² Martin Buber, Samuel Abba Horodetzky, and Hillel Zeitlin introduced hasidism to the modern world. Buber's early studies on hasidic thought were directed at the larger scholarly audience in Europe with the hope that hasidism would serve as a Jewish component in the mystical revival at the turn of the century. This is true to a lesser extent for Horodetzky and Zeitlin. See, for example, Horodetzky's comparative study of Naḥman, R. and Schleiermacher, , “Rabbi Nachman von Brazlaw: Beitrag zur Gechichte der jüdischen Mystik,” in Katz, Steven, ed., Studies by Samuel Horodezky (New York: Arno, 1980)Google Scholar; Zeitlin, Hillel, Rabbi Naḥman mi-Bratzlav: Ḥayav u-Torato (Warsaw: n.p., 1910)Google Scholar; and idem, Reb Nakhman Braslaver (New York: Harper, 1952)Google Scholar. See also Buber, Martin, The Legend of the Baal Shem Tov (1908; trans. Friedman, Maurice; New York: Harper, 1955)Google Scholar; and idem, The Tales of Rabbi Naḥman (1906; trans. Friedman, Maurice; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988)Google Scholar. On the contribution of hasidism in general and R. Naḥman in particular to modern Western spirituality, see idem, “Spinoza, Sabbatai Zvi, and the Baal Shem,” in idem, The Origin and Meaning of Hasidism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988) 89–112Google Scholar; idem, “The Place of Hasidism in the History of Religion,” in idem, The Origin and Meaning of Hasidism, 219–39; and Weiss, Joseph, “Sense and Non-Sense in Defining Judaism—The Strange Case of Naḥman of Braslav,” in idem, Studies in East European Jewish Mysticism (ed. Goldstein, David; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 249–69.Google Scholar

³ Joseph Weiss's typological analysis (“Contemplative Mysticism and ‘Faith’ in Hasidic Piety,” in idem, Studies, 47–55) maintains that hasidism can be divided into two trends: “mystical hasidism” and “faith hasidism.” While this is perhaps too simplistic, it does point to a useful distinction. Much of this theory rests on how much each hasidic school integrated and interpreted the medieval kabbalistic tradition.

⁴ R. Naḥman was born into the family of the Baal Shem Tov (Besht), the founder of hasidism. His mother Feige was the granddaughter of the Baal Shem and his two uncles, R. Moshe Hayyim Ephraim of Sudikov (1737–1800) and R. Barukh of Medzhibozh (1750–1812) were leaders of Ukrainian hasidism at the end of the eighteenth century. His family lineage was important to him and he used it to legitimate his place in the annals of hasidism. Yet even as he was influenced by his uncles and their disciples, R. Naḥman did not consider himself to be a disciple of one particular master. He often portrayed himself as a self-made ẓaddik. For more on his early life, see Green, Arthur, Tormented Master: A Life of Rabbi Naḥman (Woodstock, Vermont: Jewish Lights, 1992) 23–62Google Scholar.

⁵ For a general discussion on this shift in modern theology, see Padovano, Anthony T., The Estranged God: Modern Man's Search for Belief (New York/Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1966)Google Scholar; Roberts, David Everett, Existentialism and Religious Belief (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1967)Google Scholar; Harper, Ralph, On Presence: Variations and Reflections (Philadelphia: Trinity, 1991)Google Scholar; and Wild, John and Edie, James M., eds., Christianity and Existentialism: Essays by William Earle (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

⁶ The question of how much R. Naḥman integrated this kabbalistic worldview is a topic for another study. Although he used kabbalistic categories and jargon, it is difficult to determine how much his thinking reflects this medieval mystical tradition. Both Scholem and Buber agree—although from different perspectives—that early hasidism contributed little to furthering the kabbalistic agenda. See Scholem, Gershom, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken, 1941) 338Google Scholar. While Scholem suggested that hasidism adopted kabbalistic ideas without offering anything “new,” Buber, Martin argued (“The Faith of Judaism,” in idem, Mamre: Essays in Religion [trans., Horn, Greta; Westport, CN: Greenwood, 1970] 13)Google Scholar that hasidism had overcome Kabbala in the same way he felt it had overcome talmudism: “The Kabbalah was overcome [in hasidism] because it was taken up into the ur-Jewish conception of the dialogical life just as it was. This overcoming of Kabbala is the important work of Chassidism; it left all middle-substances to fade before the relationship between God's transcendence, only to be called ‘the limitless’ with the suspension of all limited being, and his immanence, his ‘indwelling.’” Although one can surely argue this point for the hasidic tradition of early Ḥabad and the Polish school of Kamarno, Buber's sweeping claim resonates in R. Naḥman's personalist approach.

⁷ Such a theory is implied by Schweid, Eliezer in his Jewish Thought in the 20th Century: An Introduction (trans. Hadary, Amnon; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1992) 327–33Google Scholar. Schweid places R. Naḥman's theory of divine absence between the quasi-Nietzschean pessimism of the Jewish poet Yosef Ḥayyim Brenner and the positivistic Tolstoyian ideology of A. D. Gordon, two influential thinkers in early twentieth-century Israeli thought. Referring to R. Naḥman's stories, Schweid states, “The picture which emerges from his stories is one of unbridled apostasy where demonic depravity reigns the world. The state of ‘hester panim’—the eclipse of God—which is endemic to Exile has deteriorated to a full-blown severance from God. God's presence is nowhere in evidence, not even tangentially. … The sovereignty of God is at best a distant dream, a willed vision, a groundless chimera, whereas evil is mighty, palpable and inescapable” (p. 328). I would suggest that Schweid, possibly influenced by Joseph Weiss's studies on R. Naḥan's existential persona, is reading too much of Joseph Hayyim Brenner's pessimism into R. Naḥman. R. Naḥman, unlike Brenner, does claim to resolve the crisis, both existentially as well as mystically. I am, nonetheless, in total agreement with Schweid's juxtaposition of R. Naḥman between Brenner and Gordon, making him a model of the modern struggle to come to terms with a world from which God is absent.

⁸ For some classical articles in English on the social and ideological foundations of hasidism, see Dinur, Ben Zion, “The Origins of Hasidism and its Social and Messianic Foundations,” in Hundert, Gershon David, ed., Essential Papers in Hasidism: Origins to Present (New York/London: New York University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Simon Dubnow, “The Beginnings: The Baal Shem Tov and the Center in Podolia,” in Hundert, Essential Papers in Hasidism, 25–58; Heschel, Abraham J., The Circle of the Baal Shem Tov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Jacobs, Louis, “Hasidism,” EncJud 7 (1972) 1403–7Google Scholar; and Scholem, Gershom, “Devekut or Communion with God,” in idem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism (New York: Schocken, 1971) 203–27.Google Scholar

⁹ This was particularly true of early Habad hasidism. See Elior, Rachel, The Paradoxical Ascent to God (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993) 49–78Google Scholar.

¹⁰ The importance of the recognition of divine absence has been addressed by scholars of Jewish mysticism. See, for example, Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, 7–8: “There is no room for mysticism as the link, as the abyss between man and God has not become a fact of the inner consciousness. … Mysticism does not deny or overlook the abyss; on the contrary it begins by realizing its existence.”

¹¹ The issue of literal and nonliteral readings of zimzum in post-Lurianic Kabbala is central in early hasidism, particularly in Habad hasidism. See, for example, Zalman, Shneur of Liady, Likkutei Torah (Brooklyn: Kehot, 1979) 104–6Google Scholar; and Aharon ha-Levi of Starosielce, Sha˒arei ha-Yiḥud ve ha-Emunah (2 vols.; Jerusalem: Mekkor, 1982) 1. 42a–43bGoogle Scholar. See also Elior, Paradoxical Ascent, 79–91; and Ross, Tamar, “Two Interpretations of Tzimium: R. Ḥayyim of Volozhin and R. Shneur Zalman of Liady,” Meḥkarei Yerushalayim 2 (1982) 152–69Google Scholar [Hebrew]. For an alternate reading of the use oi zimzum in postmedieval Jewish mysticism, see Ben-Shlomo, Y., “The Kabbala of the Ari in the Teachings of R. Kook,” Meḥkarei Yerushalayim 10 (1992) 449–57 [Hebrew].Google Scholar

¹² See, for example, R. Ḥayyim Vital, Ozrot Ḥayyim, part 1: Mevo She˓arim 1.1.1 and idem, “Sha˓ar ha-Kelalim” in Ez Ḥayyim (n. p.: Mekor Ḥayyim, n. d.) 5a. A systematic appraisal of Lurianic zimzum, which may have influenced R. Naḥman, can be found in Moshe Ḥayyim Luzzatto, One Hundred and Thirty-Eight Openings of Wisdom (Bnei Brak: n. p., 1992) 58–72 [Hebrew]. See also Tishby, Isaiah, The Doctrine of Evil and the ‘Kelippah’ in Lurianic Kabbala (reprinted Jerusalem: Magnes, 1991) 13–20Google Scholar [Hebrew]; and Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, 261–64. On Luzzatto's influence on hasidism, see Tishby, Isaiah, “Ikvot Ramhal be-Mishnat ha-Ḥasidut,” Ẓion 43 (1978) 201–34Google Scholar. For a more traditional rendition of the kabbalistic notion of zimzum, see Kaplan, Aryeh, Inner Space (Jerusalem: Moznaim, 1990) 120–31Google Scholar. This book attempts to introduce major themes in Kabbala, mostly from the Lurianic tradition. It is interesting that in the discussion of zimzum, a large part of the chapter is devoted to R. Naḥman's reading of zimzum and the void.

¹³ The notion that the void remains after creation is, as far as I know, R. Naḥman's alone. A more conventional view is expressed by Luzzatto (One Hundred Thirty-Eight Openings, 66): “The emanated light is called a rishimu [‘remnant’] of the primordial light. … The secret of this remnant is what is called the space of all existence, because it gives [life] to all of that which exists, which the eternal light could not have given. This space is called ḥalal [‘void’]. It is empty of the eternal eyn sof, which is the primordial light which existed before.” See also Luzzato's commentary to Vital's Ozrot Ḥayyim in Ginzei Ramhal (Bnei Brak: n.p., 1984) 297: “The void (ḥalal) is that which is empty of eternity (bilti takhliot). The remnant which remains formuis called ‘empty air.’ [Yet] there is no void without a remnant [of divine light].” The notion of the remnant of light left after the zimzum serves as a source for the panentheistic idea in the hasidic reading of Kabbala. R. Naḥman suggested that the void or emptiness of God is not supplanted by the divine light (˒or yashar) that is injected subsequently into the void. For more on the source of this remnant of light in Lurianic Kabbala, see Vital, Ḥayyim, Sha˓ar ha-Hakdamot (Jerusalem: n.p., 1850) 17–23Google Scholar; Shlomo, R. b. Ḥayyim Haikel Eliashuv, Leshem Shevo ve-Aḥlamah, Hakdamot ve Sha˒arim (Jerusalem: n. p., 1948) 35ffGoogle Scholar; Shemen Sasson no. 2, a commentary of R. Shalom Sharabi's Nahar Shalom printed in the Mekor Ḥayyim edition of the Ez Ḥayyim p. 49c and Jacob b. Ḥayyim Ẓemaḥ, Zohar ha-Raki˓a (Koretz: Kriger, 1785) 23a.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The classic Lurianic stance on this is that the product of zimzum is the emergence of judgment (middal ha-din). See, for example, Ḥayyim Vital, “Drosh Igulim ve Yosher,” in Ez Hayyim, l ld. For a scholarly study on this idea in Kabbala, see Pachter, Mordecai, “Circles and Lines—The History of an Idea,” DaǓat 18 (1987) 59–90 [Hebrew]Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Piekarz, Mendel argues (Studies in Bratzlav Hasidism [Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1972] 21–55)Google Scholar that R. Naḥman was infatuated with heresy; after a fire destroyed his house in Bratzlav, R. Naḥman decided to settle in Uman, a Ukranian town known for its Jewish heretics. When he first arrived in Uman he stayed in the house of a well-known member of the Jewish Enlightenment rather than in the residence of the local rabbi. Traditional interpreters explain this strange phenomenon by arguing that R. Naḥman intentionally engaged these heretics to redeem the divine sparks embedded in their souls, fulfilling the Lurianic directive of “descent for the sake of ascent.” This idea became a central feature in the thought of Sabbatai Zvi, who proclaimed himself messiah in the seventeenth century. For a discussion on the similarities between these two figures, see Yehuda Liebes, “Ha-Tikkun ha-Kelali of R. Naḥman of Bratzlav and its Sabbatean Links,” in idem. Studies in Jewish Myth and Jewish Messianism (trans. Stein, Batya; Albanv: SUNY Press, 1993) 115–48Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See, for example, R. Naḥman of Cheryn (in his commentary to Likkutei MoHaRan entitled Parpera˒ot le Ḥokhma [Brooklyn: n. p., 1976] 37a) who comments: “We are forced to state that God removed Himself from that place [that is, the place of the zimzum]. In truth, however, in this place there is also divinity since there can be nothing without Him. Rather, godliness is hidden and concealed there so much that it is likened to an ‘empty void’ in order to create a place for the creation.” This reading indeed reflects the classical interpretation of all theories of zimium. See, for example, Ẓemaḥ, Zohar ha-Raki˓ca, 23a–b. In my view, however, it deviates sharply from the way this void is used by R. Naḥman in Likkutei MoHaRan 79d (§1.64).

¹⁷ Although Green and Weiss used R. Naḥman's teachings as the basis for their respective psychoanalytic appraisals of his personality, I do not intend to take a similar stance. Rather, I find the spiritual struggle implicit in R. Naḥman's teachings as indicative of a Jewish spirituality founded upon the real possibility of unbelief. In my view, his struggle mirrors the spiritual life of Pascal, whose conversion and subsequent spiritual struggle were not deemed by his biographers as psychotic or depressive. See, for example, Guardini, Romano, Pascal for Our Time (trans. Thompson, B.; New York: Herder & Herder, 1966) 45–88Google Scholar; and Mesnard, Jean, Pascal (trans. Claude, and Abraham, Marcia; Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ The notion that the affirmation of the void can lead to a renewed sense of religious meaning is strikingly similar to Nietzsche's stance that nihilism can be restorative. See, for example, Carr, Karen Leslie, The Banalization of Nihilism: Twentieth Century Responses to Meaninglessness (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Carr states, “Such questioning [the questioning of truth], however, is a temporary state; from such abysses, from such severe sickness, one returns newborn.” One requires a more ‘delicate taste of joy,’ and finds within a second dangerous innocence. Thus we see here confirmation that Nietzsche regarded nihilism as a potentially restorative and redemptive event, something not only useful, but necessary for the renewed experience of the world” (p. 48). Of course, for R. Naḥman, restoration as mystical experience arises only through faith. For Nietzsche, according to Carr, the healing quality of nihilism is that it finally liberates man from the “sick” state of dependence and impotence. As is the case with most comparisons between hasidism and existentialism, their common bond is only in their shared assumptions, not in their resolutions.

¹⁹ The term “language” here refers to the noncommunicative language of the Sefer Yezirah, where the Hebrew letters are viewed as the fabric of the cosmic world. Therefore, R. Naḥman suggested that the void is the remnant of divine contraction (zimzum) that was not filled with the finite form of God in the supernal worlds. He drew his notion of language in this case from m. ˒Abot 5.1, “With ten utterances God created the world.” On the nature of language in Sefer Yezirah, see Gruenwald, Ithamar, “Some Critical Notes on the First Part of Sefer Yezira,” REJ 132 (1973) 475–512Google Scholar; and Dan, Joseph, Three Types of Ancient Jewish Mysticism (Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati Press, 1984) 16–24Google Scholar.

²⁰ See Naḥman, R. of Bratzlav, , Likkutei MoHaRan (New York: n. p., 1976) 78b–79cGoogle Scholar. I used portions of Green's translation (Tormented Master, 312).

²¹ R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 19d (§1.62). See also 20b (§2.12). For a study on the implications of the “question” in R. Naḥman, see Joseph Weiss, “The ‘Question’ in the Teachings of R. Naḥman,” in Piekarz, Studies in Bratzlav Hasidism, 109–49 [Hebrew].

²² This was not so in the earlier Kabbala. Scholem, Gershom (in Werblowsky, R. J. Z., ed., Origins of the Kabbalah [trans. Arkush, Alan; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987] 431)Google Scholar states, “From 1250 onward, a degree of uncertainty existed among kabbalists with regard to such important questions as whether the first sefirah itself was not to be considered the transcendent diety, or whether the sefirot were to be regarded as identical with the substance of the diety, or merely organs of its manifestation.” This was not the case for the Lurianists, for whom eyn sof is clearly beyond the scope of human inquiry; see also Matt, Daniel Chanan, “Ayin: The Concept of Nothingness in Jewish Mysticism,” in Forman, Robert K. C., ed., The Problem of Pure Conciousness (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 121–59Google Scholar; and Idel, Moshe, “On the Concept of Ẓimzum in Kabbala and its Research” Mekhkarei Yerushalayim 10 (1992) 59–113Google Scholar, esp. 60–68 [Hebrew].

²³ R. Naḥman's interest in heresy was not limited to the theoretical. Although his desire to settle in Uman at the end of his life is shrouded in mystery, one theory is that he was drawn to the Jewish heretics in the city, with whom he developed an ongoing relationship. For studies that deal with the move to Uman and R. Naḥman's relationship to the Maskilim, see Lieberman, Ḥayyim, “Rabbi Naḥman Bratslaver and the Maskilim in Uman,” Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Studies 6 (1951) 287–301Google Scholar; Piekarz, “The Episode of Uman in the Life of R. Naḥman of Bratzlav,” Studies In Bratzlav Hasidism, 21–55 [Hebrew]; and Green, Tormented Master, 251–65.

²⁴ R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 19d (§2.12).

²⁵ Ibid., 9b–c (§1.8).

²⁶ The simple faith of the Hasid is perhaps the faith in the zaddik and the ability of the zaddik, who exhibits the second type of faith, to redeem him from his spiritual malaise. See R. Naḥman's image (Likkutei MoHaRan 80a–81b [§1.65]) of the “master of the garden” (the zaddik) who must nurture the “trees outside the garden” (the Hasidim), whom the zaddik ultimately brings back to the garden from which they have been exiled. This lesson has been translated and published as a pamphlet by the Breslov Research Institute; see Garden of the Souls (trans. Avraham Greenbaum; Monsey, NY: Breslov Research Institute: n.d.). See also Naḥman, R. of Bratzlav, , Siḥot ha-Ran (Jerusalem: Breslav Publishers, 1961) 141.Google Scholar

²⁷ R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 15 (§2.5). This battle against reason for the masses and the interaction with reason (tikkun) for the zaddik is developed in Liebes, “Ha-Tikkun Ha-Kelali of R. Naḥman of Bratzlav,” 115–51, esp. 124.

²⁸ For a discussion of the notion of dialectical faith in R. Naḥman see Green, Tormented Master, 285–330; and Dan, Joseph, The Hasidic Story: Its History and Development (Jerusalem: Keter, 1975) 144–71 [Hebrew].Google Scholar

²⁹ For some examples of R. Naḥman's explicit directions not to become involved with this dialectical faith, see Nathan, R. (Sternharz) of Nemerov Hayyei MoHaRan (Jerusalem: Breslav Publishers, 1976) 48–55Google Scholar; and Siḥot ha-Ran. R. Naḥman stated (“Devotion to God,” 175–76): “And he spoke to me about the ways of serving God, which usually entail great suffering…. He then said, But this does not mean you, since you always must be joyful.” R. Naḥman himself stated, however, that even the ẓaddik can experience joy once he recognizes that his own suffering is due to his lack of vision (Likkutei MoHaRan 80c–d [§1.65]). For a development of the notion of suffering and the tragic fate of the ẓaddik as a necessary component in healing the world, see R. Naḥman of Cheryn, Parperaʾot le Ḥokhma 37c on Likkutei MoHaRan (§1.65), where the author notes that the lesson in question was delivered just before the death of R. Naḥman's son, Shlomo Efrayim. R. Naḥman apparently felt that his son's suffering was the fate of the ẓaddik who had to perish in order to redeem the world. A more elaborate version of this episode can be found in Kaplan, Aryeh, Until the Mashiach: Rabbi Nachman's Biography, an Annotated Chronology (ed. Shapiro, David; Jerusalem: Breslov Research Institute, 1985) 121–23Google Scholar. According to this source, R. Naḥman's first son, Shlomo Efrayim, was born the spring of 1805 and died the summer of 1806 after contracting tuberculosis. The lesson on the necessity of the suffering of the ẓaddik was said beside his son's deathbed, days before his untimely passing.

³⁰ The idea of pregnancy (ʿibur) in Lurianic Kabbala is a central principle in the process of tikkun. There are three stages of cosmic pregnancy, and each serves as a gestation period for the broken fragments of the supernal world; these are born as “new” stages of conciousness (moḥin) and then nurtured (yenika) until they reach maturation. See, for example, Vital, “Shaʿar ha-Kelalim,” in Eẓ Ḥayyim, 9c, 10a; and idem, Mevo Sheʿarim 12a–b (§2.3.2). See also R. Jacob Ḥayyim Ẓemah's gloss to Mevo Sheʿarim 12a (§2.3.2) no. 2. For a scholarly discussion on the notion of pregnancy in Lurianic Kabbala, see Pachter, Mordecai, “Smallness and Greatness in Lurianic Kabbala,” Mekhkarei Yerushalayim 10 (1992) 171–210 [Hebrew].Google Scholar

³¹ R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 30b (§1.21). See also 111b (§1.198): “When one screams to God, they say to him ‘go forward,’ as it is written (Exod 14:15), ‘then the Lord said to Moses, Why do you cry out to me? Tell the Israelites to go forward.’” Interestingly, R. Naḥman transformed the apparently negative implications of Moses' scream in the biblical narrative to something that enables one to “go forward,” that is, to give birth to conciousness (moḥin) and thus pray. For other examples of this, see R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Lukkutei MoHaRan 32d (§1.22) 50d (§1.36) 89d–90b (§1.75).

³² R. Naḥman's use of makkifim is quite complex; in Lurianic Kabbala this term generally refers to light that first retreated from vessels of creation before they shattered and then descended into the depths of the void. These lights remain undamaged and subsequently are utilized in the process of tikkun by slowly entering and exiting the broken vessel, each time building the vessel until it will be able to sustain a total integration of the light. R. Naḥman used this concept to illuminate the slow development of human consciousness. Green states (Tormented Master, 302–4) that the term makkifim in R. Naḥman's thought serves as the core of his dialectical faith as opposed to simple faith. In Lurianic Kabbala the “dialectical” phenomenon in the cosmic process of tikkun can be found in Etz Ḥayyim Palace 1, Palace of Adam Kadmon, Seventh Gate, the Gate of Mate ve lo Mate, 24–30. R. Naḥman used this motif explicitly in one instance in Likkutei MoHaRan (36d [§1.24]), where he stressed the impossibility of apprehending the light of eyn sof, even by means of the dialectical process of mate be to mate except via simḥa (“joyousness”).

³³ Ibid., 31d (§1.21).

³⁴ For R. Naḥman, the seventy nations are synonymous with idolatry and the force of evil. See, for example, ibid., 13a (§1.10) where the Gentile as idol worshipper is likened to the “power of death” in Gen. R. 9.

³⁵ R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 50d–51a (§1.36); my italics. This statement is not part of the original lesson, but a later addition by the editor. These additions, most of which are statements made by R. Naḥman himself, are not uncommon in Likkutei MoHaRan. See Weiss, Studies in Bratzlav Hasidism, 251–77.

³⁶ b. Ber. 15b.

³⁷ In another passage (Likkutei MoHaRan 9b–c [§1.8]), R. Naḥman likened the creative process to the breath (ruaḥ) of God, again an illusion to a sound that has no linguistic formulation: “How great is the groan and sigh of a Jew, for this [causes] the perfection of his deficiencies. By means of the aspect of breath, which is the spirit of life, the world was created…. The newness of the world comes about through breath [ruaḥ, meaning both breath and spirit].” This breath or spirit is depicted here as a sigh or groan that shares the nonlinguistic character of the scream that precedes linguistic prayer.

³⁸ See for example in Kook, Yehudit, R. Naḥman of Bratzlav: Studies in His Writings (Jerusalem: Mosad Y. L. Girsh, 1973) 169–75 [Hebrew]Google Scholar.

³⁹ This idea is strikingly similar to Carl G. Jung's notion of the “shadow” or the “dark self.” See his Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938) 93–95Google Scholar; and idem, Man and His Symbols (New York: Doubleday, 1964) 168–76.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 5c (§1.5).

⁴¹ Ibid., 57a (§1.49). “The fundamental purpose of creation is to reveal God's kingship. This is impossible without the creation of worlds [fragmentation] for there is no King without a people. Therefore, ẓimẓum was necessary to [create] the empty void, to create a place for the worlds in order to reveal his kingship” (ibid., 57c [§1.49]). This is a classic definition of the purpose of creation. R. Naḥman's innovation emerged when he likened the eternal nature of God to the unbridled emotions of the heart, and the ẓimẓum to the human limitation of those emotions, which creates a void and thus desire in the heart.

⁴² For a discussion of the ontic character of the Lurianic system, see Grozinger, Karl Erich, “Principles and Aims in Lurianic Cosmology,” Mekhkarei Yerushalayim 10 (1992) 37–46 [Hebrew]Google Scholar. R. Naḥman's reading of ẓimẓum here is less psychological and more phenomenological in that his concern is how ẓimẓum, as the absence of God, serve as a foundation for one's perception of the external world. His phenomenological reading retains the ontic character of ẓimẓum and uses it to legitimate both his vision of a world without God and his belief in a world full of God.

⁴³ R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 57c (§1.49).

⁴⁴ This idea reflects a similar distinction which Paul Tillich made in his discussion on the nature of the philosopher (Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955] 11, 12)Google Scholar: “We are a mixture of being and non-being. This is precisely what is meant when we say we are finite. It is man in his finitude who asks the question of being. He who is infinite does not ask the question of being, for, as infinite, he has the complete power of being. He is identical with it; he is God. And a being which does not realize that it is finite (and in our actual experience that is every being except man) cannot ask, because it cannot go beyond itself and its limits.” Echoing Heidegger, Tillich argued that the notion of nonbeing is the fundamental principle for philosophy (what Heidegger called “thinking” [Denken]). R. Naḥman suggested that the void—perhaps his confrontation with nonbeing—is the necessary prerequisite for an experience of the transcendent God.

⁴⁵ R. Naḥman used this verse in another context which corrresponds to the present discussion. In Likkutei MoHaRan 6b (§1.6) he develops his notion of repentance as the transformation from anger to passive submission: “The fundamental aspect of repentance is that one should hear an embarrassing [remark] and remain silent.” Anger is likened to the blood in the left side of the heart (gevurah), which is the seat of the evil inclination. The reaction of anger is then the reaction of the evil inclination. “The fixing for this is to turn anger (dam, literally ‘blood’) to submission (dom, ‘silence’)” (6d [§1.6]). Thus the heart is emptied of the blood and left silent or vacant. At this juncture R. Naḥman again invoked the verse in Psalms, “My heart is empty within me” (109:22), to illustrate the success of repentance in destroying the evil inclination in the heart. Although in this case the emptiness is not the absence of God but the absence of anger, the emptiness in the heart is still seen as constructive.

⁴⁶ R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 6b (§1.6).

⁴⁷ The issue of antinomianism is complex and quite subtle in hasidic thought. In this case, I have suggested that for R. Naḥman creating the void in one's own heart allows one to experience the absence of God and thus to yearn for God's presence. This implies that without that action the individual will conclude that he or she and God are truly one. Thus, any action will be God's will. Although R. Naḥman himself never reached such a conclusion, it was apparently of primary concern. For a discussion of the possible connections between Bratzlav hasidism and the Sabbatean heresy, see Leibes, “Ha-Tikkun Ha-Kelali of R. Naḥman of Bratzlav,” esp. pp. 128–50. See also Green, Tormented Master, 91. For a more general discussion, see Schatz-Uffenheimer, Rivka, Quietistic Elements in Eighteenth Century Hasidic Thought (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1968) 54–77 [Hebrew]Google Scholar; Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism, 78–142; and Magid, Shaul, “Hasidism in Transition: The Hasidic Ideology of R. Gershon Henoch of Radzin in Light of Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Kabbala” (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1994) 474–523.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ My rendering of the Hebrew term shoresh (literally, “root” or “source”) as telos in this case follows the logic of R. Nahman's argument. Earlier he suggested that the purpose of creation is the revelation of God's kingship. Here he used the term kavod (“glory”) instead of malkhut (“kingship”). Similarly, in this instance I believe that he used shoresh to mean purpose or telos.

⁴⁹ R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 12d–20a (§2.12).

⁵⁰ For an interesting and somewhat provocative kabbalistic and hasidic reading of this mishnah, see R. Yizhak Isaac Yehuda Yeḥiel Safran of Kamarno, Nozar Ḥesed (1855: reprinted Jerusalem: n. p., 1982) 80–81.

⁵¹ The notion of the closed utterance as the aspect of the infinite dimension of God that is present but undetectable in the created world is not uncommon in hasidic thought. See, for example, Zalman, R. Shnuer of Laidy, , Torah Or (Brooklyn: Kehot, 1975) 91b–cGoogle Scholar. In this text the “closed utterance” is termed “closed consciousness” (moḥin satum).

⁵² See R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Likkutei MoHaRan 80b–c (§1.65). R. Naḥman apparently based his ideas on Sefer Yezirah 1.7 (Jerusalem: Levin Epstein, 1965) 28a: “Their end is unified with their beginning and their beginning is unified with their end.” See Moses Naḥmanides' commentary on that statement; he illuminates the circular nature of the cosmic order in relation to the system of the sefirot. R. Naḥman took this notion and applied it to the words of prayer: “When one stands on the last word of his prayer, he should still be on the first word of his prayer. In that way he can complete his entire prayer without separating from the first letter of his prayer.” The danger of words is that they threaten the closed and holistic nature of the pristine expression of the soul. Thus, the one who speaks must be certain that the words do not become linear and diffuse the initial intent of the soul's yearning.

⁵³ Scholem, Gershom, “Reflections on Jewish Theology,” in Donnhauser, W. J., ed., On Jews and Judaism in Crisis (New York: Schoken, 1976) 282Google Scholar. Such an assertion resonates in existential thought from Pascal through Heidegger. Scholem's statement, however, is particularly relevant to the present discussion in that it serves as the conclusion of his discussion on kabbalistic interpretations of creation (zimzum). As discussed earlier, zimzum is the basis of R. Naḥman's affirmation of the void as well as his solution against the heresy that may result from such an assertion. Scholem states, “The universe of space and time, this living process we call Creation, appeared to the kabbalists to be intelligible only if it constituted an act of God's renunciation in which He sets Himself a limit. Creation out of nothing, from the void, could be nothing other than creation of the void, that is, of the possibility of thinking of anything that was not God” (p. 282). Without reference to R. Naḥman, whom Scholem respected as a creative hasidic thinker but not as a kabbalist, Scholem seems to have discovered the very foundation of R. Naḥman's position.

⁵⁴ For the most recent discussion on Scholem and Buber's dialogue on Hasidism, see Gellman, Jerome, The Fear, the Trembling, and the Fire: Kierkegaard and Hasidic Masters on the Binding of Isaac (New York/London: Lanham, University Press of America, 1994) xiv–xxiGoogle Scholar. Gellman's work reflects many of the issues I addressed in this article.

⁵⁵ See Buber, Martin, The Legends of the Baal Shem Tov (New York: Schocken, 1969) 69–70Google Scholar: “All things were enveloped by the abyss, and yet the whole abyss was between each thing and the other. None could cross over to the other, indeed none could see the other, for the abyss was between them.” As with Scholem's writing, this appears to be a direct reference to R. Naḥman, stated in the larger context of early hasidism. Although many early hasidic writings point to this assertion, I have not found the sophisticated and intricate treatment of the problem and its solution in texts other than R. Naḥman's Likkutei MoHaRan. See also Buber, , Tales of Rabbi Naḥman (trans. Friedman, Maurice; New Jersey: Humanities, 1988) 3–17Google Scholar; and idem, “Judaism and Civilization,” in idem, On Judaism (New York: Schocken, 1967) 194Google Scholar. This issue has also been discussed in Silberstein, Laurence J., Martin Buber's Social and Religious Thought (New York: New York University Press, 1989) 50–56.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ For a brief overview of some of these figures, see Padovano, The Estranged God; and Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief.

⁵⁷ For a thoughtful discussion of this issue see, Green, Tormented Master, 275–336.

⁵⁸ In my view, the Bratzlav school has minimized the dialectical nature of his thought. For example, R. Naḥman's apparent tirade against rationalist medieval philosophy from Sa˓adia Ga˒on through Gersonides is viewed as his explicit rejection of the whole medieval Jewish philosophical tradition. Although that may be the case, his teachings, only a small portion of which I discussed in this article, exhibit a far more complex picture. This picture yielded a creative and innovative solution to a problem that faith, in its pristine simplistic form, could not cure. For his critique of rationalism, see R. Nathan (Sternharz) of Nemerov, Hayyei MoHaRan 2.18d–21b and R. Naḥman of Bratzlav, Siḥot ha-Ran, 36 (§32).

⁵⁹ R. Naḥman's dialectical thinking emerges numerous times in his teachings. See, for example Likkutei MoHaRan 7a (§1.6): “When a person wants to go in the way of repentance, he must be an expert in halakhah. He must be a expert in two aspects—that is, an expert in ‘going’ (razo1) and an expert in ‘coming’ (shov). The halakhic system becomes a dynamic process that demands an ability to be in constant spiritual motion. This results in the elevation of the one's conciousness to the realization of the divine.” See Zohar 2.213b and 3.71.

⁶⁰ See Marcel, Gabriel, Being and Having (London: Dacre, 1949) 100Google Scholar. See also idem, “On the Ontological Mystery,” in idem, The Philosophy of Existentialism (1956; reprinted New York: Citadel, 1962) 19Google Scholar: “A mystery is a problem which encroaches upon its own data, invading them, as it were, and thereby transcending itself as a simple problem.”

⁶¹ For R. Naḥman, repentance is dynamic in that it always yields the need for further repentance. It is the process of human transformation whereby the individual, having achieved a new consciousness through repentance, looks back on his or her first act of repentance and, from his more elevated place, needs to repent on his initial act of repentance. This process continues indefinitely. See Likkutei MoHaRan 6d (§1.6c): “Even if a person knows himself that he achieved a complete repentance, he needs to repent on his first repentance. Initially when he repented, he did it according to his understanding. Afterward, when he did repent and thus achieved a higher apprehension of God, it will be found that, according to his understanding now, his initial understanding was mundane. Therefore, he must repent on his initial understanding.”

⁶² See Harper, Ralph, On Presence: Variations and Reflections (Philadelphia: Trinity, 1991) 39–54Google Scholar. Harper draws an important distinction between the early Heidegger and Marcel, seeing Marcel as a bridge between Heidegger and Buber. The introduction of Buber to Harper's discussion on Marcel strengthens comparison between Marcel and R. Naḥman. Buber's earliest works on hasidism focused on R. Naḥman of Bratzlav with whom Buber shared a common journey. See Buber's Tales of Rabbi Naḥman.

⁶³ This describes the general attitude of hasidism toward Kabbala, and is even more pronounced in R. Naḥman. See, for example, Elior, Rachel, “Hasidism—Historical Continuity and Spiritual Change,” in Schäfer, Peter and Dan, Joseph, eds., Gershom Scholem's Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism: 50 Years Later (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994) 318Google Scholar: “Hasidic doctrine did not intend to create a new layer of theosophy in order to decipher the subtleties of the divine cosmology. Rather, it sought to present a comprehensive dialectical worldview which would bridge between the divine processes described in Lurianic Kabbala and man's conciousness and his thinking process.” Even though Elior attempts to defend Scholem's thesis that hasidism did not offer an “original” kabbalistic doctrine, I believe her point can be taken out of its formal polemical context. If Elior could make this argument for a more theosophically oriented hasidism such as Habad, it would only strengthen such a claim regarding R. Naḥman. Traditional Bratzlav readings of Likkutei MoHaRan, beginning with its author R. Nathan of Nemerov, argue that Kabbala was the backbone of R. Naḥman's thought. For example, see “Introduction to Sifre Likkutei MoHaRan,” in Likkutei MoHaRan 5b: “All the writings of the Ari, may his memory be blessed [R. Isaac Luria, a sixteenth century Kabbalist from Safed], the Zohar, the Tikkunim and all of the holy Kabbala. All of them are included in this holy work [Likkutei MoHaRan]. Every lesson is directed toward a particular mitzvah and chapter in [R. Isaac Luria's] Eẓ Ḥayyim.” This may indeed be the case. R. Naḥman's personalist approach, however, does not contribute to the kabbalistic system of Luria, and he does not require his reader to know intimately the kabbalistic system from which he works. In this light Buber's position that hasidism “overcame” the Kabbala by transforming it into a source for the encounter between the human and divine may be useful. See Martin Buber, “Spirit and Body of the Hasidic Movement,” in idem, Origin and Meaning of Hasidism, 121–25 and idem, “The Faith of Judaism,” 13.

⁶⁴ Marcel, Gabriel, Philosophical Fragments 1909–1914 (trans. Blain, Lionel A.; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965) 41.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Marcel, Gabriel, The Mystery of Being (trans. Hague, Rene; 2 vols.; Chicago: Regency, 1950) 46Google Scholar: “Not only does the word ‘transcendent’ not mean ‘transcending experience,’ but on the contrary there must be a possibility of having an experience of the transcendent as such, and unless the possibility exists the word can have no meaning.” The finite or empirical world gets its life from the infinite, he explained. “In other words, if there is anything real in the finite, it will be infinite; it is from the infinite that the finite gets the little reality it possess, by itself, it is nothing, nothing but an abstract and contradictory view” (idem, Philosophical Fragments, 44).

⁶⁶ Pascal, Blaise, Pensées (trans. Krailsheimer, A. J.; Baltimore: Penguin, 1996) §263.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Ibid. §282.

⁶⁸ Ibid. §242. See also Goldman, Lucien, The Hidden God: A Study of Tragic Vision in the Pensées of Pascal and the Tragedies of Racine (trans. Thody, Philip; New York: Humanities, 1964) 22–40, 167–92.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Pascal, Pensées §242.

⁷⁰ Green states (Tormented Master, 318–19): “As we closely examine certain passages dealing with the very heart of Naḥman's ‘existential’ teachings, the constant struggle to search out integrate maqqifin we find that the end of that process is in fact mystical, in the most proper sense of the term.” Perhaps Green intends to make a distinction between the terms “mystical” and “kabbalistic” here. While R. Naḥman indeed resolved the ominous trek through the void with a mystical perception of divine presence, the kabbalistic cosmological apparatus plays only a nominal role. Green's observation thus questions the accuracy of the typology set up by Weiss, Joseph in his Studies in Bratzlav Hasidism (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1974) 87–96 [Hebrew]Google Scholar.

⁷¹ See Green, Arthur, Devotion and Commandment: The Faith of Abraham in the Hasidic Imagination (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1989) 55.Google Scholar

⁷² The use of and interest in magic and theurgy in hasidism is an area that is only now receiving scholarly attention. See, for example, Nigal, Gedalyah, Magic, Mysticism and Hasidism (Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1994)Google Scholar; and Idel, Moshe, Hasidism: Between Ecstasy and Magic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995)Google Scholar.