¹ See Armogathe, Jean-Robert, “Proofs of the Existence of God,” in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (ed. Garber, Daniel and Ayers, Michael; trans. Carlson, Thomas A. and Garber, Daniel; 2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 1:305–30Google Scholar, esp. 305–9.

² Secundæ responsiones; CSM 2:164 / B Op 1:997 / AT 7:235.

³ See, in particular, Dutton, Blake D., “Suarezian Foundations of Descartes’ Ontological Argument,” The Modern Schoolman 20 (1993) 245–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scribano, Emanuela, L’esistenza di Dio. Storia della prova ontologica da Descartes a Kant (Rome: Laterza, 1994Google Scholar; French transl.: L’existence de Dieu. Histoire de la preuve ontologique de Descartes à Kant [trans. Charles Barone; Paris: Seuil, 2002]); Goudriaan, Aza, Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis bei Suárez und Descartes. Im Zusammenhang mit der nederländischen reformierten Theologie und Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History; Leiden: Brill, 1999)Google Scholar; and Secada, Jorge, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ As translated in CSM 2:4; Meditationes, Epistola dedicatoria; B Op 1:684 / AT 7:4, 8–13: “Addamque etiam tales esse, ut non putem ullam viam humano ingenio patere, per quam meliores inveniri unquam possint: cogit enim me causæ necessitas, et gloria Dei, ad quam totum hoc refertur, ut hic aliquanto liberius de meis loquar quam mea fert consuetudo.”

⁵ As translated in CSMK, 150; To Mersenne, July 7, 1640; B, 1232–1234 / AT 3:126, 23–127, 1: “fait voir et approuver par divers Docteurs, et si je puis, par le Corps de la Sorbonne.”

⁶ As translated in CSMK, 153; To Mersenne, September 30, 1640; B, 1284 / AT 3:184, 18–20: “je le dédierais, si vous le trouvez bon, à Mrs de la Sorbonne en général, afin de les prier d’être mes protecteurs en la cause de Dieu.” The Meditationes would be published with the notice “Cum Privilegio et Approbatione Doctorum,” which explains why scholars sometimes claim that the approbation was in fact accorded: see Armogathe, Jean-Robert, “L’approbation des Meditationes par la Faculté de Théologie de Paris (1641),” Bulletin cartésien 21 (1994) 1–3Google Scholar; Hatfield, Gary, Descartes and the “Meditations” (London: Routledge, 2003) 44Google Scholar. However, there are at least three reasons for concluding that the Meditationes never received the approbation: 1) Descartes's complaint in his letter of January 19, 1642 to Guillaume Gibieuf, who had tried to plead with the Sorbonne for him (To Gibieuf, January 19, 1642; B, 1561 / AT 3:473, 13–474, 8); 2) the lack of the approbation in the first edition of the Meditationes (Paris: Soly, 1641); 3) the fact that in the second edition (Amsterdam: Elzevier, 1642) the notice “Cum Privilegio et Approbatione Doctorum” was deleted. See Baillet, Adrien, La vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes (2 vols.; Paris: Horthemels, 1691; repr., New York: Garland, 1987) 2:137Google Scholar; Adam, Charles, Vie et œuvres de Descartes. Étude historique (Paris: Cerf, 1910 = AT 12) 302Google Scholar; AT 3:419 n.; Crapulli, Giovanni, “La prima edizione delle Meditationes de prima philosophia di Descartes e il suo ‘esemplare ideale,’” Studia cartesiana 1 (1979) 37–90Google Scholar; and van Otegem, Matthijs, A Bibliography of the Works of Descartes (1637–1704) (2 vols.; Quaestiones infinitae 38; Utrecht: Zeno, 2002) 1:160Google Scholar. It should be added also that the fact that the Meditationes did not receive the approbation is one of the arguments addressed against Descartes by Gassendi in the Disquisitio metaphysica, Scribendi occasio, inst. 3: “Abfuit sublimis Facultas, ut votis tuis annueret” (Gassendi, Pierre, Disquisitio metaphysica seu dubitationes et instantiæ adversus Renati Cartesii Metaphysicam et Responsa [ed. Rochot, Bernard; Paris: Vrin, 1962] 21Google Scholar).

⁷ Meditationes, Epistola dedicatoria; B Op 1:686 / AT 7:6, 19–20.

⁸ See Baillet, La vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes, 2:101.

⁹ Gouhier, Henri, La pensée religieuse de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1924; 2nd ed., 1972)Google Scholar; Espinas, Alfred, Descartes et la morale (Études sur l’histoire de la philosophie de l’action; 2 vols.; Paris: Bossard, 1925)Google Scholar; and Laporte, Jean, Le rationalisme de Descartes (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1945; 2nd ed., 1950)Google Scholar. For a recent theological approach see also Teologia fondamentale. Testi antologici (ed. Antonio Sabetta and Pierluigi Sguazzardo; Rome: Città nuova, 2004) 71–80.

¹⁰ Gilson, Étienne, La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie (Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine; Paris: Alcan, 1913; 2nd ed., Paris: Vrin, 1987)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Hardouin, Jean, Athei detecti, in Opera varia (Amsterdam: Du Sauzet, 1733) 1–273Google Scholar. On Hardouin's interpretation of Descartes, see Fabro, Cornelio, Introduzione all’ateismo moderno (Cultura 28; Rome: Studium, 1964) 99–126Google Scholar.

¹² Spitzel, Theophil Gottlieb, Scrutinium atheismi historico-ætiologicum (Augsburg: Prætorius, 1663)Google Scholar. See also Fabro, Introduzione all’ateismo moderno, 111 and 120–22.

¹³ Schoock, Maarten, Admiranda Methodus novæ philosophiæ Renati Des Cartes (Utrecht: Janssonius van Waesberge, 1643; repr., Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger, 2010)Google Scholar. See also the French translation La querelle d’Utrecht. René Descartes et Martin Schoock (trans. Theo Verbeek; Paris: Les impressions nouvelles, 1988) 153–320. On Voetius, see Duker, A. C., Gisbertus Voetius (4 vols; Leiden: Brill, 1897–1915; repr., Leiden: Groen, 1989)Google Scholar; Janse, L., Gisbertus Voëtius (1589–1676) (Banier bibliotheek voor het gezin; Utrecht: De Banier, 1971)Google Scholar; De scholastieke Voetius. Een luisteroefening aan de hand van Voetius’ “Disputationes selectæ” (ed. W. J. van Asselt and E. Dekker; Zoetermeer, Holland: Boekencentrum, 1995); van Asselt, W. J., “G. Voetius, gereformeerd scholasticus,” in Vier eeuwen theologie in Utrecht. Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de theologische faculteit aan de Universiteit Utrecht (ed. de Groot, Aart and de Jong, Otto J.; Zoetermeer, Holland: Boekencentrum, 2001) 99–108Google Scholar; Goudriaan, Aza, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625–1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen (Brill's Series in Church History 26; Leiden: Brill, 2006)Google Scholar; and Beck, Andreas J., Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676). Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 92; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the controversy between Voetius and Descartes, see Thomas Arthur McGahagan, “Cartesianism in the Netherlands, 1639–1676: The New Science and the Calvinist Counter-Reformation” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1976); Verbeek, Theo, “Voetius en Descartes,” in De onbekende Voetius. Voordrachten wetenschappelijk symposium Utrecht 3 maart 1989 (ed. van Oort, J.et al.; Kampen, Holland: Kok, 1989) 200–219Google Scholar; idem, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy, 1637–1650 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992); idem, “Descartes and the Problem of Atheism: The Utrecht Crisis,” Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis / Dutch Review of Church History 71 (1991) 211–23, esp. 213; van Ruler, J. A., The Crisis of Causality: Voetius and Descartes on God, Nature, and Change (Leiden: Brill, 1995)Google Scholar; and idem, “Waren er muilezels op de zesde dag? Descartes, Voetius en de zeventiende-eeuwse methodenstrijd,” in Kometen, monsters en muilezels. Het veranderende natuurbeeld en de natuurwetenschap in de zeventiende eeuw (ed. Florike Egmond, Eric Jorink, and Rienk Vermij; Haarlem, Holland: Arcadia,1999) 120–32.

¹⁴ Lettre apologétique de M. Descartes aux magistrats de la ville d’Utrecht, contre MM. Voétius père et fils; B Op 2:116–92 / AT 8.2: 201–73. See also Verantwoordingh van Renatus Descartes aen d’Achtbare Overigheit van Uitrecht. Een onbekende Descartes-tekst (ed. Erik-Jan Bos; Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996) and the French translation in La Querelle d’Utrecht (ed. Verbeek), 406–37.

¹⁵ See Bos, Erik-Jan, “Descartes's Lettre Apologétique aux Magistrats d’Utrecht: New Facts and Materials,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1999) 415–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Schoock, Admiranda methodus, 13: “Etenim si verba semper virtutem arguerent, iisque tuto fides adhiberi deberet, ab Atheismi levissima etiam suspicione homo noster alienissimus esset.”

¹⁷ Schoock, Admiranda methodus, 262: “Ut alia enim multa loca passim in sex Meditationibus occurrentia omittamus, in ipsa Dedicatoria epistola ad Sorbonam parisiensem evidenter ac audacter satis ostendit se Atheismi suspicione nequaquam lavorare velle.”

¹⁸ Schoock, Admiranda methodus, 262: “Similibus verborum ampullis Atheismi suspicionem a se averuncare laborabat Cæsar Vaninus, et tamen publice Tolosæ est combutus non tantum quod Atheus esset, sed Atheismi Apostolus” (quoted in Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670 / AT 8.2:174, 25–27). On the question of Vanini's atheism, see Scribano, Emanuela, “Le tracce dell’ateo. Da Lessius a Descartes via Vanini, Mersenne e Petit,” Rivista di storia della filosofia 62 (2007) 677–98Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Schoock, Admiranda methodus, xiii (quoted in Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1644–46 / AT 8.2:142, 1–6): “Cognovi hominem cum Vaninio paria facere, et dum videri vult Atheos Achilleis argumentis oppugnare, subdole ac admodum occulte Atheismi venenum iis affricare, qui anguem in herba latitantem præ ingenii imbecillitate ubique deprehendere non possunt.”

²⁰ As translated in CSM 2:5; Meditationes, Epistola dedicatoria; B Op 1:684 / AT 7: 4, 13–15: “Atqui quamtumvis certas et evidentes illas putem, non tamen ideo mihi persuadeo ad omnium captum esse accommodatas.”

²¹ A Dutch version of the Epistola ad Voetium was published at the same time as the Latin edition: Brief van Rene Des Cartes, aen den vermaerden D. Gisbertus Voetius (Amsterdam: Van Baardt, 1643).

²² Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1567 / AT 8.2:65, 5–8: “Non opus sit aliis argumentis ad probandum eam, non ab illo cujus nomen feret, vel certe non ab illo solo, sed præcipue a te conscribi.” See also Lettre apologétique; B Op 2:117–93 / AT 8.2:201–73.

²³ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670 / AT 8.2:175, 22–25: “Quamvis enim quis, putans refutare Atheismum, rationes afferat quæ ad hoc non sufficiant, imperitiæ tantum, non ideo statim Atheismi, est accusandus.”

²⁴ Descartes refers here (see also B Op 1:1668 / AT 8.2:173, 11–12) to the disputations defended by Voetius on June 22 and 29 and July 6 and 13, 1639: Disputationum theologicarum . . . de atheismo . . . sub præsidio D. Gisberti Voetii . . . tueri conabor Gualterus de Bruyn (Utrecht: Roman, 1639). A revised version of the disputations, containing explicit references to Descartes, would be published by Voetius in 1648–1649 in Disputationes theologicæ selectæ (5 vols; vols. 1–3: Utrecht: Janssonius van Waesberge, 1648–1659; vol. 4: Amsterdam: Janssonius van Waesberge and Weyerstraet, 1667; vol. 5: Utrecht: Smytegelt, 1669). The text of the disputations of 1639 was discovered by Theo Verbeek: see “From ‘Learned Ignorance’ to Scepticism: Descartes and Calvinist Orthodoxy,” in Scepticism and Irreligion in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (ed. Richard H. Popkin and Arjo Vanderjagt; Leiden: Brill, 1993) 31–45. A partial English translation of the Disputationes theologicæ selectæ is available in Reformed Dogmatics: J. Wollebius, G. Voetius, F. Turretin (ed. and trans. John W. Beardslee III; Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

²⁵ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670 / AT 8.2:175, 25–176, 4: “Quin etiam profecto, cum Atheorum refutatio sit difficillima, ut ipse testaris in ultimo tuo libro de Atheismo, non omnes qui contra Atheos infeliciter certarunt habendi sunt imperiti.”

²⁶ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670–72 / AT 8.2:176, 4–8: “Vide Gregorium de Valentia, Theologum solidissimum et celeberrimum: ille refutat omnia argumenta quibus usus est D. Thomas ad existentiam Dei probandam, et invalida esse ostendit. Idemque etiam alii graves et pii theologi fecerunt.”

²⁷ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670–72 / AT 8.2:176, 8–16: “Adeo ut ab iis qui vestro more loquuntur, dici possit de D. Thoma (qui, si quis unquam alius, ab omni Atheismi suspicione quammaxime fuit remotus), ejus argumenta contra Atheos, penitius inspecta et examinata, elumbia et ficulnea deprehendi; eademque comparatio de illo cum Vanino possit institui, et ausim addere (absit tamen invidia dicto) aptius quam de me, quia mea argumenta nunquam fuerunt ita refutata.”

²⁸ To La Thuillerie, January 22, 1644; B Op 1:1844 / AT 4:89, 19–21: “Diserte affirmabat me hic, tanquam alterum Vaninum, Tholosæ combustum, subdole et admodum occulte Atheismum docere.”

²⁹ To the University of Groningen, February 17, 1645; B Op 1:1974 / AT 4:178, 8–13: “Nulla manifestior calumnia, quam cujus nulla probatio est, nisi ex qua contrarium ejus quod affirmatur possit inferri: ut ille non alio argumento me Atheum probat, quam quod scripserim contra Atheos, et, multorum judicio, non male.”

³⁰ For a general presentation, see Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 13–33.

³¹ Despite its relevance, both from a theoretical and historical point of view, and despite the long debate that it generated at the time, Cajetan's interpretation of the five ways has never received systematic attention in the modern literature. There are, however, two excellent works in which the theoretical relevance of this topic is stressed: O’Brien, Thomas C., Metaphysics and the Existence of God: A Reflexion on the Question of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: Thomist Press, 1960) 38–39, 235–40, and esp. 241Google Scholar, and Twetten, David B., “Clearing a ‘Way’ for Aquinas: How the Proof from Motion Concludes to God,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 70 (1996) 259–78Google Scholar, esp. 267–68 and 275–76. From a more historical perspective, there is Carlo Giacon, I grandi commentatori di San Tommaso (vol. 1 of La seconda scolastica; Archivum philosophicum Aloisianum, series 2, 3; 3 vols; Milan: Bocca, 1944–1950; 2nd ed., Turin: Nino Aragno, 2001) 133–40. See also Brockhoff, J., “Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von der Erkennbarkeit Gottes,” Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie 3 (1889) 182–97Google Scholar, at 184–85; Geny, Paul, “A propos des preuves thomistes de 1’existence de Dieu,” Revue de philosophie 31 (1924) 575–601Google Scholar, at 577; van Steenberghen, Fernand, Le problème de l’existence de Dieu dans les écrits de S. Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l’Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1980) 296Google Scholar; Elders, Leo J., The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1990) 131 n. 264Google Scholar; Johnson, Mark F., “Why Five Ways?,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 65 (1991) 107–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 110; and Stéphane-Marie Barbellion, Les “preuves” de l’existence de Dieu. Pour une relecture des cinq voies de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Cerf, 1999) 279–80. See also the writings of Mauro Mantovani: “Ratio e demonstratio: L’argomentazione dell’esistenza di Dio. I commenti universitari alle cinque vie del maestro Juan de Guevara (OSA, 1518–1600),” in Momenti del logos. Ricerche del “Progetto LERS” (logos, episteme, ratio, scientia) in memoria di Marilena Amerise e di Marco Arosio (ed. Flavia Carderi, Mauro Mantovani, and Graziano Perillo; Rome: Nuova cultura, 2012) 351–383, esp. 353 and 381–82; An Deus sit (Summa Theologiæ I, q.2). Los commentarios de la “primera Escuela” de Salamanca (Salamanca: Editorial San Esteban, 2007); and La discussione sull’esistenza di Dio nei teologi domenicani a Salamanca dal 1561 al 1669. Studio sui testi di Sotomayor, Mancio, Medina, Astorga, Báñez e Godoy (Rome: LAS, 2011).

³² Thomas de Vio Cajetanus, Commentaria in primam partem “Summæ theologiæ” (1507), q. 2, a. 3, n. 3, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (Leonine edition; Rome: Typographia polyglotta, 1882 –) 4:32: “Circa has rationes in communi, advertendum est diligenter quod possunt afferri ad duo. Primo, ad concludendum illud ens incorporeum, immateriale, æternum, summum, immutabile, primum, perfectissimum, etc., quod et quale Deum tenemus esse. Et sic istæ rationes habent plurimum disputationis: eo quod prima via . . . non ducit ad motorem magis immobilem quam sit anima intellectiva; secunda . . . non ducit nisi ad corpus cæleste et ejus motorem; reliquarum quoque nulla magis sursum ducere videtur. Et ad hoc intentum non afferuntur hoc in loco hæ rationes, ut nunc nunc patebit. Alio modo afferri possunt ad concludendum quædam prædicata inveniri in rerum natura, quæ secundum veritatem sunt propria Dei: non curando quomodo vel qualiter sint, etc. Et ad hoc intentum hic afferuntur: et sunt nihil fere difficultatis habentes secundum philosophiam.”

³³ Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiæ, I, q. 3, in Opera omnia 4:35–49.

³⁴ De Vio, Commentaria, 4:32: “Et ut melius intelligatur quod dicimus, singillatim explanando dicitur quod primæ viæ ex parte motus, sat est quod inferatur, ergo datur primum movens immobile, non curando utrum illud sit anima cæli aut mundi: hoc enim quæretur in sequenti quæstione.”

³⁵ Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiæ, I, q. 3, in Opera omnia 4:107–13.

³⁶ De Vio, Commentaria, 4:32: “Secundæ quoque viæ ex parte efficientis, sat est quod ducat ad primum efficiens, non curando an illud sit corpus vel incorporeum: hoc enim quæretur in sequenti quæstione. Tertiæ vero viæ ex parte necessarii, sat est quod ducat ad primum necessarium non ex alio, non curando an sit unum vel plura: hoc enim quæretur in questione XI. Quartæ quoque viæ, ex gradibus rerum, sat est ducere ad maxime ens, verum, bonum, nobile a quo sunt omnium participationes. Et similiter quintæ viæ, ex gubernatione, sat est ducere ad primum gubernantem per intellectum, quicumque sit ille.”

³⁷ I think that Cajetan employs the term “proprium” here in the Aristotelian sense, as a predicate that belongs to the subject alone and necessarily (Aristotle, Top. 102a20–25). See Twetten, “Clearing a ‘Way’ for Aquinas,” 266: “A proof's nominal definition, for Thomas, must be proper to God; that is, it must belong to God and only to God—it must be convertible with ‘God.’”

³⁸ De Vio, Commentaria, 4:32: “Omnia enim hæc prædicata, scilicet movens immobile, primum efficiens, necessarium non ex alio, maxime ens, et primum gubernans intelligendo, sunt secundum veritatem propria Deo: et ideo, concludendo hæc inveniri in rerum natura, concluditur directe, quasi per accidens, quod Deus est, idest, Deus non ut Deus, sed ut habens talem conditionem, est; et consequenter, ipsum substratum, scilicet Deus ut Deus, est.”

³⁹ On the historical importance of Báñez's Scholastica commentaria, see Belda, Juan Plans, La Escuela de Salamanca y la renovación de la teología en el siglo XVI (Madrid: Biblioteca de autores cristianos, 2000) 918Google Scholar. On Báñez's criticism of Cajetan, see Mortimer J. Adler, “The Demonstration of God's Existence,” The Thomist 5 (1943) 188–218, at 189–90; Twetten, “Clearing a ‘Way’ for Aquinas,” 267–68 and 276; and Mantovani, La discussione sull’esistenza di Dio, 266–69. See also Knasas, John F. X., “Ad Mentem Thomæ: Does Natural Philosophy Prove God?,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 61 (1987) 209–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ Báñez, Domingo, Scholastica commentaria in universam primam partem Angelici Doctoris D. Thomæ, in duos tomos divisa (2 vols; Venice: Bertano, 1602)Google Scholar I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:137: “Tertio notandum est, quod hæ rationes ad duo possunt afferri. Primo ad probandum esse in rerum natura ens quoddam infinitum, immateriale, etc. quale dicimus esse Deum. Secundo, ad concludendum inveniri in natura quædam prædicata, quæ secundum veritatem sunt propria Deo, non curando quomodo illi conveniant.”

⁴¹ Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:137: “Cajetanus in hoc articulo dicit rationes istas quasi per accidens concludere Deum esse, scilicet quod invenitur primus motor, quod est prædicatum proprium Dei secundum veritatem. Hæc tamen sententia falsa est.”

⁴² Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:137: “Et probatur primo. Nam vel prædicata, quæ hic de Deo concluduntur, sunt propria Deo, vel communia sibi, et corpori cælesti, sive motori ejus. Si primum, ergo male docet Cajetanus per has rationes non concludi motorem magis immobilem, quam anima intellectiva vel forma cæli. Si secundum, ergo non concludunt aliqua prædicata, quæ secundum veritatem sunt propria Deo: siquidem communia, non sunt propria. Nam si hoc commune tantum concluditur sequitur, neque etiam per accidens, istas rationes probare, Deum esse. Nam illud prædicatum motor immobilis, non curando an aliquo modo saltim per accidens sit mobilis, potest competere alteri quam Deo, scilicet intelligentiæ motrici cœli, ergo etiam si probetur, hujusmodi motorem esse, nihil proprium de Deo probatur.”

⁴³ Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:137: “Nam prædicata, quæ in cæteris rationibus probantur de Deo, non possunt alteri ab ipso competere. v.g. esse primum efficiens, ens non ab alio, ens omnium perfectissimum, ergo directe istis rationibus probatur, Deum esse.”

⁴⁴ Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, 1:137: “Licet omnes illæ rationes simul sumptæ non probent immediate et explicite, Deum esse, et multo minus, Deum esse illud ens perfectissimum, quo perfectius quid excogitari nequit (hoc enim reservatur ad probandum in sequentibus quæstionibus) nihilominus rationes illæ efficacissime probant, quod in rerum natura reperiuntur perfectiones quædam, et proprietates, quæ alteri quam Deo nequeunt competere, et ex consequenti virtualiter, et implicite probant, Deum esse. Nam prima ratio convincit reperiri in rerum natura primum movens immobile, et sic aliæ probant efficaciter alias proprietates, quæ soli Deo convenire possunt.”

⁴⁵ Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, 1:137: “Ita sentiunt Capre. in I. d. 3. q. 1 Ferr. I. con. gen. cap. 13. circa secundam rationem D. Thom.” See John Capreolus, Defensiones theologiæ divi Thomæ Aquinatis (ed. Ceslai Paban and Thomas Pègues; 7 vols.; Tours: Cattier, 1900–1908) lib. 1, dist. 3, q. 1, 1:164–72; Francis Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), Commentaria in “Summam contra Gentiles” St Thomæ Aquinatis (1522), lib. 1, cap. 13, n. 22.3, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia, 13:39a.

⁴⁶ For more details on the history of the crisis of the five ways, see Agostini, Igor, “Suárez e Descartes e il problema della dimostrazione dell’esistenza di Dio,” in Francisco Suárez and His Legacy: The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy (ed. Sgarbi, Marco; Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2010) 169–204Google Scholar. See also O’Brien, Metaphysics and the Existence of God, 38–44.

⁴⁷ Zumel, Francisco, In primam D. Thomæ partem commentaria (2 vols.; Venice: Prati, 1597)Google Scholar I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:75b: “Caietanus in hoc articulo notat, quod rationes, quæ adducuntur ad probandum esse unum Deum . . . non multum probant: imo habent ingentem difficultatem. . . . Istæ demonstrationes non colligunt explicite et formaliter Deum esse.”

⁴⁸ de Molina, Luis, Commentaria in primam Divi Thomæ partem, in duos tomos divisa (2 vols.; Venice: Societas minima, 1602–1604)Google Scholar I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:38b: “Notat Cajetanus, non afferri ad probandum, Deum existere, quatenus ens quoddam a concretione materiæ, ac mutatione liberum est, etc. sed solum ad probandum prædicata quædam, quæ Deo conveniunt, ut movens immotum, primam causam etc. existere in rerum natura. In progressu namque ostenduntur alia ipsius Dei attributa, necnon esse unum tantum, et non plures.”

⁴⁹ John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot), Cursus theologicus (vols. 1–3; Paris: Desclée et Socii, 1931–1937) q. 2, a. 1, 419a: “Quinque rationes principales elegit D. Th. in hoc. art. 3. ad probandum Deum esse; ex quibus, ut advertit Cajetanus (in præsenti), directe probat quinque conditiones, seu attributa divinitatis, quæ non possunt inveniri nisi in ente increato; et sic illis probatis, remanet probatum dari aliquod ens increatum.” On the importance of Poinsot's Cursus theologicus, see Ramón Ceñal, “La filosofia española del siglo XVII,” Revista de la Universidad de Madrid 11 (1962) 373–410, esp. 382. See also Forlivesi, Marco, “Le edizioni del Cursus theologicus di Johannes a S. Thoma,” in Divus Thomas (Bon.) 93 (1994) 9–56Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Mariales, Xantes, Bibliotheca interpretum ad universam “Summam theologiæ” Divi Thomæ Aquinatis Ecclesiæ Doctoris (4 vols.; Venice: Combi and La Noú, 1660)Google Scholar controv. 14, c. 6, 1:28: “Inter nostrates iurgium magnum invenio, utrum D. Thomæ Aristotelisque discursus, directe, absolute probent Deum esse; an potius solum indirecte?”

⁵¹ Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor. In quibus omnes materiæ, quæ continentur in “Summa theologica” D. Thomæ Aquinatis, ordine explicantur (4 vols.; Venice: Ciotti, 1592) pa. 1, q. 2, punct. 3, 1:83: “Est autem observandum, quod quamvis nulla hujusmodi rationum concluderet, tamen pro certo nihilominus habendum esset id quod diximus punto precedente, nempe demonstrari posse quid sit Deus. Neque certum est ex fide, quod per hanc vel illam rationem demonstretur.”

⁵² Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor, 1:83: “Sed tamen defendemus etiam has divi Thomæ rationes.”

⁵³ Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor, 1:84: “Concedo, nullam harum rationum, aut omnes simul provare per se, quod primum illud movens, sit etiam unum numero, infinito, immateriale, etc. Cæterum ex hoc non sequitur aliud, quam non probari his rationibus quis sit Deus, seu qualis sit natura Dei, prout nostro modo imperfecte potest etiam a nobis cognosci, ut in sequentibus quæstionibus videbimus. Minime autem inde sequitur, non probari his rationibus Deum esse, eo modo probationis, qui sufficiat ad satisfaciendum quæstioni, an est, de qua tantum iam agimus.”

⁵⁴ Thomas Aquinas, I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2um, in Opera omnia 4:30b: “Quæstio quid est, sequitur ad quæstionem an est.” See Aristotle, An. post. 1.1.74 a; 2.8.93a.

⁵⁵ Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor, 1:84: “Et ratio est, nam huic questioni an est, satisfiat per se, satis est probari veritatem illorum conceptuum, quos imperfecte et confuse solemus in mente formare, cum rei nomen audimus; ita scilicet ut constet ex probatione, eos conceptus non esse commentitios, sed aliquod ens omnino esse in rerum natura, quod illis respondeat. Probare vero conceptus alios magis distinctos, quibus ulterius cognoscimus, nam cujusmodi sit ea res, pertinet ad quæstionem quid sit, non autem ad quæstionem an est. Alias istæ duæ quæstiones minime distinguerentur.”

⁵⁶ Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor, 1:85: “Quocirca, cum Caietanus hic negat, probari per se his rationibus divi Thomæ Deum esse . . . et concedit tantum, id probari per accidens . . . non satis distinxisse videtur inter quæstionem an est, et quid est.”

⁵⁷ Revius, Jakob, Methodi cartesianæ consideratio theologica (Leiden: De Vogel, 1648) 84Google Scholar: “Si viveret Valentia, laudes quas ei assentator Cartesius adscribit, non impedirent, quo minus tam atrocem iniuriam ad animum revocarer. Tantum enim abest omnia Thomæ argumenta pro existentia Dei refutet, ut contra ea omnia contra adversariorum cavillationes defendeat” (also in Revius, Jakob, A Theological Examination of Cartesian Philosophy: Early Criticisms (1647) [ed. Goudriaan, Aza; Leiden: Brill, 2002] 160Google Scholar).

⁵⁸ Although contemporaneous scholars also shared Revius's criticism (see, e.g., Aza Goudriaan's remarks in Theological Examination, by Revius, 4, 54), André Robinet has tried to clear Descartes of this accusation (Descartes. La lumière naturelle. Intuition, disposition, complexion [Paris: Vrin, 1999] 195–97). Robinet's point is that Descartes's reference to Gregory is correct because Gregory would accept, as Descartes does, the antithomistic thesis that the “quid sit” question precedes the “an sit.” Such an interpretation does not seem correct to me, for two reasons: first, Gregory does not hold the thesis attributed to him by Robinet; second, even supposing that Gregory does indeed have this thesis, he nevertheless defends Aquinas's five ways.

⁵⁹ As translated in CSM 2:29; Descartes, Meditationes, III; B Op 1:736 / AT 7:427–28: “Omnia enim diligentissime circumspexi, et nullum aliud potui hactenus reperire.” See also Descartes's Conversation with Burman (transl. with intr. and comment. by John Cottingham; Oxford: Clarendon, 1976) 12: “After a most careful survey of all the effects, he found none which would serve to prove God's existence except from the idea of God”; B OP 2: 1258 / AT 5:153: ‘Omnia effecta diligentissime circumspexit et nullum reperit quod Deum inferat praeter ejus ideam.”

⁶⁰ de Gamaches, Philippe, Summa theologica. Cum indice triplici quæstionum et capitum, rerum ac verborum, et locorum concionibus utilium (Paris: Sonnius, 1634)Google Scholar q. 2, cap. 2, 38b: “Respondemus non esse nunc quæstionem de singularitate, aut unitate numerica illius principiii, de ea enim inferius quæst. X. sicut nec quærimus nunc, an sit spirituale et incorporeum, an ternum et immutabile, etc. Quamvis enim veritas ex prædictis facile appareat, tamen istæ quæstiones sunt postea suis locis seorsim pertractandæ, nunc autem solum probamus tale principium supremum, et independens vere esse actu, eiusque existentia esse naturali lumine manifesta.”

⁶¹ Suárez, Francisco, Disputationes metaphysicæ, disp. 29, sect. 2, n. 5, in Opera omnia (28 vols.; Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1856–1878Google Scholar) 26:35b–36a: “Et ideo ad demonstrandum Deum esse non satis est ostendere dari in rerum natura ens quoddam necessarium et a se, nisi etiam probetur illud esse unicum et tale ut sit fons totius esse, a quo pendent et illud recipiunt omnia quæ ipsum esse quoquo modo participant. Hoc autem demonstrato, sufficienter ostenditur Deum esse; nam reliqua ejus attributa quæ cum hujusmodi ente necessariam connexionem habent, postea demonstranda sunt”; for English translation I have relied on The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28–29 (ed. and trans. John P. Doyle; South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2004) 85.

⁶² Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicæ, disp. 29, sect. 1, n. 41, 26:33b: “Nos non possumus demonstrare Deum esse nisi demonstrando aliquo modo quid sit, ut ex dicendis clarius patebit” (Metaphysical Demonstration, 80).

⁶³ Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicæ, disp. 29, sect. 3, n. 2, 26:47b–48a: “In Deo non possunt omnino seiungi hæ quæstiones eo quod et esse Dei sit quidditas Dei et proprietates illius esse, quibus ostendi potest illud esse proprium Dei, constituunt (ut ita loquamur) ipsam quidditatem et essentiam Dei” (Metaphysical Demonstration, 114–15).

⁶⁴ On this topic, see Scribano, L’existence de Dieu, 99–106.

⁶⁵ As translated in CSM 2:78; B Op 1:822 / AT 7:107, 25–108, 1: “In illa idea continetur quid sit Deus, saltem quantum a me potest intelligi; et, iuxta leges veræ Logicæ, de nulla unquam re quæri debet an sit, nisi prius quid sit intelligatur.”

⁶⁶ As translated in CSM 2:78; B Op 1:822 / AT 7:108, 3–6: “Illa est quæ docet non modo aliquam esse mei causam, sed præterea etiam in causa illa contineri omnes perfectiones, ac proinde illam Deum esse.”

⁶⁷ See Henry of Ghent, Summa quæstionum ordinarium theologiæ (Paris: Ascensius, 1520) 22.5, 134C; John Duns Scotus, Opera omnia (ed. Charles Balić et al.; Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950) 1.3.1, 3:6.

⁶⁸ As translated in CSM 3:165; To Mersenne, December 31, 1640; B Op 1:1356 / AT 3:272, 25–273, 3: “Je vous prie, à l’endroit où j’ai mis juxta leges Logicæ meæ, de mettre au lieu juxta leges veræ Logicæ; c’est environ le milieu de mes réponses ad Caterum, où il m’objecte que j’ai emprunté mon argument de S. Thomas. Et ce qui me fait ajouter meæ ou veræ au mot Logicæ, est que j’ai lu des Théologiens qui, suivant la logique ordinaire, quærunt prius de Deo quid sit, quam quæsiverint an sit.” On this point, see Landucci, Sergio, I filosofi e Dio (Rome: Laterza, 2005) 143Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ See Savini, Massimiliano, Johannes Clauberg. “Methodus cartesiana” et ontologie (de la philosophie, Bibliothèque d’histoire; Paris: Vrin, 2011) 102–9Google Scholar; 139–60.

⁷⁰ See esp. Aza Goudriaan, introduction to Theological Examination, by Revius, 1–61.

⁷¹ Revius, Jakob, Suarez repurgatus, sive syllabus “Disputationum metaphysicarum” Francisci Suarez . . . (Leiden: Heger, 1643) 207–9Google Scholar; 504–7; 518–19; 872. See the texts in Revius, Theological Examination, 181–90.

⁷² The texts are now available in Revius, Theological Examination, 63–108.

⁷³ Savini, Johannes Clauberg, 105.

⁷⁴ Revius, Methodi cartesianæ consideratio theologica, 84; also in Revius, Theological Examination, 160: “Argumenta Thomæ pro existentia Dei . . . omnia rejicit Cartesius.”

⁷⁵ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670–72 / AT 8.2:176, 16.

⁷⁶ Revius, Methodi cartesianæ consideratio theologica, 84; also in Revius, Theological Examination, 160: “Neve solus insanire videatur, Gregorium de Valencia Iesuitam sibi socium assciscit.”

⁷⁷ Andreæ, Tobias, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, opposita Jacobii Revii . . . “Considerationi theologicæ” quam vocat (2 vols.; Groningen: Collën, 1653–1654) 2:297Google Scholar: “Si diceret quod conetur defendere, nil haberem quod ipsum arguerem, sed nec ille eopse coargueret Cartesium, qui id non negavit, nec de eo quod conatus sit, voluerit, sibi propositum esse professus sit, sed de eo quod egerit, locutus est. At quod defendat falsum est. Quia, quæ profert quibus ea invalida ostendat, etsi conetur solvere, non tamen solide solvit, et sic quod Cartesius dixit revera ea reputat et invalida esse ostendit.”

⁷⁸ Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:300: “Sed tamen defendemus etiam has divi Thomæ rationes, nempe quia est Doctor Angelicus, cui sacramentum dixerat, et militare decreverat.”

⁷⁹ Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:299: “Id vero Cartesius negat, et nos cum eo, et MAXIME id inde sequi asseveramus.”

⁸⁰ Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:299: “Nec enim, ut perperam vulgo, quæstio An est, potest demonstrari aut determinari ante quæstionem Quid est, aut sejunctim ab ea, sive involvente demonstratione quidditatem, cujus existentiam debet inferre; nec concludens An est, non includens id QUID, quod esse demonstrandum est, vere concludit id esse vel existere, cum sit absurdum velle probare, existere, nescientem Quid aut de quo concludat.”

⁸¹ Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:300: “Et ita argumenta Cartesii concludunt de ipso Deo, de ente omnimodis perfecto, qualem homo natura concipere, et studio et revelatione accedente perfectius cognoscere potest: ut de ejus demonstrationibus dici nequeat, quod Valentia de argumentis Thomæ, neque singulis neque omnibus rationibus probari quasdam perfectiones sine quibus non est Deus, adeoque neque singulis neque omnibus probari Deum esse. Qui enim probat de ente omnimodis perfecto, vel omnes perfectiones habente, id existere, non omittit quasdam perfectiones, sine quibus non est Deus, proindeque nec deficit in probando, Deum esse; sed probat ipsum Deum esse, præter quem non queat esse tale ens, nec etiam cogitari possit ulla perfectio ulterior, quæ inesse debeat enti, cujus existentia demonstratur, ut id Deus esse agnoscatur, cui ei tributæ omnes.”

⁸² Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:301: “Quare, quod Valentia Cajetano reponit, Non satis distinxisse videri inter quæstionem AN EST et QUID EST, quod Revius ineptiens, idem de Cartesio dicit, ego de ipso Valentia, ipsoque Revio verius, nescisse distinguere illas quæstiones, aut saltem recte eas tractandi modum ignorasse.”

⁸³ Revius, Jakob, Kartesiomania, hoc est, furiosum nugamentum, quod Tobias Andreæ, sub titulo “Assertionis methodi cartesianæ,” orbi literato obstrusit, succincte ac solide confutatum (2 vols.; Leiden: Lopez de Haro, 1654)Google Scholar 2:203: “Quis similes præstigias unquam audivit? Refutat Valentia argumenta Thomæ . . . quia illa non recte defendit, id autem re ipsa refutare est.”

⁸⁴ Revius, Kartesiomania, 2:205–6: “Hactenus nihil audio moliri Gregorium adversus Thomam, sed potius pro eo. Nam illud, quamvis nulla harum rationum concluderet etc. hypotheticum est, alioqui dixisset, quamvis nulla concludat.”

⁸⁵ Revius, Kartesiomania, 2:205: “Sed Cartesius hic inscitia haud dubie peccavit, dum auctorem non inspectum in subsidium vocat. Assertor vero mavult eum Cartesio opponere, et quem ille pro se citat, atque ut ei fidem conciliet, theologum solidissimum et celeberrimum vocat, eum hic ut Cartesii adversarium introducit, et ineptissimum disputatorem esse persuasum vult.”