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Cranmer As a Nominalist — sed contra

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2011

William J. Courtenay
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Extract

In the last issue of the Harvard Theological Review, Mr. Eugene McGee has rendered the service of repeating the old caricature of Nominalist Eucharistic theology (this time pinning the donkey's tail on the English reformer Cranmer) and extending this line of argument in such a way that it can be clearly faced and perhaps finally silenced. For, contrary to Mr. McGee's claim, he is not the first to “discover” the Nominalism of Cranmer. Throughout the forties and fifties of this century there raged a controversy over whether Cranmer could be called a Zwinglian and, if so, to what degree. In this controversy were drawn Dom Gregory Dix, G. B. Timms, E. C. Ratcliff, C. C. Richardson, and G. W. Bromiley. In the course of their arguments both Dix and Richardson referred to the Nominalism of Zwingli and Cranmer, who, Dix and Richardson felt, shared essentially the same position. “Cranmer,” Dix said, “was a man of the high Renaissance period, with all its deliberate ‘subjectivism,’ which sought so intently to segregate what was present in the forefront of consciousness as words as the only significant element in human life.” Richardson expanded on this charge. “The philosophic presuppositions of Zwingli's thought on the Eucharist,” he said, “are derived from Nominalism and humanism. Like most of the Reformers Zwingli attacks transubstantiation from a Nominalist point of view.” McGee's exposition bears a striking resemblance to Richardson's development of this thesis, and is to be regarded as its “re-presentation.”

Type
Research Article
Information
Harvard Theological Review , Volume 57 , Issue 4 , October 1964 , pp. 367 - 380
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1964

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References

1 McGee, Eugene K., “Cranmer and Nominalism,” HTR 57 (1964), 189–216CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 McGee, op. cit., 189.

3 The Shape of the Liturgy (Westminster, 1945), pp. 613–734; “Dixit Cranmer et non timuit,” Church Quarterly Review 145 (1948), 145–76Google Scholar; 146 (1948), 44–60.

4 Dixit Cranmer (London, 1946); reprinted as “Dixit Cranmer,” Church Quarterly Review 143 (1947), 217–34; 144 (1947). 33–51.

5 The Book of Common Prayer in the Church of England; its Making and Revisions, 1549–1661 (London, 1949).

6 Zwingli and Cranmer on the Eucharist (Cranmer dixit et contradixit) (Evanston, 1949).

7 Thomas Cranmer, Theologian (London, 1956).

8 “Dixit Cranmer et non timuit,” Church Quarterly Review 145 (1948), 174Google Scholar.

9 Zwingli and Cranmer on the Eucharist (Cranmer dixit et contradixit) (Evanston, 1949), pp. 8–9.

10 McGee, op. cit., 206–07.

11 McGee, op. cit., 200.

12 “Here Cranmer was obviously equating philosophy and Nominalist philosophy, for it was only Nominalist philosophy which held that Consubstantiation was more reasonable than Transubstantiation.” McGee, op. cit., 201.

13 “Even though Durandus, Duns Scotus, and Gabriel Biel all accepted Transubstantiation, Cranmer cited with approval the fact that all did so on the authority of the Church, that is, the bishop of Rome. He quoted Scotus, the subtilest of the school authors, as saying of the words of Scripture that they ‘might be expounded more easily and more plainly without transubstantiation,’ but Rome chose otherwise. Gabriel Biel was quoted in the same sense. Thus, Cranmer concluded that transubstantiation was held because of the authority of Rome….” McGee, op. cit., 195; contrast my footnote 18.

14 McGee, op. cit., 200.

15 McGee, op. cit., 200; cf. also 212.

16 McGee, op. cit., 193.

17 “Although Cranmer did not say that by philosophy he meant Nominalism, yet the position which he takes here as the true teaching is a Nominalist one. A non-Nominalist, like St. Thomas, held that the body and soul were one substance, not two.” McGee, op. cit., 209.

18 “Nonetheless, his [Cranmer's] Nominalist position on the power of God's will had something to do [sic!] with his reverence for Scripture alone as the source of truth.” — “Those things which were ‘discrepant from reason’ were nonetheless to be believed as the omnipotent God's ‘pleasure and will,’ if, and only if, ‘we find these things written in scripture.’” — “… and so for Cranmer Scripture as opposed to man's vain imagination was the only adequate basis for truth.” McGee, op. cit., 202; cf. also 195; cf. my footnote 13.

19 “He [Gardiner] charged Cranmer with trying to dispense with ‘mystery or marvel,’ and trying to use ‘reason without faith,’ ‘blind reason,’ a reason that had ‘no participation with faith,’ in order to find a ‘jolly easy way’ like the Sabellians and the Arians. He did all but coin the term ‘rationalism’ to describe Cranmer's method.” McGee, op. cit., 199; “Furthermore, it was also a Nominalist characteristic to separate philosophy and theology, or reason and faith.” McGee, op. cit., 202; cf. also 201–02.

20 “He [Cranmer] did not put reason before faith; he did not make reason the rule of faith. Rather he subordinated reason to faith by use of the Nominalist principle that God's will was superior to his reason.” McGee, op. cit., 201; cf. 202, 210.

21 “Another example that could be taken would be the idea of the Church. A Realist would hold that the universal Church as the mystical body of Christ really existed as a whole, and that individual churches or Christians were members of it, and were subordinate to its authority.” — “A Nominalist, on the other hand, would see the individual churches and Christians as the real units, and the Church would be a collective name for Christians.” — “Late medieval conciliarism was Nominalist in origin and concept, and Cranmer was a conciliarist.” McGee, op. cit., 204. “The Nominalists had rejected universal ideas and the Neoplatonic notion of divine ideas in the mind of God, for ideas seemed to come between the omnipotent creator and the creature so as to govern the divine mind. Similarly, Nominalists abolished real relations, for if a relationship were real, it would exist outside the mind as a third thing.” McGee, op. cit., 210.

22 McGee, op. cit., 206.

23 McGee, op. cit., 195.

24 De corpore christi, c.5 (The “De Sacramento Altaris” of William of Ockham, ed. T. B. Birch [Burlington, Iowa, 1930], pp. 182–86, hereafter referred to as Birch).

25 Summa theologica, P.III, q.75, a.2–3 (Summa Theologica, Institutus Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis [Ottawa, 1945–1955], IV, 2940a–42a, hereafter referred to as Ot) and In Scripto Sententiarum, L.IV, d.xi, q.i, a.1–2 (In Scripto Sententiarum, ed. A. Moos [Rome, 1947], IV, 433–42, hereafter referred to as Moos).

26 McGee, op. cit., 207.

27 Liber Sententiarum, L.IV, d.xi (Patrologiae Cursus Completus, series Latina, ed. J. P. Migne [Paris, 1880], vol. 192, coll. 862–63, henceforth referred to as PL; and Libri IV Sententiarum [Quaracchi, 1916], pp. 803–05, henceforth referred to as QR).

28 De sacro altaris mysterio, L.IV, c.20 (PL 217, 870 A–871 D); c.i, X (1, 1) (Corpus juris canonici, ed. Friedberg [Leipzig, 1922], II, 5–6, referred to hereafter as RF); c.6, X (3, 41) (RF II, 636–39).

29 De Sacramento eucharistiae, c.i (Opera Omnia [Paris, 1674], I, 434a–34b).

30 Summa theologica, P.IV, q.38, m.2 (Summa Theologica [Lyon, 1516], IV, fol. 175r–175v).

31 Glossa ordinaria Decreti Gratiani, col. 1873 (Decretum D. Gratiani, totius propemodum juris canonici compendium, una cum Glossis [Lyon, 1560]).

32 Summa super Titulis Decretalium Compilata (Lyon, 1542), fol. 185r.

33 Sent., L.IV, d.x, q.i (Opera Omnia [Paris, 1891–95], XVII, 152–86); Sent., L.IV, d.xi, q.i (XVII, 319); Sent., L.IV, d.xi, q.3 (XVII, 388–90).

34 Sent., L.IV, d.xi, q.3 (In Sententias Commentariorum Libri Quatuor [Lyon, 1562, (1549)], foll. 275v–76r).

35 Sent., L.IV, d.xi, q.20 (In Libros Sententiarum [Venice, 1507], IV, fol. 18r).

36 Quodlibeta, q.10 (XXV, 4O3ff.).

37 Loc. cit.; Sent., L.IV, d.xii, q.i (277v–78r).

38 C.i, X (i, i) (RF II, 5–6); c.6, X (3, 41) (RF II, 636–39).

39 Loc. cit.

40 De corpore et sanguine christi, L.I (PL 149, 1430); L.III (PL 149, 1480).

41 Petri Venerabilis Tractatus contra Petrobrusianos (PL 189, 787–819).

42 De divinis officiis, L.II, c.2 (PL 170, 35); cf. L.II, c.s (PL 70, 38); L.II, c.9 (PL 170, 40); De Trinitate, L.VI, c.32 (PL 167, 431).

43 G. N. Buescher, The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham (Washington, 1950), PP. 65–93; Moody, E. A., “Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt,” Franciscan Studies 7 (1947), 138–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 Summa theol., P.III, q.75, a.6 (Ot IV, 2944b–45a).

45 Moody, op. cit., 138–40.

46 De corp. christi, cc.17–41 (Birch, pp. 246–500); cf. Buescher, op. cit., pp. 67–86.

47 De corp. christi, c. 16 (Birch, 240–44); cc. 23–24 (Birch, 284–88).

48 McGee, op. cit., 200.

49 Moody, op. cit., 139.

50 As the key words in describing succession are desinit esse, so the key word in describing this theory is remanet or manente.

51 Sent., L.IV, d.xi, q.i, a.i, qu.3, sol.i (Opera Omnia [Parma, 1852–69], VII, 631; Moos IV, 436–37).

52 Sent., L.IV, d.x, q.i, n.5–8 (XVII, 172–74).

53 It is interesting to note that although John Teutonicus and Hostiensis considered remanentism to be a valid interpretation of the 1215 decision, Scotus and Ockham considered it excluded, thus anticipating the thirteenth session of the Council of Trent, which, for the first time, unambiguously excluded remanentism; cf. H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum (Rome, 1963 [1854]), 1642 (877).

54 McGee, op. cit., 194–95.

55 A History of Philosophy, II (London, 1959); III (London, 1960).

56 A very strange position, since elsewhere (McGee, op. cit., 202) the Nominalists were supposed to have made Scripture the only exception to rational proof.

57 Summa theol., P.I, q.46, a.2 (Ot I, 294a–94b).

58 Sent., L.IV, d.x, q.i, n.5–8 (XVII, 172–74).

59 Sent., L.IV, q.6 D; De corp. christi, c.5 (Birch, 182–86).

60 McGee, op. cit., 199.

61 Ockham, De corp. christi, c. 6 (Birch, 188–96); Quodl. IV, q.24; Quodl. IV, q. 36; Biel, Expositio canonis misse, lect. 43 per totum (Gabrielis Biel Canonis Misse Expositio, ed. H. A. Oberman and W. J. Courtenay, II [Wiesbaden, 1964], 110–36); Thomas, Summa theol., P.III, q.76, a.3 (Ot IV, 2951b–52b).

62 A body is circumscriptively present when it occupies space, each part of the body occupying a different place within that space, neither confused within nor found outside that space, e.g., as a person occupies a chair. It is usually contrasted with definitive presence, in which the whole occupies every single part, e.g., as the soul occupies the body.

63 Thomas, Summa theol., P.III, q.76, a.5 (Ot IV, 2954a–54b); cf. q.75, a.2 (Ot IV, 2940a–40b).

64 Richard, Sent., L.IV, d.x, a.2, q.2.

65 Scotus, Sent., L.IV, d.x, q.3 (XVII, 222–25); d.xi, q.3 (XVII, 375–76).

66 Ockham, De corp. christi, c.6 (Birch 192–96); cf. c.29 (Birch, 336–52).

67 Biel, Expos, can. misse, lect. 43 per totum.

68 Ockham, De corp. christi, c.6 (Birch, 192); cf. also Quodl. IV, q.36.

69 Ibid.

70 Thomas, Summa theol., P.III, q.76, a.5 (Ot IV, 2954a–54b).

71 McGee, op. cit., 209.

72 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, III (London, 1960), 97.

73 Summa theol., P.II, q.63, m.4 (Summa Theologica, II [Quaracchi, 1930], 421–22).

74 Sent., L.II, d.xii, a.i, q.3 (Opera Omnia, II [Quaracchi, 1882], 299–301); d.xiii, a.2, q.2 (II, 319–22); cf. d.xvii, a.2, q.2, ad 6um (II, 423).

75 Registrum Epistolarum Johannis Pecham Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis, III, ed. C. P. Martin (London, 1885 [1882–85]), 840, 852, 862, 864, 870, 896.

76 Letters edited by Ehrle, , “Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus in der Scholastik,” Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des M.A. 5 (1889), 614–32Google Scholar.

77 Quodl. II, qq.2–5 (Quodlibeta, 1518, 1961, vol. I, 29r–31v); Quodl. IV, qq.13–14 (I, 104v–23v).

78 Sent., L.IV, d.xi, q.3, a.2 (XVII, 411–38).

79 Sent., L.II, d.xvi–xvii, q.3, a.i (Super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, II [Venice, 1522], fol. 86 E–F).

80 Sent., L.II, d.xvi, q.i, a.i, nota i C.

81 Dialogus, P.I, lib. 2, c.12 in Monarchia romani imperii, ed. Goldast, II, 419–20.

82 Contra haeresim de communione laicorum (Opera Omnia, I [Antwerp, 1706], 458 C); ibid. (Opera I, 463 A).

83 Collectio Judiciorum, ed. C. Duplessis d'Argentre (Paris, 1728), I, 77; cf. de Vooght, Les sources de la Doctrine Chrétienne (Paris, 1954), p. 237; Apologia, in Gerson, Opera I, 715 C-D; cf. ibid., 710 C–D.

84 Sent., L.III, d.xxxvii, q.i, a.i C.

85 Cf. H. A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 361–412.

86 McGee, op. cit, 199, 202.

87 McGee, op. cit., 202–03.

88 McGee, op. cit., 195.

89 McGee, op. cit., 199.

90 Op. cit., pp. 88–89.

91 Biel, Sent., L.I, d.vii, q.i, a.2, concl. 3 and 5; cf. Oberman, op. cit., pp. 98–99; 50–68.

92 Collected Articles on Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1958); cf. Trapp, D., “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century,” Augustiniana 6 (1956), 147–48Google Scholar.

93 E. F. Jacob, Essays in the Conciliar Epoch (Manchester, 1952); cf. Boehner, Ph., “Ockham's Political Ideas,” The Review of Politics 3 (1943), 462–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in Collected Articles on Ockham, pp. 442–68.

94 Brian Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory (Cambridge, 1958).

95 Cf. Oberman, op. cit., pp. 353 ff.

96 “Secunda iusticia est nostra et propria, non quod nos soli operemur earn, sed quod cooperemur illi primae et alienae. Haec nunc est ilia conversatio bona in operibus bonis, Primo in mortificatione carnis et crucifixione concupiscentiarum erga seipsum …, Secundo et in charitate erga proximum, Tercio et in humilitate ac timore erga deum, …” Sermo de duplici iustitia. 1519 (WA, II [1884], 146–47); cf. also Sermo de triplici iustitia. 1518 (ibid., 43–47).