¹ See Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Secrets of the Guide of the Perplexed: Between the Thirteenth and the Twentieth Centuries,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 5 (1986) 23–69 (Hebrew). For further comments on the attitudes of the medieval commentators, see Lawrence Kaplan, “Maimonides on the Miraculous Element in Prophecy,” HTR 70 (1977) 233–56.

² Šem-Toḇ, ’Efodi, Abarbanel, and Mordeḵai Yoffe. See also Julius Guttmann, “Das Problem der Kontingenz in der Philosophie des Maimonides,” MGWJ 83 (1939) 406–30; Israel Ravitzky, “The Question of a Creation or Primordial World in the Philosophy of Maimonides,” Tarbiz 35 (1966) 333–48 (Hebrew); Kaplan, “Maimonides on Prophecy,” 248; Roslyn Weiss, “Maimonides on the End of the World,” Maimonidean Studies 3 (1992–1993) 195–218; Kenneth Seeskin, Maimonides on the Origin of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Daniel Davis, Method and Metaphysics in Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 26–42.

³ See Herbert Davidson, “Maimonides’ Secret Position on Creation,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (ed. Isadore Twersky; 3 vols.; Harvard Judaic Monographs 2, 5, 8; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) 1:16–40; Norbert Samuelson, “Maimonides’ Doctrine of Creation,” HTR 84 (1991) 249–71; Tamar Rudavsky, Time Matters: Time, Creation, and Cosmology in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000) 30–37. See also Alfred L. Ivry, “Maimonides on Creation,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 9 (1990) 115–37 (Hebrew). Ivry imputes to Maimonides an essentially Platonic position in which there is no preexistent matter, yet there is “something” that is not an entity but also not nothing. In my opinion, Ivry’s labyrinthine formulations belie a variation on the notion of preexistent matter.

⁴ Ibn Tibbon (see Aviezer Ravitzky, “Ibn Tibbon and the Esoteric Character of the Guide,” Da‘at 10 [1983] 19–46 [Hebrew]), Narbonne, and Caspi. See also Leo Strauss, “The Literary Character of the Guide of the Perplexed,” in Persecution and the Art of Writing (New York: Free Press, 1952) 38–94; Warren Zev Harvey, “A Third Approach to Maimonides’ Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle,” HTR 74 (1981) 287–301.

⁵ Shlomo Pines, “The Limitation of Human Knowledge According to al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja and Maimonides,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature (ed. Twersky) 1:82–109; Avraham Nuriel, “The Question of a Primordial or Created World in the Philosophy of Maimonides,” Tarbiz 33 (1964) 372–87 (Hebrew); Michael Zvi Nehorai, “The Manner in which Maimonides Expressed His Views on Creation,” Da‘at 37 (1996) 119–26 (Hebrew); Josef Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

⁶ See Warren Zev Harvey, “The Mishneh Torah as a Key to the Secrets of the Guide,” in Me’ah She‘arim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life in Memory of Isadore Twersky (ed. Ezra Fleischer et al.; Jerusalem: Magnes, 2001) 11–28, at 12–14.

⁷ The Laws of the Palestinian Talmud (ed. Saul Lieberman; Texts and Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America 13; New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1947) 5 n. 7 (Hebrew). Warren Zev Harvey also notes the opening to Maimonides’s Arabic Treatise on Logic, which according to one manuscript begins with the Arabic expression Bismillah rab al-‘ālamīn (In the name of the Lord, God of the world). See “[Yehuda] Liebes’ Sefer Yetzira: Between Parmenides, Nietzsche, and Maimonides,” in And This for Yehuda: Studies Presented to our Friend, Professor Yehuda Liebes, on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday (ed. Maren R. Niehoff, Ronit Meroz, and Jonathan Garb; Jerusalem: Bialik Institute; The Mandel Institute for Jewish Studies, Hebrew University, 2012) 17–27, at 24 n. 47 (Hebrew).

⁸ Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (trans. Yosef Kafih; Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1987) 3 n. 1 (Hebrew); Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought: Studies in Ethics, Law, and the Human Ideal (SUNY Series in Jewish Philosophy; Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999) 30.

⁹ Masha Turner devoted two articles to the description of Abraham in the writings of Maimonides. In her opinion, Maimonides presents him as a philosopher who evolved from Aristotelianism to Platonism. In doing so, he laid the foundations for Moses’s prophecy, which renewed the belief in the creation of the world. See “The Portrayal of Abraham the Patriarch in the Guide of the Perplexed,” Da‘at 57 (1996) 181–92 (Hebrew); eadem, “Abraham Our Father in the Thought of Maimonides,” in The Faith of Abraham: In the Light of Interpretation throughout the Ages (ed. Moshe Hallamish, Hannah Kasher, and John Silman; Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 2002) 143–54 (Hebrew).

¹⁰ A Maimonides Reader (ed. Isadore Twersky; New York: Behrman House, 1972) 73. All translations from the Mishneh Torah were taken from this book with minor changes.

¹¹ See Harvey, “Mishneh Torah as Key,” 18–19. See also Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah) (YJS 22; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) 225–26.

¹² Warren Zev Harvey believes that this stage in Abraham’s development reflects the metaphysical proof of Avicenna, as it is explained by Maimonides in Mishneh Torah, Hilkot yesodey hattorah 1.4. See Warren Zev Harvey, Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas (Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought 6; Amsterdam: Gieben, 1998) 47–48, 60–65; idem, “Maimonides, Crescas, and the Parable of the Castle,” in Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Thought (ed. Racheli Haliva; Studies and Texts in Scepticism 5; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018) 167–72. Sara Klein-Braslavy believes that the verb bara’ can imply any one of the three opinions cited in the Guide of the Perplexed 2.13. I find her claim unconvincing. See the appendix at the end of this article. See Sara Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Story of Creation (2nd ed.; Jerusalem: R. Mas, 1987) 89–90 (Hebrew); eadem, “Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Verb Bara’ and the Creation of the World,” Da‘at 16 (1986) 40–41 (Hebrew).

¹³ The story of Abraham parallels that of Socrates. Abraham raises doubts about the fundamental beliefs of his society, undermining the authority of the regime and resulting in his persecution. However, unlike Socrates, he escaped with his life. See Leo Strauss, “Persecution and the Art of Writing,” Social Research 8 (1941) 488–504.

¹⁴ Maimonides Reader (ed. Twersky), 73.

¹⁵ See for example: “You know from what I have said that opinions do not last unless they are accompanied by actions that strengthen them, make them generally known, and perpetuate them among the multitude. For this reason we are ordered by the law to exalt this day, in order that the principle of the creation of the world after nonexistence be established and universally known in the world through the fact that all people refrain from working on one and the same day” (Guide of the Perplexed 2.31). Maimonides also attributes this insight to idolaters. See Guide of the Perplexed 3.37, and see also Eliezer Hadad, “Act as a Designer of Consciousness: Wittgensteinian Comments on Maimonides’ Philosophy,” in The Halakhah as Event (ed. Avinoam Rosenak; Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute, 2016) 256–94 (Hebrew).

¹⁶ Maimonides Reader (ed. Twersky), 73–74.

¹⁷ Responsa of Maimonides (Yehoshua Blau edition; 4 vols.; Jerusalem: Mekitze Nirdamim, 1960) 2:314, responsa 164.

¹⁸ See Joel Kraemer and Josef Stern, “Shlomo Pines on the Translation of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 8 (1998) 13–24. See also Pines’s translation in Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (trans. Shlomo Pines; 2 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) 2:282 n. 4, and Shamma Friedman, Studies in the Language and Terminology of Talmudic Literature (Asuppot umevo’ot ballashon 16; Jerusalem: Academy of the Hebrew Language, 2014) 3–42 (Hebrew).

¹⁹ All translations from the Guide of the Perplexed are taken from the Pines edition with minor changes (italicized text is from the edition unless bracketed). The Judeo-Arabic source which served as the basis for this edition was that of Salomon Munk with the additions of Issachar Joel (Jerusalem, 1930–1931).

²⁰ In the Guide of the Perplexed 2.20, Maimonides explicitly states that the creation of the world by divine intention contradicts Aristotle’s view of its necessary existence.

²¹ See Davidson, “Maimonides’ Secret Position,” 27–34.

²² For the relation between this argument and al-Ghazali, see Mark Steiner, “A Note on Maimonides and al-Ghazali, Leibniz and Clarke,” ‘Iyyun 67 (2019) 256–58 (Hebrew).

²³ Aristotle, Cael. 1.2–3, 268a–270b; 1.3, 270b20–24. For a description of Aristotle’s few comments on the subject and the divergent possibilities encountered by his commentators, see Ruth Glasner, “The Question of Celestial Matter in the Hebrew Encyclopedias,” in The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy: Proceedings of the Bar-Ilan University Conference (ed. Steven Harvey; Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought 7; Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2000) 313–15. Al-Farabi used two different terms to indicate the matter of the earth (māddah) and the matter of heaven (mawḍū‘), because the latter is never in a state of potentiality. As opposed to Aristotle, al-Farabi maintained that the spheres were composed of both matter and form. In some of his writings, however, he notes that each sphere can have only one form, its spirit, in contrast to matter in the sublunar world that can change forms. See Janos Damien, Method, Structure, and Development in al-Fārābī’s Cosmology (IPTS 85; Leiden: Brill, 2012) 206–10. Following in the wake of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, Maimonides maintained that despite the essential difference between the matter of the heavens and the matter of the earth, the spheres nevertheless contain matter and form. In his opinion, the different directions of the various spheres’ movements reflect their different forms. Maimonides further believed that the circular motion of the spheres indicates that they are living beings with a soul, in contrast to the straight movement of the elements, which indicates that the source of their movement is nature, not a soul (Guide of the Perplexed 2.4). Again, this does not, according to him, negate the existence of forms in the spheres.

²⁴ Stern, Matter and Form, 280–81, was puzzled by this conclusion. In his view, the different movements of different spheres forced Maimonides to conclude that their forms are different but not their matter. Abarbanel, however, explained that the linear motion common to all the sublunar elements indicates one kind of matter while the circular motion common to all the celestial spheres indicates another. At the same time, the distinct directions in which the different elements move (up and down) indicate different forms and the distinct directions and speeds in which the spheres move indicate their different forms.

²⁵ Maimonides rejects al-Farabi’s claim that the difference between the matter of the spheres and that of the stars is a minor one: the former being transparent while the latter is not. He criticizes him for referring only to the difference in transparency between the stars and the spheres and not to the difference in motion. Šem Toḇ Ibn Falaquera noted a contradiction between Maimonides’s assertion that one must distinguish between the matter of the spheres and that of the stars, and his discussion appears in the Guide of the Perplexed 2.26. In this latter chapter, Maimonides seems to accept the position of the tanna R. Eliezer that the matter of heavens and what is within them (= the stars) is the same. See Šem Toḇ b. Joseph Ibn Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh (ed. Yair Shiffman; Meqorot leḥeqer tarbut yiśra’el 7; Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies, 2001) 268.

²⁶ Guide of the Perplexed 1.74. See Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) 433–44; Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation, and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 154–203.

²⁷ Stern, Matter and Form, 148–59, 280–86, devoted an extensive discussion to this evidence. He concludes that God as a “particularizer” is the same as God as “the necessarily existent in virtue of itself” which serves as a cause for the contingent world. Maimonides’s use of the word “particularizer” indicates that there is some incomprehensible reason for the world’s existence. Maimonides takes the term “particularizer” itself from the Mutakallimun, but he imbues it with the meaning of the proof of Avicenna. It is unclear why Maimonides claims that “particularization” makes an explanation predicated on intention preferable to one based on necessity. Maimonides does not use the term “particularizer” to characterize God as the cause of the contingent world, but to characterize God as the cause of heaven “in this fashion” (Guide of the Perplexed 2.20), implying that the heavens could exist in other configurations. According to Stern’s understanding, Maimonides is actually reiterating Avicenna’s position. According to my suggestion, however, Maimonides is moving away from Avicenna’s demonstration in the direction of that of the Mutakallimun (demonstration from the heavens but not from the earth). See Ömer Mahir Alper, “Avicenna’s Argument for the Existence of God: Was He Really Influenced by the Mutakallimùn?” in Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam (ed. Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman; IPTS 56; Leiden: Brill, 2004) 129–41; Peter Adamson, Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 170–89. On Maimonides’s discussion of this proof, see Davidson, Proofs; Josef Stern, “Maimonides’ Demonstrations: Principles and Practice,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001) 47–84.

²⁸ See Arthur Hyman, “From What is One and Simple Only What is One and Simple Can Come to Be,” in Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought (ed. Lenn E. Goodman; Studies in Neoplatonism 7; Albany: SUNY Press, 1992) 111–35.

²⁹ See Charles H. Manekin, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge according to Maimonides: Earlier vs. Later Writings,” in Maimonides: Conservatism, Originality, Revolution (ed. Aviezer Ravitzky; 2 vols.; Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 2008) 1:297–316 (Hebrew); idem, “Divine Will in Maimonides’ Later Writings,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008) 189–222.

³⁰ This expression is used twice by Abraham, at Gen 24:3 and Gen 24:7. It seems that Maimonides quotes the second verse that mentions only the heavens without the earth.

³¹ Stern, Matter and Form, 150–51, maintained that in this paragraph, Maimonides left open the possibility of two proofs from the heavens: one from the constant rotation of the spheres as proposed by Aristotle, and one from the irregularity in the spheres’ rotation, Maimonides’s own proof. It should, however, be emphasized that Maimonides explicitly refers to differences in the spheres’ motions and the fact that the stars are embedded within them. Similarly, Maimonides chooses the verse spoken by Moses, “Who rides upon the heaven,” as a support for his proof of creation predicated on the structure of the heavens. In the Guide of the Perplexed 1.70, Maimonides interprets this verse as pointing mainly to God’s transcendence, but he also incorporates the idea that the spheres rotate by virtue of will. This interpretation may refer mainly to differences in the direction of the spheres’ rotations and velocities, rather than the location of the stars within the spheres. See Stern, Matter and Form, 169–70.

³² In this interpretation, Maimonides adopts the proof articulated by Avicenna. See above, nn. 12 and 27.

³³ Guide of the Perplexed 1.52, 56. Regarding this paradox, see Stern, Matter and Form, 279.

³⁴ See Hilkot yesodey hattorah 1.1–7; Hilkot tešubah 3.7; Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought: From Maimonides to Abravanel (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 54–61. He rejects various explanations to account for the omission of creation from the thirteen principles. He concludes that Maimonides wanted to include only those principles that do not require a complete understanding of God and that are absolutely necessary. Creation is included in the secrets of Torah and is not necessary for the observance of commandments and, therefore, was not included as a principle.

³⁵ “Know that a foundation of the great Torah of Moses is that the world is created: God formed it and created it after its absolute non-existence. That you see me circling around the idea of the eternity of the world is [only] so that the proof of His existence will be absolute as I explained and made clear in the Guide” (Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah, Tractate Sanhedrin, “Pereq Ḥeleq”; translation from Kellner, Dogma, 54). This note appears in the margins of Maimonides’s autograph copy (MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, Poc. 295: https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/objects/ b7e0b998-0a85-4a30-851f-58d67be5247d/surfaces/a77b5292-7188-46bb-84c5-f4ebb43b26fd/). See Kellner, Dogma, 240 n. 211, regarding the identification of the manuscript that contains the note. It is interesting that Maimonides did not see fit to add a similar note in his Mishneh Torah.

³⁶ See Klein-Braslavy, Story of Creation, 86–90. I find her proof from Maimonides’s interpretation of the verse “who forms the light and creates darkness, who makes peace and creates evil” (Isa 45:7) to be convincing. However, the way she draws the meaning of the Hebrew verb bara’ from Maimonides’s use of the Arabic verb ḫalaqa seems to me to be forced. In my opinion, Maimonides did indeed think that the verb “create” carried only two meanings, not three. Nuriel, “Question,” has argued that Maimonides referred to God using the title of al-bari’ (the Creator) in passages in the Guide of the Perplexed in which opinions are presented that are contrary to creation, while this title does not appear in passages referring to creation. In Nuriel’s opinion, this phenomenon indicates that Maimonides interpreted the verses of creation according to the concept of eternity. Beyond Ravitzky’s criticism (“Question of a Creation”) of this approach, I think that it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding. Maimonides accepted almost all of Aristotle’s conclusions about the relationship between God and the world after his creation, as he explicitly states in the Guide of the Perplexed 2.25 (see also Kaplan, “Maimonides on Prophecy,” 253). Therefore, use of the title “Creator” does not contradict most Aristotelian positions. To the contrary, Maimonides wished to emphasize that, unlike the Mutakallimun, his conception of creation entails (almost) no change to Aristotle’s conception of the relationship between God and the world after it was created.

³⁷ Klein-Braslavy, Story of Creation, 81–84.

³⁸ This conclusion, I believe, also stems from other sources. The contrast between “generated from some being” and “created from nothing” (al-mubtada‘ min ‘adam) (Guide of the Perplexed 2.17 [trans. Pines, 297]) proves that it is creation ex nihilo being referred to here. The same holds true for the expressions: “according to our opinion and our doctrine of the production in time of the world as whole after [the] nonexistence” (ba‘da al-‘adam) (Guide of the Perplexed 3.13 [trans. Pines, 450–51]) and “according to our opinion—produces all the things that are other than itself after they have been nonexistent” (ba‘da al-‘adam) (Guide of the Perplexed 3.20 [trans. Pines, 428]).

³⁹ I found no place in the Guide of the Perplexed where the term “nonexistence” (עדם, ‘adam) is used to refer to matter, although of course it is a quality associated with matter. Ivry, “Maimonides on Creation,” 133–34, treats this inconsistency as evidence for his approach that the phrase “[the] purely and absolutely nonexistent” (al-‘adam al-maḥḍ al-muṭlaq) does not mean absolute nonexistence but “something” between existence and non-existence. Having precisely articulated his view, Maimonides later allowed himself to express the idea in a less precise and more popular fashion. Ivry also denies the accuracy of the distinction between “after” and “from” (ibid., 130 n. 45). While I accept that Maimonides is indeed inconsistent on this point, in my opinion all of these expressions indicate absolute nothingness. Ivry admits that his interpretation is predicated on a philosophical perspective which regards the creation of the world ex nihilo an impossibility (ibid., 134). Julius Guttmann, “Das Problem der Kontingenz,” argued that Maimonides’s central philosophical innovation was to offer a view that lay between those of the Mutakallimun and Aristotle vis-à-vis the extent of impossibilities.

⁴⁰ Klein-Braslavy, Story of Creation, 96–99.

⁴¹ She mentions the Guide of the Perplexed 2.30, in order to prove that bara’ (to create) and ‘aśah (to make) are identical verbs. Maimonides argues that since “the Lord [’adon] of all the earth” (Josh 3:11, 13) connotes creation from eternal matter, the Pentateuch added the verbs “create” and “make” to negate such a view. In other words, they share a single meaning. It should, however, be noted that this shared meaning relates to the shared negation of eternal matter and not complete synonymity. See Klein-Braslavy, Story of Creation, 98.

⁴² Maimonides illustrates this argument through one fire that produces many different results. “An instance of this is fire: it melts some things, makes others hard, cooks and burns, bleaches and blackens. Thus if some man would predicate of fire that it is that which bleaches and blackens, which burns and cooks, which makes hard and which melts, he would say the truth. Accordingly he who does not know the nature of fire thinks that there subsist in it six diverse notions, by means of one of which it blackens, whereas it bleaches by means of another, cooks by means of a third, burns by means of a fourth, melts by means of a fifth, and makes hard by means of a sixth—all these actions being opposed to one another, for the meaning of any one of them is different from that of any other. However, he who knows the nature of fire, knows that it performs all these actions by virtue of one active quality, namely, heat. If, however, such a state of affairs exists with respect to a thing acting by virtue of its nature, it exists all the more with respect to one who acts through will, and again all the more with respect to Him, may He be exalted, who is above every attributive qualification” (Guide of the Perplexed 1.53).