No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
The Universal Perspective and Moral Development*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2011
Extract
Every decision, from trivial considerations of where to have lunch to the momentous conclusion that it is right to risk life for the realization of some ideal, is made by a man who has personal interests, group loyalties, and his own preferences and aversions. In many practical decisions, such as choosing an investment portfolio or inviting guests to a party, we expect these particular interests to play a role in guiding the choices. By contrast, we are suspicious of a moral decision if personal preferences or limited loyalties may have played a role in the choice. We tend to discount a man's analysis of the demands of justice if it corresponds too closely to his own interests, and someone who urges us to value precisely those things which will bring him personal profit is apt to receive a short hearing.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1972
References
1 As examples, one might consider Firth, Roderick, Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer Theory, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XII (1952), 317–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; or Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963), 170.Google Scholar
2 I do not mean to imply that differences in race or culture are never relevant to arguments about moral obligation; only that they are not relevant insofar as they merely divide the disputants according to particular interests and loyalties, rather than point to real differences between situations. The argument that blacks should be given preference in hiring or college admissions, for example, rests on the claim that because of historical patterns of discrimination, being black demonstrably changes a man's situation in a way which imposes an obligation to make reparation to him.
3 Piaget, Jean, The Moral Judgment of the Child, tr. Gabain, Marjorie (New York, 1965).Google Scholar
4 Kohlberg, Lawrence, Moral Development and Identification, Child Psychology, ed. Stevenson, H. W., Sixty-Second Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I (Chicago, 1963), 322.Google Scholar
5 Kohlberg, Lawrence, Stage and Sequence: the Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization, Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed, Goslin, David (Chicago, 1969), 369–89.Google Scholar
6 Kohlberg, Lawrence, The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order, I, Vita Humana VI (1963), 25.Google Scholar
7 Temple, William, Nature, Man and God (London, 1951), 187.Google Scholar
8 Tillich, Paul, Morality and Beyond (New York, 1966), 37.Google Scholar
9 For example, the account of the origins of racism in Kelsey, George, Racism and the Christian Understanding of Man (New York, 1965), 19–23.Google Scholar
10 Mandelbaum, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (Glencoe, Ill., 1955), 186.Google Scholar
11 Again I draw on Mandelbaum's terminology, since he regards moral disagreements as those in which “… differing conclusions are reached on a specifically moral issue even though each disputant understands the nature of his opponent's conception of all the nonmoral aspects of that which is being judged.” (Mandelbaum, 187). I do not mean this terminology to suggest that every moral disagreement represents an ultimate, irreconcilable difference in standards. The point is that in these disagreements, variations in implicit moral philosophies of the disputants, rather than variant views of the facts, lie behind the controversy.
12 Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence …, 384, 389.
13 Piaget, 315–25.
14 Robert Bellah, New Possibilities in the Religious Self-Understanding of Man, lecture delivered at a symposium presented by the Department of Religion and Biblical Studies of Wellesley College, March 7, 1969.
15 Piaget, 98.
16 Piaget, 72–73.
17 Allport, Gordon W., The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), 43–46Google Scholar, indicates the prevalence of this way of thinking about limited loyalties. While Allport recognizes the need for moral development in order to expand limited loyalties, he still conceives the problem as one of enlarging the “in-group” with which a man identifies to include all humanity.
18 Asch, Solomon, Social Psychology (New York, 1952), 380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
19 Alexander, Franz, Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis (New York, 1948), 98–99.Google Scholar
20 The author wishes to thank his associates on the staff of Community Change, Inc. of Reading, Massachusetts, who have been helpful in applying the developmental approach to educational programs designed to evoke a recognition of racial prejudice in American institutions.
21 Rawls, John, The Sense of Justice, Philosophical Review LXXII (1963), 281–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22 Turiel, Elliot, Developmental Processes in the Child's Moral Thinking, Trends and Issues in Developmental Psychology, ed. Mussen, P. et al. (New York, 1969), 92–133.Google Scholar