¹ All of the citations from The Guide of the Perplexed are from the translation of Shlomo Pines (Chicago/London: University of Chicago, 1963).

² See notes 40, 42.

³ See notes 41, 42.

⁴ For the purposes of this essay, it makes no difference whether, for Maimonides, the particular divine will that effects a miracle operates at the time the miracle occurs or whether it was operative during the “work of the beginning” (see Guide 2.29 and Šěmônâ Pěrāqîm, chap. 8). On Maimonides's general theory of miracles, see Heller, Joseph, “Maimonides’ Theory of Miracles,” Between East and West (ed. Altmann, A.; London: East and West Library, 1958) 112–27Google Scholar; Schweid, Eliezer, “The Concept of the Miraculous as a Foundation of Faith,” (in Hebrew) Ta^˓am wě-Hăqāšâ (Ramat-Gan: Massada, 1970) 185–93Google Scholar, and Reines, A. J., “Maimonides’ Concept of Miracles,” HUCA 45 (1974) 243–85.Google Scholar

⁵ Isaac Abravanel's commentary on the Guide (Warsaw: I. Goldman, 1872) 2.66a. (This edition also contains the commentaries of Shem Tob b. Joseph, Efodi, and Asher Crescas.) See Reines's, Alvin translation of Abravanel's commentary on the section on prophecy in the Guide, Maimonides and Abravanel on Prophecy (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College, 1970) 15–16.Google Scholar

⁶ Or Adonai, 2.2, 4. The reference to Crescas in Reines {Maimonides and Abravanel, 16 n. 38) is incorrect.

⁷ Sēfer Ha-^˓Iqqārîm, (5 vols.; ed. Husik, I.; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1930) 3.70.Google Scholar As Reines (Maimonides and Abravanel, 15 n. 36) points out, Abravanel's attribution of this interpretation to Crescas and Albo is incorrect.

⁸ “Maimonides’ Lehre von der Prophetie,” Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abrahams (New York: Jewish Institute of Religion, 1927) 76–78.Google Scholar

⁹ Husik, Sēfer Ha-^˓Iqqārîm 3.70 n. 1.

¹⁰ “Halevi and Maimonides on Prophecy,” JQR (n.s.) 33 (1942) 70.Google Scholar

¹¹ Abravanel, Commentary, 2.66a, 67b; Reines, Maimonides and Abravanel, 16. Wolfson's interpretation (“Halevi and Maimonides”) of Maimonides's position is based upon a mistranslation of Maimonides's text:

Wolfson translates: For we believe that, even he who is naturally fit for prophecy and has prepared himself for it may yet not actually prophesy, for the act of prophecy depends upon the divine will, and according to my opinion it is a miraculous act like all miracles and it occurs in the same manner. (“Halevi and Maimonides,” 70)

But the correct translation is that of Pines: “namely on account of the divine will,” or to be more precise: “and it is on account of the divine will.” “It” refers not to prophecy but to the withholding of prophecy. Thus, Maimonides goes on to state: “For it is a natural thing that everyone who according to his natural disposition is fit for prophecy and who has been trained … should become a prophet.”

¹² Joseph Kaspi, Maskîyôt Kesep (ed. S. Werblunger; Frankfurt a.M.: J. Fried, 1848; reprinted in Šělôšâ Qadmônê Měpāršê ha-Môreh, Jerusalem: Orstel, 1961) 113.

¹³ Biʾûr Narboni (ed. J. Goldenthal; Vienna: K. K. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1852; reprinted in Šělôšâ Qadmônê Měpāršê ha-Môreh) 42a, 43a.

¹⁴ Shem Tob b. Joseph's commentary on the Guide, 2.67a-b.

¹⁵ Efodi's commentary on the Guide, 2.67b.

¹⁶ Abravanel, Commentary, 2.67a-b. Reines, Maimonides and Abravanel, 16–19.

¹⁷ It is striking that Wolfson (“Halevi and Maimonides,” 70), in discussing the passage from the Guide in which Maimonides presents the third opinion, does not mention Maimonides's analogies. For surely the analogies that Maimonides brings clinch the argument that what is miraculous for Maimonides is the withholding of prophecy and not, as Wolfson would have it, the phenomenon of prophecy itself.

¹⁸ Kaspi, Maskîyôt Kesep, 113. One might argue in response to Kaspi that when Maimonides (Hilkôt Yěsôdê ha- Tôrâ 7.5) states, “Even though [those who desire to become prophets] direct their attention, it is possible that the divine presence rest upon them and it is possible that it should not rest upon them,” he is referring to the concept of God's miraculously withholding prophecy. However, if he is referring to that concept, he is being extremely vague about it. (But cf. Strauss, Leo, “Notes on Maimonides’ Book of Knowledge,” Studies in Mysticism and Religion in Honor of Gershom Scholem [Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967] 275.)Google Scholar The correct explanation of this passage, in my opinion, is that offered by Goldman, Eliezer, “Maimonides’ View of Prophecy,” (in Hebrew) Samuel K. Mirsky Memorial Volume (ed. Appel, G.; New York: Yeshivah University, 1970) 105.Google Scholar Goldman states that the reason why Maimonides, in this passage, believes it is possible that those who are otherwise fit for prophecy and prepared for it and are directing their attention may not receive the divine presence is not because God miraculously withholds prophecy from them, but rather because one of the prerequisites of a prophet is the ability to concentrate intensely on all that he knows, to direct his mind totally toward God. Therefore, even one who possesses all of the other prerequisites for prophecy and attempts to achieve this high level of concentration and direction may not achieve it and consequently not become a prophet.

¹⁹ Abravanel, Commentary, 2.66a. Reines, Maimonides and Abravanel, 20.

²⁰ Efodi, Commentary, 2.67b.

²¹ Shem Tob, Commentary, 2.68a.

²² Kaspi, Maskîyôt Kesep, 113.

²³ Shem Tob, Commentary, 2.68a.

²⁴ Efodi, Commentary, 2.67b-68b.

²⁵ Kaspi, Maskîyôt Kesep, 99–101, 107.

²⁶ The question as to whether Maimonides's affirmation of creation out of nothing reflects his true opinion or not has been a highly controversial issue since the medieval commentators and to our present day. While the majority of both medieval and modern scholars have assumed that Maimonides's affirmation of creation out of nothing reflects his true opinion, there have always been a notable minority who have insisted that Maimonides's esoteric opinion on this question is in accordance with the view of Aristotle. Among the latter group in addition to Kaspi, are Narboni, Biʾûr Narboni, 34a-b; Joseph Solomon del Medigo, Nôblôt Hākmâ (Basel 1621) 6b; Becker, J., Sôdô Šel Môreh Něbûkîm (Tel Aviv: J. Simoni, 1956) 49Google Scholar; Berman, L., Ibn Bajjah and Maimonides (in Hebrew; unpublished diss., Hebrew University, 1959) 156–63;Google Scholar S. Pines, in the introduction (“The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed”) to his translation of The Guide of the Perplexed, cxxviii-cxxix; Nuriel, A., “The Question of a Primordial or Created World in the Philosophy of Maimonides” (in Hebrew) Tarbiz 33 (1964) 372–87.Google Scholar

²⁷ However, Maimonides's attitude concerning this rabbinic statement is not as simple as it might first appear, since this statement is presented by Maimonides as a part of “the opinion of our Law [concerning providence] … [as it] has been literally stated in the books of our prophets and is believed by the multitude of our scholars” (Guide 3.17, p. 469). But Maimonides (pp. 469–71) differentiates his own position concering “the opinion of our Law” from that of the “multitude of our scholars” (also note Guide 3.23, pp. 493–96, where Maimonides differentiates between the opinion of Eliphaz which is the opinion of our Law and the superior opinion of Elihu) and the relationship between the two positions is not clear. (See Shem Tob, 3.25b-26a.)

²⁸ E. Schweid, “The Concept of the Miraculous,” 190, 192. Schweid's analysis seems to be based primarily upon the following statement of Maimonides: Solomon himself has … stated that these works of the deity—I mean the world and what is in it—even though they are made, are permanently established in their nature for ever, … [For] the works of the deity are most perfect, and with regard to them there is no possibility of excess or deficiency. Accordingly … there is no possibility of something calling for a change in them. He has also, as it were, … given an excuse for what changes, saying. … And God hath so made it, that they should fear before him (Eccl. 3:14)—he refers to the production in time of miracles. (Guide 2.28, pp. 335–36)

²⁹ Abravanel, Commentary, 2.68a. Reines, Maimonides and Abravanel, 21. Abravanel then goes on to cite a number of verses that Maimonides might have had in mind when he—according to Abravanel—stated that there are many verses which maintain “the fundamental principle … that the divine will may withhold prophecy.”

³⁰ Munk, S., Les Guides des Egarés (Paris: A. Franck, 1861), 2.264, n. 1.Google Scholar

³¹ Kafih, J., Môreh ha-Něbûkîm (translated from Arabic into Hebrew; Jerusalem: Mossad Ha-Rav Kook, 1972) 241, n. 28.Google Scholar

³² Sirat, C. (Les théories des visions surnaturelles dans la pensée juive du Moyen Age [Leiden: Brill, 1969] 138Google Scholar) attempts to refute Abravanel's interpretation by pointing out that all of the verses that Abravanel cites as examples of verses that Maimonides had in mind when he, according to Abravanel (see above, n. 29), stated that there are many verses which maintain the “fundamental principle that the divine will may withhold prophecy” are interpreted by Maimonides, in other chapters of the Guide, in a naturalistic sense. However, since, as we shall see immediately, Maimonides never said that there are many verses which maintain that God can miraculously withhold prophecy, Sirat's refutation is unnecessary and not to the point.

³³ Cf. 2.48, p. 410; Shem Tob, 97b; Narboni, Biʾûr, 46a.

³⁴ See Maimonides's famous definition of prophecy in 2.36, p. 369, and the commentaries of Shem Tob and Efodi, ad loc. Cf. Maimonides's discussions of prophecy in Guide 2.12, p. 279; Hilkôt Yěsôdê ha-Tôrâ 7.1; Introduction to Hēleq, the sixth fundamental, and that of Alfarabi in The Political Regime in Medieval Political Philosophy (ed. Lerner, R. and Mahdi, M.; New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) 36–37.Google Scholar

³⁵ With reference to the phrase “whom He wills, whenever He wills it,” see Maimonides's interpretation of the verse “Whatsoever the Lord willed, that hath He done” (Ps 135:6). “The meaning of [this] text … is that the things willed by God are necessarily accomplished, there being no obstacle to hinder the carrying-out of this volition; but that H e … wills only what is possible, and not everything that is possible, but only that which is required by His wisdom to be such. … This is the opinion of all those that adhere to the Law and also the opinion of the philosophers, and it is also our own opinion” (3.25, p. 505).

³⁶ Goldman (“Maimonides’ View of Prophecy,” 205) realizes that Maimonides's statement that “God turns whom He wills, whenever He wills it, into a prophet” would seem to mean something entirely different than his statement that “it may happen that one who is fit for prophecy and prepared for it should not become a prophet, namely, on account of the divine will.” However, despite his initial realization, on the basis of an ingenious but unconvincing interpretation of Maimonides's position he concludes by assuming that both statements are just making the same point in different ways.

³⁷ The Arabic root ) is used by Maimonides in all these passages.

³⁸ The last passage continues “whereupon the possibility arises to which the power of the deity becomes attached.” This passage is ambiguous. It might also be possible to translate the passage “whereupon the possibility of its [occurring] is dependent upon the power of the deity.” In any event, it is unclear whether Maimonides is here referring to God's granting prophecy, which is more likely on the basis of the first [Pines's] translation or to God's withholding prophecy, which is more likely on the basis of the second translation. If we accept the first translation, which Pines and Kafih advocate, and assume that Maimonides is referring to God's granting prophecy—obviously only as a remote cause—then we have no problem. This is the interpretation of Narboni (Biʾûr, 43), who interprets “the power of the deity” as referring to His primordial will. If we adopt the second translation and assume that Maimonides is referring to God's withholding prophecy then we have to assume that for Maimonides the fundamental principle to which he refers is only “that there must be training and perfection” and not that “the possibility of its [occurring] is dependent upon the power of the deity.” My own opinion is that Maimonides in this passage is speaking about God's granting prophecy but phrased his statement in a deliberately ambiguous way so as to mislead the casual reader.

³⁹ See below, nn. 41–43.

⁴⁰ Mordecai Jaffe, Lěbûs Pinnat Yiqrat (Lublin: 1594) 28a-b.

⁴¹ Kafih, Môreh ha-Něbûkîm, 239, n. 1. Both Kafih here and Atlas, Samuel (“Moses in Maimonides, Spinoza, and Solomon Maimon,” HUCA 25 [1954] 370–73)Google Scholar offer explanations of this correspondence between the three opinions concerning prophecy and the three opinions concerning creation that are essentially the same as Jaffe's. Neither of them cites Jaffe and, it would seem, both are unaware of his explanation.

⁴² The standard explanation of the correspondence between the three views concerning creation or eternity and the three views concerning prophecy is that offered by Abravanel (Commentary, 2.66b [Reines, Maimonides and Abravanel, 5–7]) and adopted by Munk (Les Guides, 259, n. 2) and Friedlander, M. (Guide of the Perplexed [2d ed.; London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1904] 2.161, n. 1).Google Scholar According to Abravanel (I am following Reines's paraphrase, p. xxxii, n. 74), “The first opinion on prophecy is that God miraculously created prophecy from nothing, and similarly, the first opinion on cosmogony, is that God miraculously created the world from nothing; the second opinion on prophecy is that prophecy is produced by the natural order, and similarly, the third opinion on cosmogony, is that the world is eternally produced by the natural order; the third opinion on prophecy (Maimonides's) is that prophecy arises naturally, but God may prevent its occurrence by a creative act of will, and the second opinion on cosmogony (Plato's) is that the world is produced by the creative will of God acting on a pre-existent matter.” Despite the attractiveness of this explanation, it is fraught with difficulties. First, according to Abravanel, Maimonides's view on prophecy corresponds to a view on cosmogony which he rejects and conversely his view on cosmogony corresponds to a view on prophecy that he rejects and indeed stigmatizes. Moreover, there is no real analogy between Maimonides's view on prophecy and Plato's view on cosmogony since for Maimonides God's creative or special will is a creative force that acts to create the world. Diesendruck (“Maimonides’ Lehre von der Prophetie,” 77) accepts Abravanel's explanation but derives from it the conclusion that for Maimonides prophecy is created by the direct will of God. He does this so as to have Maimonides's view on prophecy analogous to Plato's view on cosmogony. But, as we have seen, such an explanation of Maimonides's position is untenable. Reines similarly accepts AbravaneFs explanation, but inasmuch as he holds that “There can be no question … that Maimonides holds to the opinion that prophecy is a natural event” (p. xxxiii, continued from p. xxxii, n. 74) he attempts to refute Diesendruck; but his refutation is unconvincing. In fine, it appears to me that the explanation of Jaffe and Kafih is much to be preferred.

⁴³ In this light, we can understand why Abravanel, in explaining the correspondence of the three opinions concerning prophecy and the three opinions concerning creation, did not feel constrained to establish a correspondence between Maimonides's own view on creation and his own view on prophecy (see previous note). For the basis of Maimonides's view on prophecy, for Abravanel, is not his view on creation, as it is for Jaffe, but rather Biblical and Rabbinic texts. Therefore, this correspondence for Abravanel is not and need not be a relationship of logical entailment, but it simply is an interesting analogy and nothing more. It is, therefore, not that disturbing if the analogy is not precise.

⁴⁴ The Arabic reads which ibn Tibbon and Kafih translate as

⁴⁵ Cf. 2.7, p. 266; 3.8, pp. 431–32; 9, pp. 436–37; 10, p. 440; 11, pp. 440–41; 12, pp. 443–44; 15, p. 459; 25, p. 506. A careful reading of these texts should suffice to enable us to discover Maimonides's answer to the question he, himself, poses in 2.25, p. 329, “Why did He [God] … not put the accomplishment of the commandments and the nontransgression of the prohibitions into our nature?” Cf. Reines, A., “Maimonides' Concepts of Providence and Theodicy” HUCA 43 (1972) 204–05.Google Scholar