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² “I believe that Judaism knows of no revealed religion in the sense in which Christians understand this term. The Israelites possess a divine legislation—laws, commandments, ordinances, rules of life, instruction in the will of God as to how they should conduct themselves in order to attain temporal and eternal felicity. Propositions and prescriptions of this kind were revealed to them by Moses in a miraculous and supernatural manner, but not doctrinal opinions, no saving truths, no universal propositions of reason” (Mendelssohn, Moses, Jerusalem, or, On Religious Power and Judaism [trans. Arkush, Allan; Hanover/London: University Press of New England, 1983] 89–90).Google Scholar

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⁵ Miller, Perry, Jonathan Edwards (New York: Meridian, 1959).Google Scholar

⁶ See, e.g., Cherry, Conrad. The Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Reappraisal (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966).Google Scholar

⁷ Miller, Perry, “The Rhetoric of Sensation,” in idem, Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956) 167–83.Google Scholar

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⁹ Ibid., 193.

¹⁰ Calvin, John, Institutes of the Christian Religion (ed. McNeill, John T.; trans. Ford Lewis Battles; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977) 1. 551.Google Scholar

¹¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958) 24–25.Google Scholar

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¹³ This is Edwards's formulation of the fourth sign. Religious Affections, 266.

¹⁴ Ibid., 383.

¹⁵ Ibid., 426.

¹⁶ Varieties, 342.

¹⁷ For further discussion of this issue, see my Religious Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) 155–227.Google Scholar

¹⁸ James's conception of an empirical psychology, centering on introspection, was influenced by Franz Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. See Ryan, Judith, “American Pragmatism/Viennese Psychology,” Raritan 8 (1989) 45–54.Google Scholar

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²⁰ Varieties, 34.

²¹ The Letters of William James (ed. James, Henry; Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920) 1. 127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²² Varieties, 341–42.

²³ In addition to the examples he adduces, James's chief argument for his claim that religion is a matter of feeling or sense rather than of intellect is that a comparison across traditions would show feeling and practice to be invariant, while doctrines and beliefs vary widely. For a criticism of this argument, see Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 158–61.

²⁴ Varieties, 55.

²⁵ For a brief discussion of this thread that runs through the Varieties, and citation of the relevant passages, see Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 156–69.

²⁶ James, William, The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) 186 (original emphasis).Google Scholar

²⁷ Varieties, 335–36.

²⁸ Principles, 850. See also Chapter XVII, esp. 662–78.

²⁹ Varieties, 13.

³⁰ Ibid., 25 (original emphasis).

³¹ Ibid., 399–400.

³² This point is set out more fully in “The Will to Believe,” in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) 13–33.Google Scholar

³³ Varieties, 13; Peirce, Charles Sanders, “The Fixation of Belief,” in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (ed. Hartshorne, Charles and Weiss, Paul; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934)5. par. 358–87.Google Scholar

³⁴ Peirce says that a person who sees that any of her beliefs are determined by something extraneous to the facts should experience doubt about those beliefs. He recommends a method “by which our beliefs may be determined [originally “caused”] by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something on which our thinking has no effect” (Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” in Collected Papers V, par. 384).

³⁵ See, e.g, Shope, Robert K., The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).Google Scholar

³⁶ Varieties, 193.

³⁷ “A Faithful Narrative,” in The Great Awakening, 130–211.

³⁸ “Some Thoughts Concerning the Revival,” in The Great Awakening, 331 —41.

³⁹ Varieties, 223–24.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 221.

⁴¹ Ibid., 34. For “thick description,” see Geertz, Clifford, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 3–30.Google Scholar

⁴² Varieties, 34.

⁴³ Religious Affections, 197 (original emphasis).

⁴⁴ For more on this distinction, see Proudfoot, Religious Experience, 190–227.

⁴⁵ An earlier version of this article was delivered as the William James Lecture at Harvard Divinity School in November 1987.