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Ben Sira on the Free Will Problem: A Comparison with Chrysippus

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 August 2021

Xi Li
Xi Li*
Affiliation:
The Catholic University of America; [email protected]
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Abstract

This article deals with the similarities and differences between Ben Sira and Chrysippus regarding their solutions to the tension between free will and determinism. Both Ben Sira and Chrysippus argue for compatibilism, the theory that free will and determinism are compatible. However, Ben Sira and Chrysippus have different understandings of freedom required by moral responsibility. According to Chrysippus, consent is the internal cause of persons’ actions, and, thus, they should be responsible for these actions. By contrast, Ben Sira claims that although being shaped by God’s plan, persons could have done otherwise and, in this sense, are responsible for their sins. The first section of this article examines the texts of Ben Sira and Chrysippus regarding the problem of free will. The second section discusses the positions of Ben Sira and Chrysippus on compatibilism. The last section explains the possible influence of Chrysippus on Ben Sira and the main difference between their understandings of freedom.

Keywords

free willdeterminismcompatibilismmoral responsibilityBen SiraChrysippus
Type
Articles
Information
Harvard Theological Review , Volume 114 , Issue 3 , July 2021 , pp. 328 - 345
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the President and Fellows of Harvard College

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Footnotes

*

I want to thank Dr. Bradley Gregory for his seminar on Ben Sira, which provided me with the opportunity to write this article. I am deeply indebted to one anonymous reader for the helpful comment on the structure of this article as well as to another for suggestions on the translation of Sir 15:11–20. Special thanks go to Sophy Schulman, who read through the paper and helped to polish my writing.

References

1 Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Periods (2 vols; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974) 1:14. Ursel Wicke-Reuter, Göttliche Providenz und menschliche Verantwortung bei Ben Sira und in der Frühen Stoa (BZAW 298; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000) 50, 137. In his comparison of Ben Sira with the Greek philosophers concerning the free will problem, David Winston mentions Chrysippus and concludes that Ben Sira absorbs Hellenistic ingredients into his own thought. However, Winston does not recognize that the view of Chrysippus is a form of compatibilism (David Winston, “Freedom and Determinism in Greek Philosophy and Jewish Hellenistic Wisdom,” in The Ancestral Philosophy: Hellenistic Philosophy in Second Temple Judaism; Essays of David Winston [ed. Gregory E. Sterling; Providence, RI: Brown Judaic Studies, 2001] 44–56, at 52–55).

2 Thomas Pink, Free Will: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 2.

3 Michael McKenna and D. Justin Coates, “Compatibilism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Edward N. Zalta), 21 December 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/compatibilism/.

4 Gary Watson, “Introduction,” in Free Will (ed. Gary Watson; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) 1–15, at 2.

5 See, for instance, Jesse M. Peterson, “Is Coming into Existence Always a Harm? Qoheleth in Dialogue with David Benatar,” HTR 112 (2019) 33–54. In this article, Peterson shows that contemporary philosopher David Benatar’s claim that “coming into existence is always a harm” helps to clarify the value ranking of hypothetical life scenarios in Qoheleth.

6 As Patrick W. Skehan and Alexander A. Di Lella point out, there is an extra colon to 14b, וישתיהו ביד חופו, which “makes flagrant nonsense in this place” (Patrick W. Skehan and Alexander A. Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira [AB 39; New York: Doubleday, 1987] 269).

7 All translations of both Hebrew and Greek texts in this paper are mine. Although there are some minor variants among Manuscripts A and B of the Hebrew text and the Greek text of Sir 15:11–20, these variants do not change the main ideas of Ben Sira, especially his position of compatibilism. This paper uses Manuscript A of the Hebrew text.

8 Sharon Lea Mattila, “Ben Sira and the Stoics: A Reexamination of the Evidence,” JBL 119 (2000) 473–501, at 480.

9 Theophil Middendorp, Die Stellung Jesu Ben Siras zwischen Judentum und Hellenismus (Leiden: Brill, 1972) 31: “Schwierige Fragen, wie die nach Determinismus und Freiheit des Willens hat Ben Sira nie völlig zu Ende gedacht.”

10 G. Box and W. Oesterley, “The Book of Sirach,” in The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament (ed. R. H. Charles; 2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1913) 1:268–517, at 371. See also Skehan and Di Lella, Ben Sira, 268; they translate רצי as “free choice.”

11 Jean Hadot, Penchant mauvais et volonté libre dans la Sagesse de Ben Sira (Brussels: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1970) 98–99. Box and Oesterley also point out that רצי here is used in a neutral sense (Box and Oesterley, “The Book of Sirach,” 371).

12 Hadot, Penchant mauvais, 99: “L’insistance ici est nettement mise sur l’aspect «volontaire» du yêṣér avec le libre choix du bien ou du mal, c’est-à-dire sa «neutralité».”

13 The Greek text has διαβολίον. This term has the neutral meaning required by the context, but it does not convey the idea that persons have the capacity of choosing between alternatives.

14 Robert H. Pfeiffer, History of New Testament Times: With an Introduction to the Apocrypha (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949) 393.

15 R. P. C. Spicq, L’Ecclésiastique: Traduit et Commenté (SB 6; Paris: Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1941) 645: “la liberté ou puissance de délibérer et de choisir entre le bien et le mal.”

16 Anthony A. Long, “The Early Stoic Concept of Moral Choice,” in Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought: Studia Gerardo Verbeke ab amicis et collegis dicata (ed. F. Bossier et al; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1976) 77–92, at 77.

17 Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2:1125. The translation is mine.

18 Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998) 243. The translation is hers. The numbers are inserted by Bobzien for her reconstruction of the argument.

19 Ibid., 244.

20 Ibid., 244–45.

21 Ibid., 255–56. The translation is Bobzien’s.

22 R. J. Hankinson, “Explanation and Causation,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (ed. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 479–512, at 491.

23 Otto Kaiser, “Die Rezeption der stoischen Providenz bei Ben Sira,” JNSL 24 (1998) 41–54.

24 Ibid., 50–51.

25 Jonathan Klawans, “Josephus on Fate, Free Will, and Ancient Jewish Types of Compatibilism,” Numen 56 (2009) 44–90, at 59–62.

26 Ibid., 60.

27 Ibid.

28 I am thankful to an anonymous reader for encouraging me to make clear this point.

29 Dewey D. Wallace Jr., “Free Will and Predestination: An Overview,” in The Encyclopedia of Religion (ed. Mircea Eliade; 16 vols.; New York: Macmillan, 1987) 5:422–26, at 422. For a similar view, see C. T. McIntire, “Free Will and Predestination: Christian Concepts,” ibid., 426–29, at 426.

30 Wally V. Cirafesi, “ ‘Taken from Dust, Formed from Clay’: Compound Allusions and Scriptural Exegesis in 1QHodayota 11:20–37; 20:27–39 and Ben Sira 33:7–15,” DSD 24 (2017) 81–111, at 107. For the view that Sira 33:7–15 has an element of determinism, see Wicke-Reuter, Göttliche Providenz, 258–59, and Gerhard Maier, Mensch und Freier Wille. Nach d. jüd. Religionsparteien zwischen Ben Sira u. Paulus (WUNT 12; Tübingen: Mohr, 1971) 99.

31 Klawans, “Josephus on Fate,” 60.

32 Ibid.

33 Wicke-Reuter, Göttliche Providenz, 84: “die Welt in ihrer Gesamtheit bis ins Kleinste von der Fürsorge Gottes bestimmt ist, so daß nichts von seinem Plan und seiner Zuwendung ausgeschlossen ist.”

34 Jan Liesen, Full of Praise: An Exegetical Study of Sir 39,12–35 (JSJSup 64; Leiden: Brill, 2000) 258.

35 J. R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970) 65–71; Steven C. Roy, How Much Does God Foreknow? A Comprehensive Biblical Study (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006).

36 Benjamin G. Wright, “Ben Sira on Kings and Kingship,” in Jewish Perspectives on Hellenistic Rulers (ed. Tessa Rajak et al.; HCS 50; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007) 76–91, at 82.

37 George Foot Moore, “Fate and Free Will in the Jewish Philosophies According to Josephus,” HTR 22 (1929) 371–89, at 379.

38 Rudolf Smend, Weisheit des Jesus Sirach (Berlin: Reimer, 1906) 143: “Allmacht und Allwissenheit Gottes” which “sind in seiner Weisheit einbegriffen.” Similarly, Spicq comments, “None of these secret choices of his creations escapes from his omniscience” (Spicq, L’Ecclésiastique, 645: “Aucun de ces choix secrets de sa créature n’échappe à son omniscience”).

39 Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom, 259. The translation is hers.

40 Miryam T. Brand, “ ‘At the Entrance Sin is Crouching’: The Source of Sin and Its Nature as Portrayed in Second Temple Literature” (PhD diss., New York University, 2011) 162–63 [italics in original].

41 Ibid., 163–64.

42 For Chrysippus’s distinction of two types of causes and how the analogy of cylinder helps to illustrate such a distinction, see Josiah B. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970) 148–50.

43 Anthony A. Long, “The Stoic Concept of Evil,” Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1968) 329–43, at 340.

44 André-Jean Voelke, L’idée de volonté dans le Stoïcisme (Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine. Histoire de la philosophie et philosophie générale; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973) 125: “Chez Chrysippe, la raison est coextensive à l’hégémonikon tout entire … est toute la partie maîtresse de l’âme qui est vouloir.”

45 Brand’s distinction between sinfulness and actions in the above quotation is confusing. The term “sinfulness” may refer to sinful motivations or characters, which are distinct from actions. However, Brand also mentions “actual sins,” which seem not to be different from “actions.” Thus, it is more reasonable to accept the view of Spicq that “these verses … are an excellent expression of the specific character of Jewish religion, ‘religion of action’ ” (Spicq, L’Ecclésiastique, 646: “Ces versets … sont une excellente expression du caractère spécifique de la religion juive, <<religion de l’action>>”).

46 Skehan and Di Lella, Ben Sira, 272. A similar view is seen in Hadot, Penchant Mauvais, 102.

47 The term “the doctrine of free will” is also used in Pfeiffer, History, 394.

48 Skehan and Di Lella, Ben Sira, 271.

49 See, for instance, Jack R. Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20 (AB 21A; New York: Doubleday, 1999) 440; Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20 (AB 22; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983) 86; William McKane, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Jeremiah (2 vols.; ICC 19; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1986) 1:151; William H. Brownlee, Ezekiel 1–19 (WBC 28; Waco, TX: Word, 1986) 49.

50 Wicke-Reuter, Göttliche Providenz, 133: “Die Infragestellung der Verantwortung des Menschen für seine Sünde ist folglich kein genuine jüdisches Thema. In diesem Punkt tritt bei Ben Sira eine neue Problemlage in Erscheinung.”

51 Chrysippus tackled two challenges while Ben Sira mentioned merely one. Given that both challenges to Chrysippus assume a stance of hard determinism, Ben Sira either combines these challenges into one or considers them to be the same.

52 In Dom David Amand’s discussion of the scholars who dealt with the tension between fatalism and freedom in the ancient Greek world, the only Jewish scholar mentioned is Philo of Alexandria (Dom David Amand, Fatalisme et liberté dans l’antiquité grecque [Leuven: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1945]).

53 McKenna and Coates, “Compatibilism.”

54 Ibid. Bobzien makes a similar distinction between Indeterminist Freedom (freedom to do otherwise) and Un-predeterminist Freedom (freedom of action with no causes prior to the action) (Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom, 277).

55 See, for instance, A. J. Ayer, Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1954) 271–84. For a theological version of compatibilism which assumes this concept of freedom, see Bruce Reichenbach, “God Limits His Power,” in Predestination and Free Will (ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986) 101–24, and Clark Pinnock, “God Limits his Knowledge,” in Predestination and Free Will (ed. Basinger and Basinger), 143–62.

56 For instance, Harry G. Frankfurt understands free will as the desire to desire and argues that this desire is compatible with determinism (Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68 [1971] 5–20).

57 The Greek text of Alexander Aphrodisias is from R. W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate: Text, Translation and Commentary (London: Duckworth, 1983). The translation is mine.

58 A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 1:393. See also Long, “Early Stoic Concept,” 86.

59 Josiah B. Gould has Chrysippus as the first Stoic philosopher who put forward the idea that persons could not have done otherwise (Josiah B. Gould, “The Stoic Conception of Fate,” JHI 35 [1974] 17–32, at 17).

60 The Greek text of Moralia is from Plutarch’s Moralia (LCL; trans. Harold Cherniss; 17 vols; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) 13: II, 1033A–1086B. The translation is mine.

61 J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) 119.

62 Wicke-Reuter, Göttliche Providenz, 47: “Ob er aber tatsächlich Handlungsfreiheit besitzt, so daß er auch anders handeln könnte, als er es tatsächlich tut, ist schwer vorstellbar, wenn der äußere Geschehensablauf determiniert ist.”

63 Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom, 278.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., 279.

66 For the Epicurean position on the free will problem, see R. J. Hankinson, “Determinism and Indeterminism,” in Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (ed. Algra et al.), 513–41. For the position of Skepticism, see Pink, Free Will, 18–21.