¹ It should be noted that Dante's poem differs from the innumerable visions of the Middle Ages, and from ancient katabasis literature, in that it contains a consistent philosophical allegory applicable to this life. The studies of Charles S. Singleton have examined this pattern in the poem and situated it in its historical context, and it is to those studies that this paper owes its view of the poem as a whole. See Commedia: Elements of Structure, Dante Studies 1 (Cambridge, 1957)Google Scholar, and Journey to Beatrice, Dante Studies 2 (Cambridge, 1958).Google Scholar

² Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, 2 (1145b,1.27).

³ In the Republic (VII, 529c) Socrates says that the turning within of the soul is the beginning of looking upwards: “in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards…” (Jowett). See also the famous allegory of the cave, Rep. VII, 516a ff., and the “turning of the eye” in 519b, 533d and Timaeus gid. According to Plotinus, death for the soul is to rest in matter. It must withdraw its eye from the mire and reascend (Enneads I, 8, 13; Bréhier I, 128). These are the ancient ancestors of the theme to which Dante alludes in the last sentence of a chapter in the Convivio (111,5): “O ineffabile sapienza che così ordinasti, quanto è povera la nostra mente a te comprendere! E voi a cui utilitade e diletto io scrivo, in quanta cechitade vivete, non levando li occhi suso a queste cose [the movements of the sun], tenendoli fissi nel fango de la vostra stoltezza!” For the influence of Plato's “turning of the eye” on the philosophical idea of conversion, see the succinct remarks of Dodds, E. R. (ed.) in Proclos, The Elements of Theology (Oxford, 1933), p. 218.Google Scholar Coupled with this strictly philosophical tradition there exists also the religious topos, common to pagan and Christian thought. See Psalm 120, I: “levavi oculos meos in montes, unde veniet auxilium meum.” In Conv. Ill, 12, 7, Dante tells us that “Nullo sensibile in tutto lo mondo e più degno di farsi essemplo di Dio che il sole.” For the conversion toward the light in St. Thomas, see S.T. I—II, 109, 6 resp.

⁴ “… pronus sum ad omne flagitium, ita me obruunt concupiscentiae fluctus, ut quotidie mergar, et in profundum peccatorum ruam.” Augustine, Sermo CCCLXV, PL 39, 1645, quoted by Singleton, “Sulla fiumana ove ’1 mar non ha vanto,” Romanic Review XXXIX, 4 (December, 1948), p. 274. This article explores the long patristic tradition evoked by Dante's simile. For the philosophical meaning of the “shipwrecked soul” in antiquity, see the notes of Waszink, J. H. (ed.) on Tertullian's De anima 52, 4 (Amsterdam, 1947, pp. 538–9).Google Scholar He quotes St. Ambrose's De bono mort. 8, 31: “denique iustis mors quietis est portus, nocentibus naufragium putatur” and suggests that such metaphoric shipwrecks may be dependent upon the helmsman-ship metaphor for the body and soul composite (Phaedrus 247c). In St. John Climacus’ Scala Paradisi, translated by a contemporary of Dante's we find the word “pelago” used repeatedly in the same sense as in Inferno I: “… lo grave, profondo e lo crudele pelago della vita tempestosa…. ” La Scala del Paradiso, ed. Antonio Ceruti (Bologna, 1874), p. 5.

⁵ Dante quotes the De finibus at least nine times in his works. See Moore, E., Studies in Dante (first series): Scripture and Classical Authors in Dante (Oxford, 1896), pp. 353–4.Google Scholar

⁶ Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum III, xiv, 48.

⁷ Ibid., IV, xxiv, 65.

⁸ Augustine, De sententia Jacobi liber, Epistola CLXVII, 13. PL 33, 738.

⁹ This translation is based upon the interpretation suggested by A. Pagliaro, “… lo passo che non lasciò già mai persona viva” in Studi Letterari: Miscellanea in onore di Santini, Emilio, Facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell’ Università di Palermo (Palermo, 1956), P. 109Google Scholar: “È palese che persona viva costituisce una unità concettuale, poichè viva è attributo di persona e non ha il valore predicativo che l'interpretazione corrente vi attribuisce. Si tratterà perciò di ‘persona viva’ nel senso più proprio di uomo che sia in vita, anima e corpo.” The quotation from the Psalms would seem to substantiate this reading, particularly since in the moral allegory, the summit of the mountain represents man's justification.

¹⁰ In the Convivio (III, 7, 5) Dante used water to symbolize corporeity. The angels are free of it altogether, the animals are totally submerged, while man holds the medius locus: “da una parte sia da materia libera, da un’ altra è impedita, sì come l'uomo ch'è tutto ne l'acqua fuor del capo, del quale non si può dire che tutto sia ne l'acqua nè tutto fuor da quella. …” Here the opposition body/soul is presented by the dyadic image of the Stoics. Man's mediate position in the ontological order corresponds to his position in the moral order — at least in this life.

¹¹ See Charles S. Singleton, Commedia: Elements of Structure, pp. 11–12.

¹² For a long history of the question before 1904, see D'Ovidio, Francesco, Nuovi Studi Danteschi (Milano, 1907), pp. 447–69.Google Scholar See also Guerri, , Di alcuni versi dotti della Divina Commedia (Città di Castello, 1908), pp. 51Google Scholar ff., and Mazzoni, G., Lectura Dantis (Roma, 1914), pp. 23Google Scholar ff., as well as many others. I have used D'Ovidio's study, pp. 452 ff., to summarize the various theories outlined in the following paragraph.

¹³ Natalino Sapegno, commenting upon this verse, settles for this “obvious” reading: “Di questo verso, tanto discusso, la spiegazione più ovvia resta tuttavia quella che ne dava il Boccaccio: ‘Mostra l'usato costume di coloro che salgono, che sempre si ferman più in su quel piè che più basso rimane.’” La Divina Commedia, ed. Sapegno (Firenze, 1955)1, 5.

¹⁴ De caelo II, ii, 285a.

¹⁵ Glossing Ephesians 1, 20 (“Et constituens ilium in dextera sua coelis”), he explains: “Quoniam Christus Dei motus est; motus autem in operatione est; operatio vero motus semper in dextera est; id circo Christus in dextera Dei est constitutus.” PL 8, 1250–1.

¹⁶ De anima III, x, 4331324. Averroes’ commentary assumes that it is the right which moves out first: “Quoniam autem motus animalis compositus est ex attractione et expulsione manifestum est, quoniam, quando pars dextra movetur a nobis et sustentati fuerimus super sinistram, tune quedam partes illius partis erunt expulse ad anterius et quedam attracte, et sunt partes que sunt posterius.” Comment. Magnum in Arist. De anima lib., ed. Crawford, F. Stuart, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi VI, i (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 525–6.Google Scholar

¹⁷ De motu animalium 8, 702a2i. St. Augustine alludes to this analysis in his De Genesi ad litteram (VIII, xxi, 41): “Denique nee in ambulando pes levatur, nisi alius fixus totum corpus ferat, donee ille qui motus est a loco unde fertur, ad locum quo fertur, immoto articulo sui cardinis innitatur.” PL 34, 388–9.

¹⁸ De hist, animal. II, ii, 498b.

¹⁹ Naturalis Historiae XI, 45. Similarly Joannes Philoponus recalled the principle that all motion begins on the right, when he commented upon De anima I, 3, 406b25: διò καἱ τὰ βάρη ἐπἱ τοὺς ὰριστεροὺς ἐπιτίθεμεν ὥμους, ἴνα εὔλυτα ἥ τὰ δεξιὰ τὰ ὴγούμενα τῆς κινήσεως. In Arist. de anima lib. comment., ed. Hayduck, M., Comment, in Arist. Graeca, vol. XV (Berlin, 1897)Google Scholar, p. 119,11. 30–31. Aristotle says nothing about left or right in this context, however, speaking merely in a general way of the movement imparted to the body by the soul.

²⁰ Quaestiones super de animalibus II, 3, ed. Filthaut, E., O.P. Opera Omnia XII (Monasterii Westfalorum, 1955), p. 110.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid., II, 7; pp. 112–3. He adds this remark, which will prove to be of relevance for the allegory of Dante's verse: “Pes enim sinister magis stabilis est, et ideo illi magis est innitendum, propter quod tardius movetur nisi a casu.” (Ibid.)

²² De caelo et mundo II, lectio II (Arist. 285a15–25). Opera Omnia XIX, p. 82.

²³ Ibid., p. 81.

²⁴ Inf. I, 19–21: “Allor fu la paura un poco queta/che nel lago del cor m'era durata/la notte ch'i'passai con tanta pieta.” In the Vita nuova (II, 4), Dante refers to this cavity of the heart as the “secretissima camera del cuore,” in which dwells “lo spirito della vita.” Boccaccio's commentary on the line adds that in this receptacle “abitano li spiriti vitali.” According to Aristotle, it was in the heart that the pneuma was gathered (De motu 8, 7O2a21) and, as we shall see, this spiritus applied alternate pushing and pulling forces to the muscles and tendons, enabling the body to move. For Albertus Magnus, the left foot was less agile because the heart “influit suam virtutem in partem dextram” (loc. cit.). The two expressions “lago del cor” and “piè fermo” both obviously allude to the Aristotelian physiology.

²⁵ Curtius, E. R. (European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Trask, W. R. [New York, 1953], pp. 136Google Scholar ff.) discusses corporal metaphors and remarks that the subject is relatively unexplored: “An entire volume could be filled with examples from patristic literature, alone.” He suggests that the source of such imagery is Plato's “eye of the soul,” and collects some of the more “baroque” examples (“ears of the mind,” “knees of the heart,” “the hand of my tongue”), but does not mention the pes animae which we are about to discuss.

²⁶ D'Ovidio (op. cit., p. 461) doubted the existence of an allegorical significance in this verse, and seemed not at all disturbed by the fact that the commentators (except Boccaccio) were quick to find one. Had he known of the many “feet-of-the-soul” images in the patristic tradition, however, one feels that his skepticism would have been somewhat shaken. Furthermore, as soon as one grants that “fermo” means “left,” there can be no doubt that the line is charged with allegorical meaning, for the distinction between right and left is very carefully made by Dante throughout his itinerary, as it was in nearly all vision literature, from the Pistis Sophia and the Acts of Thomas to the philosophical vision poems of Avicenna and its derivatives. By far the most famous of such distinctions derives from the use made of the Pythagorean “Y,” or bivium to represent at once the topography of the other world, and the crossroads of choice in this life. Servius' commentary on Aeneid VI, 136 is one of the most famous allegorizations of the left/right distinction in these terms (ed. Thilo [Leipzig, 1888], pp. 30–31), and the Visio Tnugdali admirably illustrates the use made of the ancient idea in medieval voyages to the other world: “Respondens angelus dixit ei: Benedicta sis, ne mireris; hec est mutatio dextere excelsi. Per aliam viam debemus redire in regionem nostram. Tu ergo benedic deum et sequere me” (ed. Wagner [Erlangen, 1882], p. 40). In the strictly philosophical allegory which E. Cerulli has suggested is one of the few antecedents of Dante's poem (“Les Pérégrinations de l'âme dans l'autre monde d'après un anonyme de la fin du XIIe siècle,” ed. M. T. d'Alverny, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du M.A., XIII [1940–42], pp. 283–4; Cerulli, E., II “Libro della Scala,” Studi e testi 150 [Città del Vaticano, 1949], pp. 519–22)Google Scholar, we find that heaven and hell represent the dispositiones animae: dextra et sinistra et media. “… dicitur dispositio dextra felicitas et sinistra miseria.” Here the left and right of the cosmos are associated with the “left and right” of the soul. In the light of all these currents it seems rash in the extreme to dismiss the possibility of allegory in Dante's verse. For the importance of direction or “orientation” in gnostic literature and in Avicenna's poetry, see Corbin, H., “Avicenne et le récit visionnaire,” Conferenze dell'Ist. Ital. per il medio ed estremo oriente VII (Roma, 1955), pp. 16–17.Google Scholar For the “Y” in the pagan otherworld, see Cumont, Franz, Lux Perpetua (Paris, 1949), p. 287Google Scholar, and for the entire history of the idea, see Panofsky, E., Herkules am Scheidenwege, Stud, der Bibl. Warburg (Leipzig, 1930)Google Scholar, esp. p. 62 ff.

²⁷ Phaedrus 253c.

²⁸ Timaeus 44c, trans. Chalcidius, ed. Wrobel (Leipzig, 1876), p. 50.

²⁹ Ibid., Commentarius IX, 211; p. 250.

³⁰ See, for example, St. Cyprian, Epistola LXXVII — Ad Nemesianum; PL 4, 429.

³¹ Stromatum VII, 7; PG 9, 456.

³² Liber de Isaac et anima VIII, 79; PL 14, 559.

³³ Jamblique, Traité de l'âme, trans. A. Festugière, O.P., in La Révélation d'Hèrmes Trismégiste, III, 226–27. For the sources of such metaphors, and for their philosophical importance, see Festugière's lengthy notes, ibid.

³⁴ De peccatorum meritis et remissione II, 13, 20. Corpus Script. Eccles. Latin. LX, 93.

³⁵ Ennaratio in Psalm. XCIV, 1; PL 37, 1217.

³⁶ Ibid., IX, 15; PL 36, 124.

³⁷ De fuga saeculi VII, 43; PL 14, 618.

³⁸ Philo, glossing Gen. 49, 16 (“Dan shall be a serpent by the way … that biteth the horse's heels….”), suggested that the soul is our road and that “the passions are likened to a horse: “For passion, like a horse, is … impulsive, full of wilfulness, and naturally restive.” (Legum allegoria II, 96; Philo I, trans. Colson, F. H. and Whitaker, G. H., Loeb Classical Library [London, 1929], p. 287.Google Scholar) This is obviously Plato's horse on the left. In Ambrose's day, it was thought that Gen. 3,15 (“he shall watch thy head, and thou shalt watch his heel”) meant that the serpent wounded Adam's heel, and Philo notes the difficulty involved in the meaning of that verse (ibid., p. 429). It may be that Ambrose blended the two passages from Genesis, and associated them with the Phaedrus myth.

³⁹ De sacramentis III, i, 4–7; PL 16, 452–3. For the ceremony of the washing of the feet, and the controversy it provoked, see Malvy, A., “Lavement des pieds” (art.), Dictionnaire de théologie catholique v. 9 (Paris, 1926), cols. 16–36.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ “… verum tamen cum in rebus humanis postea vivitur, utique terra calcatur. Ipsi igitur humani affectus, sine quibus in hac mortalitate non vivitur, quasi pedes sunt, ubi ex humanis rebus afficimur; et sic afficimur, ut si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipiamus.” In Joan. Evang. XIII, 6–10, Tract. LVI, 4; PL 35, 1788–89.

⁴¹ “respondents peccatum quidem actum dici et esse, non rem. Sed etiam in corpore claudicatio eadem ratione actus est, non res, quoniam res pes ipse vel corpus vel homo est, qui pede vitato claudicat nee tamen vitare potest claudicationem, nisi habuerit sanatum pedem, quod etiam in interiore homine fieri potest, sed gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum.” De perfectione iustitiae hominis III, 5; CSEL 42 (Leipzig, 1902), p. 5.

⁴² Sermo V, 8; PL 38, 58.

⁴³ Homiliarum in Ezechielem, lib. II, hom. II, 13; PL 76, 955–56.

⁴⁴ A few representative citations will suffice: Rabanus Maurus, De universo IV, 1; PL 111, 75; Comment, in Genesim III, 20 (where Gregory is quoted at length); PL 107, 610; Rupert Tuitiensis, In Exodum comment. II, 13 (De Trinitate); PL 167, 620; Hugh of St. Victor, Miscellanea III, 126; PL 697–8 (where Gregory is again quoted); all of Gregory's citations are quite naturally recalled by Garnerius of St. Victor, Gregorianum in his chapter LVI: “De pedibus”; PL 193, 233 ff.; finally Alanus ab Insulis faithfully recalls Augustine: ”Lavi pedes meos, id est affectus meos purgavi ab omni saeculari cura et concupiscentia….” Elucidatio in Cant, canticorum V; PL 210, 86.

⁴⁵ Pietro quoted Augustine Ennar. in Psalm. IX, 15. He then concluded that the pilgrim was limping: “Igitur … pes auctoris, idest affectio in quo magis adhuc firmabatur, erat inferior, quod adhuc ad infimi terrena relicta aliquantulum magis inclinabatur, quamquam superior pes ad superiora ascenderet, et sicut claudus ibat.” Benvenuto da Imola offered similar identifications for the pilgrim's feet: “pes inferior erat amor, qui trahebat ipsum ad inferiora terrena, qui erat firmior et fortior adhuc in eo quam pes superior, idest amor, qui tendebat ad superna. Amor enim est pes, quo anima graditur….” Francesco da Buti followed the others: “come I'uomo ha due piedi, così due affetti erano in lui, I'uno ragionevole alle virtù, l'altro sensuale alle concupiscenzie.” For all these comments, see G. Biagi (ed.) La D. C. nella figurazione artistica e nel secolare commento (Torino, 1924), vol. I (Inferno), canto I, 30.

⁴⁶ “Duos pedes habet anima, intellectum scilicet et affectum. Qui quando aequales sunt, quod scilicet affectus adaequatur intellectui veritatis, homo bene ambulat. Si autem vel ambo vel alter curvus est, intellectus scilicet per errorem et affectus per libidinem, homo claudus est.” Postilla super Isaiam, XXV, 6, ed. Siepmann, F., Opera Omnia XIX (Monasterii Westfalorum, 1952), p. 371.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ ”Sed quid per pedes? Intellectus utique et affectus….” Homiliae Dominicales Aestivales LXXXVI; PL 174, 601.

⁴⁸ See below, p. 268.

⁴⁹ See, for example, Gregory the Great's gloss on Ezekiel 1, 7: “Et pedes eorum pedes recti”: “Quid per pedes nisi gressus actuum designatur?” Horn, in Ezech. lib. I, hom. III; PL 76, 806.

⁵⁰ De anima III, x, 433b ff.

⁵¹ De motu animalium 8, 702a ff.

⁵² See Landino's exact remark, in his commentary on the verse: “… come il corpo è portato da’ piedi, così l'anima dall'appetito” (Biagi, loc. cit.).

⁵³ See Convivio III, II, 5: “… quello che è causato da corpo circulare ne ha in alcuno modo circulare essere….” Busnelli and Vandelli mention Albertus Magnus’ use of this principle in the De causis (1, 4, 7), “applicandolo al moto e alia struttura degli animali, che si muovono per semicircoli, e hanno le articolazioni organate con dischi e cavità, perchè tutto è causato dal moto circolare dei cieli.” Convivio, ed. Busnelli-Vandelli (Firenze, 1934), p. 266. We may add that Aristotle compares the heart's motus girativus to a “ball and socket joint” (trans. W. D. Ross, Works of Arist. Ill [Oxford, 1931], 433b21) in De anima III, x. Undoubtedly Albert had this type of articulation in mind.

^53a Such an association is implicit in Timaeus 36c ff. where the “circle of the same” in the world soul (i.e., the celestial equator) and in the human soul (i.e., the reflective intellect) is given a motion ὲπὶ δεξιά. A discussion of the relevance of this analogy to Dante's poem is in preparation.

⁵⁴ Sermones: Dominica tertia in Quadragesima II; Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1901), IX, 225.

⁵⁵ Aristotle, Problemata XXVII, 10–11 (949a). Cf. Thomas, S.T. I-II, q. 44: De effectibus timoris.

⁵⁶ S.T. I-II, 44, 1, resp.

⁵⁷ Inf. I, 90: “ch'ella mi fa tremar le vene e i polsi.” The veins and arteries serve to transmit the vital spirits.

⁵⁸ Loc. cit., art. 4, resp.

⁵⁹ Commedia: Elements of Structure, p. 13.

⁶⁰ See above, p. 257.

⁶¹ Purgatorio XXVII, 140.

⁶² “S'io ti fiammeggio nel caldo d'amore/di là dal modo che ’n terra si vede,/sl che delli occhi tuoi vinco il valore,/ non ti maravigliar; chè ciò procede/ da perfetto veder, che, come apprende,/ così nel bene appreso move il piede.” Paradiso V, 1–6. Dante implies the analogy between the movement of the soul and the movement of the feet in Purg. XVIII, 43–45: “… s'amore è di fuori a noi offerto,/ e I'anima non va con altro piede,/ se dritta o torta va non è suo merto.”

⁶³ In IV Sent, d.xvii, q.i, a.3, sol. 3; quoted by Singleton, Journey, pp. 13–14.

⁶⁴ According to Henri de Lubac (Surnaturel [Paris, 1946], p. 96), the maxim is not found in Augustine, but represents his thought accurately. The locus classicus is Peter Lombard Sent. 2, 29, 1. We may add to the instances of the use of the formula given by de Lubac, the Sententiae divinitatis II, II, 2 ed. B. Geyer, Beitrӓge zur Gesch. der Phil, des M. VII, 2–3 (1909), p. 24. One of the passages from Augustine which may have been influential in this formulation of the doctrine is Ennar. in Psalm. XCIV, 1: “Unus ergo idemque homo corpore stans uno loco, et amando Deum accedit ad Deum, et amando iniquitatem recedit a Deo: nusquam pedes movet, et tamen potest et accedere et recedere.” (PL 37, 1217)

⁶⁵ (Pseudo) Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica, Prima Pars, secundi libri, Inq. IV, tr. Ill, quest. IV, 516 (Quaracchi, 1928), II, 762.

⁶⁶ For a résumé of the history of the doctrine, see Odon Lottin, Problèmes de Morale III, 1; Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles (Louvain, 1954), IV, 272–275.

⁶⁷ Manuscript Clm 7972 (Munich, Staatsbibliothek), f.6^r; partially edited by Lottin, ibid., p. 71.

⁶⁸ Hugo de Sancto Caro, Liber Proverbiorum II; Opera Omnia (Lugduni, 1645), III, 6, col. 4.

⁶⁹ Perhaps the most convincing proof that the pattern we are suggesting, a progression from illness, to a partial health, to final soundess and Virgil's pronouncement “te sovra te corono e mitrio,” was recognizable to a contemporary is provided by the anonymous text edited by M. T. d'Alverny (see above, note 26). We read there that the soul has three dispositions, right, left, and middle, just as the body has three states: health, illness and neutrality. Further, the dispositions of the right are ten, and lead to Paradise, as the ten on the left lead to hell. The first step toward happiness is union with the guidance of an angelic intellectus agens. The first step toward hell cannot fail to remind us of the Pauline struggle: “Prima est ut non possit operari anima quod vult, quia non habet obediens sibi nee cui imperet, nee proprias operationes secundum creationem exercere potest, et cum hoc cupiat et non possit, torquetur …. Et quia sic impeditur anima ab operibus suis et ab his que multum cupit, dicitur ligata et in manibus et in pedibus, sicut dicitur homo ligatus qui detinetur ab his que vult facere” (p. 294). The greatest difficulty is posed by deciding what is the condition of man who dies with the dispositio media, and the text suggests a vague fusion of limbo and purgatory: “Status enim anime que perveniet ad felicitatem cum exuitur a corpore non est sine fine, sed ad tempus finibilis, eo quod creata est sapiens naturaliter et bona, quare potius tendit ad id quod est de natura sua quam ad contrarium, nisi habeat impediens” (p. 299). The half-way point along the dispositions of the right corresponds to the point reached by Dante's pilgrim at the end of Purg. XXVII, justification: “Sexta est ut dominetur anima sibi ipsi et obediat sibi ipsi et ut dominans et dominatum sint idem, quod est dicere ut ipsa sit equata sibi ipsi in velle et habere et posse et est sensus: tantum velit habere quantum habet vel habere potest et e contrario et tantum velle facere quantum facit vel facere potest et e contrario, et sic non erit diminutio in sua essentia, actu nee potentia, quia sua essentia eadem est suis formis et sue forme eedem cum ea et hanc equationem dominationemque felicem nemo habet in vita ista” (pp. 288–9). Here are all the elements of justificatio impii, whose relevance to the Purgatorio has been traced by Singleton (Journey, pp. 57–71). The anonymous author echoes the Aristotelian conception of generatio (motus ad formam) with the words “essentia eadem est suis formis …” and associates it with Christian justification by adding “nemo habet in vita ista,” which recalls Psalm 142, 2, and Dante's “lo passo che non lasciò già mai persona viva.” For generatio as praeparatio ad gratiam, see Singleton, ibid., pp. 43–54.

⁷⁰ “libero, dritto e sano è tuo arbitrio,/e fallo fora non fare a suo senno:/ per ch'io te/ sovra te corono e mitrio.” Purgatorio, XXVII, 140. Dante uses Boethius' definition of the liberum arbitrium in the De monarchia: “liberum arbitrium esse liberum de voluntate iudicium” (I, xii, 2). He goes on to say, “… dico quod iudicium medium est apprehensionis et appetitus: nam primo res apprehenditur, deinde apprehensa bona vel mala iudicatur; et ultimo iudicans prosequitur sive fugit” (I, xii, 3). Hence “arbitrio” is the act of choice midway between the “senno” (apprehensive) and the actual deed (“fare”). Dante as a rationalist, had to believe in the priority of intellect in the act of choice. Thus the pilgrim begins the shorter journey with an apprehension of the truth, the glance up at the light. In the concatenation of apprehensive and appetitive movements, represented by the steps of the feet, one or the other of the feet had to step out first, and this was intellectus. But even the intellectus had to have a prime mover, and this, like the prime mover in every causal chain was God, Who called the pilgrim to look up at the truth (cf. Thomas, ST I, 82, 4 ad 3; Singleton, Journey, pp. 48–56). Thus, grace is operative in some sense in every human act, and the complexities of this problem of actual grace were to vex Christian philosophers until well after the Renaissance. Bruno Nardi (“II libero arbitrio e l'asino di Buridano,” Nel Mondo di Dante [Roma, 1944] PP. 287–303) affirmed Dante's “moral intellectualism,” which the poet shared with some contemporary Averroists: “La libertà consiste dunque, per Dante, nel potere che ne ha la ragione, non prevenuta dall'appetito, di suggerire alia volontà quello che è da fare, non nel potere da parte di questa di opporsi anche al giudizio della ragione, come volevano Duns Scoto, Enrico di Gand ed altri, e nemmeno di volgere la ragione a compiacere il talento, come pensava Tommaso.” He based his argument on Par. IV, 1–9 “Intra due cibi, distanti e moventi/d'un modo, prima si morrìa di fame,/che liber’ uomo l'un recasse ai denti;/…/ per che s'i'mi tacea, me non riprendo,/ dalli miei dubbi d'un modo sospinto,/poi ch'era necessario, nè commendo.” Nardi failed to distinguish the liberty of fallen man from the liberty of the justified, and therefore his conclusions seem somewhat facile. If our interpretation of the piè fermo verse is correct, in Inf. I, of all places, it is clear that the will does not necessarily follow the discernment of the intellect, and the pilgrim is obviously not free. The longer journey to the summit is precisely the quest for freedom, and is the work of grace. Nardi's flippant analysis of the human act in Thomas’ writings fails to examine adequately the difference between the speculative reason and the practical. The former conforms to external reality, the latter depends upon the practical judgment of the rectified appetite, and hence can be turned. In the poem, it is Beatrice who resolves Dante's doubt in Par. IV, but Nardi has not attempted to evaluate her rôle, as grace, in the human act. The poet's point is that in this question of action, grace will be the prime mover on a subject who would otherwise remain inert. For the entire complex problem, at least as it applies to Thomas, see Lottin, “A propos de l'intellectualisme morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin,” Psychologie et Morale III, 651.

⁷¹ Lottin, IV, 274–5.

⁷² Republic IV, 440a ff. Cf. Arist. I Politics 2, 11, 1254b5 and Thomas, ST I-II, 17, 7.

⁷³ The concept is set forth in detail by Lottin, III, 283 ff.

⁷⁴ De anima II, 3, 414b2; III, 9, 432b5 ff.

⁷⁵ Reade, W. H. V., The Moral System of Dante's Inferno (Oxford, 1909), p. 116Google Scholar ff.

⁷⁶ Reade, p. 118; John Damascene, PG 94, 928b; Lottin, I, 394 ff.

⁷⁷ For an influential and typical statement of these divisions, we need only turn to Albertus Magnus, who identifies them and describes their respective rôles in the human act: “Si autem consideremus movens quodcunque movet, tune sunt duo in genere moventia …. Quorum unum in genere quidem movens est ut decernens motum, alterum sicut impetum faciens in motu …. Si autem determinari habet movens, ut causans motum, tune oportet duo esse ad minus, quorum unum determinat, et alterum facit impetum: & sic sunt duo moventia quae sunt vel intellectus & appetitus, vel phantasia & appetitus.” (De anima III, IV, viii, text. 56; Opera omnia [Lugduni, 1651], III, 178.) After an analysis of the power of discernment, the appetitive power is similarly subdivided: “…appetitus, sicut diximus, commune aliquod est, et dividitur in appetitivam rationalem, et in appetitivam sensibilem: et ilia quidem est quae rationalis voluntas proprie vocatur. Ilia autem quae est sensibilis pars animae, vocatur desiderium.” (Ibid., x, p. 181.) The sensitive appetite is twofold: “Desiderativa autem est animae sensibilis pars appetitiva, dividitur in concupiscibilem et irascibilem …: [Plato] vocavit autem concupiscibilem virtutem desiderativam eorum quae afficiunt secundum delectationem. … Irascibile autem vocavit virtutem animae quae insurgit ad arduum quod est in ausu et gloria et victoria et in omni eo quod collocat in gloria et in gradu quodam sublimitatis et altitudinis secundura seipsum. …” (Ibid., p. 182.) Albertus is careful to state that these powers are formally distinct from the irascible and concupiscent powers in animals: in homine enim sunt rationales. They participate in the rational insofar as they are subject to the will. Man is free only when the will maintains its power over all: “hoc modo [voluntas] quasi motor est aliarum virium ad actum vel actus, et hoc modo dicimus, quando per voluntatem domini sumus nos nostrorum actuum, et sumus liberi: quia liberum vocamus, quia causa sui est et non causa alterius.” (Ibid.) This is the liberty which is conferred upon the pilgrim at the summit. Avicenna undoubtedly contributed much to these psychological doctrines. See Kitab al-Najat, VI in Avicenna's Psychology, trans. F. Rahman (London, 1952), p. 37 and Rahman's commentary, pp. 73–4.

⁷⁸ IV, XXII, 10; XXVI, 6.

⁷⁹ See Reade's lengthy and somewhat inconclusive discussion, op. cit., pp. 404–30.

⁸⁰ The principle of mediation, a characteristic of much of Greek philosophy, was expressed by Thomas Aquinas as “natura in suo infimo contingit naturam in ejus supremo.” (Contra Gent. II, 91.) The importance of this principle for all phases of theological speculation remains to be explored. Among recent partial examinations of the problem is Allers', Rudolf “Triad and Mediation in Augustine” (The New Scholasticism, XXXI, 4, October, 1957).Google Scholar

⁸¹ ”Non ti rimembra di quelle parole/con le quai la tua Etica pertratta/le tre disposizion che ’1 del non vole,/incontinenza, malizia e la matta/ bestialitade? …” Inf. XI, 79–83. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics VII, I, 1145a16: “circa mores fugiendorum tres sunt species, malitia incontinentia et bestialitas.”

⁸² As in the discussions of the “firm foot,” here too, d'Ovidio will serve as guide through the mass of bibliography. For his remarks on Casella's work, which has not been available to me, see in particular “Le Tre Fiere,” Studii sulla Divina Commedia (Milano, 1901), pp. 305Google Scholar ff.

⁸³ Summa Theologica tract. Ill, q. II, mem. I, n.220; Quaracchi III, pp. 232–3.

⁸⁴ “Io avea una corda intorno cinta,/ e con essa pensai alcuna volta/ prender la lonza alia pelle dipinta.” Inf. XVI, 106. Just as Dante had hoped to catch the lonza with this girdle of self-reliance, so when he momentarily passes the lonza on the prologue scene, he seems almost confident about what appears to be an initial victory: “sì ch'a bene sperar m'era cagione/di quella fera alia gaetta pelle/l'ora del tempo e la dolce stagione.” Inf. I, 41–43.

⁸⁵ “Ma perchè frode è dell'uom proprio male,/più spiace a Dio; e però stan di sutto/li frodolenti è più dolor li assale.” Inf. XI, 25–27.

⁸⁶ “Ed una lupa, che di tutte brame/sembrava carca nella sua magrezza,/e molte genti fè già’ viver grame/” Inf. I, 49–51. In his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas refers to the wolf as “vorax in omnibus” in a context which deals with various types of incontinence (In Eth. VII, vi).

⁸⁷ “Alio modo potest corrumpi contemperantia humanarum affectionum alicujus bestiae, puta leonis aut porci. Et hoc est quod vocatur bestialitas.” (VII, i).

⁸⁸ De opere et eleemosynis 1; PL 4, 603.

⁸⁹ Ad Simplicianum I, 1, 9; PL 40, 106. See also Contra Julianum VI, x, 29; PL 44, 839. For the later history of this doctrine, see Lottin IV, 55 ff.

⁹⁰ In Lucam 10, 30; PL 92, 469.

⁹¹ Summa Theologica IV, tr. Ill, quaest. Ill, 1,510; Quaracchi II, 746.

⁹² ST I-II, 85, 3; cf. De malo 2, 11.

⁹³ D'Ovidio, Studii, pp. 305 ff.

⁹⁴ ST I-II, 77,3, ad 1.

⁹⁵ D'Ovidio raised this objection to Casella's thesis: “…contro lui sta la contradizione ov'ei s'impiglia di volere dall'un lato che le tre fiere siano una prefigurazione precisa dell'Inferno, e dall'altro che la fiera meno temibile rappresenti giusto il peccato più cupo.” Studii, p. 311.

⁹⁶ Twice the pilgrim refuses to enter into the flames, and submits only when Virgil reminds him: “Or vedi, figlio:/ tra Beatrice e te è questo muro.” Purg. XXVII, 35–6.

⁹⁷ In Eth. VII, vi, end.

⁹⁸ Lottin IV, 275.

⁹⁹ For the most influential statement of the allegory see Augustine, De trinitate XII, 12 (PL 42, 1007–8). The temptation of the serpent was identified with the “primus motus” of the sensitive appetite, or concupiscence of the flesh.

¹⁰⁰ “perpetua corruptio sensualitas est intelligenda quantum ad fomitem, qui nunquam totaliter tollitur in hac vita: transit enim peccatum originale reatu, et remanet actu.” Thomas, ST I-II, 74, 4, ad 2.

¹⁰¹ Bonaventure represented the causal chain in meteorological terms: “Et sicut in maiori mundo vapores elevati infrigidantur propter malitiam aeris et praepediunt aspectum solis; sic in minori mundo cogitationes de sensualitate ascendentes infrigidantur et calore gratiae privantur propter malitiam rationis peccato consentientis et impediunt aspectum solis iustitiae.” Sermones II, Opera IX, 226.

¹⁰² Ad Simplicianum, I, 1.6–17; PL 40, 104 ff.; Serm. ad popul. 30, 2–3; PL 38, 188–9; Contra Jul. 3, 26; PL 44, 733.

¹⁰³ Thomas' exposition of Aristotle's incontinentia recalls Paul's malum concupiscentiae: “Si quidem igitur sit perversitas ex parte appetitus ut ratio practica remaneat recta, erit incontinentia, quae scilicet est, quando aliquis rectam aestimationem habet de eo quod est faciendum vel vitandum, sed propter passionem appetitus in contrariam trahit.” In Eth. VII, 1.

¹⁰⁴ Purg. XXV, 136–9.