¹ All quotations from Jerusalem will be cited from the German, “Jerusalem, oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum,” in Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe (ed. Alexander Altmann et al.; 24 vols.; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1929–1932; Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1972–2004) 8:99–204 (henceforth: JubA), and from the English translation Jerusalem; or, On Religious Power and Judaism (trans. Allan Arkush; Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England for Brandeis University Press, 1983) (henceforth: Arkush). The English follows Arkush for the most part, except in a few spots where I prefer a more literal and less artful translation. Henceforth, references to Mendelssohn's Gesammelte Schriften will follow the conventions of Mendelssohn scholarship and cite JubA, followed by volume and page.

² In his “Vorrede” to “Vindicae Judaeorum,” by Menasseh ben Israel, JubA 8:3–25.

³ Cranz, August, Das Forschen nach Licht und Recht. In einem Schreiben an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn auf Veranlassung seiner merkwürdigen Vorrede zu Manasseh ben Israel (Berlin: Maurer, 1782) 12–13Google Scholar, 17.

⁴ Ibid., 15.

⁵ Ibid., 23–24.

⁶ For an articulation of this view, see, for example, Fritz Bamberger's remark: “Faced with this dilemma, Mendelssohn draws a distinction between religion and Judaism. He equates Judaism with law, and demonstrates that Judaism's legislation, which is its essence, does not concern truths or convictions” (“Mendelssohn's Concept of Judaism,” in Studies in Jewish Thought: An Anthology of German Jewish Scholarship [ed. Alfred Jospe; trans. Eva Jospe; Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981] 343–60, at 356–57). Michael Morgan moves in this direction, as well, when he confronts the challenge of explaining why Mendelssohn viewed the law as obligatory in his own day: “The key to Mendelssohn's justification of the continued obligation to obey the ceremonial laws of Judaism is the fact that those laws were once and always remained civil laws, even in 1783, when the state no longer exists” (“History and Modern Jewish Thought: Spinoza and Mendelssohn on the Ritual Law,” in Dilemmas in Modern Jewish Thought: The Dialectics of Revelation and History [Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992] 14–26, at 24).

⁷ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:194; Arkush, 128 [italics in original].

⁸ See Altmann, Alexander, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: Alabama University Press, 1973) 547–49Google Scholar. See also Arnold Eisen's explanation: “The Sabbath-breaker was stoned because he offended against the state as much as against God. The two were at that point indivisible. Mendelssohn only adds, as against contemporary proponents of ecclesiastical coercion, that the Mosaic constitution was unique. Its model no longer applied. As against the Searcher, he argues that Judaism since the Jewish state's destruction had known of no penalty other than the sinner's remorse” (Eisen, Arnold, “Divine Legislation as ‘Ceremonial Script’: Mendelssohn on the Commandments,” Association for Jewish Studies Review 15 [1990] 239–67, at 250Google Scholar). Although for the most part offering an account of Mendelssohn with which I am much in agreement, David Sorkin too suggests that “ancient Judaism was the exception that proved Mendelssohn's argument in part 1 that religion should have no coercive powers” (Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment [London: Halban, 1996] 138).

⁹ Arkush, Allan, Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994) 227Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Gottlieb, Michah, “Between Judaism and German Enlightenment: Recent Work on Moses Mendelssohn in English,” Religious Compass 4 (2010) 22–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 36 n. 73.

¹¹ Feiner, Shmuel, Moses Mendelssohn: Sage of Modernity (trans. Berris, Anthony; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010) 173Google Scholar.

¹² Freudenthal, Gideon, No Religion without Idolatry: Mendelssohn's Jewish Enlightenment (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 2012) 175Google Scholar, 178.

¹³ Batnitzky, Leora, How Judaism Became a Religion: An Introduction to Modern Jewish Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011) 22Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Arkush, Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment, 229.

¹⁵ Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn, 518.

¹⁶ My account of Mendelssohn's view of original Judaism shares much in common with Ran Sigad's “Moses Mendelssohn: Judaism, Divine Politics, and the State of Israel,” Da’at 7 (1981) 93–103 [Hebrew], although I hesitate to draw some of the conclusions that Sigad draws for contemporary Judaism. As I will indicate, my emphasis on Mendelssohn's interest in pedagogy draws on Sorkin's work, and I have taken advantage of Gideon Freudenthal's recent account of the ceremonial law in No Religion without Idolatry. I likewise draw generally from Warren Zev Harvey's “Mendelssohn's Heavenly Politics,” in Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism (ed. Alfred L. Ivry, Elliot R. Wolfson, and Allan Arkush; Amsterdam: Harwood, 1998) 403–12.

¹⁷ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:116; Arkush, 47.

¹⁸ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:109; Arkush, 40.

¹⁹ See Michah Gottlieb's observation: “While many scholars claim that Mendelssohn upholds a separation of church and state, this is not precise. Rather, Mendelssohn holds that the state and religion have common goals and, ideally, act in concert with one another. What Mendelssohn opposes is state religion” (Gottlieb, Michah, Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn's Theological-Political Thought [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011] 49CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

²⁰ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:140–41; Arkush, 73–74.

²¹ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:110–11; Arkush, 41.

²² “It follows that under ideal conditions, i.e., on the level of principle alone, there is no difference between religion on the one hand and state and politics on the other. Mendelssohn's essential position on this question is indeed actually the opposite of what is attributed to him, i.e., the separation of religion and state” (Sigad, “Moses Mendelssohn,” 95).

²³ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:127; Arkush, 58.

²⁴ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:112; Arkush, 43.

²⁵ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:121; Arkush, 52 [italics in original].

²⁶ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:112, Arkush, 41–42.

²⁷ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:113; Arkush, 44 [italics in original].

²⁸ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:112; Arkush, 42.

²⁹ Mendelssohn, Moses, “Über die Empfindungen,” JubA 1:43–119Google Scholar, at 99, translated into English in Mendelssohn, Moses, Philosophical Writings (ed. and trans. Dahlstrom, Daniel; Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy; Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 3–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 61 (henceforth: Dahlstrom).

³⁰ Although I align Mendelssohn's views on perfection here with the Leibniz-Wolff school, I by and large accept the claim, made convincingly most recently by Gideon Freudenthal, that Mendelssohn's privileging of the standards of common sense should remove him from the ranks of properly dogmatic metaphysicians (Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry, 12–14, 21–63). When Mendelssohn affirms metaphysical positions, they are typically Leibnizian-Wolffian positions, but so far as I know, Mendelssohn does not and could not endorse the necessity of metaphysical knowledge in the way that Christian Wolff does when he claims, for example, that “since man is bound to the perfection of the understanding, so he is also bound to attain thorough knowledge” (Wolff, Christian, Vernünfftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, zu Beförderung ihrer Glückseeligkeit, den Liebhabern der Wahrheit mitgetheilet [Halle im Magdeburgischen: Rengerische Buchhandlung, 1752] 181Google Scholar, § 284 [henceforth: Wolff, Moral]). On Mendelssohn's cautious identification with the Leibniz-Wolff school, see also Willi Goetschel's remark: “The self-conscious manner in which Mendelssohn employs Leibniz as the most feasible philosophical position changes the ontological status of Leibnizian metaphysics from indisputably true to an understanding that privileges one form of metaphysics over another simply in terms of which one provides the more probable and plausible form of theoretical reasoning” (Goetschel, Willi, Spinoza's Modernity: Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Heine [Studies in German Jewish Cultural History and Literature; Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004] 90–91Google Scholar).

³¹ Wolff defines perfection as the “harmony [Zusammenstimmung] of the manifold” (see, for example, Wolff, Christian, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, den Liebhabern der Wahrheit mitgetheilet [Halle im Magdeburgischen: Rengerische Buchhandlung, 1747] 78Google Scholar, § 152 [henceforth: Wolff, Metaphysik]; idem, Vernünfftige Gedancken von dem gesellschafftlichen Leben der Menschen und insonderheit dem gemeinen Wesen [Frankfurt: Rengerische Buchhandlung, 1736; repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1975] 166, § 224 [henceforth: Wolff, Politik]), and Baumgarten defines perfection as the “agreement” of “several things” such that “taken together they constitute the sufficient ground of a single thing” (Baumgarten, Alexander, Metaphysics [ed. and trans. Fugate, Courtney D. and Hymers, John; London: Bloomsbury, 2013] 117, § 94Google Scholar). Leibniz identifies the “most perfect world” as “the one which is at the same time the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena” (von Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, “Discourse on Metaphysics,” in Philosophical Essays [ed. and trans. Ariew, Roger and Garber, Daniel; Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989] 35–68Google Scholar, at 39), but when speaking of God's absolute perfection he defines it as “nothing but the magnitude of positive reality considered as such, setting aside the limits or bounds in the things which have it” (“Monadology,” in Philosophical Essays, 213–25, at 218). Mendelssohn himself in fact discusses how to reconcile these two definitions of perfection (the “harmony” definition he identifies with Wolff, and the “reality” definition he identifies with Leibniz) in the notes to his “On Sentiments,” JubA 1:119; Dahlstrom, 90–91. I will address the relation between divine and worldly perfection when I discuss the notion that the world reflects divine unity harmoniously across its manifold. But see Rutherford, Donald, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 24–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a very helpful discussion that reconciles Leibniz's different formulation of perfection.

³² “On Sentiments,” JubA 1:60; Dahlstrom, 23 [italics in original].

³³ Compare Wolff's discussion of worldly perfection in his Metaphysik, in which he emphasizes not merely the unity, but also the manifold that is harmonized in a perfect world: “since perfection consists in the agreement of a manifold, but this agreement is that much greater, the greater the manifold of things that is to be found that agree with one another, so a world is more perfect in which a greater manifold of things is to be found than where one perceives fewer differences” (Metaphysik, 445, §713). Compare also Baumgarten's emphasis on unity and manifold in his definition of a perfect world: “The most perfect world is that in which the greatest of the most parts and the most of the greatest parts that are compossible in a world agree in as great a single being as is possible in a world” (Metaphysics, 182, §436).

³⁴ Mendelssohn, Moses, “Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes,” JubA 3.2:3–175Google Scholar, at 101–2.

³⁵ Mendelssohn, Moses, Sefer netivot hashalom. Vehu hibur kolel hameshet humshe Torah ʻim tirgum ‘Ashkenazi uVi’ur (Vienna: Schmid, 1795) 8b–9aGoogle Scholar. Compare Mendelssohn's paraphrase of Leibniz's Theodicy: “The doctrine that all parts of creation [are] perfect, but the whole is the most perfect of all, we find suggested in Scripture with express words: ‘And God saw all that he made and behold it was very good [tov me’od].’ One recalls that Hebrew has no real word to express the superlative. . . . Thus the ‘tov me’od’ means as much as the best” (“Sache Gottes oder die gerettete Vorsehung,” JubA 3.2:221–60, at 234, §49) [italics in original; brackets in original].

³⁶ “Morgenstunden,” JubA 3.2:101–2.

³⁷ Wolff, Metaphysik, 642–43, §1045 [italics in original]. Leibniz of course asserts that each monad reflects the entirety of the universe from its own perspective. See, for example, “Discourse on Metaphysics,” in Philosophical Essays, 35–68, at 42, and “Principles of Nature and Grace,” in Philosophical Essays, 207–13, at 211.

³⁸ “Anmerkungen zu Abbts freundschaftlicher Correspondenz,” JubA 6.1:47.

³⁹ “Abhandlung über die Evidenz in metaphysischen Wissenschaften,” JubA 2:267–330, at 318; Dahlstrom, 251–306, at 296–97 [italics in original].

⁴⁰ Wolff, Moral, 12, §13.

⁴¹ “On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences,” JubA 2:318; Dahlstrom, 297–98. For an alternative account of Mendelssohn's notion of perfection, see Goetschel, Spinoza's Modernity, 95–98, 114–15.

⁴² “Rhapsodie oder Zusätze zu den Briefen über die Empfindung,” JubA 1:379–424, at 407–8; Dahlstrom, 131–68, at153. As an anonymous reviewer from HTR points out, Mendelssohn is hearkening back in this passage to Leibniz's notion of the City of God as the community of all minds under divine rule (see “Discourse on Metaphysics,” 67; “Principles of Nature and Grace,” 211–12; “Monadology,” 224, §85–87). But Mendelssohn here explicitly presents this divinely unified collective of rational beings as an ideal to be actualized politically in the world.

⁴³ “Rhapsody,” JubA 1:407; Dahlstrom, 152.

⁴⁴ For a fine explanation of the same train of thought in Leibniz, see Rutherford, Rational Order of Nature, 54–62.

⁴⁵ Mendelssohn, Moses, “Phaedon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele,” JubA 3.1: 7–159Google Scholar, at 113.

⁴⁶ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:194; Arkush, 128 [italics in original].

⁴⁷ See Walzer, Michael, Lorberbaum, Menachem, and Zohar, Noam, Authority (vol. 1 of The Jewish Political Tradition; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000) 109–116Google Scholar; see also Zev Harvey, Warren, “Kingdom of God,” in Contemporary Jewish Religious Thought (ed. Cohen, Arthur A. and Mendes-Flohr, Paul; New York: Scribner, 1987) 521–25Google Scholar. Mendelssohn is of course also responding to discussions of Jewish theocracy among modern political thinkers like Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke.

⁴⁸ See Sorkin's observation: “In part 1, Mendelssohn had argued that the best state was one whose members were able to govern themselves through education. He now asserted that ancient Judaism was the example of such a state precisely because of the identity of religion and politics. . . . For Mendelssohn pristine ancient Judaism represented an ideal of government through education/religion. It also corresponded to the ideal for politics Mendelssohn had articulated in his early philosophical works insofar as no conflict existed between individual interest and the commonweal” (Sorkin, Religious Enlightenment, 136).

⁴⁹ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:127; Arkush, 59. The claim that God has no needs of his own and demands merely what is best for each echoes Wolff's suggestion that God fulfills none of his own needs through the creation of the world, but rather fulfills the intention of revealing divine glory through the actualization of perfect harmony in the world.

⁵⁰ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:113–14; Arkush, 44–45.

⁵¹ See Harvey's comment: “In the heavenly politics of the Mosaic constitution, God is the King. Since the divine King, unlike mortal kings, has no personal needs, His only interest is the true happiness of His subjects. The Mosaic constitution is thus a constitution of freedom: it liberates human beings from the oppressive rule of other human beings” (Harvey, “Mendelssohn's Heavenly Politics,” 407).

⁵² “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:169; Arkush, 102.

⁵³ Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry, throughout, but especially 2–20, 105–21.

⁵⁴ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:184; Arkush, 119.

⁵⁵ See Breuer's argument: “Mendelssohn's point . . . was that actions were far more resistant to being reified: their execution demanded a minimal degree of purposeful volition, and even with the real specter of rote habituation, activity of this kind was far more connected to the individual's emotional and cognitive consciousness” (Breuer, Edward, “Rabbinic Law and Spirituality in Mendelssohn's ‘Jerusalem,’” JQR 86 [1996] 299–321, at 314CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁵⁶ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:169; Arkush, 102–3.

⁵⁷ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:185; Arkush, 119–20.

⁵⁸ See Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry, 135–54. See also, Morgan, “History and Modern Jewish Thought,” 14–26, and Eisen, “Divine Legislation as ‘Ceremonial Script,’” 239–67.

⁵⁹ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:196–97; Arkush, 131–32 [italics in the original].

⁶⁰ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:194; Arkush, 129 [italics in original].

⁶¹ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:113–14; Arkush, 44–45.

⁶² “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:195; Arkush, 129 [italics in the original].

⁶³ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:195–96; Arkush, 130.

⁶⁴ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:110–11; Arkush, 41.

⁶⁵ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:113; Arkush, 43.

⁶⁶ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:113; Arkush, 44 [italics in original].

⁶⁷ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:194; Arkush, 129.

⁶⁸ Cranz, Das Forschen nach Licht und Recht, 23–24.

⁶⁹ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:114; Arkush, 44–45 [italics in the original]. Sigad compellingly reconstructs Mendelssohn's political views in Jerusalem as developing along two parallel tracks: that of the “good state” and that of the “empirical” state: “Mendelssohn philosophizes . . . on two levels at once. He establishes what is the good state, which answers to all the needs of man and in which he can achieve his perfection and felicity—this is precisely a normative-ideal discussion. And in the midst of this discussion, Mendelssohn deals with the question of the empirical condition of the existing state, as we live in it and know it. This is a state in which, according Mendelssohn, a man cannot arrive at felicity and perfection, and from here there follows another normative consequence . . . which expresses itself in the idea of the separation of religion and state” (“Moses Mendelssohn,” 94).

⁷⁰ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:141; Arkush, 74 [italics in original].

⁷¹ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:115; Arkush, 45 [italics in original].

⁷² “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:140; Arkush, 73 [italics in original].

⁷³ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:127; Arkush, 59 [italics in original].

⁷⁴ Breuer offers an interesting interpretation of Mendelssohn's view of rabbinic authorities not so much as enforcers of Jewish law but rather as executors of the tradition that preserves the paths through which the ceremonial law can elicit reflection on speculative truths. See “Rabbinic Law and Spirituality,” especially 316–17.

⁷⁵ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:199; Arkush, 133.

⁷⁶ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:199; Arkush, 133.

⁷⁷ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:199; Arkush, 134.

⁷⁸ My interpretation must therefore claim that when Mendelssohn makes his distinction between “law” and “belief,” in the second part of Jerusalem, the law he emphasizes as central to Judaism is a law that is enforced pedagogically, not coercively. There are a few statements of Mendelssohn's that push against this interpretation. I think one can indeed argue for the pedagogical thrust of Mendelssohn's most famous statement about Judaism as divine legislation: “The Israelites possess a divine legislation—laws, commandments, ordinances, rules of life, instruction in the will of God as to how they should conduct themselves in order to attain temporal and eternal felicity” (“Jerusalem,” JubA 8:157; Arkush, 90) [italics in original]. Indeed, this statement reads as if Mendelssohn is trying to pull the law towards the pedagogical note with which it ends. An anonymous reader from HTR is likewise correct to note that Mendelssohn's distinction between law and belief is a response to Mörschel's postscript to Cranz's essay, and not to Cranz himself. But another famous statement distinguishing law and reflection—“The great maxim of this constitution seems to have been: Men must be impelled [getrieben] to perform actions and only prompted to engage in reflection” (“Jerusalem,” JubA 8:184; Arkush, 118–19) [italics in original]—does force me to concede an inconsistency that resists my account, especially because the term Mendelssohn uses in this passage for the enforcement of actions (treiben, getrieben) hearkens back to the term he uses in the first part of Jerusalem (i.e., antreiben) in the context of the discussion of coercion.

⁷⁹ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:196; Arkush, 131 [italics in original].

⁸⁰ Compare Goetschel's claim: “Jerusalem symbolizes the universal in the shape of the specificity of a locality, history, and particular religion” (Goetschel, Spinoza's Modernity, 148).

⁸¹ “A constitution of shorter duration can be more fitting for the vocation of the human being, and thus also for the intention of providence, and it can make happiness more accessible, than a weaker one of the longest duration” (Mendelssohn, Moses, “Über die beste Staatsverfassung,” JubA 6.1:145–48Google Scholar, at 146).

⁸² “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:197–98; Arkush, 132. See Freudenthal's illuminating discussion in No Religion without Idolatry, 174–79.

⁸³ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:184; Arkush, 118 [italics in original].

⁸⁴ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:185–86; Arkush, 120 [italics in original].

⁸⁵ While Mendelssohn highlights the one-time character of the perfect Mosaic constitution, the story of the Jewish people's rise and fall with respect to culture and enlightenment is not at all unique in Mendelssohn's account of human culture. I hope to address the way the rise and fall of Jewish culture exemplifies the cycle Mendelssohn suggests all communities undergo in a future essay. Compare Matt Erlin, “Reluctant Modernism: Moses Mendelssohn's Philosophy of History,” Journal of the History of Ideas 63 (2002) 83–104.

⁸⁶ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:184; Arkush, 118 [italics in original].

⁸⁷ Compare Mendelssohn to Homberg, September 22, 1783: “Even had [the ritual laws] lost their use as a significant script or symbolic language, their necessity as a unifying bond would not cease, and to my mind this unity would remain part of Providence's system so long as polytheism, anthropomorphism and religious usurpation dominate the world. As long as these tormentors of reason are united, the true theists must maintain a unity of some sort lest the former bring everyone to heel. In what should this unity consist? In principles and opinions?—which, as doctrines of faith, symbols and formulas, fetter reason. Rather, in actions, that is, ceremonies” (JubA 13:134, cited in Sorkin, Religious Enlightenment, 141).

⁸⁸ “Jerusalem,” JubA 8:141; Arkush, 74.

⁸⁹ A draft of this essay was presented at a conference at Cambridge University, “Jewish Studies as Philosophy? Beyond Historicism and Sociology,” in March 2014. I would like to thank conference participants for their questions, comments, and encouragement. I also wish to thank Allan Arkush, Paul Franks, Gideon Freudenthal, Sol Goldberg, and the anonymous reviewers from HTR for their constructive and challenging responses to this paper.