¹ For a recent overview, see Fishbane, Michael A., Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985).Google Scholar

² Noth, Martin, Leviticus (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965) 138. We shall not be concerned, in the present context, with various modern attempts to reconstruct the prehistory of this passage on the basis of, inter alia, its use of both singular and plural verb forms, the alternation of positive and negative injunctions, or vs 17 in its relation to vs 34. These data are hardly unequivocal, and the hypotheses based upon them correspondingly speculative; see Noth, Leviticus, 139. Moreover, this “prehistory” is quite irrelevant here.Google Scholar

³ Note the discussion of this question, with references to secondary literature, in Berger, K., Die Gesetzesauslegung Jesu (WMANT 40; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1972) 81–97.Google Scholar

⁴ Porter, J. R., Leviticus (Cambridge Commentary on the New English Bible; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976) 155.Google Scholar

⁵ See, in addition to the texts discussed below, Prov 3:12; 27:5–6; 28:23; Sir 20:2.

⁶ This point is elaborated in my The Idea of Biblical Poetry: Parallelism and Its History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) 7–12.Google Scholar

⁷ Heb. kĕsîl. Note that this term is one of moral opprobrium, used throughout Proverbs and Ecclesiastes in apposition to or association with various terms for “wicked.”

⁸ Reading conjecturally wĕsôd Iĕʾaḥēr ʾal tĕgāl (MT: wĕsôd ʾaḥēr ʾal tĕgāl). This makes better sense, and I prefer it in spite of the fact that the MT as is supports more specifically the connection between open reproach and the avoidance of slander, the theme we have been tracing. Note that T. Gad 6.5 (discussed below) presumes something like the text of Prov 25:9 as we have emended it, for its restatement reads, “In a dispute do not let another hear your secret.”

⁹ Above, n. 5. Cf. my discussion of Prov 27:6 in Idea of Biblical Poetry, where the “woundings of a friend” are to be identified as none other than “open reproach.”

¹⁰ See Weinfeld, M., Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). Connections such as ours suggest that Weinfeld's characterization of the opposed intellectual worlds of the (“theocentric”) priest and (“anthropocentric”) scribe (see esp. 179–89) may be an oversimplification.Google Scholar

¹¹ The following reconstruction is in keeping with other modem attempts, notably that of Segal, M. H., The Complete Book of Ben Sira (in Hebrew; 2d ed.; Jerusalem: Bialik, 1972) 115–16; cf. the version of R. H. Charles in APOT 2. 383.Google Scholar

¹² Syr. dlʾ yʿbd dbyš (“lest he do any wrong”), Gk. mēpote ouk epoiēsen (“perhaps he did not do”). It seems reasonable to assume a common antecedent like that conjectured by Segal, ʾašer lōʿ yaʿǎśeh (“that he not do,” “lest he do”). Such pithiness is quite characteristic of Ben Sira's Hebrew, but its ambiguity may have pushed the (frequently loose and periphrastic) Syriac to add the word byš (“evil,” “wrong”). The Greek tradition, meanwhile, may (as Segal suggests) have read ʾašer lōʾ ʿā śāh, or the confusion may have entered in transmission of the Greek text itself.

¹³ The underlying Hebrew verb is probably zʿm (Segal: zʿp); the Gk. apeilein implies this, or possibly gʿr, but the latter would hardly be used without a following bā not represented in the Greek. Syr. ṭlm (“oppress, wrong”) appears interpretive, translating in the light of vss 15 and 16.

¹⁴ See above, n. 3.

¹⁵ The Greek tradition, “Reproach [i.e., “question”] a friend, perhaps he did not do,” represents, I believe, a faulty transmission of the original (see above, n. 12); it nevertheless highlights another preventive function of “reproach,” namely, allowing the reproacher to ascertain what really happened and, in some cases, to prevent him from being angry on false premises. Attractive as this reading is, it makes for redundancy in vss 15 and 16, so on those grounds as well the Syr. is to be preferred. Ultimately, the original Hebrew and possibly the Greek were based on a homiletical explanation of the Hebrew use of the infinite absolute in Lev 19:17, hôkēaḥ tôkîaḥ, on which see below, n. 34.

¹⁶ Seen. 13.

¹⁷ The case for the pre-Maccabean origin of the original Testaments was made by Bickerman, E. J., “The Date of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” JBL 69 (1950) 245–60Google Scholar, and his arguments have persuaded some later writers. What seems clear is that there is evidence of a gradual process of transmission and augmentation: see esp. Becker, J., Untersuchungen zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Testamente der zwölf Patriarchen (Leiden: Brill, 1970)Google Scholar and idem, Die Testamente der zw۶lf Patriarchen (2d ed.; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1980)Google Scholar; and Hultgård, Anders, L'eschatologie des testaments des douze patriarches (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1977) 114–36Google Scholar. There is no reason to suppose that the passages discussed below from T. Gad are not early, and, for reasons to be seen, the view of T. Gad 4.1–3 seems a preliminary step to the Qumran understanding of “reproach.”

¹⁸ See esp. Hollander, Harm W., Joseph as an Ethical Model in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs (SVTP 6; Leiden: Brill, 1981).Google Scholar

¹⁹ The nature of this “sin” requires some clarification. It appears that the offender, having been pressed by the reproacher, might be tempted to swear a false or unnecessary oath as to his innocence. There is ample evidence to suggest that both were considered sinful by Jews in late antiquity. See thus: on reserve with regard to invoking the Divine Name in general, the LXX and Tg. Onq. versions of Lev 24:16, and cf. Philo V. Mos. 2.206 and 1QS 6.27–7.2; and on the use of divine names in oaths, Philo De dec. 84–86 and De spec. leg. 2.2–5; CD 15.1–5; cf. Matt 5:33–37. It is just possible that the “swearing” involved is actually a cursing of the reproacher with a divine name (cf. H. C. Kee's translation of T. Gad, which has “otherwise he may start cursing,” in OTP 1. 816). Cursing with the divine name is amply condemned in Jewish sources (see thus m. Šebu. 4.13, and cf. b. Sanh. 66a ad Lev 19:14 and b. Šebu. 36a; b. Tem. 3a, b. Mak. 16a; y. Šebu. 3.10); but in this case our text's use of the verb omnyō is problematic.

²⁰ A similar understanding may lie behind Tg. Onq., which renders ʿālāyw not as “because of him” but “because of his own (sin)” (ʿl dylyh). This deviation requires some explanation, and the simplest may be that Tg. Onq. wished thereby to reject other possible explanations and imply more specifically that the phrase refers to a transfer of responsibility for the infraction from the transgressor to the one who failed to carry out the commandment to reproach properly. Such is Naḥmanides’ explanation of Tg. Onq.: “‘And you shall bear no sin because of him’—for you will be guilty if he sins and you have not reproached him. And the wording of Onqelos implies this [understanding] when it renders wlʾ tqbyl ʿ1 dylyh ḥwbʾ, that you yourself should not receive punishment for his sin” (Chavel, H., ed., Nahmanides' Commentary on the Torah [in Hebrew; Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1960] 2. 119).Google Scholar

²¹ This is apparently even true of Sifra, discussed below; cf. Maimonides, , Book of the Commandments (ed. J. Qafiḥ; Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1971) 162Google Scholar, 222, and Naḥmanides, Commentary.

²² See most recently the discussion by Schiffman, Lawrence H., Sectarian Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Courts, Testimony, and the Penal Code (BJS 33; Chico: Scholars Press, 1983) 89–109.Google Scholar

²³ Text reads: ʾlyhwhw, apparently by dittography of final hw.

²⁴ For this restoration see Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 106 n. 61.

²⁵ Schiffman (Ibid., 107 n. 64) proposes reading bʿwrlt lbbw, citing with approval Brownlee's rejection of S. lwry's suggestion of bktly lbbw (“in the walls of his heart”) on the grounds that “the context requires an adversative reference to the heart.” On the contrary, the whole point is that this clause is an elaboration of Lev 19:17, “You shall not hate your brother in your heart,” and a tying together of that stricture with the Law of Reproach. An “adversative reference” would not only obscure that relation but would as well eliminate the true sense of “hatred in the heart” that is plainly being invoked here. This said, I have left the space blank since any emendation appears highly conjectural and, for the reasons just stated, “in … his heart” conveys the essential meaning. Cf. Leany, A. R. C., The Rule of Qumran and Its Meaning (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966) 176.Google Scholar

²⁶ ʾašer lōʾ běhôkēaḥ. On this form see Rabin, Ch., Qumran Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957) 32, and Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 90.Google Scholar

²⁷ The point of this paraphrase of Nah 1:2 is not (as so many translators and commentators have urged) that vengeance and grudge-bearing are a strictly divine prerogative and are not to be undertaken by humans, but that vengeance and grudge-bearing are appropriate only with actual enemies and foes and not with one's own fellows or countrymen—hence the wording of the Scriptural commandment “You shall not take vengeance nor bear any grudge against the sons of your people” (Lev 19:18) and Nahum's words, “The Lord takes vengeance on his enemies and holds a grudge against his foes” (Nah 1:2). This citation in CD was correctly explained shortly after its first publication by Lagrange, R. P., “La secte juive de la Nouvelle Alliance au pays de Damas,” RB 9 (1912) 229Google Scholar and APOT, 2. 823; cf. Gen. Rab. 55:3, b. ʾAbod. Zar. 4a. It has since been obscured; see, e.g., Rabin, Ch., The Zadokite Documents (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958) 44Google Scholar; Dupont-Sommer, A., Les Écrits de la MerMorte (Paris: Payot, 1960) 163Google Scholar; Fitzmyer, J. A., “The Use of Explicit Old Testament Quotations in Qumran Literature and in the New Testament,” NTS 7 (1961) 307; Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 89–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ Heb. bdbr mwt, and cf. CD 9.17. The sense may be that even in the case of a capital charge, the transgressor's guilt is to be transferred to the one who failed to reproach him, but this could have been stated more explicitly. Alternatively, the sense may be that the transferral takes place specifically in the case described, when someone fails to reproach his fellow for a capital offense, and stores it up “from day to day,” only to accuse him publicly later on. See below.

²⁹ Heb. ʿnh, emended to ʿwnw by Schechter and subsequently.

³⁰ Note that CD has rʿyk here for MT ʿmytk.

³¹ See Schiffman's discussion of the significance of this phrase, Sectarian Law, 90–91. It is possible as he suggests) that CD's use of the phrase here reflects a conscious analogy with Num 30:15, but this conclusion is hardly unavoidable, and in any case it is not so that “Num. 30:15 was applied to the exegesis of the quoted proof-text, Lev. 19:17” (91) since the phrase does not appear in Lev 19:17.

³² Cf. Luke 17:3; Gal 6:1; 2 Thess 3:14–15; Titus 3:10.

³³ GKC § 113 n.

³⁴ That this was a concern of early exegetes may be attested, inter alia, in the attempt of the LXX translators to imitate the construction in Greek by juxtaposing a finite verb with its participle or (as here) with the dative of a cognate noun. (On this see Lee, J. A. L., A Lexical Study of the Septuagint Version of the Pentateuch [SBLSCS 14; Chico: Scholars Press, 1983] 17). Obviously the LXX translators believed this feature of the Hebrew text to be important enough to merit this (at times awkward) form of imitation in Greek, and this may bear witness to attempts, as early as the third century, to attribute some additional significance to the Hebrew use of the infinitive absolute. The passage from Ben Sira cited above might be another indication of such a reading. For it urges that one reproach one's friend “lest he do, and if he has done, lest he continue,” and then urges a similar twofold reproaching with regard to speech. Why this peculiar before-and-after scenario? Indeed, how is one to know that one's friend is going to commit an offense in words or deed before he does it?! (This difficulty, incidentally, may have contributed to what was see above, n. 12, as the Greek's deviation from the hypothetical Hebrew original.) But the twofold act of reproaching makes perfect sense if one understands that Ben Sira is trying to explain the “doubled” verbal form hôkēaʿ tôkîaʿ—the first verb refers to reproaching that takes place before the offense is done, the second after the fact.Google Scholar

³⁵ “Four or five times “is apparently not intended as expressing a limitation, but is to be taken as the equivalent of “repeatedly.” Cf. b. B. Meṣ. 31a: “One of the Rabbis said to Raba: hokeaḥ tokiaḥ—perhaps hôkēaḥ means ‘one time’ and tôkîaḥ ‘twice.’ He said: ‘hôkēaḥ means even a hundred times.’”

³⁶ See m. Abot 3.11.

³⁷ Both of course would be expressed by Heb. ʿālāyw.

³⁸ Beyond this, it is to be noted that Ps-Jonathan specifically takes hating one's brother “in the heart” as hypocrisy, speaking “smooth words” (ŝěʿîʿayāʾ), again in keeping with the examples from Proverbs cited earlier.

³⁹ Note the discussion in Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 97–98.

⁴⁰ That Sifra's reproacher is not the injured party seems apparent not only because the text does not say that he is (though this is significant) and because Sifra makes no explicit or implicit connection between the Law of Reproach and the prior interdiction of hatred in the heart, but because the reproacher in Sifra is told to reproach his neighbor ‘‘four or five times” if necessary. Presumably, if the complaint were of a personal nature—a property dispute, for example—the injunction to repeated reproach would make little sense: if the matter could not be settled out of court, it would have to be settled in court. But if, on the other hand, his reproach were for some offense for which court action was either impossible or undesirable—and if, in particular, his “reproach” had the character of a moral exhortation, or a remonstrance for less than exemplary practice in a certain matter—then the requirement to reproach one's fellow repeatedly acquires more plausibility. Pertinent in this light is the continuation of Sifra ‘s treatment of our verse: “Said R. Tarfon: By the Temple Service [an oath], if there be anyone in this generation capable of reproaching! Said R. Elʿazar b. ʿAzariah: By the Temple Service, if there be any in this generation capable of accepting reproach! Said R. ʿAqiba: By the Temple Service, if there be any in this generation who knows how to go about reproaching.” R. Tarfon's remark cannot mean that there is no one who knows how to reproach, otherwise R. ʿAqiba's remark would make no sense. Apparently it means that there is no one fit to reproach, no one of high enough moral standing to undertake the task. This too would imply that the “reproach” in question is not that of an offended party to the offender, but an attempt by one person to prevent another from sinning. In a similar vein, b. B. Meṣ. 31a understands the “doubled” verb “reproach” in our verse as implying that reproach can go not only from “master to disciple” but “disciple to master”—here again, the clear sense is that the reproach is an attempt at moral correction rather than personal redress.

⁴¹ b. ʿArak. 16b.

⁴² Sifra ad loc. Notice that the first explanation offered by Sifra (Ibid.) of rākīl (“tale-bearer”), namely, that one ought not to be “soft (rak) of speech to one and hard to the other” surely also is aimed not at the ordinary citizen (for who then would the “one” and the “other” be?) but the judge in his treatment of the two litigants.

⁴³ De spec. leg. (LCL) 120–21 and note b.