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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2011
Jonathan Edwards expected his inquiry on the Freedom of the Will to be the definitive work on that subject, establishing for all time the truth of predestination on the twin pillars of reason and revelation. He answered every objection of the Arminians with irrefutable scriptural texts, biting satire, and devastating logic. He brought the revolutionary insights of Locke and Newton to the defense of Reformed doctrine, restructuring ancient truths on the foundations of the latest science.
The effort was immediately successful. For sixteen years no one dared to publish a rebuttal. Then, in 1770, with Edwards safely dead, James Dana of Wallingford, Connecticut, published An Examination of the Late President Edwards's Enquiry on Freedom of Will.
1 Edwards, Jonathan, The Works of Jonathan Edwards: Freedom of the Will (Ramsey, Paul, ed.; New Haven: Yale University, 1957) Vol. 1Google Scholar.
2 Dana, James, An Examination of the Late President Edwards's Enquiry on Freedom of Will (Boston: Kneeland, 1770)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Opie, John, “Introduction,” Jonathan Edwards and the Enlightenment (Opie, John, ed.; Lexington: Heath, 1969) viiGoogle Scholar.
4 Shea, Daniel B., “The Puritan Within,” Virginia Quarterly Review 50/3 (1974)Google Scholar.
5 Haroutounian, Joseph, Piety Versus Moralistn: The Passing of the New England Theology (New York: Holt, 1932) 225-26Google Scholar; Miller, Perry, Jonathan Edwards (New York: William Sloane, 1949) 72–73Google Scholar; Paul Ramsey, “Introduction,” Freedom of the Will, 11; Shea, “Puritan Within”; Woefel, James W., “Listening to B. F. Skinner,” The Christian Century, 30 Nov 1977Google Scholar. Shea draws the closest parallel between Edwards and Skinner but says, “nothing in Edwards' vocabulary could account for Skinner's experiments with pigeons” (p. 426).
6 Dana, Examination, 1. 2–3.
7 Ibid., 29.
8 Ramsey, Freedom of the Will, 19, 18.
9 “Language is indeed very deficient, in regard of terms, to express precise truth concerning our own minds, and their faculties and operations,” Edwards, “Freedom of the Will,” The Works of President Edwards in Four Volumes [hereafter cited as Works, unless otherwise indicated] (New York: Leavitt & Allen, 1857) 2. 143. “It must be confessed that language is here somewhat imperfect, and the meaning of words in a considerable measure loose and unfixed, and not precisely limited by custom, which governs the use of language.” Edwards, “Religious Affections,” Works, 3. 4.
10 Edwards, “Revival of Religion in New England,” Works 3. 280.
11 Edwards, “Religious Affections,” Works, 3. 3.
12 Edwards, “Remarks” appended to “Freedom of the Will,” Works, 2. 183.
13 Skinner, B. F., About Behaviorism (New York: Random House, 1976) 60Google ScholarPubMed. This latest summary of Skinner's position is the principal work on Skinnerian behaviorism cited in this paper. Although Skinner has several books to his credit, this one work adequately sums up his basic position.
14 Edwards, “Freedom of the Will,” Works, 2. 4.
15 Ibid., 7. Edwards's passing attempt to dismiss the problem of the origins of the “strongest motive” is contained in Part 1, Section II, of Freedom of the Will.
16 Edwards, , “Of the Prejudices of the Imagination,” The Works of Jonathan Edwards: Scientific and Philosophical Writings (Anderson, Wallace, ed.; New Haven: Yale University, 1980) 6. 196Google Scholar.
17 Edwards, “The Nature of True Virtue,” Works 2. 291.
18 Ibid., 283.
19 Skinner, About Behaviorism, 41, 51, 228.
20 Edwards, “The Mind,” (Anderson ed.) 6. 373–74. Sang Hyun Lee (“Mental Activity and the Perception of Beauty in Jonathan Edwards,” HTR 69 [1976] 369–96) also points out the importance of the idea of “habit” in Edwards's thought. But this article does not make the comparison with behaviorism nor does it clarify the distinction between regenerate and unregenerate habits, a distinction crucial to understanding Edwards's dual concept of the perception of beauty.
21 Edwards, “True Virtue,” Works, 2. 284.
22 Edwards, “The Mind,” (Anderson ed.) 6. 374.
23 Ibid., 345; Edwards, “Freedom of the Will,” Works, 2. 38.
24 Skinner, About Behaviorism, 246.
25 Edwards, “Men Naturally God's Enemies,” Works, 4. 42–43.
26 Edwards, “True Virtue,” Works, 2. 300; Edwards, “Freedom of the Will,” Works, 2. 129.
27 Skinner, About Behaviorism, 235, 88.
28 Edwards, “The Nature of True Virtue,” contains the best examples.
29 Edwards, “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,” Works, 4. 315.
30 Edwards, “Religious Affections,” Works, 3. 38, 139–40.
31 Edwards, “Revival of Religion in New England,” Works, 3. 337–38.
32 Edwards, “Religious Affections,” Works, 3. 39.
33 Edwards, , “Diary,” The Works of President Edwards in Ten Volumes (Dwight, Sereno, ed.; New York: Converse, 1829) 1. 92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
34 Edwards, “Extracts from his Diary,” Works, 1. 9.
35 Edwards, “Religious Affections,” Works, 3. 188.
36 Ibid., 227, 71.
37 Edwards, “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” Works, 4; Edwards, “Religious Affections,” Works, 3. 114.
38 Skinner, About Behaviorism, 231. It is for this reason that Skinner often gives the impression of believing that ideas play no part in human behavior, as if humans were simply mechanical devices reacting without thought. He prefers to speak of stimulus and response and to avoid the mental connection between them. To speak, as Edwards did, of ideas and “inclinations,” would to Skinner be to flirt with the fallacy of “mentalism.” He is skeptical about the possibility of actually observing what happens in the nervous system. Still, some form of “mentalist” theory is needed to fill the gap between stimulus and response even in Skinner's system. The role played by ideas and beliefs in “ego psychology” can be seen as a modern equivalent to Edwards's stress on “prejudices” and “inclinations.”
39 Edwards, “The Mind,” (Anderson ed.) 6. 344, 353.
40 Ibid., 375.
41 Melville, Herman, “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” The Works of Herman Melville (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963) 13. 129Google Scholar.