck knew Gregory's writings but either overlooked or rejected Gregory's opinion of the provenance of this letter. So did Capreolus and Luis de Molina; see Oberman, Werden und Wertung der Reformation, 358f., n. 42: Luther and Carlstadt may well have done the same. Certainly this does not destroy Grane's argument, but it does weaken it somewhat.

³⁵ Chrysopassus III.xciii. Concerning statements by Augustine in contra Iulianum and de gratia et libero arbitrio: “Quam verborum sententiam valens ille Gregorius Ariminensis verbatim sequutus, hucusque progressus est ut concederet elemosynam ex naturali pietate ab infideli praestitam non esse bonum sed peccatum. Aut si natus ex visceribus misericordiae motus, parenti pauperi et inopi subveniret identidem peccatum esse. Vide eum dist. xxviii. secundi. Cui non dissimiliter tenet Dionysius Cisterciensis dis. xvii primi, articulo tertio, dicens orantem horas canonicas sine charitate peccare mortaliter non quia oret sed quia non oret in charitate … neuter tamen istorum doctorum tenetur.”

³⁶ Chrysopassus III.lxxix. “… ut lautissime per eum disputatur dis. xxviii secundi: attamen eum hoc loco non recipimus.” III.xciii. “… Vide eum dist. xxviii. secundi. Cui non dissimiliter tenet Dionysius Cisterciensis … neuter tamen istorum doctorum tenetur.”

³⁷ Chrysopassus II.lxxvi. “Tertium evidentiale: Omnia ergo possunt per gratiam dei fieri; in primis tamen et praecipue opera meritoria eius gratia fiunt. Ne prolixior sim quam vel vos disideretis vel ipse velim, omitto quae Gregorius Ariminensis ponit dis. xxvi secundi, que est una ex singularibus questionibus Gregorii quae posset induci tota. … Nam omnino adversatur nobis Gregorius: sed oculatus facile intelliget oppositum suarum conclusionum esse verum.” Distinctions 26, 27, and 28 are treated together in Gregory's commentary: see Super primum et secundum Sententiarum (St. Bonaventure, New York: 1955Google Scholar, reprint of the Venice edition of 1522) 92^r-103^v.

³⁸ Chrysopassus ii.ix. “Evidentiale primum. Deus ita est causa efficiens hominum quod ipso non agente, nihil aliud agit; et cuiuscunque effectus etiam naturalis deus est potior causa quam creatura.”

³⁹ Chrysopassus II.lxxiii. “Secundum evidentiale: Certum est deum optimum omnia propter suam bonitatem fecisse et facere, non solum quae intellectiles respiciunt creaturas sed et totius universi perfectionem et conditionem.”

⁴⁰ Chrysopassus II.lxxvi. “Tertium evidentiale: Omnia ergo possunt per gratiam dei fieri; in primis tamen et praecipue opera meritoria eius gratia fiunt.”This is the context in which Eck adduces Gregory of Rimini's discussion in the Sentences-Commentary, II, distinction xxvi (supra, n. 37/).

⁴¹ Chrysopassus II.xcii. “Quartum evidentiale: Non obstante voluntate dei liberrima deus gratuite dedit certas regulas tam naturalibus quam rationalibus creaturis, quas vocamus legem dei ordinatam, secundum quas quamlibet creaturam permittit agere, et ei secundum easdem regulas coagit.” This axiom reflects Eck's use of the common late medieval distinction between the absolute and the ordained power of God, a distinction that has been especially associated with Nominalism. Recent studies have argued that the emphasis on the potentia absoluta dei was not so much to cast doubt upon the reliability and certainty of God's activity as to assert the divine freedom and the contingency of that activity. One can find these themes elsewhere in the Chrysopassus: III.xvii, the divine intention cannot be necessitated; III.lxiii, God becomes a debtor only through his absolutely free choice; III.lxxv, de potentia absoluta God could deprive the beati of their beatitude; III.lxxv, even if God were to contravene the laws of justice established for the created order, he would not be unjust. A discussion of the two orders of divine power in recent interpretations of Nominalism is found in Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” in The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval Religion, 26–49.

⁴² Chrysopassus II.xciii (the section number is missing in the text). “Conclusio: Misericordissimus deus aliquos sine ratione praedestinat; aliquos vero cum causa et ratione, non quidem necessitante sed congruente et decente.”

⁴³ Chrvsopassus II.xciiii-III.xv. “Prima pars probatur sic: Quia aliqui ex speciali gratia sunt ordinati ad vitam aeternam, ita quod sibi ipsis non sunt derelicti sed praeveniuntura gratia ne ponant obicem, ergo aliqui praedestinantur sine ratione praevia in eis praevisa aut reperta. Antecedens probatur primo de diva virgine Maria. … Secundo probatur antecedens in sanctificatis ex utero qui omnes praeventi sunt a gratia dei: qualis fuit S. loannes baptista. … Qualis Ieremias propheta. … Talis fuit Esaias secundum multorum sententiam. … Sanctus quoque Nickolaus a multis huic ordini ascribitur. … Joseph preterea coniunx divae virginis Mariae computatur inter sanctificatos in utero a christianissimo cancellario Gersone. … Tertio probatur antecedens ab initio conclusionis assumptum, de parvulis. Sed fortasse melius reservantur ad secundam partem. … Quarto probatur antecedens assumptum pro principali conclusione, in sancto Paulo, quasi per vim ad statum gratiae perducto, in sancto Matheo apostolo et aliis mirabiliter vel ad fidem vel ad meliorem frugem conversis. …”

⁴⁴ Chrysopassus III.xv. “Et talis vocatio est privilegiata, et indubie est effectus praedestinationis non ratio.”

⁴⁵ Chrysopassus III.xvi (incorrectly numbered xxi). “Aliquos vero … deus praedestinat cum ratione et causa. … Quia deus ab aeterno praevidit hunc assensurum bonae motioni et inspirationi divinae, propterea vult ei dare gratiam. Et quia deus praevidet ab aeterno hunc per eandem gratiam multa bona opera facturum, et in ea finaliter permansurum, ideo vult ei et ordinat eum ad tantam gloriam. Et illa praevisio, aut potius illa praevisa sic cognita seu in esse cognito, sunt ratio praedestinationis.”

⁴⁶ Chrysopassus III.xix. “Ilia ratio congruentiae et decentiae est in adultis initiative assensus motionis divinae et inspirationis, cui acquiescendo de congruo disponit se faciendo quod in se est ad recipiendum gratiam, per quam postea si ab ea non decidat meretur vitam aeternam.” Eck is using a common phrase from late medieval discussions of justification. For the use of the expression facere quod in se est by other late medieval authors see Oberman, H. A., “Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam: Robert Holcot, O.P. and the beginnings of Luther's Theology,” HTR 55 (1962) 317–42Google Scholar, and Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 131–39 et passim. Unlike Holcot and Biel, Eck insists that it is only in response to the special assistance of God that one can do one's best and thus dispose oneself for justification. Eck's understanding of the facere quod in se est may be closer to that of his teacher Wendelin Steinbach, but this will require further study. On Steinbach see Feld, Helmut, Martin Luthers und Wendelin Steinbachs Vorlesungen über den Hebräerbrief. Veröffentlichungen des Institut für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Band 62 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1971) 201–13Google Scholar, esp. 206; and H. A. Oberman, Werden und Wertung der Reformation, 119–40. Steinbach's commentary on Galatians is available in the edition by Feld, , Wendelini Steinbach Opera exegetica quae supersunt omnia I: Commentarius in epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas. Veröffentlichungen des Institut für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Band 81 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1976).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Chrysopassus III.lix. “Et sic Deus influit naturalia mediante causa secunda, ita influit aliqua per se immediate, ut gloriam, gratiam, et illam motionem” (italics mine). Biel is not nearly so clear that the prior divine activity is to be distinguished from the influentia generalis: Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 138, n. 59. Helmut Feld finds Steinbach clearly distinct from Biel and Occam in his doctrine of grace; Martin Luthers und Wendelin Steinbachs Vorlesungen über den Hebräerbrief, 212. It is not clear, however, whether Steinbach insists as clearly as does Eck upon a special divine prevenient assistance distinct from the influentia generalis.

⁴⁸ Chrysopassus III.lix. “Unde sicut dona naturalia proprie non sunt effectus nee ratio praedestinationis, ita nec illa motio quamvis sit supernaturalis.”

⁴⁹ Supra, n. 45, and Chrysopassus III.xxviii. “Unde congruum est et decens ex divina liberalitate tales praedestinari ad vitam aeternam postquam obsequuti sunt bonae motioni divinae.” Later, responding to an argument about the priority of God's activity in salvation, III.lxiiii: “Ad inducta vero dicendum quod probationes sunt concedendae in illo quod probant, scilicet esse motionem a Deo et vocationem internam.”

Here we may raise the question of the necessity for special divine aid to perform any morally good act. In the Chrysopassus, as we have seen, supra, n. 34, Eck clearly holds that even the pagans can perform morally good acts. He does not, however, explain the relationship between such acts and special divine assistance. Without comment he cites Thomas’ ambiguity on the issue, III.lxvi. “… in Summa hoc vult [Thomas], quod ad actum meritorium homo indiget gratia. Sed ad actus bonos non meritorios sufficit liberum arbitrium ex puris naturalibus cum generali motione divine sine gratia gratum faciente, sine qua potest ad tempus ab omni actu peccati cessare, se etiam ad gratiam recipiendam praeparare, non autem a peccato resurgere. Haec autem est veritas, quod idem doctor sanctus art. ix non decidit an auxilium speciali ratione homini impensum, sit aliud ab influentia et cooperatione dei generali, qua assistit omni agenti, ipsum movendo secundum suam naturam; aut quod homo solum indiget tali auxilio gratiae sub duplici ratione, generali et speciali.” At Leipzig Eck is emphatic that special assistance precedes every meritorious act, but I can find no passage in which he states clearly that special assistance is necessary for all morally good acts. Thus the Chrysopassus and the Leipzig material are in harmony in what they omit as well as what they include.

⁵⁰ Chrysopassus III.lix. “Ipsa etiam motio divina, quae praevenit et praeoccupat voluntatem, nec est effectus nec ratio praedestinationis. Quod non sit effectus probatur: est enim communis omni homini praedestinato et reprobato. Omnes enim Deus movet sufficienter …” III.lxv. “Illa enim motio est generalis omnibus hominibus, sed acquiescere est solum bonorum …” (italics mine).

⁵¹ Chrysopassus III.lxviii. “… de eo quod liberum arbitrium nostrum acquiescit inspirationi internae et vocationi divinae: quem assensum vocat propheta ‘auditionem,’ secundum doctores potes appellare sentimentum. Quia cum dicit, ‘Hodie si vocem meam audieritis,’ ‘nolite obdurare corda vestra.’ Et dicit, ‘hodie,’ innuens quod semper praesens sit et praesentaria illa divina motio et vocatio.”

⁵² Steinbach objects to Gregory's distinction between auxilium generale and auxilium speciale; Feld, Martin Luthers und Wendelin Steinbachs Vorlesungen über den Hebräerbrief, 206. Eck on the other hand expresses no reservations about these terms.

⁵³ Disputatio Avi^v. “Est autem contrarietas ista: in exordio sue disputationis dixit liberum arbitrium adiutum gratia habere specialem et naturalem activitatem in bono opere, in processu autem disputationis dixit se nunquam cogitasse liberum arbitrium habere specialem activitatem quam gratia non praestiterit. Quero igitur cum habere activitatem ex alio non sit eam habere ex se, neque homini proprium sed alienum, quomodo huisusmodi dictum sibi ipsi dissidens concordari ne nostra disputatio per inane emicet. …”

⁵⁴ Sider, Ronald J., Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt: The Development of His Thought 1517–1525. Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought XI (Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1974) 76–77.Google Scholar “Somewhat incredibly, Eck simply denied that he had ever attributed a natural activity to the will in good deeds. … Foolishly, Karlstadt failed to press the fact that Eck had contradicted himself.”

⁵⁵ Sider, Andreas Bodenstein, 80.

⁵⁶ Disputatio, Bi^r. “Respondeo et dico neque ab exordio neque in processu unquam me dixisse liberum arbitrium habere activitatem naturalem respectu boni operis sed opponendo contra d. d. assumpsi probaturus liberum arbitrium habere activitatem productivam et elicitivam boni operis adiutum a gratia de quo me remitto ad acta Notariorum. Quare addendo adiutorium gratie non naturalem sed supernaturalem dedi voluntati activitatem a gratia sibi communicatam in qua sententia adhuc persevero. … Postremo fateor liberum arbitrium habere propriam et specialem activitatem ad opus bonum sed talem quam dat deus et gratia.”

⁵⁷ Supra, n. 7.

⁵⁸ Supra, n. 56.

⁵⁹ Disputatio Aii^r “Verum hoc erat propositi nostri et hoc saxum voluebamus, ut liberum arbitrium, vis nostra rationalis adiuta gratia naturali virtute productiva elicitativa non fraudaretur.” (italics mine) Sider notes that in Seitz's edition the word probaretur is used instead of fraudaretur.

⁶⁰ Disputatio Aii^v-Aiii^r. (Continuing immediately after the passage in n. 59) “Hoc est quod voluntas non haberet se mere passive ad bonum, nec liberum arbitrium esset res de solo tituolo post peccatum sed potius cooperaretur deo sua gratia adiuvante. … ”

⁶¹ Disputatio Bi^r. “… Quare addendo adiutorium gratiae non naturalem sed supernaturalem dedi voluntati activitatem a gratia sibi communicatam. … “

⁶² I note and to some extent share the perplexity expressed to me by Harry J. McSorley about Carlstadt's misunderstanding of Eck. If Carlstadt was trained in the scholastic tradition, why did he not interpret Eck properly? Eck's usage of scholastic terminology is not eccentric, and yet Carlstadt misunderstood it. It is puzzling.