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The Motive of Individualism in Religion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 November 2011

Warner Fite
Affiliation:
Bloomington, Indiana

Extract

These passages, which I have printed elsewhere, I venture to reproduce on the ground that they state, if somewhat baldly, not indeed all that is important for an individualistic philosophy, but what is most distinctive and necessary. And thus they enable us to see the full dimensions of the question which I shall endeavor to answer, namely, whether the spirit of a free man is compatible with that reverence for the universe and desire for unity with the universe, conceived always as a personal universe—or, more concretely, with that worship and love of God—which I shall assume to be implied in any genuine religion. I need hardly say that the usual answer to the question would be negative. Those who stand firmly enough for the right of self-assertion in the presence of our fellows would be likely either to deny the authority of religion or at any rate to hold that self-assertion has properly no place there. And traditional Christianity, while teaching the doctrine of a personal relation to a personal God and, in the doctrine of personal immortality, affirming, almost distinctively, the worth of the individual soul, treats this worth, hardly as a right, but as a gift, and holds that though a man may stand upright in the presence of his fellows, in the presence of God his attitude must be one of self-abnegation and self-effacement—of submission. On the other hand, in Mr. Bertrand Russell's essay, A Free Man's Worship, in which I should say that the motif of the “free man” is rendered for the most part admirably, it seems to be implied that a free man's religion is necessarily a religion of self-sufficiency. This states my question: Does the individualistic motive imply a spiritual self-sufficiency?

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1914

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References

1 Individualism, New York, 1911, pp. 90 and 27.

2 Philosophical Essays, London, 1910.

3 Scientific psychology to the contrary. In speaking, however, of “impersonal mental states,” I should say that we are thinking, not of any fact of consciousness, but of some one of the several objects used by psychologists to “represent” consciousness, such as an image (in a mirror), a photograph, a book, or a piece of writing—something which can convey an idea or represent an object to a thinking person, but which itself knows nothing.