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Transmigration in Plato

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2011

Erland Ehnmark
Affiliation:
Lund University

Extract

Transmigration is often regarded as an integral part of Platonic teaching and it is, of course, an undisputed fact that the idea of rebirth occurs very often in the Platonic dialogues; it holds an especially prominent position in most of his expositions of future life. Yet on closer examination it may be doubted whether Plato really considered the question of rebirth capable of or worthy of a serious and formal treatment. Metempsychosis is most often mentioned in the so-called Platonic myths, and almost regularly these are preceded by a cautious warning that what will follow is a myth, or a tradition, which may be true, but, obviously, cannot be presented as capable of proof. Even when metempsychosis is mentioned outside the myths, it is frequently, if not always, referred to as a “tradition.”

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1957

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References

1 See for instance Zeller-Nestle, , Grundriss d. Gesch. d. griech. Phil., 1928, p. 165Google Scholar; Thomas, H. W., Epekeina, 1938, p. 79Google Scholar; Stettner, W., Die Seelenwanderung bei Griechen und Römern (Tüb. Beitr. XXII), 1934, p. 33Google Scholar: “Seit dem Menon war die Seelenwanderung für Platon ein Baustein im Gebäude seiner Philosophie geworden; er konnte nicht ausgebrochen werden, ohne grössere Teile mit sich zu reissen. In diesem Aufbau liegt die Gewähr dafür, dass er wirklich an die Seelenwanderung geglaubt hat; sie hatte ja nicht bloss selbständige Bedeutung, sondern auch dienende Funktion.” P. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, 1930, pp. 61, 166 sq. qualifies his opinion so that metempsychosis is a matter of faith, not a proved fact to Plato. — P. Friedländer, Platon, I, 1954, p. 347, note 15, denies expressly that there is any “Seelenwanderungslehre” in Plato.

2 E.g. in the Meno. For Cratylus 400 C see lastly M. P. Nilsson in Gnomon, 1956, p. 18. Cf. Thomas, Epekeina, p. 51.

3 Murphy, N. R., The Interpretation of Plato's Republic, 1951Google Scholar; quoted from J. H. S., 1954, P. 201.

4 Cf. Eranos, 1946, p. 116.

5 παράδειϒμα Gorgias 525 C/E.

6 Burnet, J., Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito, 1941, ad 41 BGoogle Scholar.

7 Apology 41 A, Gorgias 523 E sq. Nilsson, , Geschichte d. griech. Rel. I, 1955, p. 824Google Scholar. Demosthenes XVIII 127 scarcely belongs here, as they are represented as accusers, not as judges. Cf. Burnet ad Apol. 41 A.

8 Cf. Eranos, 1948, p. 20.

9 Taylor, A. E., Plato, the Man and his Works, 1948, p. 173Google Scholar.

10 The expression ἔν τινι Φρονρᾷ (62 B) cannot here mean “on duty,” but must mean “in prison.” Socrates has already in the Apology used the simile of a man being on duty (28 D) and there is no reason why he should find the thought strange here. The idea of the imprisoned soul recurs in Phaedo 114 B, this time in no ambiguous terms. Cf. Burnet ad 62 B for various interpretations of the passage.

11 I quote the translations of the Loeb edition, compared with that of Jowett.

12 Söderblom, N., The Living God, 1933, p. 234Google Scholar.

13 παλαιός λόϒος.

14 Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. v., Plato I, 1919, p. 329Google Scholar. Wilamowitz' comment, “individuelle Fortdauer ist damit also auf das entschiedenste verneint,” bears, as the context shows, only on the general theory of “dem beständigen Wechsel von Werden und Vergehen” for which he quotes Eur. fr. 836 (Nauck). Plato reckons, at least sometimes, with a constant number of souls. Cf. below.

15 Cf. A. Dieterich, Mutter Erde, 1905, p. 21 sq.; Nilsson, Geschichte I, pp. 175, 459, 675 sq. and below p. 18.

16 Cf. Eranos 1948 p. 16. — The statement 81 A that the tradition is “true and beautiful” is, of course, not to be understood literally: it serves as a basis for the admonition 81 D not to be idle in the pursuit of truth, for if the soul is immortal and has seen the ideas, truth is attainable. The details of its fate before and after death are in comparison less relevant. Cf. Phaedo 114 D.

17 έν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, 69 C.

18 Cf. 81 E: through the desire of the corporeal which clings to them, the bad souls are again imprisoned in a body.

19 Cf. the “meadow” in Gorgias 524 A and Od. 24.13.

20 108 C it is said that the bad soul is, after a certain time, carried to its fitting habitation, εἰς τὴν αὒτῇ πρέπονσαν οἴκησιν. This seems to mean that it is reincarnated, cf. 81 E: ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὤσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἢθη ὁποῖ' ἄττα ἃν καὶμεμελετηκѵῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῳ βίῳ. If, as Robin supposes (in the Budé edition of the Phaedo), further punishments are intimated, as an anticipation of what is said 113 D sq., it is difficult to understand the statement just made (107 E) that all the dead are brought back. This can only mean back to earth or back to the “meadow” (as in the Republic). In either case, reincarnation must be presupposed.

21 πάλιν ἑκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῷων ϒενέσεις. Burnet translates “for the birth of animals” and refers to 81 E. So also Robin. In such case, however, there would in this context be no reincarnation as human beings. Stallbaum, in his edition of the Phaedo (1866), comments: “ut migrent rursus in animalium corpora” and compares with 70 C: πάλιν ϒίϒνεσθαι έκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὐς ζῶντας, which evidently gives a better sense to the passage.

22 Robin compares Timaeus 41 D.

23 Stettner, op. cit. p. 40: “Der Gedanke an eine ausgleichende Gerechtigkeit ist das Hauptmotiv, das Platon zur Seelenwanderung geführt hat.”

24 The myth in the Phaedrus is an instance of this. The salient point in this connection is that there is a possibility of salvation for those who three times have chosen the philosophical life (249 A). But in the Phaedrus also the idea of recurring world-ages is found, e.g. 249 C. If the Phaedrus really is earlier than the Republic, this would mean that the idea of eternal recurrence tends to be dominating to Plato. Robin (Budé ed., Introduction p. CXXIV) points out that in this dialogue also a constant quantity of souls is presupposed.

25 Cf. 903 D: “and inasmuch as soul, being conjoined now with one body, now with another, is always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself or owing to another soul…”

26 870 D/E, cf. 904 C, 872 E, 881 A.

27 959 B, cf. Boyancé, P., La religion de Platon, Rev. Et. Anc. 1947, p. 180Google Scholar.

28 Leges 721 C: γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων ἐστί τι ξυμφυὲς τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου, δ διὰ τέλους αὐτῷ ξυνέπεται καὶ ξυνέψεται, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀθάνατον ὂν τῶ παῖδας παῖδας παίδων καταλειπόμενον, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ὂν ἀεὶ, γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετειληϕέναι.

29 τῆς ἀειγενοῦς ϕύσεως ἀντέχεσθαι.

30 Cf. des Places ad loc. (Budé edition) and Nilsson, Geschichte, I, p. 675 sq.

31 Platon I p. 338, cf. p. 330 and Phaedrus 24s D/E. Frutiger, op. cit. p. 141 sq.

32 42 B. Cf. Cornford, F. M., Plato's Cosmology, 1937, p. 144Google Scholar, note 1, and A. Rivaud, Introduction to the Timaeus (Budé edition) p. 92.

33 Proceedings of the 7th Congress for the History of Religions, 1951, p. 34.

34 E. Rohde, Psyche, 1925, II p. 29, 123, 165. Stettner, op. cit. p. 19.

35 Festugière, A.-J., Personal Religion among the Greeks, 1954, p. 46.Google Scholar