¹ Rashi, in his comment on Ru. iii. 12, conjectured that Elimelech was an uncle of Boaz, while the nearer kinsman was the brother of Elimelech. But this is no more than conjecture, found also in the Midrash Rabba.

² Cf. M. Burrows (J.B.L., lix, 1940, p. 23): ‘The marriage of Boaz and Ruth presupposes a custom related to levirate marriage, but not quite the same.’

³ Ru. iv. 7.

⁴ According to the Talmud ‘Samuel wrote his own book and Judges and Ruth’ (T.B. Baba Bathra 14 b), and this has been followed in modern times by Cornely (Introductio in U.T. libros sacros, II i, 1897, pp. 233 f.). The book has been ascribed to the period of the early monarchy by Keil (Lehrbuch der hist.-kritisch Einleitung, 3rd ed., 1873, p. 437), Wright, (The Book of Ruth in Hebrew, 1864, p. xlivGoogle Scholar — not later than David; modified later in his Introduction to the Old Testament, 1890, p. 126, to a date between David and the Exile), L. Fillion (in Vigouroux’ Dictionnaire de la Bible, v, 1912, cols. 1275 f.), and Steinmueller (Companion to Scripture Studies, ii, 1942, p. 82); to a period between David and the Exile by Oettli (in Oettli and Meinhold, Die geschichtlichen Hagiographen und das Buch Daniel, 1889, pp. 215 f.) and Driver (Introduction to the Literature of the O.T., 9th ed., 1913, pp. 454 ff.); to the period of Hezekiah by S. Davidson (Introduction to the Old Testament, i, 1862, pp. 482 ff.) and Reuss (Littérature politique et polémique, 1879, pp. 26 f.); to the exilic period by Ewald (Geschichte des Volkes Israel, 3rd ed., 1864, p. 225), König (Einleitung in das A.T., 1893, p. 287), and Jepsen (T.S.K., cviii, 1937–8, p. 424); to the post-exilic period by Wellhausen (in Bleek's Einleitung in das A.T., 4th ed., 1878, pp. 204 f.), Bertholet (in Budde, Bertholet and Wildeboer, Die fünf Megilloth, 1898, pp. 49 ff.), Nowack (Richter, Ruth und Bücher Samuelis, 1902, pp. 180 f.), Cornill (Introduction to the Canonical Books of the O.T., E.T., 1907, pp. 254 f.), Steuernagel (Lehrbuch der Einleitung in das A.T., 1912, pp. 430 f.), Gautier (Introduction à l'A.T., ii, 3rd ed., 1939, p. 150), Sellin (Introduction to the O.T., E.T., 1923, p. 226 — the first years after the Return; cf. Einleitung in das A.T., 7th ed., 1935, p. 147 — in 4th century B.C.), Joüon (Ruth, 1924, pp. 12 f.), Meinhold (Einführung in das A.T., 3rd ed., 1932, pp. 336 f.), Oesterley and Robinson (Introduction to the Books of the O.T., 1934, p. 84), Eissfeldt (Einleitung in das AT., 1934, pp. 542 f.), Pfeiffer (Introduction to the O.T., 1941, pp. 717 ff.).

⁵ Cf. Wolfenson, L. B., ‘The Purpose of the Book of Ruth,’ in Bibliotheca Sacra, lxix, 1912, pp. 329Google Scholar ff.

⁶ So, e.g., by Bertholet (op. cit., pp. 52 ff.), Cornill (op. cit., p. 256), Sellin (Einleitung, 7th ed., p. 147), Meinhold (op. cit., p. 337). This view was proposed as long ago as 1816 by L. Bertholdt (Hist.-kritische Einleitung in sämmtliche Schriften des A. u. N. Ts, 1812–19, pp. 2356 f.; the passage is given in translation in Joüon, op. cit., p. 4).

⁷ Cf. my Israel's Mission to the World, 1939, pp. 46 ff.

⁸ Umbreit (T.S.K., vii, 1834, pp. 305 ff.) argued that its purpose was religious rather than political: ‘Der Verf. wollte zeigen, wie selbst eine Fremde aus dem Gebiete der verhassten Moabiter gewürdigt werden konnte, Stammutter des grossen Königs David zu werden, weil sie zum Gotte Israels ein unbedingtes Vertrauen bewiesen.’

⁹ Cf. Keil, op. cit., p. 437; L. Fillion, loc. cit., cols. 1280 f.

¹⁰ So, amongst many others, König, op. cit., p. 287; Bertholet, op. cit., pp. 68 f.; S. R. Driver, op. cit., pp. 455 f.; W. R. Smith, Encyclopaedia Biblica, iv, 1907, col. 4169; L. B. Wolfenson, The Book of Ruth, 1911, p. 9 = AJ.S.L., xxvii, 1910–11, p. 293; Joüon, op. cit., p. 96; Burrows, J.B.L., lix, 1940, pp. 450. Wellhausen, on the other hand, thought that this genealogy was ‘das wichtigste Merkmal der Zeit’ (op. cit., p. 204).

¹¹ Op. cit., pp. 25 f. The assumption that Mahlon was an Ephraimite rests on the description of him as an Ephrathite in Ru. i. 2, and the evidence of Jg. xii. 5 that an Ephrathite means an Ephraimite. But Ru. i. 4 shows that Mahlon was of Bethlehem, which in Ru. iv. 11 is equated with Ephrath or Ephrathah, from which the gentilic is here derived. Cf. also Mic. v. 1 (E.V. 2).

¹² In R.G.G., v, 1913, col. 107 (2nd ed., iv, 1930, col. 2181): ‘Die Erzählung enthält nichts Geschichtliches.’ Cf. Gressmann (Die Anfänge Israels (S.A.T., I ii), 1914, p. 284), who declares that it is ‘keine Geschichte, sondern Sage’ and ‘Novelle.’

¹³ So Driver, S. R., Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy, 2nd ed., 1896, p. 285Google Scholar: ‘The marriage of Bo'az and Ruth is not a Levirate-marriage: Bo'az … “purchases” her.’ L. M. Epstein (Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud, 1942, pp. 86 ff.) draws a sharp distinction between levirate marriage and ge'ullah marriage, with the latter of which he identifies the marriage of Ruth, the distinction being that whereas in the former the widow remains in the same family household (operating only in the case of brothers living together), in the latter she goes over to another. Neufeld (Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, 1944, pp. 38 ff.) more soundly holds that the levirate duty is one of the Go'el's (sic! for Go'el's) responsibilities. Bewer (A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, pp. 143 ff.), while holding that the ge'ullah and the levirate were combined in the oldest times, thinks that in the book of Ruth the ge'ullah is not connected with the levirate. He eliminates the references to the levirate in the book of Ruth as interpolations (T.S.K., lxxvi, 1903, pp. 328 ff., 502 ff.), and is followed by Wolfenson (The Book of Ruth, p. 15=A.J.S.L. xxvii, 1910–11, p. 299). Cf. also A.J.S.L., xx, 1903–4, pp. 202 ff., where Bewer maintains that the levirate interpolations were inserted by partisans of Nehemiah and Ezra to neutralize the effect of the book by their skilful suggestion that Boaz only married Ruth because he was by law compelled to do so. Bewer's suggestion is rejected by Burrows J.B.L., lix, 1940, p. 450). Burrows also rejects the view of Koschaker, Gordon and Mittelmann that Ruth is inherited as part of the estate (ibid., p. 449). Of this there is no suggestion whatever. Ruth was in Bethlehem because she had chosen to come, not because she was part of the property at the disposal of another.

¹⁴ Cf. preceding note, and Epstein's distinction between ge'ullah marriage and levirate marriage. But Deut. xxv. 5–10 cannot be treated as basic for the discussion of a usage which has its roots much farther back, and if, as is commonly held, that law restricted levirate marriage, it cannot be held that in earlier days a less restricted usage did not constitute levirate marriage.

¹⁵ Cf. Lattey, C., The Book of Ruth, 1935, p. xxviGoogle Scholar: ‘The principle upon which Tamar acts, and which Judah acknowledges as just, seems to be that since the proper Goel, Judah's third son Shelah, is not allowed her, she has a right to the next God after him, Judah himself.’

¹⁶ Cf. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, iii, 5th ed., 1921, pp. 208 ff. note; Scheftelowitz, J., ‘Die Leviratsehe,’ in A.R.W., xviii, 1915, pp. 250 ff.Google Scholar; and, amongst older writers, Benary, F., De hebraeorum leviratu, 1835, pp. 31Google Scholar ff.

¹⁷ For recent reviews of the discussions cf. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 77 ff., and Neufeld, op. cit., pp. 23 ff.

¹⁸ Cf. J. F. McLennan, Primitive Marriage, 1865, p. 204 (= Studies in Ancient History, 1886, pp. 112 f.): ‘the only explanation that can be given … is that the law of succession was derived from polyandry’ (cf. also The Patriarchal Theory, 1885, pp. 330 ff); J. G. Frazer, Folklore in the O.T., ii, 1919, p. 304: ‘the two customs of the sororate and the levirate seem traceable to a common source in a form of group marriage.’

¹⁹ Cf. Bertholet, , Deuteronomium (KHC), 1899, p. 77Google Scholar; Margoliouth, in Hastings’ E.R.E., i, 1908, pp. 448 f.

²⁰ Cf. I. Benzinger, Encyclopaedia Biblica, ii, 1901, col. 2675: ‘Hebrew levirate marriage admits of sufficient explanation from the simple fact that in Hebrew baalmarriage wives in general are property that can be inherited.’ Cf. also P. Koschaker, ‘Die Eheformen bei den Indogermanen,’ in Sonderheft des 11. Jahrgangs der Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 1937, pp. 77–140 b. (to which I have not had access), and ‘Fratriarchat, Hausgemeinschaft und Mutterrecht in Keilschriftrechten,’ in Z.A., xli, 1933, pp. 1 ff. (esp. p. 61); and Epstein, op. cit., p. 79: ‘the two primitive concepts, that the woman is family property and that the childless person is cut off from the family tree and must be artificially regrafted, are the main motives transmitted to us …, and are in themselves sufficient to explain the origin of the levirate custom.’ Burrows, in contrast to Benzinger, above cited, says: ‘we may observe that, except among the Hebrews and perhaps the Canaanites, levirate marriage was not in the ancient Near East a means of securing a son for the dead. It was rather a part of the whole system of family relationships, authority, and inheritance’ (B.A.S.O.R., 77, Feb. 1940, p. 15).

²¹ The sole raison d'être of levirate marriage that appears in the Old Testament is the provision of an heir for the deceased. This has led Morgenstern to suggest that the origin of the practice in Israel was independent of that elsewhere. Cf. H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, pp. 161 f.: ‘This is an altogether new motif, not without occasional, though not frequent, parallels in the marriage practice of other, non-Semitic peoples, but entirely without parallel in Semitic practice, at least so far as present evidence goes. It is this motif which is characteristically Israelite, and which indicates that the institution of levirate marriage must have had an independent development in Israel.’ The re-interpretation and rationalization of older practice in terms congenial to the culture of the time is by no means uncommon, however.

²² Cf. M. Burrows, ‘The Ancient Oriental Background of Hebrew Levirate Marriage,’ in B.A.S.O.R., 77, February 1940, pp. 2 ff., and ‘Levirate Marriage in Israel,’ in J.B.L., lix, 1940, pp. 23 ff.Google Scholar; also the same writer's Basis of Israelite Marriage, 1938; P. Koschaker, Quellenkritische Untersuchungen zu den “altassyrischen Gesetzen” (M.V.A.G., xxvi, No. 3), 1921, pp. 46 ff.; Cruveilhier, P., ‘Le lévirat chez les hébreux et chez les assyriens,’ in R.B., xxxiv, 1925, pp. 524 ff.Google Scholar; Hrozný, F., Code Hittite, 1922, pp. 146 fGoogle Scholar. (§ 193); Koschaker, ‘Zum Levirat nach hethitischem Recht,’ in Revue hittite et asianique, ii, 1932–4, pp. 77 ff.; Price, I. M., ‘The so-called Levirate-marriage in Hittite and Assyrian Laws,’ in Oriental Studies dedicated to Paul Haupt, 1926, pp. 268 ff.Google Scholar; Gordon, C. H., ‘Parallèles nouziens aux lois et coutumes de l'A.T.’ in R.B., xliv, 1935, pp. 34Google Scholar ff. (esp. p. 37). In view of this widespread practice throughout Israel's milieu, it is impossible to accept the view of Geiger that the levirate was confined to Judah (‘Die Leviratsehe, ihre Entstehung und Entwickelung,’ in Jüdische Zeitschrift, i, 1862, pp. 19 ff.). It should be added that in Ras Shamra texts there are found occurrences of the expression ybmt l'imm, where the root from which the Hebrew יכם = brother-in-law appears, and where Albright renders progenitress of the peoples (Cf. B.A.S.O.R., 77, Feb. 1940, pp. 6 f.). This is held to show that the original meaning of the root was procreate, and hence that brother-in-law is a secondary limitation in Hebrew. Cf. Neufeld, op. cit., p. 23 n.

²³ Cf. Sale's note on Qur'an iv. 23 (The Koran, 1838 ed., pp. 57 f.), and Tabari's comment on the passage (cited and translated in W. R. Smith's Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, 1903 ed., pp. 104 f.). Cf. also Muhammad Ali's comment on the passage (The Holy Qur-án, 2nd ed., 1920, p. 205 — text numbered iv. 19 in this edition), but contrast R. Bell's note (The Qur'ān, i, 1937, p. 71). Cf. too al-Bukhari's Ṣaḥīḥ lxv, on Sura iv. 6 (in L. Krehl, Receuil des traditions mahométanes par … el-Bokhâri, iii, 1868, p. 220) : ‘(avant l'islamisme) lorsqu'un homme mourait, c'étaient ses héritiers qui avaient un privilège sur sa veuve. Ceux qui le voulaient l'épousaient; d'autres préféraient la marier à un tiers, et ceux qui le voulaient ne les mariaient pas du tout. Ils avaient plus de droits sur cette veuve que leurs propres parents’ (Tr. of Houdas, O., Les traditions islamiques, iii, 1908, p. 295Google Scholar). For more modern times cf. Burckhardt, J. L., Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys, 1830, p. 64Google Scholar: ‘If a young man leaves a widow, his brother generally offers to marry her; custom does not oblige him or her to make this match, nor can he prevent her from marrying another man. It seldom happens, however, that she refuses; for by such an union the family property is kept together’; or A. Jaussen, Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab, 1908, p. 48: ‘En principe, elle (i.e. the widow) doit devenir la femme du frère du mari, qui a droit sur elle, et très souvent l'épouse. Si la veuve ne veut absolument pas, elle retourne chez son père.’

²⁴ The evidence from India contained in the Laws of Manu is frequently cited. There we learn that if a man died after betrothal to a maiden, his brother ‘shall approach her once in each proper season until issue be had’ (ix. 69 f.; tr. by E. Bühler in The Laws of Manu, in Sacred Books of the East, xxv, 1886, pp. 339 f.), though her consent must be obtained (ix. 97.; p. 344). Further, if a man is without issue, his brother or some other relation may be authorized to beget a son for him, but again it is emphatically stated that a single son is permitted (ix. 59 f.; pp. 337 f.). Here it is not clear whether this is permitted while the husband still lives, or only after his death, but the commentators follow the former interpretation. Further, it is laid down that ‘he who takes care of his deceased brother's estate and of his widow, shall, after raising up a son for his brother, give that property even to that son’ (ix. 146; p. 356. Cf. ix. 190; p. 369).

²⁵ It is probable that the Rabbis correctly interpret the Hebrew practice, in the later historical times at any rate, when they say that if the deceased left a child of either sex there should be no levirate marriage (cf. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 96 f.). From the time when a daughter was allowed to inherit this may have become the case, and ‘son’ in Deut. xxv. 5 may thus have had this wider interpretation. (In T. B. Baba Bathra 119 b, the law permitting daughters to inherit is based on the interpretation of ‘son’ in Deut. xxv. 5 in the sense of child of either sex.) In more ancient times it is likely that only a male heir would count (cf. I. I. Mattuck, in Studies in Jewish Literature issued in honor of Kaufmann Kohler, 1913, p. 211), and beyond the borders of Israel we find that even where there were male children levirate marriage was practised (cf. Joüon, The Book of Ruth, p. 9; and Cruveilhier, R.B., xxxiv, 1925, pp. 533 ff.). But in Israel levirate marriage was limited to the one purpose of raising an heir for the dead. Hence the emphasis is not on the childlessness of the widow, but of the deceased. It is not that she is entitled to motherhood for her own sake, but that her husband is entitled to an heir from her, if he has not already had one from her or from another wife.

²⁶ Cf. Pedersen, Israel I–II, 1926, pp. 395 ff.

²⁷ Cf. W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 25: ‘if the slayer and slain are of different kindred groups a blood-feud at once arises, and the slain man may be avenged by any member of his own group on any member of the group of the slayer,’ Cf. too S. R. Driver, in Encyclopaedia Biblica, ii, 1901, cols. 1746 f.; S. Nyström, Beduinentum und Jahwismus, 1946, pp. 11 f.

²⁸ Ex. xxi. 12 makes it clear that the penalty is to be exacted of the slayer only, but does not specify that only the next-of-kin of the slain is required to exact it. The Deuteronomic law (Deut. xix. 6, 12), with its reference to ‘the avenger of blood’ seems to imply that there is only one. 2 Sam. xiv. 7, in an account of the time of David, represents ‘the whole family’ as rising up, but this is in a case of fratricide, and therefore within a single family group, and the sequel again, xiv. 11, speaks only of ‘the avenger of blood.’

²⁹ The altar in Ex. xxi. 14; cf. 1 Kgs i. 50, ii. 28 ff. Deut. xix. 1 ff. appoints cities of refuge, and so Num. xxxv. 9 ff. The two latter passages lay down provisions for adjudication, so that only the homicide and not the murderer may be given benefit of sanctuary.

³⁰ Num. xxxv. 25, 28.

³¹ Bewer (A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, pp. 143 ff.) traces four stages in the development of the levirate.

³² Driver and Miles (The Assyrian Laws, 1935, pp. 244 f.) hold that the book of Ruth represents an extension of levirate marriage from the brother-in-law to more distant kinsmen. So Morgenstern, H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, pp. 175 f. This seems most improbable. It is far more likely that what was once wider became narrowed to the brother-in-law, just as we know that in later times it was rarely practised at all, and the Talmud hedges the practice round in every way (cf. Epstein, op. cit., pp. 93 ff.).

³³ In the case of the redemption of property this is stated explicitly in Lev. xxv. 45 f.

³⁴ Cf. Lesètre, H. (in Vigouroux' Dictionnaire de la Bible, iv, 1908, col. 215Google Scholar): ‘si les frères avaient à épouser la veuve de leur aîné défunt, l'obligation était étendue, à défaut de frères, aux parents les plus proches. Mais alors l'obligation s'imposait sans doute moins impérieusement.’

³⁵ Dennefeld, (Introduction à l'A.T., 1935, P. 83Google Scholar) regards iv. 7 as a late gloss. The only reason for this supposition is apparently its embarrassment of the theory of the composition of the book in the age of David. In that, as in all matters, it is preferable to seek a theory which fits the facts rather than to bend the facts to a theory.

³⁶ Cf. A. R. S. Kennedy, The Book of Ruth, 1928, p. 57: ‘It is purely symbolical, representing the transfer of a right, or of property, from one person to another. In Scotland the conveyance of land used to be similarly ratified by the seller handing a piece of turf to the purchaser’; G. A. Cooke, The Book of Ruth (Camb. Bible), 1918, p. 15: ‘When property was transferred, as in the present case, to take off the sandal and hand it to the person in whose favour the transfer is made, gave a symbolic attestation to the act, and invested it with legal validity.’ But no property was transferred; it remained in the hands of Naomi at this stage.

³⁷ Cf. the Ramayana, Book ii, Canto 112 (R. T. H. Griffith, The Rámáyan of Válmíki, 1915, pp. 265 f.), where Rama symbolizes his surrender of his authority to Bharat by giving him his sandals.

³⁸ Cf. Scheftelowitz, A. R. W., xviii, 1915, p. 255: ‘Der Schuh gilt nämlich als Symbol des Rechts, des Besitzes. Schon bei den alten Aegyptern ist die Sandale das Symbol der Macht, der Herrschaft.’

³⁹ Cf. E. R. Lacheman (J.B.L., Ivi, 1937, pp. 53 ff.), who explains Ru. iv. 7 f. by a Nuzi text, which shows that in a case of adoption the transfer of real estate was made more valid by lifting the foot from the property and placing the foot of the other party in it. Also E. A. Speiser (B.A.S.O.R., 77, Feb. 1940, pp. 15 ff.), who argues that shoes and garments were token payments to validate special transactions by lending them the appearance of normal business practice, and who applies this to Ru. iv. 7 and 1 Sam. xii. 3 (emended text), and also to Am. ii. 6.

⁴⁰ Cf. also Buttenwieser, The Psalms, 1938, pp. 75 f., where Psa. lx. 10 (E.V. 8) = Psa. cviii. 10 (E.V. 9) is explained in terms of the shoe as a symbol of domination.

⁴¹ Burckhardt (op. cit., pp. 64 f.) says: ‘If a man permits his cousin to marry a lover, or if a husband divorces his runaway wife, he usually says, “She was my slipper, I have cast her off”.’

⁴² Bewer (A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, p. 144) says that the drawing off of the shoe in the case of the levirate signifies his renunciation of his right of inheritance. This is doubtful. As the next-of-kin he would seem to be the heir, but since it is his duty to beget an heir, he would forfeit the inheritance by performing the levirate duty. While it is improbable that a man who refused to perform the duty would be allowed to have the inheritance, he would lose it either way — unless the levirate union was not fruitful.

⁴³ Cf. Burrows, J. B. L., lix, 1940, p. 448.

⁴⁴ Burrows (ibid., p. 447) suggests that the property had been held in pledge by a friend.

⁴⁵ Num. xxvii. 1–11 shows that daughters could inherit in Israel when there were no sons. In Arabia the rule was anciently otherwise (cf. W. R. Smith, Kinship and Marriage, 1903, p. 117). But we are nowhere told of the wife's title to inherit in Israel, though in 2 Kgs viii. 1–6 we find a widow in possession — presumably in trust for her son. Neufeld (op. cit., p. 240 f.) suggests that Naomi may have been ‘merely the executrix or trustee for the regulation of the succession of the legal heirs.’ This is very improbable. Since there were no children of Elimelech, and even to Naomi a levirate marriage for herself or her daughters-in-law seemed out of the question, unless Naomi had some rights in the property the only heirs were Elimelech's relations. It is improbable that a woman who was, ex hypothesi, not herself one of the heirs would be given any authority over the legal heirs. Moreover, if this were all Naomi's right, why should the next-of-kin, who was then presumably the heir, be asked to buy the property of Naomi, and be ready to buy it before the question of taking Ruth arose? Clearly Naomi had some title of her own in the property. Jepsen (T.S.K., cviii, 1937–8, pp. 419 ff.) has suggested that the property was received by Naomi from her own family, and merely administered by Elimelech during his lifetime, and since this would mean that the redeemer would have to be of Naomi's family he concludes that Naomi and Boaz were related. A similar view had been advanced by Caspari, (N.K.Z., xix, 1908, pp. 115Google Scholar ff.). This view is unlikely, and is not supported by Ru. iv. 3, 9. Bewer (A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, p. 148) finds in Naomi's possession of the property a ‘very late mode of inheritance.’ But we have no solid grounds for this assumption. Presumably a widow with minor sons administered the property for them until they were of age. It is unlikely that a widow who had reared sons to manhood would be treated with less honor. While it is improbable that a general title of widows to inherit prevailed in ancient Israel, we cannot assume from the book of Ruth that its author presumed such a title. It merely sets before us a widow of advanced age, who had fulfilled the function of motherhood, and who had outlived her husband and her married sons, inheriting her husband's property. To such a woman custom, which is the maker of law, may well have accorded rights. Nor can we exclude the possibility that Elimelech had willed the life interest in the property to her. For even where a woman had no title to inherit, a husband might have had power to will her a share in his estate. This was done in Nuzi texts (cf. E. A. Speiser, A.A.S.O.R., x, 1930, p. 19: ‘the wife receives a life interest in whatever share is willed to her, the ultimate heirs being the sons”), and its possibility here cannot be excluded.

⁴⁶ Joüon (op. cit., p. 10) holds that Ruth only replaced Naomi because Naomi was too old to bear children. It is doubtless true that if Naomi had been younger the next-of-kin's first responsibility would have been to her and not to Ruth. But it is more doubtful if Joüon is right in saying that Ruth replaced Naomi legally just as Boaz replaced Elimelech. For Boaz replaced Elimelech as a blood relation, whereas Ruth was not of the same stock as Naomi. We must beware of linking the present case with one such as Leah's and Rachel's giving of their handmaids to bear for them. It was not as Naomi's handmaid that Ruth preserved the line of Elimelech, but as Mahlon's widow. Whoever was next-of-kin to Elimelech was also next-of-kin to Mahlon, but it was only in relation to the younger of these widows that levirate marriage could fulfil its purpose. Volz (TX.Z., xxvi, 1901, cols. 348 f.) with still less reason suggests that in the original form of the story Naomi married Boaz.

⁴⁷ Burrows (J.B.L., lix, 1940, p. 29) notes that there is no indication as to what happened to the dead man's estate when the brother-in-law refused to take the widow, and suggests the possibility that the brother-in-law was then the legal heir. It seems inconceivable that he would be rewarded for his dishonor of his brother by the possession of that brother's estate.

⁴⁸ Burrows (ibid., p. 449) does not seem to me sufficiently to distinguish between these two things. He observes that Boaz ‘acquires her along with the field, which he purchases as redeemer.’ But Ruth was no more part of the property than was Orpah, and she is nowhere spoken of as property to be exploited by a purchaser, but as one to whom the next-of-kin owed a duty; moreover, his ‘possession’ of her was for one purpose and one purpose only, viz. the raising of seed to the dead.

⁴⁹ So Lesètre (loc. cit., col. 216): ‘il est dair que le frère déjà marié était exempt du lévirat, autrement la loi eût present la bigamie.’ Cf. Lattey, op. cit., p. xxii. With this contrast the view of Cruveilhier (R. B., xxxiv, 1925, p. 544): ‘Le Deutéronome ne specifie aucunement que le beau-frère doit être célibataire. Un tel silence autorise à croire que le lévir pouvait être marié. Nous pouvons même ajouter que généralement il devait l'être, le mariage étant dans l'antiquité la condition normale de tous les adultes. On concoit que pour le but à la fois élevé et pieux de procurer des enfants issus d'un sang fraternal, on n'ait point hésité à faire une brèche au principe monogame.’ It is doubtful, however, if Cruveilhier is right in speaking of a monogamic rule at this time.

⁵⁰ A. Alt (Ursprünge des israelitischen Rechts, 1934, pp. 12–33) argues that the casuistic laws of Israel were of Canaanite origin. The Deuteronomic formulation of the law of levirate marriage is probably so far modified from any assumed Canaanite original that it is doubtful how far its form can be held to be Canaanite, but that the custom of levirate marriage had its roots in pre-Israelite practice is almost certain.

⁵¹ Cf. the Indian practice cited above. Burrows (B.A.S.O.R., 77, Feb. 1940, pp. 5 f.) thinks the Hebrew practice was differentiated from the Indian in this respect. To the present writer this seems unlikely.

⁵² Cf. Lattey, op. cit., p. xxvi. Lattey assumes that in levirate marriage the widow became the full legal wife of the kinsman, but that the first son was reckoned not as his, but as the dead man's, while succeeding sons were regarded as the issue of the second husband. If the woman had but one son by her second husband, this would mean that the latter would be left without legal issue, although he had a child born in legal wedlock. I cannot think this is in any way probable, and it is not supported by the book of Ruth, as will appear below.

⁵³ Where the levirate bridegroom was not previously married and the widow became his full wife, one would expect the first son to be both the real father's heir and also the legal heir of the deceased, while any succeeding children would be reckoned to the real father alone. Where, however, the levirate bridegroom already had children the case would be different, and an institution whose only raison d'être in Israel was to provide an heir for the dead would hardly function beyond the range of its purpose. It is not without significance to observe here that Judah, who was not himself childless, had no further relations with Tamar after she had once become pregnant.

⁵⁴ So Josephus, Antiquities, V ix. 4 (v. 334); also Targum on Ru. iv. 6. So, too, Morgenstern, H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, pp. 174 f.

⁵⁵ Cf. Pedersen, Israel I–II, 1926, pp. 204 ff.

⁵⁶ Op. cit., p. 37 n. Neufeld says ‘it is clearly indicated that the fact that Ruth went to glean on the field was only the means employed by her to introduce herself to the notice of Boaz … in the hope of subsequent marriage with him.’ He neglects to say where this is ‘clearly’ indicated.

⁵⁷ In the Arabic parallels to the levirate marriage above noted, the kinsman established his claim to the widow by throwing bis garment over her. J. Lewy (R.H.R., cx, 1934, pp. 31 ff.) cites Assyrian evidence to show that the skirt of the garment stood for the personality of the wearer, and especially for his honor. Hence the symbolic action here invited would signify that Boaz extended the cover of his position and person to her. Cf. Deut. xxiii. 1 (E.V. xxii. 30), Ezk. xvi. 8.

⁵⁸ W. E. Staples (A.J.S.L., liv, 1937, pp. 62 ff.) maintains that Naomi knew that Boaz was not her next-of-kin. He translates Ru. ii. 20 ‘he is not our go'el' instead of ‘he is one of our kinsmen,' while Ru. iii. 12 becomes ‘I am not really your go'el.' Despite the ingenuity with which these renderings are defended, they are not natural, and no attempt is made to convert Ru. iii. 9 into anything other than a simple statement of Ruth to Boaz that he was her go'el. The sincerity of Naomi and Ruth must then be impugned in the interests of these unnatural renderings, and the view is proposed that Ruth's visit to Boaz was to force the next-of-kin to take up his obligations or to renounce his rights. How a visit which had to be kept from his knowledge could force him to do anything is discreetly not shown. The story shows how his hand was forced precisely by suppressing the knowledge of this.

⁵⁹ Gen. xxxviii. 24. Cruveilhier (R.B., xxxiv, 1925, p. 527) describes Tamar's conduct as incest and a crime. That it was such by the standards of the time is most improbable. In many lands where levirate marriage is found the father-in-law takes the widow, and if in pre-Deuteronomic days the duty was not restricted to the brother-in-law, but extended to the next-of-kin, or failing him the next but one, it is hard to see where incest or crime comes in. This does not mean that we need go all the way with Gunkel in lauding Tamar (Die Urgeschichte und die Patriarchen (S.A.T., I i), 1911, pp. 256 f.).

⁶⁰ Kiddushin i. 1.

⁶¹ May, H. G. (J.R.A.S., 1939, pp. 75Google Scholar ff.) holds that Ruth's night interview with Boaz took place at the Bethlehem high place, and that relations between them occurred on that occasion. He finds some evidence of this in the six omers of barley which Boaz gave to Ruth, which he connects with the hire of a sacred prostitute, and believes that our present text has been purged. This reduces the insistence on the importance of seeing that no one knew of Ruth's visit to nonsense, since ex hypothesi Boaz would not be the only person celebrating the festal harvest rites at the shrine. It is unnecessary to rewrite a story which is consistent with itself in order to turn it into the account of something which is imposed upon it. In the same way it is entirely without evidence when May observes that ‘Naomi and Ruth, as the source of the Davidic line, are represented according to the pattern of the mother-goddess who gives birth to a son who rules as divine king and brings prosperity to the land.’ Of this there is no hint whatever in the book, and it is quite gratuitous to read it into it. Similarly with the further statement that ‘this historical tradition of David's ancestry proclaimed the divine character of the Hebrew kingship by the mythological patterns which formed its literary structure.’ W. E. Staples, who also quite gratuitously imposes a cultic interpretation on the book, denies that it has anything at all to do with David. He eliminates every reference to David as secondary, and assigns such historical basis as the book possesses to the period of Nebuchadrezzar. Elimelech is here made the dying god, and Naomi becomes the mother-goddess, whose devotee, or ḳedeshah, Ruth, is (A.J.S.L., liii, 1936–7, pp. 145 ff.Google Scholar). To the present writer this seems completely fanciful, and the evidence offered of the flimsiest. The etymology of the name Bethlehem cannot establish that every incident that happened in the town must be cultic; nor can the etymology of the names of Elimelech and Naomi prove that this is a cultic story. Yet it is on such ‘evidence’ that Staples relies. On such principles much cultic significance could be found in the genealogies in the early chapters of 1 Chron. The unnamed kinsman is useless to Staples, and he therefore regards him as negligible, and says he adds nothing to the story. This neatly evades the issue why a cultic text should be burdened with what is cultically meaningless. Actually the nearer kinsman is anything but unimportant in the story.

⁶² Morgenstern, J. (H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, p. 169Google Scholar), after saying (in my view incorrectly) that Ru. iv. 7 shows that the drawing off of the shoe was the symbol of the conclusion of a transfer of property, rightly observes: ‘By the performance of this particular ceremony … she (i.e. the widow) had acquired her freedom and full control of her person from her brother-in-law; no longer did he have any authority over her, but she was now free to dispose of herself as she might choose.’

⁶³ Het Huwelijk van Ruth, 1941, pp. 7 f.; and Oudtestamentische Studiën, i, 1941–2, p. 58.

⁶⁴ It is possible that some reference to the story of Tamar lies in the suggestion of waiting for them to be grown up. Tamar had to wait some years for the brotherin-law who was then denied her; but to wait for unborn sons would be unthinkable!

⁶⁵ Cf. A.J.S.L., xix, 1902–3, p. 144.

⁶⁶ So Lattey, op. cit., p. xxix; Epstein, op. cit., pp. 93 f. Cf. also Wechsler, in Jüdische Zeitschrift, i, 1862, pp. 257 f.

⁶⁷ Deuteronomium, 1898, p. 78.

⁶⁸ Cf. Paterson, in Hastings' D.B., iii, 1900, p. 269 b.

⁶⁹ Ru. iv. 5. Most editors recognize that the present Hebrew text (= ‘thou must buy it also of Ruth the Moabitess’) needs to be corrected by the change of a single letter, to yield ‘also Ruth the Moabitess thou must acquire.’ Cf. iv. 9.

⁷⁰ Cf. supra. That the genealogy was appended by another hand is likely enough, but not on this ground.

⁷¹ This disproves such a statement as that of Smith, W. R. (Encyclopaedia Biblica, iv, 1907, col. 4169Google Scholar): ‘That the genealogy was borrowed from Chronicles and added to Ruth by a later hand seems certain, for the author of Ruth clearly recognizes that Obed was legally the son of Mahlon, not of Boaz’ (italics mine). Cf. Burrows, (J.B.L., lix, 1940, p. 450Google Scholar): ‘Obed is not regarded as the son of Boaz except in the genealogy’; also Joüon (op. cit., p. 96): ‘Dans la seconde généalogie, les mots Booz engendra ‘Obed, ne sont pas dans l'esprit du récit, car ainsi le nom d'Elimèlek ne serait plus “prononcé en Israël”.’ Morgenstern, (H.U.C.A., vii, 1930, p. 177Google Scholar) would delete Ru. iv. 11 b, 12, as well as the genealogy at the end of the chapter, but no reason for this is offered except its supposed conflict with the point of view of the rest of the book. He thus takes the opposite course to Bewer, who, as above noted, deletes as secondary every reference to levirate marriage for Ruth, in order to leave her child as the heir of Boaz and not of Mahlon, while Dijkema, F. (Nieuw Theologisch Tijdschrift, xxiv, 1935, pp. iiiGoogle Scholar ff.) holds that Ru. iv. 17 b is an interpolation, and so abolishes both Obed and David from the book. It seems more satisfactory to seek a solution which can accommodate all the facts presented to us, rather than to impose our theory upon the facts by violence. In the present case such a theory does not seem hard to attain, and there is the less justification for violence.