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Pierre D'Ailly and the Absolute Power of God: Another Note on the Theology of Nominalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2011

Francis Oakley
Francis Oakley
Affiliation:
Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts
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Extract

During the last couple of years two articles have appeared in these pages, both concerned primarily with what one of them calls “the theology of nominalism.” This in itself is significant because it reflects a growing interest among theologians and ecclesiastical historians in the theological positions characteristic of those late medieval thinkers who belonged to the “nominalist” or “terminist” school. But more significant is the fact that the authors of the two articles should adopt diametrically opposed approaches to these positions, for it illustrates in a very concrete fashion the pioneer state in which the study of later medieval scholasticism still lingers. Much of the land on this particular frontier is not merely untenanted but even uncharted, and those brave or foolhardy enough to work in the area enjoy a freedom of movement bewildering to others whose business confines them to the more settled regions of earlier or later centuries. It is not so much that the wilderness is trackless as that one is still free to choose from among several possible routes each of which has its own potent inducements to offer to those who are anxious to grasp the lay of the land. There is still a great deal of debate about the respective worth of these various routes and nothing that can be said at present is likely to put an end to it.

Type
Research Article
Information
Harvard Theological Review , Volume 56 , Issue 1 , January 1963 , pp. 59 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1963

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References

1 Lindbeck, George, “Nominalism and the Problem of Meaning as Illustrated by Pierre d’Ailly on Predestination and Justification,” The Harvard Theological Review, LII (1959), pp. 43–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heiko A. Oberman, “Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with attention to its Relation to the Renaissance,” ibid., LIII (1960), pp. 47–76.

2 Boehner, Philotheus, “Ockham’s Tractatus de praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus and its main problems,” in Collected Articles on Ockham, New York, 1958, p. 425Google Scholar.

3 Gilson, Etienne, History of Christian Philosophy, New York, 1955, p. 407Google Scholar. The whole of Part 9 (pp. 385–427) is devoted to analyzing the significance and effects of the condemnations.

4 Baudry, L., Le Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae attribué à G. d’Occam, Paris, 1936, pp. 30–40Google Scholar.

5 Among them Etienne Gilson — see esp. his Unity of Philosophical Experience, London, 1938Google Scholar, ch. 3 — and Coplestone, F. C., A History of Philosophy, III, Westminster, Md., 1953, pp. 47Google Scholar ff.

6 See, e.g., Wulf, Maurice de, Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale, 6th ed., Paris, 1947, III, pp. 27–51Google Scholar.

7 He refers especially to the studies listed in Franziskanische Studien, XXXII (1950), pp. 114–183Google Scholar. The principal work of Moody, Ernest listed there is his The Logic of William of Ockham, New York, 1935Google Scholar. All Boehner’s articles on Ockham have been gathered together in the volume cited above in n. 2.

8 The Logic of William of Ockham, pp. vi and 307.

9 “In propria causa: A reply to Professor Pegis,” Collected Articles, p. 302.

10 Ockham: Philosophical Writings, London, 1957, pp. xvii–xxiiGoogle Scholar.

11 Gandillac, M. Patronnier de, “Usage et valeur des arguments probables chez Pierre d’Ailly,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, VIII (1933), pp. 43–91Google Scholar. Despite some inaccuracies this is still the best general introduction to d’Ailly’s position — though for a detailed study of his epistemology see Meller, B., Studien zur Erkenntnislehre des Peter von Ailly, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1954Google Scholar. Note Gandillac’s conclusion (p. 90): “Au terme de cette étude, ou l’idée de Puissance divine a joué le rôle d’un leit-motiv, il nous reste à dire … que cette conception amoindrie de la nature, sur laquelle le Nominalisme fonde la valeur de ses arguments probables... nous paraît bien plutôt l’effet d’une exigence religieuse que le témoignage d’une critique philosophique.”

12 History of Christian Philosophy, p. 410.

13 Quaestiones super I, III et IV Sententiarum, Lyons: Nicolaus Wolff, 1500, Princ. in I Sent., E, f. 2iv where he cites the condemned article: “Quod creatio non est possibilis, quamvis contrarium tenendum sit secundum fidem” — cf. Mandonnet, P., Siger de Brabant et l’Averroïsme Latin au XIIIme siècle, 2nd. ed., Louvain, 1908, vol. II, p. 189Google Scholar, art. 189.

14 Sent. I, qu. 12, art. 2, J. f. i47r: “Unum signum est magnae ruditatis et ineruditionis in scripturis facere magnam difficultatem in hoc, sicut communiter faciunt rudes juristae qui imaginantur deum esse obligatum legibus creatis.”

15 Sent. I, qu. 13, art. 1 C, f. 1591:: “… omne quod fieri non implicat contradictionem deus possit de sua absoluta potentia facere.” Cf. Ockham, , Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, Lyons: Jean Trechsel, 1495Google Scholar, II, qu. 8 O; Quodlibeta Septem una cum tractatu de sacramento altaris, Strassburg: Jordanus de Quedlinburg, 1491Google Scholar, Quodl. VI, qu. 1 and 6.

16 Princ. in I Sent., K, f. 23V: “Notandum est quod sicut voluntas divina quicquid potest producere, mediante causa secunda, potest producere se sola, sic ipsa de potentia absoluta posset rationalem creaturam obligare se sola…. Sed tamen ipsa de potentia ordinata non posset rationalem creaturam obligare nisi mediante aliqua lege creata.” Cf. Ockham, Sent. I, dist. XLII, qu. 1 G; Sent. II, qu. 4, qu. s K, and qu. 19 N, O, P; Quodl. VI, qu. 1 and 6.

17 Princ. in I Sent., D, f. 2ir: “… sicut attribuitur voluntati divinae esse primam causam efficientem sic attribuendum est eidem esse primam legem obligantem;” “… Sicut impossibile est secundam causam agere, prima causa non agente, sic impossibile est legem aliquam obligare, prima lege non obligante.” See also Sent. I, qu. 14, art. 3, Q, f. 173r.

18 “De libertate creaturae rationalis,” in Gerson, J., Omnia, Opera, ed. Ellies du Pin, Antwerp, 1706, I, col. 632Google Scholar. Cf. Ockham, Quodl. VI, qu. 2 and 6; Opus Nonaginta Dierum, Lyons: Jean Trechsel, 1495Google Scholar. ch. 95, § Hereticum est dicere omnia de necessitate evenire.

19 Sent. IV, qu. 1, art. 1, E, f. i8Sr: “Ignis est proprie causa caloris et tamen non necessario sed mere contingenter ad ignem sequitur calor sicut patuit de igne trium puerorum in fornace. Similiter calor igne praesente potest produci igne, nihil causante, sicut patet si deus de se solo produceret calorem suspendendo actionem ignis praesentis….” (Italics mine). Ockham cites the same example to illustrate a very similar contention — see Opus Nonaginta Dierum, ch. 95, § Hereticum est dicere omnia de necessitate evenire.

20 Sent. I, qu. 9, art. 2, R, f. 22v: “… nullum est bonum vel malum quod deus de necessitate sive ex natura rei diligat vel odiat … nee aliqua qualitas est ex natura rei justicia, sed ex mera acceptatione divina.” Ibid., qu. 14, art. 3, T, f. 174V: “Prima propositio est quod deus obligat ad multa possibilia et tamen posset obligare ad illorum opposita.” Cf. Ockham, Sent. II, qu. 5 H. aPrinc. in I Sent., H, f. 22V: “Evidenter enim est impossibile deum velle rationalem creaturam teneri ad non obediendum sibi: sed non sic est evidenter impossibile deum velle ipsam teneri ad odium sui, quia ad primum evidenter sequitur contradictio et non ad secundum.” This is, of course, another famous contention of Ockham’s — see Sent. II, qu. 19 O-P. Commenting on this argument, Boehner emphasizes that what is involved is a purely logical and not an ethical possibility, because if a created will obeyed God’s command to hate Him, it would, by its very act of obeying, love Him. — “A recent interpretation of Ockham’s Philosophy,” Collected Articles, pp. 152–153.

22 Sent. I, qu. 13, art. 1, D, f. 159r — where d’Ailly defines the terms in this fashion. Cf. Ockham, Quodl. VI, qu. 1; Opus Nonaginta Dierum, ch. 95, § Nota de duplici potentia dei.

23 When he is speaking of the naturally ordained order (as opposed to the supernatural ordination revealed to us in the Scriptures) d’Ailly uses such phrases as naturaliter vel de lege ordinata, or de communi lege et naturaliter, or de potentia naturali seu naturaliter ordinata, or naturaliter … stante divina ordinatione, or even, when he is speaking specifically of the physical order, de communi cursu naturae. See his “De Trinitate,” in Gerson, I, col. 619; Sent. I, qu. 1, art. 2, JJ, f. 96r; Sent. IV, qu. 1, art. 2, N, f. 188r; ibid., qu. 5, art. 3, QQ, f. 272r; Sent. I, qu. 13, art. 1, D, f. 159v. Cf. the similar phrases employed by Ockham — de communi lege (Sent. I, Prol., qu. 7; Sent. II, qu. 19 O), stante ordinatione quae nunc est, stante ordinatio divina (Sent. III, 12 CCC), secundum communem cursum (Sent. I, Prol., qu. 7 E; Sent. III, qu. 3 B).

24 Sent. I, qu. 3, art. 1, M, f. 72v: “Notitia intuitiva tarn sensitiva quam intellectiva potest simpliciter esse de re non existente; probatur … quia omnis res absoluta distincta loco et subjecto ab alia re absoluta potest per divinam potentiam absolutam existere sine ilia.” (Italics mine). Another famous doctrine of Ockham’s — cf. Quodl. VI, qu. 6.

25 Cf. supra, n. 16.

26 Witness to this is his insistence that just as God does many things through the agency of secondary causes although, as First Cause, He alone can do all things, so also, in the constitution of a just lord, he freely associates with his approving will “many created circumstances or titles” — such as hereditary succession or “the common choice of many” — even though without the coincidence of such titles he could, by “His most free will,” confer lordship upon anyone. — “De legitimo dominio” and “Utrum indoctus in jure divino,” in Gerson, I, cols. 643–644, 652–653. Though the actual terms are not used we are back face to face with the potentia absoluta-ordinata distinction and perhaps nowhere in d’Ailly’s political thought is its value more apparent than here. For it enables him to solve in a manner consistent with his basic philosophical principles one of the perennial problems facing the Christian political theorist — that of according an absolute validity to the proposition that all power is of God without having to ignore the merely human arrangements for its disposition.

27 Sent. I, qu. i, art. i, E. f. 441-: “Dico quod duplex est evidentia: quaedam est evidentia primi principii vel reducibilis ad earn. Alia est evidentia conditionata, qualis est evidentia nostri ingenii quae est circa primam. Evidentia absoluta simpliciter potest describi quod est assensus verus sine formidine causatus naturaliter, quo non est possibile intellectum assentire et in sic assentiendo decipi vel errare.”

28 Ibid., O, f. 48r: “Aliqua humana notitia de necessario et impossibili aliter se habere, sicut de primo principio et similibus est infallibilis. Patet quia non stat ipsam esse et aliter esse quam significat, nee est possibile talem notitiam aliter significare…. Et ideo licet Deus posset ipsam facere non esse aut non significare, tamen non potest facere earn significare oppositum sui significati quod modo significat, sicut quod non posset facere quod caliditas frigefaceret….”

29 Ibid., E, f. 44r: “Evidentia autem secundum quid potest describi quod est assensus sine formidine causatus naturaliter, quo non est possibile, stante dei influentia generali et nullo facto miraculo, intellectum assentire et in sic assentiendo decipi vel errare” (Italics mine). See also Sent. I, qu. 3, art. 3, DD, f. 78r where d’Ailly defines ratio naturalis as “rationem sumptam ex hiis nobis apparent de communi cursu naturae,” and adds: “Sic ergo sumendo, patet quod multae rationes naturales possunt fieri et factae sunt a philosophis concludentes tantum unum deum esse, licet non evidenter tamen probabiliter et probabilius quam posset concludi oppositum.” Gandillac, p. 47, incorrectly equates ratio naturalis with evidentia conditionata, but this is to overlook the difference between probability and evidence. He similarly misinterprets lumen naturale—a related term — by equating it with evidentia absoluta, whereas d’Ailly himself defines it as “lumen sive cognitionem sine errore intellectui possibilem de communi cursu naturae …,” i.e. only in the presently ordained economy — Sent. I, qu. 3, art. 3, DD, f. 78r.

30 Ibid., qu. 1, art. 1, F, f. 44r-44v: “Impossibile est viatorem aliquid extrinsecum ad eo sensibile evidenter cognoscere esse evidentia simpliciter et absoluta, sed bene evidentia secundum quid et conditionata … quia quicquid deus potest facere mediante causa secunda, vel mediantibus causis secundis, potest per seipsum….”

31 Cf. Sent. I, qu. 1, art. 1, E-F, f. 44r-44v; art. 2, Y, f. 5iv-52r; art. 3, JJ, f. 56r.

32 Ockham: Philosophical Writings, Introduction, p. xxii where he also adds: “He is a theologian who views the world from the standpoint of the absolute. Consequently he sees many truths which were called ‘eternal’ dwindling away in the light of eternity, which is God himself. The actual order of creatures remains contingent; the possible order is above contingency. Hence the tendency of Ockham to go beyond the investigation of the actual order, by asking what is possible regardless of the state of the present universe.”

33 Sent. I, qu. 9, art. 2, H, f. n8r: “Nullus potest esse amlcus dei de lege ordinata non habendo in se aliquam qualitatem infusam quae sit charitas vel gratia…. Et … per amicum dei intelligendo ilium quem deus specialiter diligit et ad speciale bonum, scilicet ad vitam aeternam…. Prima conclusio probatur, et licet non possit probari ratione naturali, quia per nullam rationem naturalem possumus concludere aliquem habitum supernaturalem, tamen potest probari auctoritate multiplied tarn scripturae quam sanctorum.” (Italics mine). Cf. ibid., K, f. ngv. For the views of Ockham and Gregory see Vignaux, P., Justification et Prédestination au XIVe siècle, Paris, 1934, pp. 119Google Scholar and 143.

35 Sent. I, qu. 9, art. 2, H-J, f. 118r–119r: “Aliquis potest esse amicus dei de potentia absoluta non habendo aliquam qualitatem infusam quae sit charitas vel gratia…. Quia … nullam contradictionem implicat quod deus ordinaret earn [eternal life] dare alicui sine charitate aut alio dono create” (Italics mine). For the views of Ockham and Gregory, see Vignaux, pp. 119–121 and 144.

35 Lindbeck, p. 48.

36 Ibid.

37 Sent. I, qu. 9, art. 2, R, f. 121v: “… Vitare peccatum ex puris naturalibus potest duplidter intelligi: Uno modo ut per pura naturalia excludamus omnia dona infusa supernaturalia; alio modo ut per hoc excludamus adjutorium supernaturale. Tune secundum hoc pono aliquas propositiones. Prima quod secundo modo nullus ex puris naturalibus potest aliquid peccatum vitare. Patet: quia esto quod deus absolveret ipsum a debito habendi charitatem seu quodvis aliud donum supernaturale. Tamen adhuc non posset ex puris naturalibus id est ex se et sine adjutorio del supernatural, peccata vitare, sicut nee aliquid agere bene. Secunda est quod primo modo quis potest ex puris naturalibus quodlibet peccatum vitare. Patet si deus absolveret ipsum a debito habendi donum supernaturale etc. Tertia est quod primo modo quis non potest de lege ordinata ex puris naturalibus quodlibet peccatum mortale vitare. Patet quia de lege ordinata talis teneatur esse in charitate vel gratia.” The first two “propositions,” which Lindbeck (p. 47) cites, should be read in conjunction with the third which draws the revealing comparison with the situation de lege ordinata. Only by the absolute power, and, therefore, “by the supernatural aid of God” could a man be absolved from the necessity of having the gift of infused grace and be able to avoid sin ex puris naturalibus. In an earlier argument d’Ailly makes a statement which helps to corroborate this interpretation — “Sequitur quod de potentia absoluta est possibile creaturam rationalem diligere deum meritorie sine habitu infuso charitatis vel gratiae. Patet … quia actus dilectionis est meritorius ex divinae voluntatis acceptatione. Modo ipsa potest talem actum acceptare ita bene si non fiat in gratia sive in puris naturalibus sicut si fiat in gratia” — ibid., K, f. ngv. (Italics mine). The whole issue is very complex but Lindbeck makes it more complex than it is by stating (p. 47, n. 18) that the discussion concerns uncorrupted nature before the Fall. This is true of the text of Gregory to which he refers but not of those drawn from d’Ailly or Ockham, for they concern neither man’s uncorrupted state nor his present state but simply what would be possible de potentia absoluta. See Vignaux, pp. 124 and 157. In d’Ailly’s discussion “the state of innocence” is mentioned only in an incidental reference.

38 Lindbeck, p. 44.

39 As also does the teaching of Ockham, his chosen master. Thus Leff, Gordon, Bradwardine and the Pelagians, Cambridge, 1957, p. 188Google Scholar, can correctly say that “by invoking God’s absolute power Ockham opens the way to his seemingly Pelagian views; for God can do anything, and, in discussing what is possible for man, Ockham is only discussing what is possible for God” — and (p. 197) “in this sense it would be more precise to say that it is not man so much as God who is free from grace: because His acts are not made conditional upon it, neither are His creatures.”