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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2011
The new morality like every other new thing in this fast-moving time seems to have declined in notoriety and disciples with age. But there are still good reasons for recognizing and exploring a new morality in contemporary Christian ethics. These reasons will only become clear later, but they can be set down now by way of introducing the analysis that follows.
2 DonaldEvans characterizes “situation ethics” as seen in Fletcher somewhat differently: “First, he accepts only those moral rules which are viewed as maxims concerning what actions usually produce the best consequences, and he regards these maxims as merely guidelines concerning what action is likely to produce the best consequences in the particular situation. Second, he rejects all allegedly exceptionless moral rules.” Evans, Love, Situations, and Rules, Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, edited by Outka, Gene H. and Ramsey, Paul (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 380.Google Scholar
3 Gustafson, James M., Context Versus Principles: A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics, Harvard Theological Review 58 (1965), 171–202CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This article is very helpful in demonstrating the untenability of this debate, but I do not find his explanation of why the debate occurred entirely adequate. He attributes the debate to differences of priority and emphasis on one of four different “base points for Christian moral discourse” that most Christian ethics include. Certainly, most systematic statements of theological ethics do include social analysis, theological affirmations, moral principles, and descriptions of moral conduct. But differences between ethical traditions are more than a consequence of which of these base points is chosen as the beginning point of ethical analysis.
4 Gustafson draws attention to the ways representative spokesmen of the new morality weigh and relate these three “contexts.” Ibid., 175–86.
5 See especially Lehmann, Paul, The Foundation and Pattern of Moral Behavior, Christian Faith and Social Action, edited by Hutchinson, John A. (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), 93–116Google Scholar; Ethics in a Christian Context (Harper & Row, 1963)Google Scholar; and Fletcher, Joseph, Situation Ethics (Westminster Press, 1966)Google Scholar; Moral Responsibility (Westminster Press, 1967)Google Scholar; Situation Ethics under Fire, Storm Over Ethics, Bennett, John C., et al. (United Church Press, 1967), 149–73Google Scholar; Reflection and Reply, Situation Ethics Debate, edited by Cox, Harvey (Westminster Press, 1968), 249–64Google Scholar; What Is a Rule?: A Situationist's View, Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, 325–49. Hereafter Lehmann's Ethics in a Christian Context will be cited as ECC and Fletcher's Situation Ethics as SE.
6 Lehmann shares the “intuitive” approach with men like KarlBarth, DietrichBonhoeffer, and John A. T. Robinson. Fletcher's “reflective” approach has much in common with H. RichardNiebuhr, James M. Gustafson, and JosephSitter.
7 Toulmin, Stephen, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge University Press, 1964)Google Scholar. After preparing the final version of this paper, I discovered that Toulmin's approach had been put to a similar use in analyzing the logic of theological argument by Heimback, Raeburne S. in his Theology and Meaning, A Critique of Metatheological Scepticism (Stanford University Press, 1969), 204–48Google Scholar.
8 Toulmin, ibid., 146–259.
9 Ibid., 94–145.
10 Ibid., 176.
11 Ibid., 120–22.
12 Toulmin cites approvingly GilbertRyle's claim that warrant-establishing arguments should not be called “inferences” since such arguments cannot be governed by any “rules of inference.” Toulmin is willing, however, to call warrantestablishing arguments inductive arguments. He draws attention to the idiomatic use of the words “deduction” and “induction” by way of explanation. The family of words, “deduce,” “deductive,” and “deduction” are used appropriately in any field where arguments apply established warrants to fresh data to derive new conclusions. Correspondingly, such term as “induce,” “inductive,” and “induction” properly refer to the process of establishing novel warrants of “deduction.” Ibid., 120–22. Thus, Toulmin rejects the widespread practice of labeling analytic and necessary arguments “deductive,” while applying “inductive” to substantive and probable arguments. Rather, these terms correspond to warrant-using and warrantestablishing arguments respectively. Ibid., 136–41.
13 Toulmin deals at some length with the discovery and modification of scientific laws, viewed as inference warrants in scientific arguments, in The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction (Harper Torchbooks, 1960Google Scholar) and Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry into the Aims of Science (Harper Torchbooks, 1963).Google Scholar
14 Toulmin, Stephen, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1953).Google Scholar
15 Ibid., 146–48.
16 Ibid., 148–65.
17 Ibid., 150–52.
18 Ibid., 140–43.
19 ibid., 152–63.
20 Ibid., 157–59. 195–201.
21 Ibid., 157, 201.
22 Although Toulmin does not make any comparisons, there are possible parallels of function between the “ideals of order” in morality and in science. As we have seen, Toulmin draws attention to the “self-evident” character of the way of life in moral arguments. A way of life is the inevitable “precondition” and “presupposition” of all concrete moral judgments and general moral principles. But such “preconceptions” are neither universal nor necessary, since they can and do change under the pressures of personal experience and rhetorical argument. See An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, 152–63, 195–201.
In a similar vein, Toulmin analyzes the crucial role of “ideals of order” in the development and application of scientific theory. “Ideals of order” are the standards of rationality and intelligibility that lie at the heart of scientific argument. These standards are the “self-explanatory” paradigms through which all phenomena are viewed and understood. Toulmin also draws attention to the peculiar logical status of these explanatory ideals. They are both “preconceived” and “empirical.” Scientists always work with certain concepts of the ultimate nature of matter, motion, change, and the like. These conceptions are the basis rather than the result of observation and experiment. In this sense, they are “preconceived” notions, since they initially frame the questions scientists put to nature and they finally ground the explanations scientists give to nature. But these “preconceptions” change and develop through time in the light of discovery and experience. In this sense, they are “empirical” notions. They are tentatively held and subject to revision in response to new problems and new insights encountered through experimentation and observation. See Foresight and Understanding, 44–115.
These parallels in function raise questions about possible parallels of status between the explanatory ideals of science and ethics. In what sense is a way of life “empirical”? How is a way of life established and modified? Compare Foresight and Understanding, 99–101, and An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, 157–59.
23 Fletcher, SE, 15
24 Ibid., 28–33; Moral Responsibility, 33; Situation Ethics under Fire, 165; Reflection and Reply, 252; What Is a Rule?, 333–38.
25 Fletcher, SE, 27, 30–31, 57–86.
26 “The ruling norm of Christian ethics is love: nothing else.” Ibid., 69.
27 See especially his discussions of concrete problems for moral decisions, where he explores the consequences of alternative moral decisions. Fletcher, Moral Responsibility, 81–216.
28 Fletcher, SE, 43–46.
29 Fletcher often speaks of love as the basis of rebuttal in moral argument. But love overrides moral rules only when the likely consequences of following such rules violate the utilitarian distribution of love. “[Situation ethics] has an absolute norm and a calculating method.” Ibid., 27. As we shall discuss below, this distinction between love as backing and love as rebuttal helps clarify Fletcher's claim that love and justice are the same. Cf. ibid., 86–102.
30 Since Lehmann is often interpreted as claiming immediate and inerrant intuitions, this reading of Lehmann will be fully discussed in Part III of this essay.
31 Lehmann, The Foundation and Pattern of Moral Behavior, 100; ECC, 14–17; 74–101; 141.
32 Lehmann, ECC, 73, 141, 346, 359.
33 Ibid., 344–66.
34 Ibid., 14, 45–73, 100–01; 130–31, 344–52.
35 Ibid., 74–86.
36 Ibid., 86–123.
37 Ibid., 245–49, 144.
38 Ibid., 141–45, 161.
39 Fletcher, What Is a Rule?, 337–38. Compare to similar comments in Reflection and Reply, 259–60
40 Fletcher, What Is a Rule?, 338.
41 Fletcher, SE, 60; What Is a Rule?, 337–38.
42 Fletcher, SE, 148; What Is a Rule?, 338; Situation Ethics under Fire, 158–59.
43 For a similar division, see Outka, Gene H., Character, Conduct, and the Love Commandment, in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, 38–48.Google Scholar
44 Fletcher variously refers to this kind of principle as ruling norm, final norm, ultimate principle, boss principle, constitutive principle, and formal principle.
45 Perhaps these two different ways of expressing his ultimate principle is what Fletcher has in mind in his distinction between a “formal” principle and a “substantive” principle.
46 Fletcher refers to this kind of principle as a procedural principle or a strategic principle.
47 Fletcher typically speaks of these principles as maxims, rules, normative principles, rules of thumb, statistically preponderant generalizations, general rules, and illuminators.
48 Fletcher, What Is a Rule?, 325.
49 See such critical expositions of Fletcher's thought as Ramsey, Paul, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), 145–225Google Scholar; Outka, Gene H., The New Morality: Recent Discussion within Protestantism, The Future of Ethics and Moral Theology, edited by Brezine, Don and McGlynn, James V. (Argus Communications Cr., 1968), 44–47Google Scholar; DonaldEvans, Love, Situations, and Rules, 367–414.
50 All such principles may not be amenable to full formulation. Some principles, either implicit or explicit, governing personal behavior or unique situations may be far too complex and idiosyncratic for formulation. Such principles are often expressed in the form of moral parables or fables. In this connection, see the important essays of Hepburn, R. W., Murdoch, Iris, Oppenheimer, Helen, and Strawson, P. F. in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Ramsey, Ian T. (The Macmillan Company, 1966).Google Scholar
51 Fletcher explicitly rejects the view that moral experiences are so radically discontinuous that they cannot provide any meaningful carryover from one situation to the next. See his criticisms of “antinomianism” or “extemporism” as well as his discussions of the role of moral principles in ethics, e.g., SE, 22–25, 31–37; Moral Responsibility, 30–32, 73–77; Situation Ethics under Fire, 155–57; Reflection and Reply, 249–51; What Is a Rule?, 327–38.
52 See Fletcher, SE inter alia, and Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, 145–225
53 One of the major weaknesses of Fletcher's metaethical analysis is that he relies more on illustration than on explanation to set out his position. He would doubtlessly defend this style of analysis as his way of drawing nonprofessional and nontheological people into the debate about “how to do ethics.” But especially these people need explanation of illustration in order to interpret the illustrations rightly. Cf. Fletcher, What Is a Rule?, 330.
54 See Part Two of Moral Responsibility, 81–214. Compare to an earlier book which predates and anticipates Fletcher's situational methodology, Morals and Medicine (Princeton University Press, 1954).
55 For a glossary of Fletcher's different uses of “love,” see Lachs, John, Dogmatist in Disguise, Situation Ethics Debate, 239–40.Google Scholar
56 Fletcher, SE, 103–19
57 Ibid., 57–68.
58 Ibid., 88–99.
59 Ibid., 69–86.
60 Frankena, William, Love and Principle in Christian Ethics, Faith and Philosophy, edited by Plantinga, Avin (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964), 203–25Google Scholar. For a preliminary characterization of “act agapism” and “rule agapism,” see Frankena, , Ethics (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), 42–45.Google Scholar
61 Ramsey, , Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, 148ff.Google Scholar
62 Fletcher, Situation Ethics under Fire, 157–58; What Is a Rule?, 331–32.
63 Outka, The New Morality: Recent Discussions within Protestantism, 48–53.
64 Frankena, Love and Principle in Christian Ethics, 212.
65 Ibid., 214.
66 Ibid.
67 Outka observes that some comments from Fletcher's later writings can be read as a “combination type” but he does not believe that Fletcher has actually moved to the “right” of Frankena's spectrum. Op. cit., 69–71. If my classification of Fletcher is sound, the battlelines between Fletcher and his critics should be redrawn, since his most vocal critics recognize Frankena's “combination type” as a most fruitful possibility. See Ramsey, op. cit., 107; Outka, op. cit., 52–53; Evans, op. cit.
68 Fletcher, SE, 87–100; Moral Responsibility, 42–57; Reflection and Reply, 262.
69 See various criticisms of contributors to The Situation Ethics Debate, 58, 63, 67, 81, 85, 89.
70 On one occasion, Fletcher suggests that Christian Ethics might well dispense with the word “love” entirely, using only the word “justice.” Moral Responsibility, 57. Needless to say, Fletcher did not follow his own recommendation.
71 Fletcher, SE, 87–119; Moral Responsibility, 45–54.
72 Fletcher, SE, 95–99.
73 Fletcher virtually equates justice with conscience when he speaks of justice as “love making up its mind.” For him, conscience is a rational procedure rather than a moral faculty whose procedural principle is the just distribution of love.SE, 52–55; What Is a Rule?, 338–42.
74 Fletcher, SE, 89–92; Moral Responsibility, 53–55. Fletcher acknowledges that he should speak more clearly of a “network of situations” and that he should develop more explicitly the methodological procedures for a social ethics than he did in Situation Ethics. But he denies the frequent charge against him that he is interested only in the particular and personal situation. Reflection and Reply, 261–62.
75 Fletcher, SE, 95.
76 Ibid., 156.
77 Ibid., 31, 56; Reflection and Reply, 252.
78 Fletcher, What Is a Rule?, 332.
79 Ibid., 325; SE, 154–57, 51–52.
80 Fletcher, SE, 93, 105; What Is a Rule?, 325; Moral Responsibility, 34.
81 Fletcher, Reflection and Reply, 254–55. Italics mine. Also see SE, 80, 108, 157; Situation Ethics under Fire, 166. Cf. SE, 14–15.
82 Fletcher, SE, 51–52, 154–55, 107.
83 Fletcher draws attention to this feature of his approach to Christian ethics; ibid., 95ff., 14–15.
84 Ibid., 95–96.
85 Fletcher, What Is a Rule?, 332.
86 The question of the relation between agapism and utilitarianism can be dealt with theologically through such notions as common grace and the imago dei. The question can also be approached from a purely historical perspective in terms of the formative influences of Christian ethics on utilitarian ethics.
87 Lehmann, ECC, 85.
88 Ibid., 77.
89 See the essays by Hepburn, Murdoch, Oppenheimer, and Strawson in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy.
90 Gustafson suggests such a reading is consistent with Lehmann's fundamental procedures. See his review of Ethics in a Christian Context, Union Seminary Quarterly Review XIX (1964), 261–65Google Scholar; Christ and the Moral Life (Harper & Row, 1968), 257–58.Google Scholar
91 Lehmann, , ECC, 77–79, 146–47Google Scholar. Lehmann promises a fuller treatment of the role of law in the Christian life in a subsequent volume which has yet to appear. Ibid., 224.
92 See Lehmann's critiques of philosophical ethics and of moral theology on this point. Ibid., 268–325.
93 Ibid., 146–47, 134–35.
94 Ibid., 117–23, 242–45.
95 Ibid., 141.
96 See Ramsey, , Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, 49–103Google Scholar; Gustafson, Review of Ethics in a Christian Context, 262–65, and Christ and the Moral Life, 267.
97 See his critiques of philosophical ethics and of moral theology, Parts Two and Three in ECC.
98 Ibid., 358–59. Also see 117, 139, 141, 353.
99 Lehmann promises a fuller development in the promised second volume of his ethics. Ibid., 327–28n.
100 Ibid., 15, 73–74, 80, 122, 131, 141, 145, 248, 321, 350, 355.
101 Ibid., 351.
102 Ibid., 246.
103 Ibid., 350.
104 Ibid., 54, 85.
105 Ibid., 101.
106 Ibid., 89.
107 Ibid., 86–101. Lehmann could well draw on the rich insights of H. RichardNiebuhr concerning the connection between “evil images of the heart” and sin and error. Cf. Niebuhr, H. Richard, The Meaning of Revelation (Macmillan Company, 1941), 94–99Google Scholar, The Responsible Self (Harper & Row, 1963), 79–81, 96, 151–54, 161.
108 Lehmann, ECC, 87n, 90, 347.
109 Ibid., 95–101.
110 Ibid., 77–79, 103–23.
111 Ibid., 316.
112 Lehmann not only rejects anthropology but theological anthropology as a basis for ethical reflection. ECC, 104, 120–21, 271, 299. But, as Ramsey points out, why Lehmann refuses ethics a beginning-point in theological anthropology is not entirely clear. Ramsey, op. cit., 68–70.
113 See Niebuhr, , The Responsible Self, 149–78Google Scholar; Heimbeck, , Theology and Meaning, 204–48Google Scholar; Ramsey, , Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases (SCM Press, 1967), 48–49Google Scholar; Ferré, , Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), 371–407Google Scholar; Wisdom, , Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Basil Blackwell, 1953), 149–68.Google Scholar
114 Lehmann, , ECC, 132–45.Google Scholar
115 Ramsey makes this point convincingly in Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, 73–103.
116 Ibid., 145–59.
117 Ibid., 159. Italics mine.
118 In other discussions of the relations between Christians and non-Christians, Lehmann sees a sharp difference between them in their imaginative and behavioral sensitivity to what God is doing in the world. Ibid., 117.
119 Ibid., 72–73, 158.
120 Much of Lehmann's discussion of the problem of the double standard deals with the question of the “point of contact” between the unbeliever's experience and the message of the Gospel. Ibid., 154–55.
121 From a somewhat different approach, Gustafson draws attention to these same four areas of potential disagreement within theological ethics. Gustafson, , Two Approaches to Theological Ethics, Union Seminary Quarterly Review XXIII (1968), 340.Google Scholar