¹ The text of Philo used here is from Philo (trans. Colson, F. H.; LCL; 10 vols.; London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929–1965Google Scholar), with some modifications made to the English translation. For the Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin and Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum, mostly extant in Armenian, I have had to rely on the translation of Marcus, Ralph (Philo Supplements [LCL; 2 vols.; London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953])Google Scholar.

² On Philo's treatment of individual female biblical characters, such as Eve, Sarah, Rebekah, Rachel, Leah, and others, as well as his description of contemporary women, see Sly, Dorothy, Philo's Perception of Women (BJS 209; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990)Google Scholar. Wegner's, Judith Romney analysis (“The Image of Women in Philo” [SBLASP; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982] 551–63Google Scholar) is unfortunately rather superficial.

³ West, Candace and Zimmerman, Don H., “Doing Gender,” in Lorber, Judith and Farrell, Susan A., eds., The Social Construction of Gender (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991) 14Google Scholar.

⁴ Ibid., 17. Like any attempt to categorize reality, this distinction is not without its problems. Whether or not the social and the biological can be separated remains a point of contention. The maximalist feminist perspective, which tends to valorize women's procreative and nurturance proclivities, would be less inclined to separate these than would the minimalist perspective, which stresses that women and men are more similar than they are different.

⁵ τὸ θῆλυ γένος means literally “the female gender” and ἡ πρὸς γυναικῶν, the “womanly.” Philo uses both these expressions, as well as variations of these, to refer to the category “female,” meaning much the same thing whenever he does. This is also true of τὸ ἄρρεν γένος, or “the male gender,” and ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, or the “manly,” and variations thereof.

⁶ Philo Op. mun. 76, 134; compare Leg. all. 2.13.

⁷ Philo Rer. div. her. 164.

⁸ Ibid., 137–40; schematic diagrams of this classification system are provided by Farandos, Georgios D. (Kosmos und Logos nach Philon von Alexandria [Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1976] 259Google Scholar) and Früchtel, Ursula (Die kosmologischen Vorstellungen bei Philo von Alexandrien [Leiden: Brill, 1968] 42Google Scholar). Similarly, in the list of opposites in Agric. 139–41, male and female are mentioned as “human divisions” (τὰ ἀνθρώπου τμήματα) (for a schematic diagram, see Farandos, Kosmos und Logos, 262). Curiously, male and female do not figure among the lengthy list of opposites enumerated in Rer. div. her. 207–14.

⁹ Baer, Richard A., Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female (Leiden: Brill, 1970) 19Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See Philo Spec. leg. 1.200–201; Migr. Abr. 3, 206, 213.

¹¹ Baer, Philo's Categories, 48–49; Baer is aware that “it is precisely Philo's depreciation of woman that permits him to use her as a symbol of sense-perception, and, on the other hand, his castigation of female sense-perception and the material world which leads in turn to a further devaluation of woman” (p. 40). This is an apt description of how gender categories operate, but Baer does not name it as such.

¹² Philo Leg. all. 1.15; Rer. div. her. 170, 216; Vit. Mos. 2.210; Q. Gen. 2.12.

¹³ Philo Spec. leg. 2.56.

¹⁴ Philo Op. mun. 13–14; compare Spec. leg. 2.58–59; Q. Gen. 3.38; Q. Exod. 2.46.

¹⁵ Philo Cher. 50–52; compare Q. Exod. 2.3.

¹⁶ Baer, Philo's Categories, 51–53; Sly, Philo's Perception of Women, 219.

¹⁷ For example, Philo Leg. all. 1.1; 2.38–39; Q. Gen. 1.25; 2.18, 29; 3.3; 4.15; Spec. leg. 1.200–201; 3.178; Ebr. 73; Det. 172.

¹⁸ For example, Philo Spec. leg. 1.200–201; 3.178; Sacr. AC 102–103; Gig. 4–5; Ebr. 54–55, 59; Q. Gen. 3.3; 4.15, 38, 215.

¹⁹ Sly, Dorothy, “Philo's Practical Application of Δικαιοσύνη” (SBLASP; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991) 300Google Scholar.

²⁰ Philo Vit. Cont. 2, 32–33, 68–69, 72, 85–88; see Kraemer, Ross S., “Monastic Jewish Women in Greco-Roman Egypt: Philo Judaeus on the Therapeutrides,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 14 (1989) 342–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kraemer proposes that for Philo, “the Therapeutrides were female in form only” (p. 353). There are places, however, where Philo betrays that he views the Therapeutrides as women. First, he insists that although they are virgins, yet they bring forth immortal progeny through the seed of the Father (Vit. Cont. 68). This image is not applied to the male Therapeutae, but is commonly applied to “manly” female allegorical or mythological figures who show up in his writings, such as Wisdom and the Virtues. Second, in describing the partition which separates the men from the women in the weekly worship hall, he speaks of “the modesty proper to women's nature (τῆ γυναικείᾳ φύσει)” (ibid., 33). Thus for Philo the Therapeutrides are women—very “male” women, to be sure, but women nonetheless.

²¹ Sly, “Δικαιοσύνη,” 305–7; idem, Philo's Perception of Women, 179–213.

²² Another exception to the rule—whom Philo explicitly declares to be such—is Julia Augusta. In dedicating gifts to the temple, she “surpassed all her sex,” for her reasoning had been made “male” (ἀρρενωθεῖσα τὸν λογισμόν) by her education under Augustus (Leg. Gaj. 319–20). Even if Philo does not explicitly raise the question of women's spiritual growth, as Sly points out (Philo's Perception of Women, 223), the examples of the Therapeutrides and Julia Augusta indicate that he allows for the possibility of such development in women.

²³ See, for example, Philo Leg. Gaj. 319; Op. mun. 156; Q. Gen. 1.25.

²⁴ Sly, Philo's Perception of Women, 179–213.

²⁵ This is what Sly appears to do in “Δικαιοσύνη,” 305 n. 23.

²⁶ Philo takes very seriously the injunction that “no man shall be childless and no woman barren, but all the true servants of God will fulfill the law of nature for the procreation of children” (Praem. poen. 108–9; see Det. pot. ins. 147–48). For instance, he is careful to stress that Generic Virtue or Sarah is not incapable of bearing, and “indeed she bears only good things ceaselessly and without interval.” It is only because Abraham is not yet ready to receive her offspring that she has seemed barren (Cong. 3–10). Philo also makes sure to aver that the virginal Therapeutrides, whom he so admires, bring forth immortal progeny through the seed of the Father (Vit. Cont. 68).

²⁷ Früchtel (Die kosmologischen Vorstellungen, 172–75) discusses the parallels in the portrayal of Wisdom in Philo and in the books of Proverbs, Wisdom of Solomon, and Ben Sirach.

²⁸ Phiio Fug. 50; Q. Gen. 4.145.

²⁹ Philo Cher. 49; Det. pot. ins. 54; Ebr. 30–31.

³⁰ Philo Som. 1.200.

³¹ Philo Leg. all. 2.49; Q. Gen. 4.97; Fug. 109; Virt. 62; Ebr. 30–31; he prefers the model of God and Wisdom as father and mother of the cosmos to that of sense perception and mind (Del. 54; compare Poster C. 177; Fug. 109).

³² Philo Det. pot. ins. 115–16; compare Ebr. 112–13.

³³ For example, Philo Op. mun. 38–39, 43, 133.

³⁴ Philo Fug. 52; Som. 1.200; as another instance of this ambiguity, when the purified “virgin” soul receives the divine seed (a passive “feminine” role), she then “moulds it into shape and brings forth new life” (an active “masculine” role) (Praem. poen. 159–61).

³⁵ Goodenough, E. R. (By Light, Light [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935] 23Google Scholar) declares that “Philo flatly identifies the Logos with Sophia,” and Wolfson, Harry A. calls one “only another word for” the other (Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam [2 vols.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1947] 1. 258Google Scholar). Mack, Burton L. observes that “most scholars have commented on the identity of the figures of Wisdom and the Logos in Philo” (Logos und Sophia: Untersuchungen zur Weisheitstheologie im hellenistischen Judentum [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973] 110Google Scholar n. 10). In addition to Goodenough and Wolfson, Mack lists as examples M. Heinze who also considers them “identical”; A. Gförer and H. F. Weiss, for whom the Logos and Wisdom are “interchangeable concepts”; and A. Wlosok, who describes them as “almost indistinguishable.”

³⁶ Philo Spec. leg. 1.81; compare Sacr. AC 8; Deus imm. 57.

³⁷ Philo Rer. div. her. 199; Fug. 109; compare Virt. 62; Det. pot. ins. 54.

³⁸ Philo Rer. div. her. 127, 234.

³⁹ Philo Fug. 101; Rer. div. her. 205; Virt. 62.

⁴⁰ Philo Conf. ling. 146; Leg. all. 1.43; Fug. 101.

⁴¹ Philo Migr. Abr. 40.

⁴² Philo Som. 1.75.

⁴³ Philo Fug. 137–38; Rer. div. her. 79, 191.

⁴⁴ Philo Q. Gen. 1.57.

⁴⁵ Philo Som. 2.242; Fug. 108–9 respectively.

⁴⁶ Philo Fug. 97, compare 137; Som. 2.245 respectively.

⁴⁷ Philo Leg. all. 3.104.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 1.64–65; compare Som. 2.241–43.

⁴⁹ Philo Praem. poen. 53; Fug. 51.

⁵⁰ The interchangeability of ή διάνοια and ό νοῦς is especially evident in Philo Migr. Abr. 213: “for the irrational faculties come from sense-perception, as do the rational from understanding” (ὲκ γὰρ αὶσθήσεως αί).

⁵¹ Philo Ebr. 61; Rer. div. her. 62; Q. Gen. 4.68.

⁵² Philo Spec. leg. 2.54; the mind (ἡ διάνοια), linked to the figure of Sarah, is on several occasions said to be impregnated (for example, Sacr. AC 102; compare Spec. leg. 2.29–31).

⁵³ In a lengthy segment (Poster. C. 132–57), Rebekah is styled as the model teacher.

⁵⁴ Philo Q. Gen. 4.117, 118; Som. 1.45; Laban is given a somewhat more intermediate role in Q. Gen. 4.239. As the simplest sense-perceptible color, white, he represents the middle course between excessive indulgence and extreme asceticism.

⁵⁵ Baer, Philo's Categories, 66.

⁵⁶ Philo Q. Exod. 1.8.

⁵⁷ This is not to suggest that these constructs were necessarily the mainstay of all philosophical thought at this time. No matter how deeply ingrained and widely accepted, popular philosophy never represents the worldview of all a culture's members.

⁵⁸ Philo Migr. Abr. 205–6; Ebr. 54; Q. Gen. 4.52.

⁵⁹ Philo Q. Gen. 4.117–18; Fug. 45; Som. 1.45; Migr. Abr. 13, 203–4, 213.

⁶⁰ Philo Leg. all. 3.111; Agric. 30–34; Sacr. AC 104; Cher. 70; Poster. C. 98; Migr. Abr. 212; Q. Gen. 1.94; 2.56.

⁶¹ For example, Philo Deus imm. 106–7; Op. mun. 78; Cong. 96.

⁶² For example, Plato Tim. 32d–33a.

⁶³ Runia, D. T., Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Amsterdam: VU Boekhandel, 1983) 382Google Scholar. Runia notes that the frequency with which such passages occur in Philo “is quite out of proportion to the relative infrequency of their occurrence in the Timaeus” (p. 89). For further examples of Philo on the theme of praise and thanksgiving for the cosmos, see ibid., 88–92, 381–83.

⁶⁴ Philo Cher. 58–59.

⁶⁵ Philo Ebr. 155–56.

⁶⁶ Philo Cong. 21; compare Migr. Abr. 105.

⁶⁷ Philo Leg. all. 2.71.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 3.108–9.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 3.108–9; compare Cong. 143; Fug. 182.

⁷⁰ Philo Leg. all. 3.57–58.

⁷¹ Philo Mut. nom. 118.

⁷² Philo Q. Gen. 4.117.

⁷³ Philo Leg. all. 3.67; compare Det. pot. ins. 168–69.

⁷⁴ Philo Leg. all. 3.246.

⁷⁵ Philo Op. mun. 165–66; compare Q. Gen. 1.37, 47.

⁷⁶ Philo Leg. all. 2.74–76; Op. mun. 157–62; Q. Gen. 1.48.

⁷⁷ Quotation from Leg. all. 2.74; see Op. mun. 151–52; Leg. all. 2.71–72.

⁷⁸ It is not the mind alone to whom pleasure does her damage. Although pretending to be her lover, pleasure is actually a mortal foe to sense perception herself, maiming and dimming the senses with her surfeit (Leg. all. 3.111–12, 182–85; compare Q. Gen. 1.48).

⁷⁹ Philo Leg. all. 3.68; compare Q. Gen. 4.245; Philo's acknowledgement that “a created being cannot but make use of pleasure” and that “apart from pleasure nothing in mortal kind comes into existence” (Leg. all. 2.17–18) does little to mitigate his pronounced negative attitude toward her.

⁸⁰ Philo Spec. leg. 3.8.

⁸¹ Philo Sacr. AC 21–33.

⁸² Philo Op. mun. 150–51.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Philo Q. Gen. 1.43, 45, 37.

⁸⁵ Pleasure is the “source and foundation” (ἀρχὴ καὶ θεμέλιοζ) of passion (Leg. all. 3.113), and passion is also the source of pleasure (ἀρχὴ δὲ ἡδονῆζ μὲν τὸ πάθοζ) (ibid., 31.185).

⁸⁶ Philo Det. pot. ins. 28; compare Deus imm. 3.

⁸⁷ Philo Leg. all. 2.6, 50.

⁸⁸ Philo Q. Gen. 2.29.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 3.41.

⁹⁰ For example, Philo Cher. 52; Q. Gen. 4.238, 242.

⁹¹ The mind can cooperate with sense perception, rather than struggle against her, in which case the results are disastrous; see Q. Gen. 2.18.

⁹² Philo Leg. all. 3.222–24; compare Det. pot. ins. 52–53.

⁹³ Plato Phaedrus 253d.

⁹⁴ Plato's tripartite division of the soul is found in Phaedrus 246b–246d (reason as charioteer and pilot); Timaeus 69c–71a; Republic 434e–444d.

⁹⁵ As Runia (Philo and the Timaeus, 263–64) observes, Philo has the tendency to view the soul as essentially bipartite, divided into rational and irrational parts.

⁹⁶ Philo Rer. div. her. 257; Leg. all. 2.70; compare Fug. 188–93.

⁹⁷ This understanding of dualism is derived from Duhaime, Jean, “Le dualisme de Qumrān et la littérature de sagesse vétérotestamentaire,” Église et Théologie 19 (1988) 401–2Google Scholar.

⁹⁸ Philo Leg. all. 2.50.

⁹⁹ Ibid.; compare Vit. Mos. 2.288.

¹⁰⁰ Philo Q. Gen. 2.49; compare Rer. div. her. 185.

¹⁰¹ Philo Q. Gen. 2.49.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Philo Agric. 80–81.

¹⁰⁴ Philo Migr. Abr. 104; Philo uses this image of Exodus 15 to describe in glowing terms the joining of male and female choirs at the sacred vigil after the banquet of the Therapeutae (Cont. 85–88).

¹⁰⁵ Philo Migr. Abr. 187, 189, 195.

¹⁰⁶ Mendelson, Alan (Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria [New York: Ktav, 1982] 69–76Google Scholar) argues that the encyclical studies provide this service as the intermediate stage of the soul's journey toward the higher knowledge of Wisdom.

¹⁰⁷ Philo Migr. Abr. 189, 197; Som. 1.46.

¹⁰⁸ Philo Cher. 40.

¹⁰⁹ Philo Migr. Abr. 7.

¹¹⁰ Compare Philo Spec. leg. 3.111; 4.92, 123; Som. 1.27, 32; Conf. ling. 19–20; Det. pot. ins. 35, 85.

¹¹¹ Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, 265–67.

¹¹² Ibid., 267.

¹¹³ Sandbach, F. H., The Stoics (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975) 31–32Google Scholar, 79–80; Long, A. A., Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (2d ed.; Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986) 189Google Scholar. Plato described the universe as a “a living being imbued with mind and soul” (ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν) (Timaeus 30b), but no one “had applied the analogy as extensively as the Stoics” (Lapidge, Michael, “Stoic Cosmology,” in Rist, John, ed., The Stoics [Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978] 163Google Scholar).

¹¹⁴ For example, Philo Migr. Abr. 178–81.

¹¹⁵ Philo Op. mun. 20, 24–25, 36; Fug. 12–13.

¹¹⁶ See Long's summary of the concepts associated with Stoic Nature (Hellenistic Philosophy, 148–49). Philo's Nature does not undergo continuous cycles of death and rebirth as does Stoic Nature.

¹¹⁷ Helmut Koester has argued, not compellingly, that Philo was the originator of the concept “Law of Nature” (“NOMOΣ ΦϒΣEΩΣ: The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought,” in Neusner, Jacob, ed., Religions in Antiquity [Leiden: Brill, 1968] 521–41Google Scholar). As Horsley, Richard A. has contended, “both Cicero and Philo are dependent on an established Stoic tradition for the argument on the law of nature” (“The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero,” HTR 71 [1978] 40Google Scholar), even if their treatment is not a perfect match with traditional Stoic concepts (pp. 40–42). Less certain is Horsley's hypothesis that both Cicero and Philo have drawn their formulations from an eclectic philosophical movement inaugurated specifically by Antiochus of Ascalon (pp. 42–59).

¹¹⁸ Philo Decal. 24–26.

¹¹⁹ Philo Op. mun. 38–39, 43, 133; Plant. 15; Deus imm. 39; Decal. 41; Spec. leg. 2.100–103; Omn. prob. lib. 79.

¹²⁰ Philo Praem. poen. 99; Spec. leg. 2.205; Virt. 129–30.

¹²¹ For example, Philo Virt. 93–94, 129–30; Spec. leg. 1.322; 2.100–103, 172–73; Mut. nom. 158–60, 231; Som. 1.103; Rer. div. her. 152–53.

¹²² Philo Decal. 132; Spec. leg. 1.266.

¹²³ For example, Philo Spec. leg. 1.146; 3.184, 198; Sacr. AC 98; Poster. C. 4, 104; Leg. Gaj. 128; in Op. mun. 67, Philo displays some confusion as to whether Nature is the artificer (τεχνίτηζ) who forms living creatures or rather the art (τέχνη) by which they are formed. Yet God himself plays no role in this description of how living beings are fashioned. Only Nature figures here.

¹²⁴ See especially Philo Spec. leg. 1.329.

¹²⁵ See Runia's discussion of Philo's use of Timaeus 73a in Philo and the Timaeus, 272–74.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 374, emphasis mine.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 378, 454. Wolfson's theory that Philo believed in a creatio ex nihilo (Philo 1. 295–324) has been challenged by Runia, who argues that Philo espoused a creatio continua (Philo and the Timaeus, 96–103, 140–57, 215–22, 280–83, 287–91, 416–20, 426–33, 451–56, 505–19). David Winston argues that he espoused a creatio aeterna (Philo of Alexandria: The Contemplative Life, the Giants, and Selections [New Jersey: Ramsey, 1981] 13–21). See the summary of the debate with an extensive bibliography in Sterling, Gregory E., “Creatio Temporalis, Aeterna, vel Continua? An Analysis of the Thought of Philo of Alexandria,” Studia Philonica Annual 4 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1992) 16–21Google Scholar. While Sterling defends Winston's position (pp. 21–41), I find Runia's more convincing.

¹²⁸ Philo Q. Gen. 3.48; 4.188; Runia remarks that “Philo makes surprisingly infrequent use of this common doctrine” (Philo and the Timaeus, 128). While it is true that only two explicit statements identify the cosmos as an organism, the figure of Nature herself belies a tendency on the part of Philo to think of the cosmos in these terms.

¹²⁹ Philo Q. Gen. 3.3.

¹³⁰ Philo Op. mun. 3, 143, 171; Spec. leg. 2.13; Abr. 5–6; Vit. Mos. 2.14, 48; Martens, John W. maintains that “the law of nature, except for its quality of preexistence, is contained in full in the law of Moses in Philo's work” (“Philo and the ‘Higher’ Law” [SBLASP; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1991] 320Google Scholar; compare Nikiprowetzky, V., Le commentaire de l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie [Leiden: Brill, 1977] 117–55Google Scholar). For a bibliography on those who hold the opposing position, see Martens, 309 n. 1.

¹³¹ Philo Q. Exod. 2.1; Chrysippus (the standard of reference for orthodox Stoicism) found “no fault with the universe since all is arranged according to the best nature” (Long, , “The Stoic Concept of Evil,” Philosophical Quarterly 18 [1968] 330–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

¹³² Philo Spec. leg. 2.190–91.

¹³³ Philo Provid. 2.41–53.

¹³⁴ Philo Praem. poen. 34.

¹³⁵ Philo Provid. 2.43–53; Sandbach suggests this modern terminology (The Stoics, 31–32). Philo can resort to more traditional notions of divine recompense, and attribute these mishaps to visitations against “impiety” (ἀσεβεία) for the purpose of promoting virtue (Spec. leg. 2.190–91; Provid. 2.41). Plutarch also cites some Stoic examples of the “old-fashioned notion that plague and famine punish the wicked” (Long, “Evil,” 331).

¹³⁶ For example, Philo Som. 1.103; Sacr. AC 98–101; Spec. leg. 3.198–200.

¹³⁷ With Martens, I must emphatically take issue with those scholars who have argued that Nature and God are synonymous in Philo. These include Goodenough, By Light, Light, 31–54, and Hans Leisegang, “Physis,” PW 20.1 (1941) 1160–61. For a fuller list of commentators, see Martens, , “The Superfluity of the Law in Philo and Paul: A Study in the History of Religions” (Ph.D. diss., McMaster University, 1991) 94Google Scholar n. 158. The Philonic passages discussed here should demonstrate the serious problems with such an identification.

¹³⁸ Runia (Philo and the Timaeus, 136–37) notes that, in the treatise De opificio mundi, Philo does not dwell quite as intensely on God's transcendence in creation or on God's divine intermediaries. He explains this as being due to Philo's desire in this treatise to avoid implying there is more than one creator.

¹³⁹ Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 148–49.

¹⁴⁰ Philo Q. Gen. 3.3; compare Migr. Abr. 102.

¹⁴¹ Compare Philo Provid. frg. 1.

¹⁴² On the often fluid relationship between these two realms, see the diagram in Farandos, Kosmos und Logos, 306. Also see the comments of Mclver, Robert, “‘Cosmology’ as a Key to the Thought-World of Philo of Alexandria,” Andrews University Seminary Studies 26 (1988) 277 n. 11Google Scholar.

¹⁴³ Philo Vit. Cont. 2; compare Praem. poen. 40.

¹⁴⁴ Philo Praem. poen. 40, 44; Fug. 165.

¹⁴⁵ Philo Rer. div. her. 230–31; Op. mun. 69; see Baer, Philo's Categories, 21–26.

¹⁴⁶ This has already been illustrated by Goodenough. See, for example, his diagram in An Introduction to Philo Judaeus (2d ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) 105Google Scholar. It should be mentioned, however, as McIver (“‘Cosmology,’” 277) observes, that Philo is not consistent in his enumeration of the Powers.

¹⁴⁷ Wisdom is the fountain (πηγή), and Generic Virtue (here identified with the Logos) is the river which divides into four “sources” (ἀρχάζ) or the four “specific” (εἶδοζ) cardinal virtues: prudence (φρόνησιζ), self-mastery (σωφροσύνη), courage (ἀνδρεία), and justice (δικαιοσύνη) (Leg. all. 1.64–65; cf. Som. 2.241–43).

¹⁴⁸ See, for example, Philo Som. 1.66; Praem. poen. 40; also see Runia's discussion of the limitations Philo imposes on humanity's quest for God (Philo and the Timaeus, 366).

¹⁴⁹ For example, Philo Leg. all. 2.49; 3.216–19, 243–45; Rer. div. her. 53, 98.

¹⁵⁰ In Q. Gen. 3.5, 32, Philo ranks only four of the senses, since touch, he claims, “is common to the (other) four.” This parallels Aristotle who in De anima 2.2 (413b) declares that “the primary form of sense is touch, which belongs to all the animals. … touch can be isolated from all other forms of sense” (The Basic Works of Aristotle [trans. Smith, J. A.; ed. McKeon, Richard; New York: Random House, 1941]Google Scholar).

¹⁵¹ Philo Abr. 149–50; Deus Immut. 79. Different varieties of the extramission hypothesis of vision, in which the eyes are understood to be themselves sources of light and active in the process of seeing, had become part of the common wisdom in antiquity, and are evident in pagan, New Testament, and Jewish sources. See the summary of the sources in Allison, Dale C. Jr., “The Eye is the Lamp of the Body (Matthew 6.22–23 = Luke 11.34–36),” NTS 33 (1987) 63–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Philo opportunistically alternates between Plato's extramission-intromission theory of vision (Timaeus 45B–46D) and the Stoic theory (see Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, 231–33).

¹⁵² Philo Abr. 149–50.

¹⁵³ Philo Q. Gen. 4.147.

¹⁵⁴ Philo Abr. 149–50; this presents an interesting contrast to Aristotle who observed: “While in respect of all the other senses we fall below many species of animals, in respect of touch we far excel all other species in exactness of discrimination. That is why [human beings are] the most intelligent of all animals” (De anima 2.9; ET 421a).

¹⁵⁵ Philo Rer. div. her. 53.

¹⁵⁶ West and Zimmerman, “Doing Gender,” 34.