¹ Op. Mundi 19, 61. (Quotations from Philo in this paper are from Colson and Whitaker's translation of his works in the Loeb Classical Library.)

² Jos. 6, 29.

³ Fug. 20, 112.

⁴ Quis rer. div. her. 38, 188.

⁵ The analogy of man to the world as a microcosm to a macrocosm is implied in Philo's reference to the world as the “greatest and most perfect man” in Migr. Abr. 39, 220. Cf. Drummond, Philo Judaeus II, 65, and II, 3. On this analogy, see Plato, Tim. 30 D; 44 D; Aristotle, Phys. VIII, 2, 252b, 26–27.

⁶ Quis rer. div. her. 48, 230 and cf. 233.

⁷ Ibid., 236.

⁸ Migr. Abr. 31, 170.

⁹ Leg. All. I, 12, 31.

¹⁰ Ibid., 32.

¹¹ Quaest. in Gen. III, 10; cf. Quis rer. div. her. 54, 267.

¹² Leg. All. I, 32, 103.

¹³ Ibid., III, 22, 69.

¹⁴ Ibid., II, 4, 10.

¹⁵ Quaest. in Gen. III, 10.

¹⁶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ σοφόν, σοφία, δικαιοσύνη. See Leisegang. Indices ad Philonis Alexandrini Opera, s.v.

¹⁷ ἀγαθός, σοφός, δίκαιος. See ibid., s.v.

¹⁸ τὸ κακόν, ἡ κακἰα, ἀσέβεια, ἀμάρτημα. See ibid., s.v.

¹⁹ φαῦλος, κακός, ἀσεβἠς, ὑπαἰτιος. See ibid., s.v.

²⁰ Tim. 34 C. (quoted from various translations).

²¹ Ibid., 34 B.

²² Tim. 34 C.

²³ Ibid., 48 A.

²⁴ Ibid., 36 E.

²⁵ Ibid., 42 E ff.; 69 C.

²⁶ Ibid., 42 E–44 D.

²⁷ Ibid., 86 B–87 B.

²⁸ Legg. IX, 861 B.

²⁹ Ibid., V, 730 C; Rep. VI, 533 E.

³⁰ Polit. 293 A.

³¹ Rep. VII, 535 E. It is interesting to note that the Hebrew shegagah, which, according to rabbinic interpretation, means the commission of a sin through ignorance, is translated in the Septuagint by ἀκούσιον (Lev. 4, 2; Num. 35, 11 et passim).

³² Tim. 86 E. Cf. discussion in commentaries of R. D. Archer-Hind, A. E. Taylor and F. M. Cornford, ad loc.

³³ Fug. 14, 76.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 13, 65

³⁶ Spec. Leg. III, 21, 122.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., 121.

³⁹ Fug. 13, 66.

⁴⁰ This analysis of Philo's view as to the cause of involuntary sin is based upon passages in Spec. Leg. III, 21, 120–123, and Fug. 13, 65–14, 76. In both these places Philo discusses Ex. 21, 13, which in the Septuagint reads: “If he did not do it voluntarily, but God delivered into his hands, I will appoint thee a place whither he who hath killed shall flee.” Evidently following what in his time must have already been a Jewish tradition, which we shall quote at the end of this note, Philo takes this verse to refer to a case where A, who was a guilty person deserving of punishment (Spec. Leg. III, 21, 120–121), was killed unintentionally by B, who in the past had committed a few remediable sins (ibid., 122). His comment on this verse is as follows: “The writer feels that intentional acts are acts of our own will, and that unintentional acts are acts of God's will (θεοῦ): I mean not sins, but, on the contrary, all acts that are a punishment for sin” (Fug. 13, 65). What he means to say, I take it, is this: B's unintentional killing of A has a double aspect: (1) as a deserved punishment of A; (2) as a sin committed by B. With reference to the first of these two phases, Philo says that it is “of God's will,” because, as he says subsequently, God has chosen B as the minister of His judgment and the instrument of His vengeance upon A, in view of the fact that God does not inflict punishment directly (Fug. 13, 66; Spec. Leg. III, 21, 121–122). With reference to the second phase, he says that it is not “of God's will,” for while God has chosen B as the instrument of His vengeance upon A, He did not choose him directly for the purpose of committing an unintentional sin. Later in Fug. 14, 76, Philo says: “It is lawful, therefore, for one who feels that he has fallen into an unintentional offence, to say that the offence is according to God's will (κατὰ θεόν).” This does not mean that B is allowed to say that God has caused him to sin; it only means that he is allowed to say that he sinned because God had chosen him as an instrument of His judgment. This removes the seeming inconsistency which Colson (Philo, Vol. V, p. 45, n. c) finds in Fug. § 65 and § 76. Though this discussion of Philo deals primarily with the particular case of murder, his introductory statement in Fug. 13, 65, “The writer feels that intentional acts are acts of our own will, and that unintentional acts are God's acts,” as well as his succeeding discussion, quite clearly shows that he tries to draw from it a generalization with regard to all human actions.

The Jewish traditional interpretation of Lev. 21, 13, referred to above (quoted by Ritter, Philo und die Halacha: Eine vergleichende Studie, p. 30, n. 3, and referred to by Heinemann, Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung, pp. 400 f.), is reported in the name of Simeon b. Laḳish, a Palestinian Amora of the third century. It reads as follows: “What case does the verse deal with? It deals with the case of two persons who killed human beings, one of them unintentionally and the other intentionally, but neither of them committed his act in the presence of witnesses who could come and testify against him. The Holy One, blessed be He, therefore, causes them to meet at the same inn. The one who has killed intentionally seats himself under a ladder and the other who has killed unintentionally begins to climb that ladder and falls down upon the one who sits underneath it and kills him. The result is that he who has killed intentionally suffers punishment by death and he who has killed unintentionally suffers punishment by exile” (Makkot 10b).

Though the homily quoted is that of an Amora, it is based on an older Tannaitic homily in Mekilta on Ex. 21, 13 (ed. Weiss, p. 86a; ed Friedmann, p. 80a). The sentiment expressed in it is also found in another Tannaitic homily on Deut. 22, 8: “When thou buildest a new house, then thou shalt make a parapet for thy roof, that thou bring not blood upon thine house, if any man fall from thence.” Upon the last statement, which literally reads “if any one falling fall from thence,” the school of Ishmael comment as follows: “that man was destined to fall since the six days of creation, seeing that he has not yet fallen and yet Scripture describes him as ‘falling’; this in truth is in accordance with the principle that reward is brought about through the agency of a worthy person and punishment is brought about through the agency of a guilty person” (Sifre on Deut. 22, 8 (ed. Friedmann, § 229); Shabbat 32a). The same interpretation of the verse is also implied in pseudo-Jonathan Targum ad loc.

⁴¹ Eth. Nic. II, 6, 1106b, 36, where virtue is defined ἕξις προαιρετική, and III, 2, 1111b, 7, where προαίρεσις is said to be ἐκούσιον.

⁴² Somn. II, 26, 174.

⁴³ Quod det. pot. ins. 4, 11.

⁴⁴ Tim. 41 A–C.

⁴⁵ Gen. 8, 21–22; 9, 16–17. Cf. also Jer. 31, 34–35; 33, 20–21.

⁴⁶ Tim. 29 D–E; 41 A–B.

⁴⁷ Vit. Mos. I, 12, 65 ff.; Migr. Abr. 15, 83 ff.

⁴⁸ Vit. Mos. I, 17, 97; 23, 130–24, 139. So also in the Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin II, 1, 20a) one of the plagues from among this last-mentioned class, namely, the destruction of the first-born, is said to have been inflicted directly by God. A fourfold classification of the ten plagues found in Shibbole ha-Leḳet (ed. Buber, p. 194, referred to by J. D. Eisenstein in article “Plague” in The Jewish Encyclopedia, X, 70) by Zedekiah b. Abraham Anaw, who flourished at Rome during the 13th century, corresponds exactly to their fourfold classification by Philo. The author has evidently derived this classification independently from Scriptural verses, though the cultural conditions of the Jews at that time in Rome and their relation to Christian scholars (cf. M. Güdemann, Gesch. des Erziehungswesens und der Cultur der Juden in Italien, p. 191) do not exclude the possibility of his having somehow heard of Philo's classification.

⁴⁹ Ibid., I, 31, 174.

⁵⁰ Vit. Mos. II, 47, 261.

⁵¹ Ibid., I, 36, 202; II, 48, 267. Cf. Ex. 16, 4 ff.

⁵² Quaest. in Gen. IV, 51; Harris, Fragments of Philo Judaeus, p. 34. Cf. Gen. 19, 24.

⁵³ Ibid., I, 32. Cf. Gen. 3, 2.

⁵⁴ Ex. 15, 22–26.

⁵⁵ Vit. Mos. I, 33, 185.

⁵⁶ Ex. 17, 1–7; Num. 20, 1–13; Deut. 8, 15.

⁵⁷ Vit. Mos. I, 38, 210–211.

⁵⁸ An explanation of this miracle of bringing forth water out of the rock analogous to that given thereof by Philo occurs in the Mishnaic statement that “the mouth of the well,” i.e., the miracle here under consideration, is one of the ten things which were created at twilight on the sixth day of creation (M. Abot V, 6, and see Hebrew commentaries ad loc. and Rashi on Pesalḥim 54a). According to the Midrash, furthermore, not only this miracle and the other nine miracles which are mentioned in the Mishnah as having been created at twilight on the sixth day, but also all the other miracles recorded in Scripture, were created during the six days of creation by the decree of God in agreement with every natural object at the time He brought it into existence (Gen. Rabbah V, 5, and see Maimonides on M. Abot V, 6). The motive underlying this rational explanation of miracles in the Midrash was a desire to reconcile the possibility of miracles with God's expressed promise to observe the laws which He has established in the universe (cf. Ex. Rabbah XXI, 6, and cf. above n. 45). Miracles, according this Midrashic explanation, are thus not altogether contrary to nature, but still the events in question are not thereby deprived completely of their miraculous character. They are still to be considered as acts due to the direct intervention of God, first by His implanting them in nature as exceptions to their established order and then by His making them occur exactly at the time they were needed and by His announcing their occurrence beforehand.

On the basis of this Midrash, Judah ha-Levi offers the following explanation miracles: “The changes in the ordinary processes of nature were in accordance with nature, for they have been arranged for and determined upon by the eternal will ever since the six days of creation” (Cuzari III, 73 end). This, too, was not meant by ha-Levi to be a denial of the miraculous nature of the events that happened. In Maimonides this Midrashic view is restated as follows: “The rabbis consider these miracles as being to some extent also natural, for they say that when God created the universe and endowed it with these natural properties, He made it part of these properties that they should produce certain miracles at certain times. The sign of a prophet consists accordingly in the fact that God made known to him the time he should announce the event that is to take place and informed him that the event would take place in accordance with what has been implanted in nature from the beginning of its creation” (Moreh Nebukim II, 29; cf. Shemoneh Peraḳim, ch. 8; Commentary on M. Abot V, 6). I do not think therefore that Bréhier (Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie, 2nd ed., p. 182) is quite right in taking Philo's attempts at a rational explanation of some miracles as an indication of his disbelief in miracles.

Examples of miracles rationally explained by Philo are given also in Goodenough (By Light, Light, pp. 187–188), but the author quite properly draws no inference therefrom as to Philo's belief in miracles. Siegfried (Philo von Alexandria, p. 210) sees these attempts at a rational explanation of miracles evidence of the existence of some lingering doubt in the mind of Philo as to the logical reconcilability of miracles with his conception of God — which, as we have seen, is exactly the motive underlying the Midrashic attempt at a rational explanation of miracles.

⁵⁹ Somn. II, 32, 221–222; Leg. All. II, 21, 84.

⁶⁰ Gen. 2, 21. “Sides” instead of “ribs” in the Septuagint and Philo.

⁶¹ Leg. All. II, 7, 19.

⁶² As, e.g., Origen, who believed in the historicity of the miraculous events recorded in Scripture (cf. Cont. Cels. II, 48–53) and yet takes the stories of creation in a purely allegorical sense (Princ. IV, 1, 16), explicitly mentioning the story of the creation of Eve as being a mere allegory (Cont. Cels. IV, 38). Similarly Maimonides affirms his belief in the historicity of Scriptural narratives, including those of the miracles (Moreh Nebukim III, 50), and yet he declares that “the account given in the Pentateuch of creation is not, as generally believed by the common people, to be taken in its literal sense in all its parts” (ibid., II, 29). Here again Bréhier (op. cit., p. 184) takes Philo's statement with regard to the story of the creation of Eve as an indication of his rejection of the historicity of all the miraculous stories recorded in Scripture.

⁶³ According to Bréhier (loc. cit.), all of Philo's declarations as to his belief in the historicity of the Scriptural miracles which are to be found in his De Vita Mosis and the Quaestiones should be taken allegorically, whereas his allegorical interpretations of Scriptural miracles which are to be found in his Legum Allegoria should be taken literally.

⁶⁴ Vit. Mos. I, 38, 212.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., II, 48, 262.

⁶⁷ So Tertullian uses the act of creation as an argument for the possibility of the miracle of resurrection (cf. De resur. carn. c. XI). St. Augustine uses it as an argument for resurrection as well as for miracles in general (De civ. Dei XXI, 7). Similarly Maimonides uses creation as an argument for the possibility of miracles in general (Moreh Nebukim II, 25) and for the possibility of resurrection in particular (Ma'amar Teḥiyyat ha-Metim, c. 42, p. 30, ed. Joshua Finkel; Ḳobeẓ, II, p. 10vb).

⁶⁸ Op. Mundi 15, 46.

⁶⁹ Sum. Theol. I, 105, 6.

⁷⁰ Quod det. pot. ins. 32, 122.

⁷¹ Tim. 42 B–D.

⁷² Legg. IX, 860 B; cf. IV, 718 B.

⁷³ Tim. 41 E.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 42 D.

⁷⁵ Rep. X, 617 E.

⁷⁶ Ibid., II, 379 C.

⁷⁷ Tim. 42 E; cf. Legg. X, 900 E, 904 A.

⁷⁸ Theat. 176 A.

⁷⁹ Legg. XI, 934 A.

⁸⁰ Ibid., IX, 862 E; cf. XII, 958 A. Cf. R. D. Archer-Hind, the Timaeus of Plato, p. 325, ad 86 E.

⁸¹ Ibid., IX, 861 B.

⁸² Rep. VII, 535 E; Legg. V, 730 C.

⁸³ Cf. above, nn. 30–31.

⁸⁴ Quod Deus immut. 10, 47.

⁸⁵ Eth. Nic. III, 1, 1109b, 31.

⁸⁶ Ibid., II, 5, 1105b, 31–1106a, 2.

⁸⁷ Ibid, II, 6, 1106b, 36; cf. II, 5, 1106a, 3–4.

⁸⁸ Ibid., III, 1, 1109b, 33 ff.

⁸⁹ Quod Deus immut. 10, 47.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 48.

⁹¹ Quod Deus immut. 48.

⁹² Deut. 30, 15 and 19.

⁹³ Quod Deus immut. 10, 50.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 49.

⁹⁵ Gigant. 5, 20–21.

⁹⁶ Phaedr. 249 B–D; cf. Grote, Plato II, 219.

⁹⁷ Deut. 30, 15 and 19.

⁹⁸ The reference here is to the Scriptural statements “God is not as a man” (Num. 23, 19) and “as a man would chasten his son, so the Lord thy God will chasten thee” (Deut. 8, 5) discussed by Philo in Quod Deus immut. 11, 53 ff. and elsewhere.

⁹⁹ Harris, Fragments of Philo Judaeus, p. 8. Parts of the translation of this fragment are from Drummond's Philo Judaeus, I, 347, n.

¹⁰⁰ Drummond, loc. cit.

¹⁰¹ Quod Deus immut. 10, 49.

¹⁰² Cf. above, n. 40.

¹⁰³ Cf. above, nn. 89, 90.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. above, n. 35.

¹⁰⁵ Migr. Abr. 22, 124.

¹⁰⁶ Leg. All. III, 46, 133–137.

¹⁰⁷ Leg. All. III, 46, 134.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 135.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 136.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 137.

¹¹¹ Ibid., III, 34, 104.

¹¹² Ibid., 105. In § 104 Philo uses definitely good in the sense of virtue and evil in the sense of sin, whereas in § 105 good and evil are used by him respectively in the sense of reward and punishment. Here as elsewhere the two meanings of good and evil are used by Philo indiscriminately. Cf. above, n. 40.

¹¹³ Wisdom I, 1; 6, 12.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 6, 18.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 8, 21.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 7, 7. On the doctrine of grace in Hellenistic Judaism see also A. D. Nock, St. Paul, p. 75.

¹¹⁷ Cf. below, n. 146.

¹¹⁸ Prov. 3, 34.

¹¹⁹ Shabbat 104a and parallels.

¹²⁰ Sukkah 52b; Kiddushin 20b.

¹²¹ Leg. All. III, 46, 134.

¹²² Ibid., 135.

¹²³ Gen. 6, 8.

¹²⁴ Leg. All. III, 24, 77.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 25, 79–81.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 27, 83–84.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 28, 85–87.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 29, 88–89.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 28, 85.

¹³⁰ Vit. Mos. II, 29, 147.

¹³¹ (1) That they did sin: ‘Arakin 17a; Midrash Tehillim on Ps. 16, 2; Eccles. Rabbah on Eccles. 4, 3; Nedarim 32a and parallels. (2) That they did not sin: Mekilta on Ex. 16, 10 (ed. Weiss, p. 57b; ed. Friedmann, p. 48a; ed. Lauterbach, II, 106). Cf. S. Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology, 173; G. F. Moore, Judaism, I, 468; L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, V, 220, n. 66; 228, n. 110.

¹³² Yoma 86b and parallels. Cf. Ginzberg, op. cit., VI, 109, n. 616; 148, n. 889.

¹³³ Shabbat 55b; Sifre on Deut. 32, 50 (ed. Friedmann, § 339).

¹³⁴ Peṭirat Mosheh in Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrash, I, 118. Cf. Ginzberg, op. cit., III, 427; V, 186, n. 49.

¹³⁵ Baba Batra 17a.

¹³⁶ Gen. 2, 21.

¹³⁷ Leg. All. II, 9, 31–32.

¹³⁸ Cf. above, n. 40.

¹³⁹ Leg. All. II, 9, 33–34.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Schector, op. cit., 170–198; Moore, op. cit, I, 536–545.

¹⁴¹ Deut. 10, 15; cf. 4, 37; 7, 6–8.

¹⁴² Leg. All. III, 29, 88; cf. Op. Mundi 52, 149.

¹⁴³ Op. Mundi 52, 149.

¹⁴⁴ Bell. Jud. II, 14, 163. In Ant. XIII, 9, 172, the wording of the statement is different.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. note in Thackeray's translation ad loc., referring to Reinach; Moore, G. F., Fate and Free Will in Jewish Philosophies according to Josephus, Harvard Theological Review, 22 (1929), 379 ff.Google Scholar; I. N. Simḥoni, notes to his Hebrew translation of Bell. Jud., ad loc.; J. Klausner, Historiyyah Yisre'elit, II, 102.

Goodenough, in his By Light, Light, p. 79, takes ‘Fate’ in this passage of Josephus in its literal sense and makes Josephus attribute to the Pharisees the “doctrine of predestination,” concluding: “It is … in harmony with the Sadducees that Philo consistently, in its Stoic form, repudiates determinism, to make man a free moral agent.” This is not a happy presentation of the case. The point at issue between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, even on the basis of the statements by Josephus, was not on the question of free will; the point at issue between them was on the question of divine providence.

¹⁴⁶ It is not impossible that in his use of the term ‘assists (βοηθεῖν)’ there is a suggestion of the doctrine of divine grace as supplementary to free will, which we have discussed above n. 117. Moore (op. cit., p. 384) hesitatingly suggests a possible origin of this term in the distinction found in Chrysippus between principal and adjuvant causes. The term gratia adjuvans occurs later in Christian theology (see Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, Register, s. v., and cf. below nn. 157–161).

¹⁴⁷ Berakot 33b and parallels.

¹⁴⁸ M. Abot III, 15. See notes in C. Taylor, Sayings of the Jewish Fathers, ad III, 24.

¹⁴⁹ De Civ. Dei. XXI, 8. Translation by Dods.

¹⁵⁰ Jos. 10, 13; Is. 38, 8.

¹⁵¹ Sum. Theol. I, 105, 6, obj. 3: Ordinem naturae Deus instituit.

¹⁵² Ibid., c.; cf. Cont. Gent. III, 99.

¹⁵³ Sum. Theol. I, 105, 7, c.; cf. Cont. Gent. III, 101.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Maimonides, Maʼamar Teḥiyyat ha-Metim c. 49, p. 84, ed. Joshua Finkel; Ḳobeẓ II, 11rb, where miracles are divided into those which are (1) “impossible by nature” and those which are (2) “possible by nature,” corresponding to St. Thomas' (1) contra naturam and (2) praeter naturam (De Potentia VI, 2, ad 3; II Sent., XVIII, 1, 3c).

¹⁵⁵ Cf. above, n. 58.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. F. Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengesehichte, 4th ed., pp. 360–1, 378.

¹⁵⁷ Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos, 13 (PL 35, 2065): cum se quisque cognoverit per seipsum surgere non valere, imploret Liberatoris auxilium. Venit ergo gratia quae donet peccata praeterita, et conantem adjuvet, et tribuat charitatem justitiae.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. (2066): Gratia vero efficit ut non tantum velimus recte facere, sed etiam possimus; non viribus nostris, sed Liberatoris auxilio.

¹⁵⁹ De diversis Quaestionibus octoginta, 68, 5 (PL 40, 73): Parum est enim velle, nisi Deus misereatur: sed Deus non miseretur, qui ad pacem vocat, nisi voluntas praecesserit; quia in terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis. Cf. Luke 2, 14.

¹⁶⁰ Luke 7, 47.

¹⁶¹ Dialogus adversus Pelagianos (PL 23, 542 B): Ex qua intelligimus non nostrae solum ease potestatis facere quod velimus, sed et Dei clementiae, si nostram adjuvet voluntatem.

¹⁶² Joannis Cassiani Collationes XII (PL 49, 929A): Et idcirco manet in homine semper liberum arbitrium, quod gratiam Dei possit vel negligere vel amare.

¹⁶³ Ibid., XIII (932A): Et ita semper gratia Dei nostro in bonam partem cooperatur arbitrio, atque in omnibus illud adjuvat, protegit et defendit. Cf. Augustine, St., Liber contra collatorem III, 8 (PL 45, 1805)Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁴ Not only Pelagius but also Athanasius took the positive view on this question. Cf. Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, §§ 108, n. 3; 110, n. 2.

¹⁶⁵ Sell, E., The Faith of Islam, 3d ed., 1907, p. 244Google Scholar; Klein, F. A., The Religion of Islam, 1906, p. 73Google Scholar; Ali, M. Muḥammad, The Religion of Islam, 1936, p. 233Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁶ Rom. 11, 26–29.

¹⁶⁷ De Fide Orthodoxa II, 30 (PG 94, 969 Bf): πάντα μὲν προγινὠσκει ὁ θεὸς, οὐ πάντα δὲ προορίζει.

¹⁶⁸ Judah ha-Levi, Cuzari V, 20; cf. Saadia, Emunot we-Deʻot IV, 4.